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ABSTRACT
Abstract
The relationship between economic development and public infrastructure capital 
has puzzled economists, economic geographers, planners, and other social scientists, for 
many years. This thesis presents an attempt to theorise and conduct empirical research on 
this field in the context of a developing economy within the European Union - Greece. 
Key to understanding the work undertaken in this thesis is the wider theoretical and 
applied research, which has flourished in the US and other countries during the last 
decade. The thesis examines the effects of public capital investment on Greek economic 
development viewed at different spatial scales. More specifically, it explores the role of 
infrastructure spending at national, regional, and urban (metropolitan area of Athens) 
levels.
The empirical presentation begins with a description of the Public Investment 
Programme from 1976 onwards. This is the main channel for public investment in 
infrastructure capital in Greece. Its various public capital sub-categories have been 
aggregated into two basic types, ‘productive’ and ‘social’ infrastructure. The next step 
was to utilise a production function analytical framework and panel data analysis to 
explore the direct and network effects of infrastructure investment on manufacturing 
industry. Positive effects of infrastructure spending are apparent. An alternative approach, 
cost function analysis, is deployed in the second major empirical section. Using various 
spatial levels, the role of public capital on the private costs of production can be examined 
by the calibration of a cost function for industrial sectors. The results show that 
infrastructure investment reduces private costs in manufacturing at most spatial levels.
Finally, the thesis investigates other direct and indirect channels by which public 
capital can affect the non-manufacturing and manufacturing sectors of the private 
economy. The empirical findings show that there is no significant infrastructure impact 
on the former sector, whereas there are mixed results for the indirect channels on 
manufacturing. It can be safely argued that the public capital and regional development 
relationship is a complex one, especially as infrastructure effects can be different at 
different spatial levels.
3
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
Acknowledgements
The best moment of a doctorate thesis is probably the acknowledgements section 
(not least because writing this part means that the thesis has finished). It is the best 
because it gives you the opportunity to express your gratitude to those who made the 
thesis possible (and even though a doctorate thesis may not be a life’s work, it is the fruit 
of a lot of labour).
There are so many people to thank. First of all, this thesis would have not been 
realised without the funds provided by the State Scholarship Foundation (SSF) of Greece. 
I would like also to thank my SSF supervisor professor Georgio Kotti. Athina Artavani 
(at the Institute for Regional Development in Athens) and Nancy Xenaki (at the National 
Statistical Service of Greece) help me with both data and ideas.
My colleagues and the members of staff at the London School of Economics, who 
with their comments have improved significantly this thesis. I would like to pay an extra 
tribute to Dan Graham, and Georgios Fotopoulos. The thesis would be much ‘poorer’ 
without their input. Christos Papatheodorou has been a close friend. Talking about 
friends. Anestis Filopoulos and Vasso Riga are two of my best friends, and I have to 
thank them for improving the quality of my life. I have to add, however, that I feel that 
without their help (in all possible levels) this thesis may have not been materialised.
Finally, I have to refer especially to four persons, whose presence and help have 
been instrumental. My supervisor Nigel Spence, has guided the journey. He sewed the 
seeds and this thesis is the harvest (and if the quality of final goods is poor, then the 
blame is mine). Nikos Petralias has helped me during the thesis with comments and 
references. Probably, without him I may not have started the ‘damn thing’ in the first 
place. However, I would like also to thank him for his life stance. He still is my role 
model.
I have also to express my gratitude to my mother, for her data collection skills 
(which she developed for this project), and for the fact that she provided connections, and 
solved problems, which made the completion of the thesis possible (thanx, mom). Finally, 
Liza Tsaliki, read and corrected the whole text. I will thank her only for that, as I cannot 
thank her enough for being in my life.
4
CONTENTS
Contents
Abstract__________________________________________________________3
Acknowledgements_________________________________________________4
Contents__________________________________________________________5
List of Tables______________________________________________________9
List of Maps______________________________________________________ 14
Abbreviations_____________________________________________________ 15
Chapter 1. Introduction_____________________________________________16
1.1 The infrastructure ‘puzzle’_______________________________________________ 16
1.2 The spatial dimension o f the infrastructure-development relationship____________17
1.3 The Greek economy during the period 1976-1992____________________________18
1.4 A digression to methodological problems and research alternatives_____________ 20
1.5 Thesis structure________________________________________________________23
Chapter 2. Evolving alternative approaches to comprehending
the infrastructure-development symbiosis_______________________ 26
2.1 Introduction___________________________________________________________26
2.2 Early approaches to understanding the public capital-development connection 28
2.2.1 Definition of public infrastructure capital__________________________________28
2.2.2 Measurement of public infrastructure capital_______________________________ 32
2.3 The resurgence o f research on public capital and the production function
approach___________________________________________________________ 3 3
2.4 The cost function (duality theory) approach to infrastructure research___________ 42
2.5 The international research response to the US infrastructure discoveries_________ 45
2.6 Considering empirical specifications and technical problems
in infrastructure research______________________________________________48
2.7 What does the future hold for research on the infrastructure
development relationship?_____________________________________________53
2.8 Conclusions___________________________________________________________56
Chapter 3. The Evolution of the Public Investment Programme
in Greece: 1976-1992________________________________________ 62
3.1 Introduction___________________________________________________________62
3.2 The PIPR as an estimate of the Public Capital in Greece______________________ 63
5
CONTENTS
3.3 The Origins o f the Public Investment Programme____________________________ 66
3.3.1 The historical background of public capital in Greece_________________________66
3.3.2 The creation of the Public Investment Programme___________________________ 67
3.4 The Public Investment Programme in aggregate_____________________________ 69
3.4.1 The basic categories of the Public Investment Programme_____________________ 69
3.4.2 Temporal evolution of the PIPR and its aggregate categories___________________ 72
3.4.3 The PIPR compared to other macroeconomic indicators_______________________ 75
3.4.4 Temporal evolution of the basic PIPR categories____________________________ 77
3.4.5 Regional distribution of the public infrastructure categories____________________ 81
3.5 Estimation o f the public capital stocks_____________________________________ 101
3.6 Conclusions___________________________________________________________ 103
Chapter 4. Public Infrastructure Investment and National and Regional
Economic Growth in Greece: A  Production Function Analysis_______106
4.1 Introduction___________________________________________________________ 106
4.2 The production function analytical framework_______________________________107
4.3 The Greek secondary sector: regional distribution and temporal growth__________114
4.4 Model specification of links between private production
and public capital in Greece___________________________________________ 118
4.5 Measuring the contribution o f public infrastructure capital in Greece:
the impact at the national level and alternative specifications________________ 124
4.6 Measuring the contribution o f public infrastructure capital in Greece:
Investigating the possibilities for constant and non-constant returns of scale 129
4.7 Measuring the contribution o f public infrastructure capital in Greece:
the impact on regional growth__________________________________________ 135
4.8 Measuring the contribution o f public infrastructure capital in Greece:
an analysis o f the regional network effects________________________________141
4.9 Conclusions___________________________________________________________ 143
Chapter 5. Using duality theory and cost function analysis to understand 
the influence o f public capital on manufacturing production 
costs in Greece.____________________________________________________ 146
5.1 Introduction___________________________________________________________ 146
5.2 The cost function analytical framework:
From production functions to cost functions and duality theory_______________149
5.3 Issues o f empirical calibration within a duality theoretical framework___________ 154
5.4 A cost function analysis for die regions o f Greece____________________________ 160
6
CONTENTS
5.4.1 Calibrating regional cost functions in Greece_______________________________ 160
5.4.2 Interpreting the results of regional cost functions in Greece____________________ 162
5.5 A cost function analysis for the manufacturing sectors o f the whole o f Greece____ 171
5.5.1 Manufacturing activities in Greece_______________________________________ 171
5.5.2 Interpreting the results of national manufacturing cost functions in Greece_________ 174
5.6 A cost function analysis for the manufacturing sectors
o f the metropolitan area o f Athens______________________________________ 185
5.6.1 Manufacturing activities in the Athens region_______________________________ 186
5.6.2 Interpreting the results of manufacturing cost functions
in the Athens metropolitan area___________________________________________ 187
5.7 A cost function analysis for the manufacturing sectors
o f the Rest o f Greece region____________________________________________193
5.7.1 Manufacturing activities in the Rest of Greece region_________________________ 194
5.7.2 Interpreting the results of manufacturing cost functions
in the Rest of Greece region______________________________________________195
5.8 Conclusions___________________________________________________________ 206
Chapter 6. Public Capital, Scale Economies, and Returns to Variety: 
Investigating Alternative Channels o f Infrastructure Effects 
at Different Spatial Levels_________________________________________ 210
6.1 Introduction___________________________________________________________ 210
6.2 Scale economies, returns to variety, and public capital________________________ 212
6.3 Infrastructural impacts on the non-manufacturing sector o f the Greek economy 225
6.4 Investigating Alternative Channels o f Infrastructure Effects at
Different Spatial Levels in Greece______________________________________ 233
6.4.1 Public capital’s effects on the preferred scale of production____________________ 234
6.4.2 The effect of public capital on total manufacturing output______________________238
6.4.3 Public capital’s effects on the equilibrium number of manufacturing establishment__ 243
6.5 Conclusions___________________________________________________________ 247
Chapter 7. Conclusions____________________________________________________ 251
7.1 Infrastructure and economic development in Greece -  the principal question____ 251
7
CONTENTS
7.2 Infrastructure and economic development in Greece -  the major findings________ 253
7.2.1 The evolution of infrastructure spending and private capital investment___________ 253
7.2.2 The impact of infrastructure on manufacturing production_____________________ 255
7.2.3 The impact of infrastructure on the non-manufacturing part of the economy________ 259
7.2.4 The impact of infrastructure on manufacturing costs__________________________260
7.2.5 The impact of infrastructure on manufacturing through indirect channels__________ 263
7.3 Infrastructure and economic development in Greece -
the policy implications o f the main findings______________________________ 265
7.4 Infrastructure and economic development in Greece -
the limitations and analytical lessons to be learned_________________________270
7.5 Infrastructure and economic development in Greece -
the potential for future research_________________________________________273
Bibliography______________________________________________________ 279
Appendix I________________________________________________________ 312
Appendix II__________________ _____________________________________ 315
Appendix IH_______________________________________________________316
Appendix IV_______________________________________________________318
Appendix V________________________________________________________321
8
LIST OF TABLES
List o f Tables
Table 2.1 Production function approach - Selected Studies__________________________ 60
Table 2.2 Cost (and profit) function approach - Selected Studies_____________________ 61
Table 2.3 Other approaches for infrastructure research - Selected Studies______________ 61
Table 3.1 Source o f gross investment in fixed capital in Greece, 1976-1987____________ 64
Table 3.2 Public expenditure per capita in selected nations__________________________ 66
Table 3.3 Spatial units in use in the Public Investment Programme of Greece___________70
Table 3.4 Investment categories o f the Public Investment Programme of
Greece, 1976-1980___________________________________________________ 72
Table 3.5 Investment categories o f the Public Investment Programme of
Greece, 1981-1992___________________________________________________ 72
Table 3.6 Evolution o f public investment in Greece, 1976-1992______________________ 74
Table 3.7 Composition o f public investment in Greece, 1976-1992___________________ 74
Table 3.8 Basic infrastructure categories as percentage of GDP in Greece_____________ 75
Table 3.9 Basic infrastructure categories as percentage of total fixed asset
formation in Greece__________________________________________________ 76
Table 3.10 The evolution of public capital spending in Greece by
categories, 1976-1992________________________________________________ 78
Table 3.11 Non-spatially allocatable percentages of the Public Investment
Programme of Greece_________________________________________________82
Table 3.12 Prefectural total (overall) infrastructure spending in
Greece, 1976-1992___________________________________________________ 84
Table 3.13 Total productive infrastructure spending by nomos in
Greece, 1976-1992___________________________________________________ 86
Table 3.14 Total social infrastructure spending by nomos in
Greece, 1976-1992___________________________________________________ 88
Table 3.15 Total miscellaneous and administrative expenditure o f the
Public Investment Programme by nomos in Greece, 1976-1992 _____________ 90
Table 3.16 Total (overall) infrastructure spending per inhabitant by
nomos in Greece, 1976-1992___________________________________________92
Table 3.17 Total productive infrastructure spending per inhabitant by
nomos in Greece, 1976-1992___________________________________________94
Table 3.18 Total social infrastructure spending per inhabitant by nomos
in Greece, 1976-1992_________________________________________________ 96
9
LIST OF TABLES
Table 3.19 Total (overall) infrastructure spending per unit area by nomos
in Greece, 1976-1992________________________________________________ 98
Table 3.20 Total productive infrastructure spending per unit area by nomos
in Greece, 1976-1992________________________________________________ 99
Table 3.21 Total social infrastructure spending per unit area by nomos in
Greece, 1976-1992__________________________________________________ 100
Table 3.22 Population and size o f Greek prefectures________________________________100
Table 3.23 Prefectural total (overall) infrastructure capital stock in Greece, 1984________102
Table 4.1 Estimated Output Elasticities o f Public Infrastructure Capital
from Selected Studies________________________________________________ 113
Table 4.2 Employment, labour remuneration, industrial production, and gross 
asset formation in the private industrial sector in Greece
(establishments with 20 persons and over), 1976-1992______________________ 116
Table 4.3 Classification o f prefectures in Greece based on value-added
performance, 1976-1992______________________________________________ 117
Table 4.4 Industrial output as a function o f private capital stock and labour, 1982-1992__ 125
Table 4.5 Industrial output as a function o f private capital stock, labour,
and infrastructure capital stock, 1982-1992______________________________ 126
Table 4.6 Industrial output as a function o f private capital stock, labour, productive
and social infrastructure capital stock, 1982-1992_________________________ 127
Table 4.7 Industrial output as a function o f private capital stock, labour,
infrastructure capital stock and productive and social infrastructure capital 
stock, 1982-1987 and 1988-1992_______________________________________ 129
Table 4.8 Industrial output as an unrestricted and constrained function o f private 
capital stock and labour, with the (unrestricted) addition o f public 
capital infrastructure stock, 1982-1992___________________________________131
Table 4.9 Industrial output as a constrained function o f private capital stock, labour,
and public capital infrastructure stock, 1982-1992_________________________ 134
Table 4.10 Official Regions o f Greece (NUTS II), and Regions used in the Analysis_____ 136
Table 4.11 Industrial output as a function o f private capital stock,
and labour, 1982-1992________________________________________________ 137
Table 4.12 Industrial output as a function o f private capital stock, labour, and
public infrastructure capital stock, 1982-1992_____________________________ 139
Table 4.13 Industrial output as a function o f private capital stock, labour, and
productive and social infrastructure capital stock, 1982-1992________________ 141
Table 4.14 Industrial output as a function o f private capital stock, labour, an
infrastructure capital stock networks, 1982-1992__________________________ 142
Table 4.15 Industrial output as a function o f private capital stock, labour, and productive
and social infrastructure capital stock networks, 1982-1992__________________143
Table 5.4.1 Regional cost function for manufacturing in Greece: results o f panel-estimation 
incorporating the effects o f productive infrastructure capital, 1982-1991_______ 164
10
LIST OF TABLES
Table 5.4.2 Regional cost functions for manufacturing in Greece: likelihood ratio-tests for 
panel estimation results incorporating the effects o f social infrastructure 
capital, 1982-1991___________________________________________________ 165
Table 5.4.3 Regional cost function for manufacturing in Greece: cost elasticities of
manufacturing with respect to productive infrastructure capital, 1982-1991____ 166
Table 5.4.4 Regional cost function for manufacturing in Greece: productive infrastructure
factor bias effects over respective private input shares, 1982-1991____________ 167
Table 5.4.5 Regional cost functions for manufacturing in Greece: private input demand
elasticities with respect to productive infrastructure capital, 1982-1991_________169
Table 5.4.6 Regional cost functions for manufacturing in Greece 1982-1991: shadow
values o f productive infrastructure capital________________________________ 170
Table 5.5.1 National Statistical Service of Greece classification o f manufacturing
sectors (branches)____________________________________________________ 172
Table 5.5.2 Descriptive statistics (average percentages) for manufacturing sectors
(establishments with 20 persons and over) in Greece, 1982-1991_____________ 173
Table 5.5.3 National sectoral manufacturing cost functions in Greece: results of panel 
estimation incorporating the effects o f productive infrastructure 
capital, 1982-1991____________________________________________________175
Table 5.5.4 National sectoral manufacturing cost functions in Greece: cost elasticities of 
manufacturing sectors with respect to productive infrastructure 
capital, 1982-1991____________________________________________________176
Table 5.5.5 National sectoral manufacturing cost functions in Greece: productive 
infrastructure factor bias effects over respective private
input shares, 1982-1991_______________________________________________ 177
Table 5.5.6 National sectoral manufacturing cost functions in Greece: private input 
demand elasticities with respect to productive infrastructure 
capital, 1982-1991____________________________________________________178
Table 5.5.7 National sectoral manufacturing cost functions in Greece: shadow values of
productive infrastructure capital, 1982-1991 179
Table 5.5.8 National sectoral manufacturing cost functions in Greece: results o f panel
estimation incorporating the effects o f social public capital, 1982-1991________180
Table 5.5.9 National sectoral manufacturing cost functions in Greece: cost elasticities o f 
manufacturing sectors with respect to social
infrastructure capital, 1982-1991________________________________________181
Table 5.5.10 National sectoral manufacturing cost functions in Greece: social 
infrastructure factor bias effects over respective private input 
shares, 1982-1991____________________________________________________ 182
Table 5.5.11 National sectoral manufacturing cost functions in Greece: private input
demand elasticities with respect to social infrastructure capital, 1982-1991_____183
Table 5.5.12 National sectoral manufacturing cost functions in Greece: shadow values
of social infrastructure capital, 1982-1991________________________________ 184
Table 5.6.1 Productive and social public infrastructure capital in Greece and its sub-national 
components of the metropolitan area o f Athens and the Rest o f Greece________ 185
11
LIST OF TABLES
Table 5.6.2 Descriptive statistics (average percentages) for manufacturing sectors
(establishments with 20 persons and over) in the Athens region, 1982-1991____187
Table 5.6.3 Sectoral cost function for manufacturing in Athens region: results o f panel-estimation 
incorporating the effects o f productive public capital, 1982-1991____________ 188
Table 5.6.4 Sectoral cost function for manufacturing in Athens region: results of panel-estimation 
incorporating the effects o f social public capital, 1982-1991_________________189
Table 5.6.5 Sectoral cost function for manufacturing in Athens region: cost elasticities
o f manufacturing with respect to productive infrastructure capital, 1982-1991__190
Table 5.6.6 Sectoral cost function for manufacturing in Athens region: social infrastructure factor 
bias effects over respective private input shares, 1982-1991_________________ 191
Table 5.6.7 Sectoral cost functions for manufacturing in Athens region: private input
demand elasticities with respect to social infrastructure capital, 1982-1991____ 192
Table 5.6.8 Sectoral cost functions for manufacturing in Athens region: shadow values
of social infrastructure capital, 1982-1991________________________________193
Table 5.7.1 Descriptive statistics (average percentages) for manufacturing sectors 
(establishments with 20 persons and over) in the Rest o f Greece 
region, 1982-1991___________________________________________________ 194
Table 5.7.2 National sectoral cost function for manufacturing in Rest o f Greece region: 
results o f panel-estimation incorporating the effects o f productive infrastructure 
capital, 1982-1991___________________________________________________196
Table 5.7.3 National sectoral cost function for manufacturing in Rest o f  Greece region: 
cost elasticities o f manufacturing with respect to productive infrastructure 
capital, 1982-1991___________________________________________________197
Table 5.7.4 Sectoral cost function for manufacturing in Rest of Greece region:
productive infrastructure factor bias effects over respective private input 
shares, 1982-1991___________________________________________________ 198
Table 5.7.5 Sectoral cost functions for manufacturing in Rest of Greece region: private 
input demand elasticities with respect to productive
infrastructure capital, 1982-1991_______________________________________ 200
Table 5.7.6 Sectoral cost functions for manufacturing in Rest o f Greece region: shadow
values o f productive infrastructure capital, 1982-1991_____________________ 201
Table 5.7.7 National sectoral cost function for manufacturing in Rest o f Greece region: 
results o f panel-estimation incorporating the effects of social infrastructure 
capital, 1982-1991___________________________________________________202
Table 5.7.8 National sectoral cost function for manufacturing in Rest o f Greece region: 
cost elasticities o f manufacturing with respect to social infrastructure 
capital, 1982-1991___________________________________________________203
Table 5.7.9 Sectoral cost function for manufacturing in Rest of Greece region: 
social infrastructure factor bias effects over respective private input 
shares, 1982-1991___________________________________________________ 204
Table 5.7.10 Sectoral cost functions for manufacturing in Rest o f Greece region: 
private input demand elasticities with respect to social infrastructure 
capital, 1982-1991___________________________________________________205
12
LIST OF TABLES
Table 5.7.11 Sectoral cost functions for manufacturing in Rest o f Greece region:
shadow values of social infrastructure capital, 1982-1991___________________ 205
Table 6.1 The effect o f total public capital (total) on the GDP of the
non-manufacturing sectors o f Greece, 1982-1991__________________________230
Table 6.2 The effect o f productive public capital on the GDP of the
non-manufacturing sectors o f Greece, 1982-1991__________________________231
Table 6.3 The effect o f social public capital on the GDP of the
non-manufacturing sectors o f Greece, 1982-1991__________________________232
Table 6.4 Infrastructure effects on the scale of production: regional panel for
total manufacturing, 1982-1991________________________________________ 237
Table 6.5 Infrastructure effects on the scale of production: Greece sectoral panel for
sectors, 1982-1991___________________________________________________ 237
Table 6.6 Infrastructure effects on the scale of production: Athens sectoral panel for
sectors, 1982-1991___________________________________________________ 238
Table 6,7 Infrastructure effects on the scale o f production: Rest of Greece sectoral
panel for sectors, 1982-1991___________________________________________ 238
Table 6.8 Infrastructure effects on total output: Regional panel for total
manufacturing, 1982-1991_____________________________________________240
Table 6.9 Infrastructure effects on total output: Greece sectoral panel for
sectors, 1982-1991___________________________________________________ 241
Table 6.10 Infrastructure effects on total output: Athens sectoral panel for
sectors, 1982-1991___________________________________________________ 242
Table 6.11 Infrastructure effects on total output: Rest of Greece sectoral panel for
sectors, 1982-1991___________________________________________________ 243
Table 6.12 Infrastructure effects on the equilibrium number of firms (regression 
based infrastructure and time): Regional panel for total
manufacturing, 1982-1991_____________________________________________244
Table 6.13 Infrastructure effects on the equilibrium number o f firms (regression 
based infrastructure and time): Greece sectoral panel for
sectors, 1982-1991___________________________________________________ 244
Table 6.14 Infrastructure effects on the equilibrium number o f firms (regression based
infrastructure and time): Athens sectoral panel for sectors, 1982-1991_________245
Table 6.15 Infrastructure effects on the equilibrium number o f firms (regression 
based infrastructure and time): Rest o f Greece sectoral panel for 
sectors, 1982-1991___________________________________________________ 245
Table 6.16 Infrastructure effects on the equilibrium number o f firms (augmented
regression): Regional panel for total manufacturing, 1982-1991______________ 246
Table 6.17 Infrastructure effects on the equilibrium number o f firms (augmented
regression): Greece sectoral panel for sectors, 1982-1991___________________ 246
Table 6.18 Infrastructure effects on the equilibrium number o f firms (augmented
regression): Athens sectoral panel for sectors, 1982-1991___________________ 246
Table 6.19 Infrastructure effects on the equilibrium number o f firms (augmented
regression): Rest o f  Greece sectoral panel for sectors, 1982-1991________247
13
LIST OF MAPS
List o f Maps
Map 3.1 Total overall infrastructure spending, 1976-1992____________________85
Map 3.2 Total productive infrastructure spending, 1976-1992_________________87
Map 3.3 Total social infrastructure spending, 1976-1992_____________________89
Map 3.4 Total miscellaneous and administrative expenditure
of PIPR, 1976-1992___________________________________________91
Map 3.5 Total overall infrastructure spending per inhabitant, 1976-1992________ 93
Map 3.6 Total productive infrastructure spending per inhabitant, 1976-1992_____ 95
Map 3.7 Total social infrastructure spending per inhabitant, 1976-1992_________ 97
14
ABBREVIATIONS
Abbreviations
DEH —  Public Company for Electricity
DEKO =  Public companies (public utilities)
EYDAP =  Athens-Pireaus Water Company
G =  Part of PIPR materialised to actual investment (see 
chapter 3)
GDP —  Gross Domestic Product
LSDV =  Least Squares Dummy Variables (model)
NSSG =  National Statistical Service of Greece
OLS =  Ordinary Least Squares
OTA =  Local governments
OTE =  Greek Telecommunications Organisation
PIPR == Public Investment Programme
Prod or P(G) =  Productive part of PIPR (see chapter 3)
SAD =  Collective Decisions for Administrative Expenditure
SAE —  Collective Decisions for Works
SAM =  Collective Decisions for Research
SANT == Collective Decisions for Prefectural Funds
Soc, or S(G) =  Social part of PIPR (see chapter 3)
SUR =  Seemingly Unrelated Regression
15
INTRODUCTION
Chapter 1 
Introduction
1.1 The infrastructure ‘puzzle’
The relationship between public infrastructure capital and development has 
puzzled economists and other researchers for a long time. This thesis aims to examine 
empirically the economic impact of public investment in infrastructure capital in Greece 
during the period 1976 to 1992 with a view to shedding some light on this fascinating 
relationship. One fundamental problem is that all the elements of this relationship are far 
from being theoretically unproblematic, and that, as with all social/economic phenomena, 
such a relationship is extremely complex. As will be demonstrated in the subsequent 
chapters, public capital may well have different effects on different aspects of private 
sector production activity (productivity, cost structure, returns of scale, etc.) when viewed 
at different spatial scales. It is this underlying complexity that has given rise to the 
‘puzzle’ characterisation of the relationship between public infrastructure and 
development in some of the research literature.
Even though eminent writers from previous times, such as Adam Smith, showed 
an interest in the effects of public works on the economy, it was not after the second 
World War that there has been a systematic attempt to theorise and assess the impact of 
infrastructure on development (see chapter 2). During the last decade, however, an even 
more intense interest in the effect of public infrastructure on national and regional 
economies has generated a voluminous literature. The renewed debate was sparked by the 
works of Ratner (1983) and especially Aschauer (1987; 1988; 1989a), about the way in 
which public capital in the United States has affected development and productivity. 
Despite the fact that there are numerous examples of similar research, both from the US 
and other countries, the term public infrastructure capital (here used interchangeably with 
the terms public capital, public infrastructure, or just infrastructure) remains problematic.
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It tends to have different meanings in different contexts, as the introduction to definitional 
issues on infrastructure by Diamond and Spence (1989) indicates.
The are only two previous attempts before this thesis to examine the infrastructure 
investment effects in Greece utilising a modem analytical framework, those by 
Dalamagas (1995), and Segoura and Christodoulakis (1997). This thesis differs from 
these earlier attempts in the sense that it uses a much narrower definition for public 
capital, and employs panel data instead of time series analysis. The most crucial 
difference, however, is that there is the explicit introduction of the spatial dimension in 
the analysis.
1.2 The spatial dimension o f the infrastructure- 
developm ent relationship
The introduction of space creates an additional difficulty in the examination of the 
problem at hand There is no guarantee that public capital can have the same impact in all 
regional economies. As economic and social structures vary regionally so it is plausible to 
expect different infrastructural effects in such varying contexts. However, as will be 
argued later in this thesis, the introduction of the spatial dimension is essential for the 
understanding of the infrastructure effects on the economy, even if the only objective of 
the research sets out to understand the role of public capital at the national level.
To be more specific, the majority of recent infrastructure studies have been based 
on the analysis of time-series datasets. However, the use of such data, apart from the 
obvious shortcoming of the relatively few available observations, has an even more 
significant disadvantage. As infrastructure effects can be different at the m/cro-spatial 
level (for instance prefectural or NUTS III levels), the use of aggregate data, at national 
level for instance, can result in the loss of such cmcial information. For this reason a 
different approach has been used in this thesis (which, it must be confessed, was also 
dictated by the lack of sufficiently long enough time-series for the Greek regions, either at 
prefectural levels, or regional or NUTS II levels) - that of panel analysis.
In a typical time-series analysis, a dataset of say some 15 or 20 observations in 
time is used for the country or the region under investigation. In contrast, in the cross­
17
INTRODUCTION
section analysis say some 30 or 40 observations of, for example, spatial units or firms are 
used for a given moment in time. In the panel data analysis, the time-series observations 
for all similar cross-sectional units (prefectures, regions, sectors, firms, etc.) are stacked 
together. This method has some very significant advantages (a concise description is 
offered in Appendix I), of which the most important are the important increase in the 
number of available observations, and the enhanced ‘richness’ of the dataset (for instance, 
the information say derived from spatial units or sectors).
Even though the impact of public capital investment in the non-manufacturing 
part of the economy has been examined in more than usual detail (see chapter 6), the 
great bulk of the analysis undertaken here refers to Greek manufacturing industry. This 
analysis has been conducted at both regional and sectoral levels. In fact, even the sectoral 
analysis has been undertaken at different spatial levels - the nation as a whole, the 
metropolitan area of Athens, and a region composed of the Rest of Greece. (The dataset 
for this last region was obtained by subtracting the data for the Athens sectors from those 
of Greece as a whole).
1.3 The Greek economy during the period 1976-1992
The post war economic development of Greece was characterised by remarkable 
rates of growth up until the seventies. The Gross Domestic Product (GDP) was 350$ per 
capita in 1953, increasing to 574 $ per capita in 1960, to reach 1133 $ per capita by 1970. 
However, during the first half of the seventies it became obvious that the economic 
growth of Greece was being hampered, and an economic crisis of the Greek 
manufacturing in particular, and the Greek economy in general, began to emerge. Growth 
rates started to decelerate and after a while investment, demand and production suffered 
from severe decline. Concurrently, several structural changes took place in the Greek 
economy, such as the reinforcement of the traditional industrial sectors at the expense of 
the most advanced ones, the decline of foreign investment, the rise in foreign trade deficit 
and, after many years, the appearance of unemployment (for a further analysis, as well as 
some potential explanations for the dramatic drop of the rate of economic growth in 
Greece, see Georgakopoulos 1995, Gianitsis 1985, pp. 356-383, Katseli 1990, Kintis 
1995, Lianos et al. 1995, Sakkas 1994, or Vaitsos et al. 1987).
18
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The Greek economy did not recover during the eighties. As Christodoulakis has 
argued “the three salient characteristics o f Greek economy daring the period 1980-94 
was the decrease o f the growth rate, the dramatic decline o f investment, and the 
threatening swelling o f public debt ” (1998, p. 23). It is characteristic of the problems of 
the Greek economy that during 1981 and 1982 the increase of the national product was 
almost zero (ibid.). As Greece had become a member of the European Economic 
Community during that period the trade deficit almost doubled from 1980 to 1982.
The fiscal austerity programmes previously adopted by the government had not 
been successful and, thus, by 1985 public spending had reached 43 percent of the Gross 
Domestic Product (GDP), the inflation rate was over 20 percent, and public investment 
had fallen to 11 percent of GDP (ibid.). A new austerity package did not change the 
situation. In 1989, public spending had skyrocketed at 50 percent, and the public deficit 
reached 15 percent. It general, it can be argued that during the period under examination 
in this thesis “Greece has experienced repetitions o f fiscal political cycles with pre- 
electoral expansions giving way to post-electoral stabilizations, and the cycles have been 
getting wilder at each new turn” (Thomadakis 1993, p. 363). It is true that during the 
nineties some of these indicators improved. However, it was certainly the case that 
Greece failed to meet the Maastricht Treaty criteria in order to be in the first wave of the 
European Monetary Union.
The problems of Greek economy are not restricted only to the macro-economic 
level. The structural problems at the micro level, particularly evident in the secondary 
(industrial) sector, as mentioned earlier, abound. High transaction costs for all types of 
economic activity (Papandreou 1988a), an underdeveloped capital stock and capital 
markets, a black economy of approximately 30 percent of Gross National Product 
(Pavlopoulos 1987), an agricultural labour force about 28 percent of the total (for year 
1986, as cited in Katseli 1990, p. 270), are just some of these problems.1 It is in this 
economic context and era that this thesis examines the role of public capital in regional 
and national development.
1 Lianos and Lazaris (1995) have argued that although the Greek economy will probably do better in the 
beginning of the next century, when compared to the last thirty years, a “potential recovery would be far 
from spectacular” (p. 72).
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1.4 A digression to m ethodological problems and research  
alternatives
The recent resurgence of research about infrastructure has been based on the 
mainstream approach of neoclassical economics. The emphasis in this approach on 
empirical research is one of the main reasons for its dominance in current public capital 
thinking. Yet, this analytical framework is not uncontested. A comprehensive critique (of 
positivism and empiricism, which underpin this dominant approach) at the 
methodological level, can be found in Sayer 1992; equally interesting critiques about the 
underlying assumptions of neoclassical economics exist and one can be found in Dobb 
1973.
Even though this thesis utilises mainstream theoretical and statistical tools, it 
would be interesting to present briefly some of the basic ideas of the radical alternative 
theorisation for the role of infrastructure capital. A basic summary of this theorisation can 
be found in Skayannis (1990; 1994), along with a critique of the more mainstream 
approaches2. Some of the most interesting ideas of the radical theorisation draw directly 
from the work of Marx (despite the fact the he did not address the subject directly). He 
argued that “the relative surplus population and surplus production” must be all the 
greater if the fixed capital is of large scale, long life and only indirectly related to 
production -  “thus more to build railways, canals, aqueducts, telegraphs, etc. than to 
build the machinery” (Marx 1973, p. 707, cited in Harvey 1982, p. 217).”
As is argued in chapter 2, there is no general agreement of what types of fixed 
capital should be included in an infrastructure definition within mainstream public capital 
research. There* has been a similar debate in the context of the more radical tradition. 
Authors like Lojkine (1976) have proposed a broad definition including public works on
2 Unfortunately, this analysis ignores the (then) emerging literature from the United States (Aschauer, 
Munnell, etc.). At the same time this study has two additional shortcomings. First, it conflates the critique 
of the whole neoclassical analytical framework with the critique of particular research project (such as the 
work of Biehl [1986] for the regional effects of infrastructure in Europe) which really should be judged in 
its proper context. Secondly, it seems that it lacks a basic understanding of the rudimentary tools of 
economic analysis (see, for example, the misrepresentation of production function in Skayannis 1994, p. 
105), and the standard economic ‘jargon’ either of Marxist or orthodox approach, at least in Greek. That 
said, this basic summary has been able in addition to incorporate some of the more obscure pieces of radical 
research into the debate, which is useful in itself.
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social infrastructure. Other authors, for example, Theret (1982), have argued that such a
■i
broad definition confounds the actual physical basis of infrastructure with its operation .
One of the most interesting recent attempts at theorising the role of public capital 
following the radical tradition has come from a not unexpected source. Harvey has argued 
that “fixed capital formation and in particular the creation o f physical infrastructures in 
the built environment cannot be understood independently o f the social processes that 
regulate distribution” (1982, p. 69). In his view, fixed capital in general (which includes 
of course physical infrastructure) is installed to increase labour productivity, which, 
however, “becomes, once it is installed, a barrier to further innovation” (ibid. p. 123). In 
that sense, infrastructure can either increase or decrease economic development at a 
particular point in time. Governments can create infrastructure either by direct investment 
(such as public utilities, transport and communications), or by regulating the private 
sector which would undertake the investment.
Harvey justifies the public involvement on the basis of the “scale o f investment 
required and in part because we are dealing with \natural monopolies' which arise 
because it is physically impossible to have a large number o f competitors operating in the 
same area ” (ibid. p. 151; see also Harvey 1989b, chapter 7). Other authors have argued 
that there is an ‘oscillation’ in the provision of infrastructure between the public and 
private sectors, which depends mainly on technological and economic (profitability) 
factors (see Laepple 1973, or Skayannis 1990,1994).
However, on of the most interesting points raised by Harvey’s analysis is the 
direct relationship between evolving infrastructure fixed capital and the temporal and 
spatial displacement of resources and excess capital. He argues that “excess capital and 
surplus labour can, for example, be absorbed by switching from current consumption to 
long-term public and private investments in plant, physical and social infrastructures'’ 
(1989, p. 182). Similarly, the over-accumulation problem in a specific space can be 
solved if the excess resources can be used for the ‘production’ of new spaces in which 
capitalist production can continue. The importance of the finance and credit system in
3 This is a crucial point to the radical debate, which cannot be developed further here due to space 
limitations. For a more extensive analysis, as well as discussion of the prerequisite conceptual tools refer to 
Skayannis 1994, chapter 3.
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mediating these temporal and spatial displacements has to be noted (see Harvey, 1982 and 
1989b).
Those who control excess capital, credit, and the political system can determine 
the spatial allocation of the new infrastructure investment. This means “the ability to 
influence the production o f space is an important means to augment social power” 
(Harvey 1989b, p. 233). This power to command ‘space’, the argument continues, 
“becomes an even more important weapon in class struggle” (ibid. p. 294). At the same 
time the increased mobility of private capital and the different regional endowment of 
infrastructure capital would lead to “spatial competition between localities, cities, 
regions, and nations” (ibid. p. 295).
Sheppard and Barnes (1990) in a most useful, yet underrated attempt to ‘reshape’ 
the radical approach in economic geography, summarised previous arguments of the 
Marxist literature (Harvey 1982, or Walker 1981). They agreed that infrastructure 
investment reduces the size of inputs necessary per unit produced for a substantial period 
in the future. However, they argued that “such a strategy diminishes the flexibility o f  
future actions, however, since fixed capital investments must be depreciated before they 
can be economically written off, and because fixed capital from bygone eras may no 
longer be functional for capital accumulation” (Sheppard and Barnes p. 192). Even 
though they did not incorporate explicitly infrastructure capital in the spatial models they 
developed, their transportation model illustrates how improved transportation investment 
can ameliorate the production capabilities of a given economy (see Sheppard and Barnes 
pp. 277-280).
The radical approaches to infrastructure analysis have delineated a general 
0macro) framework in which public capital investment can be theorised. However, they 
have not yet developed appropriate analytical tools for an empirical analysis and 
assessment of specific infrastructure projects or policies. For these reasons, and without 
forgetting the theoretical value of these radical approaches, this thesis has opted to utilise 
the more conventional analytical framework provided by the neoclassical approach.
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1.5 Thesis structure
The chapters of the thesis can be divided to three basic types according to 
purpose. Chapters 2 and 3 provide the theoretical and data foundations for the empirical 
analysis. This analysis is then presented in chapters 4, 5, and 6, and the last part (chapter 
7) provides a summary of the main conclusions.
More particularly, the first part of chapter 2 contains a compendium of the earlier 
attempts to theorise and investigate empirically the public capital and economic 
development relationship. There is also an analysis of the theoretical difficulties that a 
‘public infrastructure’ definition entails, and a synopsis of the main ‘empirical tools’ upon 
which the empirical analysis has been based. However, the largest part of this chapter has 
been used to undertake a comprehensive presentation of the recent resurgence of 
academic work on infrastructure research. An attempt has been made to offer an account 
of all sides of the debate, and to do justice even to the very recent (and to, a large extent, 
tentative) methods of empirical investigation of the problem. Special attention has been 
given to illustrate the nuances and complexities that the addition of the spatial dimension 
adds to the problem.
Chapter 3 is a description of the Public Investment Programme (PIPR), which has 
been the main source for infrastructure investment in Greece. The first sections cover the 
historical and legal context in which PIPR has evolved. The latter sections present the 
temporal evolution and regional distribution of PIPR investment in total, and of its basic 
categories. Several measures have been used in order to gauge the degree of regional 
inequality.
The empirical investigation starts in chapter 4. The dominant approach in the 
recent infrastructure research is the use of production function analysis, and more 
particularly of the Cobb-Douglas variant. This analytical framework has been used in this 
chapter primarily in order to facilitate a comparison of the Greek results with similar 
findings from other countries. The centre of the investigation is the Greek manufacturing 
industry at regional (prefectural) level, and several empirical specifications have been 
used. There are also several different spatial levels of analysis, as well as temporal and 
network analysis undertaken in this section of the work.
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One recent and promising alternative analytical framework is that of cost function 
analysis and this constitutes the primary focus of chapter 5. There, in addition to the 
regional (prefectural) dataset for Greek manufacturing, several sectoral panels of data 
have been used. The first regards a sectoral dataset for Greece as a whole. The second, 
which is the only available from the National Statistical Service of Greece at the 
‘regional’ level, is that for the manufacturing industry in the metropolitan area of Athens. 
The third is the dataset for the manufacturing industry in the Rest of Greece, which has 
been derived by subtraction. Even though the interpretation of the empirical results is not 
as straightforward as might be the case for the production function analysis, the cost 
function analytical framework presents the opportunity for a deeper investigation of the 
infrastructure impact on the production and cost structure of manufacturing. Thus, several 
measures have been used to help in this direction. These are the cost elasticities of 
manufacturing with respect to infrastructure, the private factors of production bias effects, 
the private input demand elasticities with respect to public capital, and the ‘shadow 
values’ of public infrastructure.
The production and cost function approaches are perhaps the standard tools of 
empirical analysis in infrastructure research, certainly this statement is true of the former 
lines of study. There are, however, some more recent attempts in economic modelling that 
have been undertaken with the aim of investigating other more indirect channels by which 
public capital can affect private sector economic performance. Chapter 6 has used one 
such model, which takes a simple but comprehensive view of the economy, in order to 
explore further the infrastructure effects in Greece. The first part of chapter presents this 
theoretical model. The second is dedicated to the analysis of public capital’s impact on 
the non-manufacturing part of the economy, using again regional data (at the prefectural 
level), and for this purpose quasi-production functions have been employed. The use of 
these production functions was dictated by the data limitations regarding the non­
manufacturing sectors. The next part of chapter 6 presents the analysis of the potential 
indirect channels of infrastructure effects on the manufacturing part of the economy. The 
first of the explored channels concerns the effects of public capital on the preferred scale 
of production. This point is explored further by analysing the impact of infrastructure on 
the total output of the manufacturing sector. Another potential channel by which public 
capital can affect the private sector is by altering the equilibrium number of
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manufacturing establishments. This and indeed all analysis of these indirect channels has 
been conducted using once again the four available datasets, that is regional at the 
prefectural level (for total manufacturing), sectoral for Greece as a whole, sectoral for the 
metropolitan area of Athens (urban level), and sectoral for the remainder region termed 
the Rest of Greece.
The final chapter offers a summary of the major empirical findings of the thesis. It 
also presents a list of theoretical and practical limitations of work of this sort in order to 
put these findings into context. The last part of this chapter gives a comprehensive list of 
possible extensions of this research, a potential based on already existing data and 
analytical frameworks, and proposes some ideas for future research, based on different 
theoretical premises.
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Chapter 2 
Evolving Alternative Approaches to  
Comprehending the Infrastructure-Development 
Symbiosis
2.1 Introduction
Theoretical and applied research in every discipline usually reflects the problems 
and needs that a society is faced with at that specific point in time. This is even more the 
case for the social sciences. The search for a theoretical and empirical understanding of 
the relationship between public infrastructure capital and development has flourished 
whenever there was a need for a review and rationalisation of public investment policy. 
Such needs have occurred immediately after the Second World War, when there were 
numerous projects for rebuilding the destroyed infrastructure, and during the last two 
decades. The more recent period has reflected a time in many countries when the 
dominant economic philosophy has been to reduce the economic role of the public sector. 
This has been coupled with an imperative need for a more rational allocation of 
infrastructure investment.
The stabilisation policies followed by many governments have aimed to reduce 
inflation and public deficits. In many cases, the policies of fiscal austerity have slashed 
public investment in infrastructure, alongside the other public expenditures. However, 
even after recent public investment retrenchment, public infrastructure stock remains still 
a great part of the overall capital stock of almost every country. For instance, in 1987 the 
non-military public capital stock of the United States was 29 percent (1,887 billion 
dollars) of the total national capital stock. It could then, of course, be argued that just the 
sheer volume of the public investment spend begs for a comprehensive investigation of 
its effects on the economy.
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Despite the fact that understanding the relationship between public capital and 
development is critically important for national economic efficiency, infrastructure 
investment only really became a political ‘buzz’ word in the nineties. The issue of public 
investment had a significant place in the 1992 Clinton electoral programme (Clinton and 
Gore 1992 and Clinton 1993), while in European Union political agenda infrastructure 
projects have always had a special place. Electoral programmes and government policies 
have an infrastructure reference because the physical aspect of public capital stock seems 
to be construed by the electorate as a visible evidence of the policy efficiency of a 
government. However, and given the huge amounts spent, it is not always clear that 
governments know exactly in what type of public capital they should invest, nor what are 
the short and long-run effects of this investment (for example, if there is a crowding-out 
of private investment, and so on).
The need for policy guidelines has spawned a new theoretical and empirical 
interest in infrastructure research. There have been several recent attempts to provide a 
summary and further clarification of this literature. This by no means implies that there is 
a lack of previous similar literature reviews of the field. Rietveld’s (1989) review or 
Vickerman’s (1991) Infrastructure and Regional Development collected volume are 
excellent examples of the infrastructure effects literature. As regards the new strands of 
research originating in the US, Gramlich’s (1994) review essay, Sturm’s (1998) book, and 
the collected volumes edited by Munnell (1990) and Batten and Karlsson (1996) can also 
be recommended.
This chapter sets out to present in section 2 a summary of earlier attempts to 
investigate the infrastructure puzzle, before the resurgence of research in the late eighties, 
primarily utilising a different method of measuring public capital stock. Section 3 gives a 
brief presentation of the seminal work of Aschauer on US infrastructure and some key 
points of the subsequent debate, particularly about production function analysis. Part 4 
delineates the main alternative - the cost function analytical framework - and discusses 
examples of such applied work. Section 5 presents a summary overview of empirical 
research on infrastructure effects from around the world. The next part addresses the 
econometric problems and controversies of the debate to date. Part 7 offers a preview of 
some recent examples of innovatory and alternative methods that have been developed
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recently for the investigation of the infrastructure-development relationship. The 
conclusion summarises the main points of this literature survey, tables 2.1, 2.2, and 2.3 
providing a concise report of the most important contributions to the field, as well as to 
some of the main results of this research.
2.2 Early approaches to understanding the public capital -  
development connection
2.2.1 Definition of public infrastructure capital
The notion of governmental or public provision of infrastructure capital is, of 
course, not new. Adam Smith (1970) in the Wealth o f Nations suggested that the state had 
the duty to erect and maintain certain public works. Historical experience has shown that 
different countries have chosen different paths for the construction of the infrastructure 
necessary to underpin the economy. A classic example is the case of railway networks, 
which in some countries have been set up by private companies (United States), while in 
others they have been funded (and run) by the public sector, as is (was) the case in many 
European countries.
However, the exact nature of public infrastructure capital is not always clear. In 
the search for a definition of the term public capital (or public infrastructure, or just 
infrastructure, as here these terms are used interchangeably) a helpful departure point 
could involve the clarification of the term ‘capital’. A basic definition of capital1 includes 
“a// those man-made aids to further production, such as tools, machinery and factories, 
which are used up in the process o f making other goods and services rather than being 
consumed for their own sake” (Lipsey 1989, p. 3). Sometimes the term financial capital 
is employed to describe the money used to start up or maintain a business, and the term 
physical capital (or capital goods) for the tangible factors of production (see Varian 
1993).
1 This is a widely accepted definition for capital, in the neoclassical context of analysis. It has, however, to be 
reminded that other schools of though view capital differently. The radical (marxist) approach sees capital as 
“process rather than a thing' (Harvey [quoting Marx] 1982, p. 20).
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However, even if a proper and acceptable definition of capital can be generated, it 
still would be a different and, to some extent, a more difficult task to measure it. This 
measurement is even more problematic if the task is to measure public capital. The 
treatment, for instance, of military outputs or non-durable goods causes difficulties. 
Residential housing sometimes is also included in the capital stock. Education, too, is 
also difficult in terms of its human capital interpretation. It seems that public capital is a 
problematic and rather elusive term, and in most cases, instead of a well-founded 
theoretical definition, what has been employed has been a rule of thumb.
As mentioned above, the period just after the second World War brought 
infrastructure investment under the spotlight. Infrastructure networks, especially in 
Europe, had been seriously damaged, and also many governments saw investment in 
public capital as an efficient tool of economic development. One of the first authors 
dealing with the term ‘overhead capital’ was Singer who distinguished between 
‘overhead’ and ‘directly productive’ projects for development (Singer 1951). Nurkse 
(1961) considered overhead capital to be a crucial factor, which if present could lead a 
country, especially an underdeveloped one, out of a stagnation phase.
Another key writer, Hirschman (1958) adopted the distinction between ‘social 
overhead capital’ (SOC) and ‘directly productive activities’ (DPA) in his seminal work - 
The Strategy o f Economic Development. His concept of SOC includes those basic 
services without which the productive activities in primary, secondary, and tertiary 
sectors cannot function. In addition to the conventional understanding of what the 
physical infrastructure entails, SOC also includes services associated with public health 
and welfare as well as education and public security.
According to Hirschman, there are three necessary conditions by which an activity 
can be classified (or not) under the heading SOC. First, it should be able to support a 
great variety of economic activities. Second, it should be provided by public agencies free 
of charge or at rates regulated by these agencies. And third, the services that it supports 
cannot be imported. He also uses a rather complex fourth condition. The investment 
necessary to provide SOC services should be characterised by technical indivisibility 
(‘lumpiness* as he calls it) and a high capital-output ratio. This condition forms the basis
29
ALTERNATIVE APPROACHES
upon which the difference between the wide and narrow definition of SOC is based. If 
this condition is adopted, then SOC is restricted to ‘hard’ infrastructure such as highways, 
airports, power installations, whereas categories such as education and health are 
excluded.
Further, he was able to identify two sequences of development - development via 
excess capacity of SOC and the development via shortage of SOC (expansion starts 
through increases in the supply of DPA). He also argued that regional policies that follow 
the excess capacity sequence rarely generate the desirable expected results. In his 
opinion, it was irrational to rely on the ability of the SOC facilities to induce development 
of other economic activities in backward areas. He also considered that a moderate 
shortage of SOC is unlikely to do much damage to a dynamic and developing area. On 
the contrary he argued, if good quality SOC facilities were provided, there would be a 
tendency for industries to refrain from creating their own facilities.
Some writers such as Rostow (1963) suggested that, in fact, everything that is 
necessary for economic development can be considered as overhead capital. Hansen 
(1965a; 1965b) has also used the terms, direct productive capital, and overhead capital. 
He argued that public capital has different impact on different regions believing that it is 
the characteristics of the recipient region and the type of public infrastructure that will 
determine the actual impact. He took the view that it would be better to direct an 
investment in economic overhead capital to a region developed to an intermediate level, 
where it would stimulate economic growth. The contrary line is where an investment in 
overhead capital is directed to a lagging region, which well might need it most. Hansen 
takes the view that, if economic overhead capital investment is directed to the lagging 
region, this could well constitute a waste of resources because they are unlikely to be able 
to compete with the intermediate regions. It is clear for Hansen that the sequence of 
development policy should be social capital investment in lagging regions, and overhead 
capital investment in intermediate regions.
Youngson (1967, p.40) proposed another definition suggesting that “overhead 
capital is that capital which the government feels itself called upon to provide because 
private investment is absent or in a d eq u a teHis definition implies that in order to
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characterise capital as overhead capital it has to be kept in mind that the latter is not a set 
of things but a set of properties. The two main features are first an ability to create 
external economies and second a requirement to be built ahead of demand. This 
definition is in accordance with the concepts invoked by Nurkse discussed earlier.
Diamond and his co-authors (1984) also adopted Hirschman’s theoretical 
approach to infrastructure using this term as synonymous with SOC. Diamond and 
Spence (1989, p.49) also argued that infrastructure provision is like an intermediate input 
into production activities in the economy. They also provided a working and workable 
definition that indicates that “infrastructure is the collective and integrative capital basis 
for economic activity”.
A thorough analysis of the theoretical problems of infrastructure definition has 
been provided by Diewert (1986). He applied duality theory to a restricted profit function 
to examine how public services might affect private manufacturing firms. He classified 
infrastructure investment into four categories: utility, communication and transportation 
investments, and land development projects, each one of which comprised several 
subcategories (19 in total). He also provided an extensive presentation of the different 
approaches to measuring the potential benefits of investments in local public goods or 
infrastructure services.
The precursor of modem regional infrastructure research can be considered in the 
work of Mera (1973) on Japan. Using ordinary least squares and covariance analysis he 
showed2 that public infrastructure capital was significant in the production process in 
every economic sector (primary, secondary, and tertiary), with the caveat that the 
estimations were sensitive to the specification of the relevant equations.
One of the most important research projects yet undertaken attempting to analyse 
the relationship between public infrastructure and regional development was that of the 
study group co-ordinated by Biehl (1986) for the European Community.
2 Recently, Merriman (1990) commenting on the Mera analysis suggested that it would not be correct to 
transfer his conclusions to other countries, as there are significant differences of the definition of public 
capital from country to country.
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In Biehl’s report, infrastructure is defined as a resource that simultaneously displays the 
properties of both public and capital goods. The study argues that infrastructure cannot be 
provided efficiently by the market mechanism, and that, in general, it has a longer life 
cycle and/or capacity compared with private capital. Infrastructure demonstrates 
simultaneously ‘publicness’ both in production and consumption (at least in principle). It 
is usually the case that infrastructure is characterised by non-excludability, immobility, 
indivisibility, limitationality, and polyvalence, but the degree varies according to 
infrastructure type. Another type of analytical breakdown used in this report was a 
consideration whether an infrastructure category represents a ‘point’ or ‘band’ or 
‘network’ infrastructure subsystem, with bridges, roads, and the combination of a bridge 
with a road being respective examples. The group also considered as infrastructure public 
human capital, such as knowledge, information, planning and organising capabilities as 
well as basic research.
Biehl’s team examined the regional effects of public capital in nine European 
countries, Belgium, (West) Germany, Denmark, France, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Holland, 
and Great Britain. Various descriptive statistical tools were used in their analysis as well 
as the calibration of quasi-production functions3. The prime focus was on how income, 
employment, and other potentiality factors are linked with infrastructure. The general 
conclusion was that public capital does indeed contribute to regional research, although 
there has been considerable subsequent discussion about the methods and data used in 
coming to such a view.
2.2.2 Measurement of public infrastructure capital
Apart from difficulties of definition, a fundamental problem which applied 
research about public capital has to confront is how to measure it. There are two 
competing approaches on this subject, together with a third that is something of a 
compromise. The first employs physical measures of the existing stock in a country or 
region. The road capacity, for instance, can be measured in terms of length and width
3 For an implementation of quasi-production functions refer to the UK case in Meadows and Jackson (1984).
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(quantitative characteristics), and can be additionally weighted by specific indicators of 
its features, such as the number of lanes (qualitative characteristics). Such an approach 
was followed consistently cross-nationally by the research team convened by Biehl 
mentioned above.
The second approach uses monetary measures, usually by adding up past public 
investment in infrastructure. This has been extensively used in the recent research in the 
US and other countries. Both methods appear to have some advantages and 
disadvantages. The physical approach can measure the existing stock at a certain moment 
of time with few conceptual problems. However, in practice it is rather difficult to 
produce such a measurement, not to mention the problems arising from the qualitative 
characteristics of the physical capital stock. The monetary approach seems more suitable 
for macro-scale analysis, as it incorporates qualitative characteristics (a better road 
network would tend cost more than a poor one, for example), but it also has its 
drawbacks. Estimations of the stock of public capital often assumes that the price of 
public capital is set in a perfectly competitive capital market, and that the devaluation of 
the stock can be accurately estimated. These assumptions can rarely be met.
Eberts, in order to avoid these problems, proposed a third hybrid approach, where 
“the monetary estimates o f public capital could be benchmarked by using the physical 
quantity and quality measures o f public infrastructure” (1990, p. 18). Even though, 
conceptually, this way of thinking seems most proper, in that it potentially could give the 
most accurate picture of the infrastructure stock, in practical terms it has the deficiencies 
associated with both the physical and the monetary approaches.
However, it is the monetary approach, which seems to be dominant in the 
renewed interest about the effects of infrastructure on productivity and development.
2.3 The resurgence of research on public capital and the 
production function approach
During the eighties a resurgence in interest about the role of public capital 
occurred and resulted in considerable research advance. This research is based on the
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monetary approach to measuring public capital, and uses either a production or a cost 
function methodology to measure the impact of infrastructure investment on the private 
sector output and productivity. This renewed interest originates in the work of Aschauer 
(1987; 1988), and initially was focused in US public capital.
This current strand of research was spawned by the debate about the declining of 
productivity growth of the American economy during the seventies. Even though the US 
enjoyed the highest absolute level of real gross domestic product per employed person 
during the period 1960-1990, it had the smallest rate of increase in comparison to the 
other economic powers of the world. The output per worker in the United States had gone 
up by less than 50 percent, when in Japan, probably the most significant economic rival, 
it had increased by more than four times. More specifically, labour productivity growth in 
the private non-farm business sector in the US declined significantly (from an average 
annual rate of 2.5 percent in the period 1948-1969 to 2.0 between 1969-1973, and further 
to 0.5 percent over 1973-1979). During the eighties a small increase occurred but the 
average 1.2 is significantly smaller than the average of the period 1948-1969. (For a more 
detailed and thorough analysis of this context see Munnell (1990a).)
Several explanations have been proposed to explain this productivity slowdown, 
among which are changes in demographic characteristics and the level of education of the 
labour force as well as the energy crisis. At the same time as the productivity growth of 
the US economy declined, a downward trend was observed regarding the nation’s public 
infrastructure capital. The most conspicuous form of the deterioration was that of urban 
infrastructure and for an analysis of this see, for example, Patton (1984). A possible link 
between this deterioration and the general level of economic development was advanced 
in the early eighties. Choate and Walter (1984) suggested that the bad condition of the 
basic public facilities in the US was an obstacle for its economic growth. Barro (1981) 
was hinting at the problem when he included government services in a developmental 
production function, but he did not estimate directly their productivity. Ratner (1983) 
appears to be the first economist to add public capital to a production function in order to 
examine whether its marginal product would be positive.
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However, to repeat, it was Aschauer who accounted for the productivity 
slowdown as the direct result of a fall in public capital investment. His findings showed 
that there was a huge impact of public capital on the productivity of the private sector. 
These arguments generated a vigorous debate over this relationship in the US, and some 
of his ideas are regarded today as a common truth, or, at the very least, as an absolutely 
essential part of the debate on public spending4.
Aschauer used a neoclassical theoretical framework influenced by that of Arrow 
and Kurz (1970). The basic idea was to expand a Cobb-Douglas production function by 
including the stock of public infrastructure capital, a similar kind of analysis to that used 
by Mera for the Japanese case.
The Cobb-Douglas production function normally has the form:
Q = AKaLb (2.3.1)
where Q represents output, K  is the private capital input, L is the labour input, and A 
represents, normally, a measure of technological progress. If public capital is considered 
as another (unpaid) factor of production, the above equation takes the form:
Q = AKaLbG‘ (2.3.2)
where G is public capital input. It can be added here that this basic form of equation can 
be expressed not only in terms of output, but also in terms of capital productivity 
(Aschauer 1989a):
4 See, for example, Thurow (1994) Head to Head and Krugman (1994) Peddling Prosperity.
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Q / K = AKa-1LbG (2.3.4)
and labour productivity (Munnell 1990a)
Q /L  = AKaLb' 1G (2.3.5)
None of these forms of Cobb-Douglas function can be estimated by standard 
econometric methods as they are non-linear in the parameters a, b, and c. Equation 2.3.2, 
for instance, has to be transformed into a log-linear form5, by taking the natural 
logarithms of variables Q, K, L, and G, and of the constant A, in order to be estimated by 
conventional econometric methods. The operational form of equation 2.3.2 after the 
logarithmic transformation and appending an error term (e) becomes:
InQ = InA + alnK + blnL + clnG + e (2.3.6)
The parameters a, b, and c measure the elasticity of output with respect to private 
capital, labour, and public capital respectively. These coefficients are the relative shares 
of the respective factors of the total product, under the assumption that each production 
factor (input) is paid by the amount of its marginal product (which implies that there is a 
perfectly competitive market for each production factor). These shares, in a more 
rigorous language, measure the elasticities of output in respect to private capital, labour, 
and public capital6. This means that if labour, for instance, is increased one unit then the 
coefficient b indicates the respective increase in output. The relationship between these
5 Some econometricians call such a model a double-log formulation, reserving the term log-linear for models 
where the dependent variable is in logarithmic form and the independent variables have not been transformed 
(Ramanathan 1992). Here, however, the more widespread convention is followed, by which the former 
model is called log-linear (the terms log-log, and double-log sometimes are also used) and the latter log-lin 
(Gujarati 1995).
6 In a log-linear regression the estimated coefficients measure the elasticity of the dependent variable with 
respect to the corresponding independent variables, in contrast to simple linear regression where such 
elasticities have to be calculated. See Gujarati (1995) for an illustrative analysis of this point.
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coefficients represents the degree of homogeneity of the equation, or in economic terms 
the type of returns of scale (see chapter 4, section 4.6, for a more thorough analysis).
As mentioned, Aschauer’s initial interest was the examination of the effects of 
public spending on the US economy. He argued that expansions of public investment 
spending have a larger stimulative impact on private sector output than equal increases in 
public consumption expenditure have. Thus, an increase in public investment generates 
an increase in the rate of return of private capital. This increase, in turn, stimulates 
private investment (1989a). His empirical analysis showed that an increase in public 
investment produced four to seven times greater increases in private-sector output than 
increased public consumption. At the same time, changes in government consumption 
(salaries of public servants, consumption goods purchased by public sector, etc.) had no 
effect, or at least only a small positive influence, on private-sector output (Aschauer 
1987,1988).
Further, his empirical analysis for the US economy during the period 1949-1985, 
showed that different categories of public capital investment affected productivity in 
different ways. Aschauer used the ‘core’ infrastructure concept, a subdivision of non- 
military capital stock which is comprised by the sum of public investment on highways, 
mass transit, airports, electrical and gas facilities, water, and sewers. Core infrastructure 
seems to have the greatest impact on productivity, in comparison to other forms of public 
investment, such as on general public buildings (office buildings, fire and police stations, 
courthouses, garages, passenger terminals), hospitals, conservation and development, and 
educational buildings. Military capital stock did not appear to be an explanatory factor at 
all of the productivity slowdown, despite the fact that it represented one third of the total 
government stock of equipment and structures (Aschauer 1989a).
Aschauer took the view that there are two main reasons justifying public 
investment in the public infrastructure. The first is the private market’s failure to allocate 
resources the optimum way. Producers of such goods and services cannot find a practical 
manner to exclude particular agents from consuming them and, thus, cannot receive the 
right price in order to get a competitive return. The second reason is because of 
economies of scale. In the case of the acquisition and distribution of water, for example,
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there are substantial decreases in cost when the scale of production increases (Aschauer 
1989).
One of the most important supporters of these ideas is Munnell. She has justified 
public provision of goods and services using similar arguments to Aschauer and agreed 
that the drop in labour productivity was due to a decline in the growth of public 
infrastructure. She argued that an increase in public capital investment would not only 
stop the erosion of the existing infrastructure stock, but would also raise the rate of 
growth in the amount of capital per worker and, thus, labour productivity (Munnell 
1990a).
Aschauer and Munnell's ideas were truly influential and generated a vigorous 
debate with Holtz-Ealkin probably the most prominent and informed opponent. Holtz- 
Eakin, in series of papers, (1992; 1993a; 1993c) argued that the emphasis on the 
productivity and competitiveness effects of public capital is misplaced7. He did not deny 
the fact that during the seventies productivity growth fell to unprecedented levels, but he 
supported the theory of reverse causation with regard to the public infrastructure. His 
argument is that after the Second World War and until the early seventies, the US 
economy performed well. As result, substantial investment in the public infrastructure 
was undertaken, for example the construction of the interstate highway system. However, 
productivity growth dropped significantly in the seventies and in consequence 
government budgets were tightened and this, in turn, caused a serious decline in the 
growth of public capital stock. In other words, it was the decline of productivity that 
caused the decrease in the rate of infrastructure accumulation and not the converse.
Holtz-Ealkin did not deny also the fact that the large stock of public capital in the 
US provides benefits for the national economy as a whole. However, he argued that the 
US already has on average a rather good stock of infrastructure and any additional 
increase to this stock would be hardly likely to increase the overall productivity of the 
economy. He pinpointed as the major problem with public capital the fact that it is free to 
use and that there is no incentive to maintain the existing infrastructure stock.
7 However, recently Holtz-Eakin argued that public capital does affect positively private sector behaviour via 
more compex channels of influence and these are discussed later.
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What he suggested was not new investment programmes for public capital, but 
alternative programmes whose goal was to charge users for the services that the 
infrastructure delivers. These charges could be collected with the assistance of the 
appropriate sensor-mechanisms and systems (given the recent innovations in electronics 
and computers). Further, he considered that if such programmes were adopted, instead of 
new investments in public capital, then the intensity of demand for infrastructure services 
would be revealed and this, in turn, would lead to the improvement of the planning 
process. User fees, he argued, could then be directed towards the maintenance and 
modernisation of the already existing public capital. Basically, he is critical of the post­
war Federal policy in the US, which has tended to subsidise new investment in 
infrastructure rather than maintaining well the already existing stock. If a new 
philosophy, along the lines he outlines, was adopted by the Federal government then a 
more efficient use of the infrastructure stock would result. Furthermore, he feels that this 
would also help to save on resources since this policy would be more cost-effective than 
new build.
All the aforementioned examples of research on public capital have used a 
methodology based on the Cobb-Douglas production function. This category of 
production function is easy to estimate and the interpretation of the results gives some 
immediate answers about the elasticities of the production inputs. Unfortunately, granted 
its convenience and ease of use, this approach it is characterised by some restrictive 
properties. The Cobb-Douglas function is characterised by constant (unitaiy) elasticity of 
substitution, which is the measure of how the ratio of factor inputs changes as the slope 
of an isoquant changes, or alternatively is the measure of the substitution possibilities of 
the production function. However, this restriction does not represent accurately the 
dynamic aspect of the real production process, especially in cases where technological 
innovation affects the intensity of use the production inputs.
A way to relax such a restrictive assumption as the unitary elasticity of 
substitution, is to adopt a different type of production function, such as the transcendental 
function (translog). The translog function allows for variable elasticity of substitution, 
and also has the advantage of being easily estimable. If public infrastructure capital is
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added to the private capital and labour inputs the basic logarithmic form of the translog is 
as follows:
lnQ=a+PLlnL+PKhK+p0lnG+pa (lnL)(lnL)+pKK(lnKXlnK)+(\j3(lnGXlnG) 
+P1K(lnL)(lnK)+p[0(lnLXlnG)+pH}(hKXlnG)+e ( ' }
where InQ, InL, InK, and InG, are, as before, the natural logarithms of output, labour, 
private, and public capital, respectively, a is the constant term, and e the error term. The 
drawback of translog production function is that in an applied econometric calibration 
there is a need for significantly more degrees of freedom for its estimation, certainly in 
comparison to the Cobb-Douglas function.
There are, nevertheless, several examples of infrastructure research based on 
translog production functions. One, actually predating Aschauer’s work, was that of da 
Silva Costa et al. (1987) who estimated such a function for the US for the period 1932- 
1972. Their results showed that public capital and labour were complementary inputs, 
public capital exhibited diminishing returns, and the ratio of public to private capital was 
negatively related to the output elasticity of public capital.
Production function analysis, either in Cobb-Douglas or translog guise, has proven 
popular in infrastructure applied research in the US. This research field is conducted at 
three, many times intertwined, spatial levels - the national level, regions and/or states, and 
sub-regionally say at the level of metropolitan areas.
Garcia-Mila and McGuire (1992) estimated a Cobb-Douglas production function 
using a panel consisting of observations for the 48 contiguous states. As a public 
infrastructure capital proxy the study used data relating to highway capital and education. 
An interesting feature of their estimations was that they did not use state dummy 
variables because they did not want the cyclical variation to dominate the long-run 
relationship. Instead, they used the state population and a measure of the average 
industrial mix of every state to capture potential differences across states. Both highway 
and education public capital was shown to have a positive impact on output.
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However, in a more recent attempt, and estimating again a Cobb-Douglas 
function, these same authors used first differences of the data, and tested for random and 
fixed regional (state level) effects, nonstationarity, endogeneity of the private inputs, and 
measurement error. The results showed that here public capital variables were not 
significant, with the caveat that there are aspects of the problem yet to be explored, such 
as the use of time lags for the impact of infrastructure, or the networks effects (Garcia- 
Mila and McGuire 1996).
Pinnoi (1994) estimated a translog production function also using panel data (48 
states from 1970 to 1986) an applying various econometric techniques. His findings 
showed that water and sewer services are complements to private capital and labour in 
most regions and industries.
Sturm and de Haan (1995) estimated a Cobb-Douglas production function for the 
same period as Aschauer. However, they used the first differences suggesting that this is 
necessary because the variables are neither stationary nor cointegrated. They concluded 
that infrastructure does not affect development, and also stressed that the alternative cost 
function approach might be helpful.
Dalenberg and Partridge (1995 p. 635) examined the effects of public capital, 
along with taxes and government spending, on employment in 28 metropolitan areas of 
the US. Their overall conclusion is that public infrastructure “did not appear to positively 
influence metropolitan employment”.
Evans and Carras (1994a), using panel data from the 48 contiguous states in a 
production function analysis, concluded that if specific econometric methods (correction 
for serial correlation, attempt to take endogeneity into account) are used, then 
government capital, statistically, has negative productivity, with the exception of 
government educational services.
Moomaw et al (1995) replicated Munnell’s regional work for the US, but with one 
major difference. Instead of using the Cobb-Douglas form, they preferred the translog 
function. Their basic conclusion was that water and sewage systems have had the biggest 
contribution (in comparison with other types of public capital) to regional (state) output, 
especially in the southern states. They also argued that their results supported Hansen’s
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assertion that the economic impact of various types of infrastructure depends on the 
characteristics of the region.
The results of Baltagi and Pinnoi (1995), for a panel of 48 US states, showed 
again that water and sewerage capital investments make a significant contribution to 
private sector productivity, in contrast that is, to the other categories of public capital.
2.4 The cost function (duality theory) approach to 
infrastructure research8
Production function analysis is by no means the only avenue of approach to 
understanding the role of public capital. One alternative theoretical framework is that of 
cost function analysis and duality theory. An extensive theoretical presentation of this 
approach can be found in Diewert (1986) and Chambers (1988). In a nutshell this 
approach can be described as follows. In the context of a national or regional economy 
any industry can be assumed to be seeking to minimise its production cost. This can be 
expressed in terms of a private cost function:
Q = wi * Li + n * Ki (2.4.1)
where C, is the private cost of production, wt is the wage rate, Lt is the labour input, r, is 
the user costs of private capital, Kt is the private capital input, and i denotes the industry. 
This minimisation of this equation is subject to the restriction posed by the production 
function of the industry:
Yi = f(Li,K i,G ,t) (2.4.2)
8 This approach can be equated with the maximization of a profit function (which is achieved by the 
minimization of the cost function). Sturm (1998) has classified both cost and profit methods under the 
heading of the ‘ behavioural approach' to the analysis of infrastructural effects.
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where Yt is the production of industry G is the public capital input, and t denotes time 
(as a proxy for disembodied9 technical change).
From the minimisation of the private cost function, subject to the production 
restriction, a cost function can be derived:
Q = C (Wi, rj, Yi} G, t) (2.4.3)
This can be considered as the dual cost function to the production function 
defined above. Then, instead of estimating the primal function (which is the production 
function), it is possible to estimate its dual (which is the cost function defined above).
This alternative analytical framework has been proposed as superior to the 
production function approach, either Cobb-Douglas or translog (Bemdt and Hansson
1991). Production functions, besides being a restrictive functional form, suffer from 
potential problems of simultaneous equations bias. As Bemdt and Hansson argue, 
variables such as labour input, capacity utilisation or the unemployment rate should be 
treated as endogenous, otherwise standard ordinary least squares (OLS) procedures 
produce inconsistent and biased results. Additionally, production function analysis 
reveals only the impact of public capital on production and/or productivity; it does not 
provide information about under or over-provision of public infrastructure. This 
limitation is overcome by the cost function approach.
Public capital, or more accurately its services, has no market price (the case where 
public infrastructure services are charged cannot be ruled out, but can be easily 
incorporated in a more extended model). This means that infrastructure does not enter the 
cost function directly, but indirectly via the production function. Its shadow value (this 
concept can be viewed as the opportunity cost using infrastructure resources), as well its
9 If it is assumed that capital is more or less homogeneous then technological progress would affect all 
existing production processes. This depiction of technological progress is called disembodied. An alternative 
view assumes that new technological progress demands an adaptation of the existing processes (thus 
technological progress is embodied in the capital stocks). For an introduction in this subject see Heathfield et 
al. (1987). A more advanced presentation is provided by Chambers (1988).
43
ALTERNATIVE APPROACHES
impact on labour, private capital, or total factor productivity can easily derived from 
equation 2.4.3.
Cost functions provide the opportunity to answer questions such as whether public 
capital and the other production inputs are complementaries or substitutes, whether 
public investment is crowding out private capital, what is the shadow price of public 
capital, and what is its optimal level of provision.
There are some examples of the cost function approach in infrastructure research 
in the US context, though they are much fewer in number than those using production 
functions. The main reason for the prevalence of production functions is that, despite the 
fact that the cost function analytical framework can shed light on more complex areas of 
the infrastructure and development relationship, it is much more demanding in terms of 
data requirements and econometric implementation.
Nadiri and Mamuneas (1994) examined the effects of public capital and research 
and development capital on the productivity of twelve two-digit American manufacturing 
industries using cost function analysis. Their results showed that public infrastructure has 
a significant productive effect and that it is a substitute for labour and private capital, as 
well as complementing intermediate inputs. Lynde and Richmond (1992), using a 
translog cost function, have also found that public infrastructure has a positive marginal 
product and is a complement in production to private capital. Morrison and Schwartz
1992), measuring the effect of public capital investment (in highways, water, and sewers) 
on private sector costs, concluded that infrastructure does provide a significant direct 
benefit to private manufacturing.
Even though it cannot be classified as cost function analysis, the work of Deno 
(1988), estimating a translog profit function at the regional level (metropolitan areas in 
the US), has close affinity to it. Deno discovered that there are large differential effects 
across regions and categories of infrastructure, and that the greatest impact can be found 
in declining regions.
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2.5 The international research response to the US 
infrastructure discoveries
The debate spawned by Aschauer’s original work is now by no means confined to 
the US experience. Similar research has been conducted subsequently in several other 
countries or within an international comparitive framework.
An example of the latter has indeed by provide by Aschauer himself (1989b). He 
presented a comparative study of the public investment and productivity growth of a 
group of seven major industrialised countries, concluding that infrastructure has both 
positive direct and indirect effects on the private sector output and productivity growth of 
each country.
Ford and Poret (1991) conducted similar research on private-sector productivity 
for eleven OECD countries. All of their series were differentiated, and corrected for 
second-order autocorrelation. Their findings were that public capital investment had a 
large estimated return in the US and four other countries of the sample. However, even 
though there was some evidence that countries with high public infrastructure investment 
had high productivity growth, this relationship was not particularly clear.
Another piece of international comparison is the work of Evans and Karras 
(1994b). They constructed a panel of countries (Belgium, Canada, Finland, Germany, 
Greece, the UK, and the US) and tried to examine how productive public capital is. 
Criticising Aschauer’s work on econometric grounds, they concluded that if the equations 
are specified for the country and time effects then there is no evidence that public capital 
is highly productive and underprovided in the sample countries.
There is also a body of literature from national research on how public 
infrastructure affects development.
An early paper was by Looney and Frederiksen (1981) who tried to test Hansen’s 
hypothesis, namely whether planned changes in various types of infrastructure have 
significant regional effects on income levels within a developing country. Their case 
study was Mexico and they suggested that the results tentatively confirm the truth of 
Hansen’s proposition. Also working on Mexico, Shah (1992) used a restricted
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equilibrium approach to examine the impact of public infrastructure on private sector 
profitability. He specified a restricted translog cost function and using data for twenty six 
three-digit industries for the period 1970-1987 concluded that public capital had a small 
but positive multiplier effect on output.
Bemdt and Hansson (1991) measured the contribution of public capital in 
Sweden. Using an operational empirical definition for public infrastructure they showed 
that the growth rates of real private and public capital stocks in Sweden and the US, over 
the period 1960-1988, were "surprisingly similar", which means that there was a sharp 
slowdown in public capital investment. They rejected the Cobb-Douglas production 
function framework as their results produced by such an analysis were incomprehensible. 
The adoption of the alternative cost function model showed that increases in public 
capital, ceteris paribus, did reduce private costs.
Using cost function analysis for the UK, Lynde and Richmond (1993) concluded 
that public infrastructure has played a positive role in enhancing production and reducing 
costs in the manufacturing sector.
Research results from France also support the positive impact of public capital on 
regional economic development. Prud’homme (1996), using regional production 
functions, concluded that infrastructure does indeed contribute to labour productivity. 
Public capital’s elasticity was around 0.08, when private capital’s was 0.25. However, as 
Pmd’homme observed, if spillover effects and externalities are also estimated (which was 
not the case in this particular research) then infrastructure’s elasticity will probably 
exceed that of private capital.
The interest in the effects of public capital has flourished in Spain perhaps due to 
the excellent data sources that are available. Following Biehl's line of work Cutuna and 
Paricio (1994) estimated a quasi-production function for Spain as a whole. The results 
show that infrastructure is an important explanatory factor in accounting for regional 
income differences. Bajo-Rubio and Sosvilla-Rivero (1993), using the production 
function framework for the Spanish economy also supported Aschauer’s argument. It is 
interesting to note that because of the joint dependence and non-stationarity of aggregate 
time-series they argued in favour of cointegrating regression methods. Mas et al. (1996)
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conducted similar research for the Spanish regions. They also used a Cobb-Douglas 
production function and concluded that public capital in Spain had significant positive 
effects on the productivity of the private sector (with the exception of education and 
health). They also found that there were spillover (network) effects, as the elasticity of 
labour productivity to the stock of productive public capital was greater in the estimations 
where the public capital stock was composed of each particular region and the 
neighbouring ones. However, it was discovered that the effect of some forms of public 
capital on the productivity of the Spanish regions has decreased over time.
Public capital also has been demonstrated to display a positive role on the private 
sector of the Greek economy. That is the basic conclusion from a time series analysis of 
Dalamagas (1995), and Segoura and Christodoulakis (1997), who used a broad definition 
of infrastructure working at the national level (both these pieces of research are discussed 
more extensively in chapters 4,5 and 7).
Seitz and Licht (1995), using a translog cost function and a panel data set, 
estimated the impact of public capital for the eleven states of the (former West) Germany. 
They concluded that public infrastructure formation encouraged private investment and 
that such a policy instrument can be considered as an efficient instrument to improve the 
competitiveness of cities, regions, and nations.
Sturm and de Haan (1995) used a Cobb-Douglas production function not only for 
the US economy (see above), but also for the Netherlands. Their estimations for the 
Dutch economy gave rather peculiar results (several cases exhibited a negative private 
capital elasticity and a labour elasticity above one), even though they were estimated in 
first differences. Toen-Gout and Jongeling (1993, cited in Hakfoort 1996), however, 
achieved really rather high positive coefficients for their study of the effects of Dutch 
public capital.
In a context of underdevelopment, Elhance and Lakshmanan (1988) used multi­
equation econometric models in which public capital was a quasi-fixed input, to examine 
infrastructure-production system dynamics in India, both at national and regional levels 
(six states of the Indian Union). They suggested that there is evidence “o f considerable 
lagging o f infrastructure stock development optimally desired levels, and an emphasis on
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more directly productive economic infrastructures vis-a-vis indirectly productive social 
infrastructures would seem to support the conceptual formulations by Hirschman” (p. 
529).
A recent attempt to evaluate public capital’s role in Japan is that of Miyawaki and 
Tobita (1992). They argued that fiscal austerity reached even Japan during the eighties 
and that this has had, as a result, a significant decrease in public investment in 
infrastructure, for the first time since 1945. Their findings showed that what they called 
‘industrial infrastructure’ (a term covering all public invested capital with the exception 
housing, water/sewer systems, urban parks, educational facilities, and other social and 
cultural facilities) made an important, though declining, contribution to national GDP 
between 1976-1988. These results were corroborated by the work of Ohkawara and 
Yamano (1997). This research has an accentuated spatial dimension, analysing the effects 
of the regional allocation of public infrastructure by numerical simulations.
2.6 Considering empirical specifications and technical 
problems in infrastructure research
Most of the researchers involved in the US debate regarding the effects of public 
capital on productivity and/or the output of national or regional economies have used the 
production function approach. However, there is no unanimity about its exact 
specification and it is certainly the case that the specific form of the production function 
can affect the results of the research. The range of choice in the final formulation is 
surprisingly wide, given the rather rigid theoretical model that Cobb-Douglas function 
seems to be.
A first choice, not of particularly real substance, is that the analysis can be 
formulated in terms of output, private capital productivity, or labour productivity as 
dependent variables.
There are, however, significant differences in how the empirical models are 
formulated in empirical research. For instance, Aschauer (1989a) has employed, in 
addition to the three factors of production (private capital, labour, and public capital),
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capacity utilisation as a measure for the influence of the business cycle. He has also used 
capacity utilisation to assess the argument that the productivity decline in the US was a 
result of the declining capacity use. Munnell in her national analysis (1990a) also used 
capacity utilisation. However, in her regional paper (1990b) she used the unemployment 
rate as this variable can reflect the cyclical nature of productivity. Ford and Poret (1991) 
argued that the inclusion of this variable is imperative, since in their research residuals 
from regressions excluding this term were highly auto-correlated.
Another controversial and probably more important problem, is whether the data 
should be in differentiated form or not (which, in terms of econometrics, can be 
translated as the question whether the time-series used are stationary or not). Aaron 
(1990), Hulten and Schwab (1991a), Jorgenson (1991), Tatom (1991b), and Sturm and de 
Haan (1995) all argue that one of the basic problems of the time series analysis, on which 
the Aschauer-Munnell arguments are based, is trend which some times produces 
spectacular fits. There are several econometrics methods dealing with this problem, and 
one of the most popular is based on the first differences of the variables entering the 
production equations. It is important to recognise that the aforementioned researchers 
using such techniques reached results contradicting those of Aschauer and Munnell. The 
latter, however, rejected the idea of differentiating the data, arguing that such a technique 
would destroy “any long-term relationship in the data, which is exactly what one is trying 
to estimate” (Munnell 1992, p. 193). Bajo-Rubio and Sosvilla-Rivero (1993) have used 
cointegration techniques, rejecting simple OLS methods as invalid, and yet their results 
still supported the Aschauer argument. Dalenberg and Partridge (1995) argued that first 
differences over three years intervals would take into account long-run differences, while 
at the same time check for the spurious regression argument.
Another point of debate is when the empirical work is not confined to the use of 
time series, but instead panel data analysis is used. This is of great interest for regional 
analysis as, mostly, infrastructure data do have a spatial dimension. The allocation of 
investment funds is usually based on the different needs of the smaller geographical units 
within a larger total, for example the state level of the Federal programme in the US. In 
other cases, it is the local or regional government that has the responsibility to devise an 
investment programme for infrastructure. In any event, it is easy and often helpful to use
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data from a lower spatial level to construct, for instance, a panel data for the higher level. 
This means that the treatment of these combined data sets (which have both a time series 
and a cross section dimension) can contain important pieces of information not available 
from a single time-series or cross-section. However, at the same time, different 
econometric techniques are needed, as panel data analysis presents some rather special 
technical difficulties.
One such difficulty is the fact that different geographical units are endowed with 
different locational characteristics, such climate, labour markets, levels of 
industrialisation or urbanisation, and the like. These regional differences at the level of 
the lower spatial unit, which is the base for the analysis panel (a state in the case of the 
US), will enter into the error term as an unobserved component. One of the most common 
techniques in panel data analysis is to use the least squares dummy variables model 
(LSDV), instead of the ordinary least squares model (OLS). In the LSDV model 
differences across the geographical units can be captured by the use of binary variables 
representing each one of these units. This fixed effects model can be extended to include 
time differences for the period of the analysis. An alternative method is the use of a 
random effects model, especially in the case where the sampled cross-sectional units are 
drawn from a large population10.
Munnell (1990b), in her regional analysis for the US, used states as the spatial 
units in the panel (48 states for the period 1970-86). She estimated the effects of public 
capital in the production process of the US as a whole and its regions (Northeast, 
Northcentral, South, West) using the standard OLS procedures. Nevertheless, the 
employment of simple regression techniques, as Holtz-Eakin observed (1993c), produces 
biased and inconsistent results. He supported again the argument of reverse causation, 
this time at regional level. Rich states, in terms of locational endowment, will have 
greater income and output than poorer ones. That increases their ability to invest in public 
infrastructure. Holtz-Eakin suggested that research techniques such as those implemented 
by Munnell present these public investment programmes to produce rich states, when the
10 For a consideration of these techniques, see Greene (1993): Econometric Analysis. A more extensive 
analysis of the panel data methods can be found in Hsiao (1986) Analysis of Panel Data and Baltagi (1995) 
Econometric Analysis of Panel Data.
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association is in fact the other way round. Other researchers seem to agree with this point 
(Eisner 1991). Holtz-Eakin argued of the necessity to include in the production function, 
and particularly in the specification of the error term, a component that would capture the 
regional characteristics.
Kelejian and Robinson (1994) specified a panel data Cobb-Douglas production 
function by OLS for their estimations without using state dummy variables, but taking 
into account the public capital and output per labour ratio in the bordering states. At a 
second stage, they offered an account of the problems that such a model may entail, for 
example, the role of state dummies, autocorrelation, heteroskedasticity, spatial 
correlation, endogeneity of the production factors, and unit roots. Their overall 
conclusion was that infrastructure does not play a role in private sector's productivity. 
They also argued that it is not necessary to use state-specific characteristics as Holtz- 
Eakin did to obtain this result. They reached similar results in a more resent piece 
(Kelejian and Robinson 1997) where they also argued that the high coefficients of labour 
elasticities, which by the way, are the norm in the Cobb-Douglas literature for 
infrastructure, may be an indication that the labour variable is a proxy for omitted 
variables. They also explored several aspects of the spatial dimension in infrastructure 
research, especially addressing the problem of spatial correlation.
The problem in accounting for the lower spatial units of a panel data set has also 
occurred in another aspect of infrastructure research - international comparisons. Evans 
and Karras (1994b) criticised Aschauer’s (1989b) work in this respect, as in his panel 
analysis for the group of seven industrialised countries he did not allow for fixed or 
random effects for time or/and country. As Evans and Karras commented Aschauer did 
not even take into consideration the fact that capital-output ratios varied over time and 
between countries. The results Evans and Karras reached for their panel (consisting of 
different countries) showed that public capital is not productive, which is the exact 
opposite of Aschauer’s findings.
Another problem of regional production function analysis based on panel data, 
apart from the aforementioned treatment of the regional specific effects, is the 
simultaneous determination of observed quantities of private and public capital, labour,
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and output. The proposed remedy by Holtz-Eakin (1992) was the use of instrumental 
variables11 estimators by which the simultaneity bias can be circumvented.
In aggregate research studies of the monetary type the aggregation of data per se 
can create some significant conceptual and technical problems, as all aggregation 
methods have their weak spots. If the output of a country or a region is measured in terms 
of gross production value, several restrictive assumptions should be adopted in order to 
treat intermediate goods. One such assumption can be, for instance, that intermediate 
inputs should have a constant near to unity marginal product. If there are data available 
for the respective value-added, this problem can be circumvented.
For the calculation of capital stocks, either public or private, different methods 
can be employed, the most popular being that of perpetual inventory. A relevant difficulty 
for aggregate studies is the calculation of capital depreciation. If the empirical research 
applies only to a specific industry there would be no problem (that is, if the depreciation 
rates and life times of all pieces of fixed assets and machinery were known). However, in 
many pieces of macro-scale research, it is assumed that all industries of a sector or, even 
worse, all firms in all industrial sectors in a region or country have the same rate of 
depreciation. Gramlich (1994), referring especially to the measurement of infrastructure 
depreciation, argued that as public capital rarely is sold the economic rates of its 
depreciation are almost never directly measured.
The treatment of aggregate data for labour is not less problematic. Usually, what 
is used as a proxy for labour input is the average annual employment (most of the time 
adjusted by worked hours). A frequent assumption is that labour is qualitatively 
homogeneous or, in other words, that every worker or employee has the same endowment 
of skills. However, differences in labour force, such as between males and females, 
educated or not, skilled and unskilled, should be weighted in order to have a more 
reasonable approximation of the real situation.
11 The ‘instrumental variable’ of a variable Yh for instance, is a proxy variable, which is highly correlated with 
Yu but uncorrelated with the error term of the regression (see Gujarati 1995). In the specific case, Holtz- 
Eakin constructed an instrumental variable estimator that used the input levels of some states as the 
explanatory variables for other states (see section 2.2, in Holtz-Eakin 1992a).
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2.7 What does the future hold for research on the 
infrastructure development relationship?
For sure, production and cost function approaches can reveal some of the 
complicated aspects of the relation between public capital and development. There are, 
though, many facets of this relationship that have not yet been analysed thoroughly. This 
gap has fed some recent attempts to use more complex methods and models in 
infrastructure research.
A major research project at the London School of Economics has recently 
investigated the impact of the EU Cohesion Fund on the development of the four 
recipient countries - Spain, Portugal, Ireland, and Greece. One of the main areas of this 
study was an exploration of the regional effects of infrastructure investment in the 
aforementioned countries. Several different and innovative approaches were employed, 
because, as the final report (ESCL LSE 1996) argues, an “all encompassing model” does 
not exist and the traditional approaches either are invalid and/or do not have the ability to 
account for spillovers and dynamic effects. The main analytical tools employed by the 
research group were vector autoregressive (VAR) techniques12, and economic modelling 
(general equilibrium models as well as dynamic models). The principal results of the 
study were that public capital has a direct positive impact on private investment 
decisions, that there is no major difference in the impact of transport and other 
infrastructure capital, and that the regional spillovers are more important in some 
countries than others.
There are some other examples of VAR analysis for the investigation of public 
capital’s effect on private sector output. Clarida used data from the United States, Britain, 
France, and Germany (1993), McMillin and Smyth (1994) also examined the US case, 
and Otto and Voss (1996) applied the methodology to Australia. (For a more extensive 
analysis for these attempts to utilise the VAR approach can be found in Sturm 1998.) The
12 Vector autregression (VAR) is a simple method by which the problem of deciding which variable is 
endogenous and which is exogenous can be circumvented. VAR modelling, however, has been criticised as 
a-theoretical and “an article of faith” (Greene 1993, p. 553). For introductory presentations of the problems 
and limitations of the VAR technique see Gujarati (1995) or Greene (1993). For a discussion of VAR models 
in macroeconomic modelling, see Cooley and LeRoy (1985).
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overall result from these VAR analyses is that either public capital has no significant 
effect on private output, or that the causality of this relationship is not yet clear.
Recently a Spanish team of researchers tried to analyse “the total and dynamic 
partial effects o f public capital on output, employment and stock o f private capital by 
making use o f a structural VARMA13 approach (Flores de Frutos et al. 1998, p. 992). 
Their empirical findings showed that there is a long-term positive effect of public capital 
investment on the private sector variables. At the same time, however, it is shown that 
previous values of the private sector variables also affect the current level of public 
capital.
There have recently been several attempts to construct general models for the 
economy incorporating public capital, and the above mentioned project is one of them. 
The general lack of formal economic modelling can be considered as one of the 
deficiencies of the recent public capital debate. As Holtz-Eakin and Lovely (1996) have 
argued, the vast majority of the empirical literature has been confined to estimations of 
the productivity effects of infrastructure, neglecting the mechanism by which public 
capital affects firms, markets, and equilibrium production in each sector of the economy.
Alogoskoufis and Kalyvitis (1996) have provided a theoretical model for 
endogenous growth in an open economy with both private and public capital. They model 
alternative public policies regarding infrastructure investment and they concluded that “a 
transition period is required during which the private sector experiences a changing 
marginal product o f public capital. Private investment adjusts gradually until the 
economy ends in the new steady-state14. In this sense public capital formation can 
become the engine o f growth as higher public investment generates ongoing growth” (p. 
13).
13 For an analysis of this method, see Hamilton (1994).
14 ‘Steady state’ is the point at which the “amount of capital per worker remains constant' (Jones 1998, p. 
25; see also Mankiw 1997).
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Erenburg (1993) examined the relationship between private sector and public 
sector investment in the US with the use of a simple rational expectations model, 
comprised of a two-equation system. It was assumed that public investment is determined 
by the public investment and public deficit in the previous time period, and private 
investment from private and public investment and public deficit of the previous period. 
The results showed that the relation of the investment behaviour of the two sectors was 
positive.
Holtz-Eakin and Schwartz (1994) presented a neoclassical model of economic 
growth emphasising the role of infrastructure. Public capital stock is assumed to be a 
component of the aggregate production function (of the model economy). Then the 
evolution and characteristics of the steady state of the economy (see above for definition) 
are analysed. The empirical calibration of the model for the US economy, showed that 
public sector capital accumulation did not explain the growth patterns of the constituent 
states.
Another simple, but rather complete model, of a small economy has been offered 
by Holtz-Eakin and Lovely (1996) who then tested using panel data based on the states of 
the US. They sketched a simple economy comprised by two commodities (wheat and 
finished manufactures as they call them), two inputs15 (labour and capital), and tried to 
incorporate infrastructure and to formulate its effects on the private sector of the 
economy. This model assumes that there are also intermediate goods, or components in 
their terminology, which are used for the production of the finished manufactures. These 
components are also assumed as unique to their local economies (there is no trade in 
intermediate goods). The provision of public capital by the government alters the cost 
structure of the components production, which leads to changes of their preferred levels 
of production. According to Holtz-Eakin and Lovely, an increase of public capital 
provision would have, as a result, an increase in the number of component producers and 
thus would enhance “any external economies of the finished manufactures industry” 
(1996, p. 113).
15 Holtz-Eakin and Lovely noted that this model can be easily altered to a three inputs model, including 
mobile capital, and two immobile factors, labour and land (see Holtz-Eakin et al. 1996, footnote 6).
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However, there is the possibility that this increase of component producers would 
not be large enough in order to have an expansion of the manufacturing sector (that is, of 
course, the sector of finished “manufactures” production). Holtz-Eakin and Lovely 
concluded that their analysis “suggests that the effects of infrastructure provision are far 
from direct and clear-cut”.
The empirical calibration of this model, again for the American states, gave some 
interested results. It was assumed that infrastructure does not directly affect non- 
manufacturing sector, but has an impact on manufacturing, through a number of ways. 
One such way is by “altering the preferred scale of production for each firm in the 
manufacturing sector”. Their results suggest that infrastructure does not have a significant 
impact on manufacturing output. Another possible way is by affecting the equilibrium 
number of firms. Holtz-Eakin and Lovely basic argument is that it is this latter, subtler, 
way by which public capital affects production. Infrastructure increases the number of 
manufacturing establishments, and this in turn has a result an increase of the 
manufacturing output. The increase of the establishments’ number creates external 
returns, which would give, in turn, a rise on manufacturing productivity (ibid., p. 122).
2.8 Conclusions
The new infrastructure research paradigm initiated by the work of Aschauer in the 
late eighties has followed a monetary approach to the measurement of public capital 
stock. It can be safely argued that this approach has prevailed over the physical measuring 
alternative, at least for aggregate research at regional, national, and international levels. 
For both measurement types, however, the problem of an exact measurement of 
infrastructure utilisation remains, as these methods can only provide a picture of the 
existing capital stock capacity, but not of the intensity which this stock is used.
In the recent research there are two analytical frameworks which have been 
extensively used. The first, and more popular, is the use of production function analysis, 
usually as a Cobb-Douglas or translog form. The second utilises duality theory and cost 
(or profit) functions. Despite the problem that the empirical implementation of cost 
function framework is more complex and data demanding, it can shed light on more
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complex aspects of the inffastructure-productivity relationship. It circumvents potential 
problems of simultaneous equations bias of the production function approach and can 
give information about the level of public capital provision.
In this debate over the role of infrastructure in development there are two opposite 
views of the role of public capital. One supports the argument that public capital is a 
significant factor in determining private sector production. This school of thought reaches 
high and significant results for infrastructure’s impact on private output when the 
production function approach is implemented, and concludes that infrastructure provides 
significant direct benefits to manufacturing costs. This positive role of infrastructure on 
economic and regional development when viewed in policy terms means that new 
investment in public capital is necessary where the existing stock is deemed as 
inadequate or outdated. In short, infrastructure becomes an important and efficient tool of 
economic planning, either at the regional or national level. There are, however, the 
sceptics, who believe that these positive results are a product of inappropriate 
econometric techniques. Even if these results are accepted, this school of thought 
believes that the direction of causation in the inffastructure-development relationship is 
not from the former to the latter, but vice-versa. This camp advocates against the 
commissioning of new infrastructure projects, and has been especially vocal in the US 
context.
Nevertheless, most empirical research worldwide, as summarised in Tables 2.1,
2.2, and 2.3, seems to find some evidence in favour of the positive role of public capital. 
Recently, even Holtz-Eakin, who has been one of the most prominent figures in the group 
which rejects the positive results for infrastructure, identified other, more subtle ways, in 
which public capital can affect, in a positive way, the private economy.
From the empirical evidence it has also emerged that investment in the productive 
dimension of public capital16 (transportation, sewage, energy facilities, etc.) has a 
positive effect on the economy, certainly in comparison to an equivalent investment in 
social infrastructure (education, health, housing, administration, etc.) which has a 
negative or insignificant effect. These results are consistent with what is intuitively
16 Some authors use the term core infrastructure in this context (Aschauer 1989; Munnell 1990).
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expected. However, it must be kept in mind that usually only invested capital in 
buildings, materials, etc. are used as a proxy of social infrastructure services, when the 
services in these sectors include a great part of human capital, such as teachers, medical 
and clerical staff, etc. Future research in these particular categories of public capital will 
need to include more the human dimension before final judgements are made.
This last point is directly linked to the fact that, until now, a great part of research 
refers to infrastructure as a total, or perhaps there is just a distinction between productive 
and social infrastructure. However, there is a great need for analysis for the particular 
types of public capital (transportation, energy facilities, education, health, etc.). There is 
an existing literature for some of these categories, especially for transportation (Button 
1996), but for others a much deeper investigation is needed.
Another important conclusion is that the spatial dimension does matter in the 
infrastructure debate. Even though the research presented here is at a more macro scale, 
there are numerous examples of research on specific infrastructure projects (airports, 
highways, bridges, etc.). If this is taken as the smallest spatial level then four more levels 
can be distinguished - urban infrastructure research (effects of public capital on urban 
centres and land prices, Haughwout 1994; 1996), regional research, national research, and 
that of international comparisons. The results from the US research have shown that the 
larger the level of analysis, the larger is the estimated impact of public capital (Aschauer 
1993a), or at least for some of the infrastructure categories (Haughwout 1994)17. One 
potential explanation is that a larger scale analysis reveals spillover effects, which 
otherwise would remain undetectable. It has to be mentioned here that there are examples 
of work in which the existence of such spillover effects has been specifically investigated 
(Mas et al. 1996).
One of the weaknesses of the methods described is that there is no thorough 
investigation of some of the macroeconomic infrastructure effects. Infrastructure 
investment as a tool of national or regional policy can make possible the diversification 
of the economy towards new products or sectors, or areas. Consistency of public
17 However, Boamet has argued that “although much effort has been devoted in arguing whether state or 
national infrastructure stocks are too large or too small, the most important effects are the locar (1998, p. 
398).
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infrastructure investment can act as a counterbalance to political or business cycles. 
Related to this point is the notion that infrastructure investment can be a channel by 
which there can be a permanent flow of resources from consumption to investment in 
countries or regions where the market for capital is underdeveloped or distorted. There is 
potential, for example, of the use of an extensive public infrastructure programme instead 
of a stabilisation one; usually the latter is used in order to maintain credibility of the 
public sector. However, there is always the danger that a stabilisation policy can lead to 
high unemployment and stagnation. Public infrastructure investment could, potentially, 
be a more reliable long-term alternative to such policies, as in many cases governments 
tend to loosen fiscal austerity measures before elections, contrary to public investment 
policies, which are popular with the electorate. There is also the argument that favours 
the role of public capital investment as a more efficient Keynesian policy tool in 
comparison with enhanced traditional public spending of other sorts (for a more extensive 
analysis of these points see for instance Kessides 1996).
The following tables (2.1 to 2.3) presents a summary of most of the important 
examples of infrastructure research18. The first contains empirical research based on the 
production function approach, the second, research that has utilised the cost function 
approach, and the last details other pieces of research. Even a cursory examination of 
these tables shows that most of the cost function analyses have produced results that 
support the thesis that public capital investment has a beneficial impact on the private 
sector of the economy. The results for the other approaches tend to be mixed, even 
though, it can be argued that there is more evidence for a positive infrastructure impact 
than the converse.
18 Appendix V presents additional bibliographical references on infrastructure maintenance, management, 
privatization, and other related topics.
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Table 2.1 Production function approach - Selected Studies
Author Year Country Level of Aggregation Specification Results for Public Capital
Aschauer 1989a USA National Cobb-Douglas p.f. high positive
Aschauer 1989b International
Comparison
Panel of Group of Seven 
Industr. Countries
Cobb-Douglas p.f. high positive
Bajo-Rubio
etal..
1993 Spain National Cobb-Douglas p.f. 
time series (cointegration)
high positive
Baltagi and 
Pinnoi
1995 USA Panel of the 48 states Cobb-Douglas p.f. some of G categories (water etc.) 
positive
Bergman and 
Sun
1996 USA Regional Cobb-Douglas p.f. distinct effects in regions at 
different develop, levels
Cutanda and 
Paricio
1994 Spain National quasi-production function high positive
Eisner 1991 USA National-Regional
(States)
Cobb-Douglas p.f.
Time series-Cross Section
positive
Evans and 
Karras
1994 USA National Cobb-Douglas p.f. 
(differenciated) Panel data
negative productivity of public 
capital (except education)
Evans and 
Karras
1994 International
Comparison
Panel of 7 OECD 
countries
Cobb-Douglas p.f. 
(differenciated) Panel data
no evidence that public capital is 
productive
Ford and 
Poret
1991 International
Comparison
Comparison of 11 OECD 
countries
Cobb-Douglas p.f. 
(differenciated) Time Series
ambiguous findings
Garcia-Mila 
and McGuire
1988 USA National-Regional
(States)
Cobb-Douglas p.f.
Time series-Cross Section
positive
Garcia-Mila,
etal.
1996 USA National Cobb-Douglas p.f. 
(differenciated) Panel data
not significant
Holtz-Eakin 1992 USA National-Regional Cobb-Douglas p.f. 
Panel data
almost zero
Hulten and 
Schwab
1991 USA Regional Cobb-Douglas p.f. 
(differenciated) Time Series
does not generate externalities
Kelejian and 
Robinson
1994 USA National Cobb-Douglas p.f.
Time series-Cross Section
does not play a role in private 
sector's productivity
Kelejian and 
Robinson
1997 USA Panel comprised by USA 
states
Cobb-Douglas p.f. 
Panel data
results sensitive to specification 
regional G involves spillovers
Mas, etal. 1996 Spain National-Regional Cobb-Douglas p.f. 
Panel data analysis
positive
Mera 1973 Japan Regional Cobb-Douglas p.f 
Panel data analysis
high positive
Miyawaki 
and Tobita
1992 Japan National Cobb-Douglas p.f. high positive
Munnell 1990a USA National Cobb-Douglas p.f. high positive
Munnell 1990b USA Regional Cobb-Douglas p.f.
Time series-Cross section
significant positive
Ohkawara 
and Yamano*
1997 Japan Regional/National Cobb-Douglas p.f. 
Simulation of reg allocations
significant positive in the 
production function
Rrud’homme 19% France Regional/National Cobb-Douglas p.f. significant positive
Ratner 1983 USA National Cobb-Douglas p.f. small positive
Rovolis and 
Spence
1998 Greece Regional/National (Panel 
data analysis)
Cobb-Douglas p.f. significant positive
Segoura & 
Christodoul.
1997 Greece National (Time series) Cobb-Douglas p.f. significant positive
Sturm and 
deHaan
1995 USA
Netherlands
National Cobb-Douglas p.f. 
First differenced
does not play a role (both in 
USA and the Netherlands)
Tatom 1991 USA National 
(Business sector)
Cobb-Douglas pf. 
(differenciated)
Insignificant
Toen-Gout & 
Jongeling
1993 Netherlands National Cobb-Douglas p.f. significant positive
G = infrastructure
p.f. = production function
* See there for the results of other research teams
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Table 2.2 Cost (and profit) function approach - Selected Studies
Author Year Country Level of Aggregation Specification Results for Public Capital
Bemdtand
Hansson
1991 Sweden National Variable Cost function increases in private capital 
reduce private costs
Conrad and 
Seitz
1994 Germany National Cost function public capital contributes to total 
factor productivity
Lynde 1992 USA National Profit rate function Increasing G may help to restore 
profit rate and increase output
Lynde and 
Ricnmond
1992 USA National Cost function (translog) high positive
Lynde and 
Ricnmond
1993 USA National Profit function (translog) G is an important part of 
production process
Lynde and 
Ricnmond
1993 United
Kingdom
National Cost function (translog) high positive
Morrison & 
Schwartz
1992 USA Regional Variable Cost function public capital augments 
productivity growth
Morrison & 
Schwartz
1996 USA Regional (New England 
manufacturing sector)
Variable Cost function G has cost-saving benefits 
(in the short-run)
Nadiriand
Mamuneas
1991 USA Manufacturing (12 2- 
digit Industries)
Translog Cost function significant productive effects
Seitz 1993 Germany National 
(Public roads)
Leontief Generalized c.f. 
Panel data analysis
K & G complementary 
L & G substitutes
Seitz 1994 Germany National
(Core public capital)
Leontief Generalized c.f. 
Panel data analysis
K & G complementary 
L & G substitutes
Seitz and 
Light
1995 Germany Regional Translog Cost function 
Panel data analysis
strongly encourages private 
invest & reg. competitiveness
Shah 1992 Mexico Manufacturing (23 3- 
digit Industries)
Translog Cost function 
Restricted Equilibrium appr.
small positive multiplier effect 
on output
c.f. = cost function
K = private capital, L = labour, G = public capital
Table 2.3 Other approaches for infrastructure research - Selected Studies
Author Year Country Level of Aggregation Specification Results for Public Capital*
Duffy-Deno 
and Eberts
1991 USA Regional (28 standard 
metropolitan statis. areas)
Simultaneous equations 
system
significant positive
Eberts 1991 USA Regional (40 standard 
metropolitan statis. areas)
Correlation and Regression 
analysis
positive
Eberts and 
Fogarty
1987 USA Urban areas Correlation and Regression 
analysis
positive
Elhance and 
Lakshmanan
1988 India National-Regional 
(6 States)
Multiequation model -
Erenburg 1993 USA Nationale Rational expectations model positive significant relationhip 
between priv.& public investm.
Flores, 
Gracia and 
Perez
1998 Spain National Structural (VARMA) 
approach
positive long-term effects of 
public capital on private sector 
variables
Holtz-Eakin
and
Lovely
1996 USA National General equilibrium model affecting manufacturing 
productivity via indirect channels
Holtz-Eakin
and
Schwartz
1994 USA National Neoclassical growth model negligible impact on annual 
productivity growth
Neill 1996 USA National Neoclassical Growth Model An increase of public capital 
should lead to an output increase
•Where there is a direct estimation
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Chapter 3
The Evolution o f the Public Investm ent 
Programme in Greece: 1976-1992
3.1 Introduction
The first step for the assessment of the role of public infrastructure in national and 
regional economic development is to compile the relevant data, preferably at the lowest 
possible spatial level. The powerful role that the central state has played in Greek 
economic life has been an advantage for the completion of this task, as the great bulk of 
infrastructure capital has been centrally invested. The data for the regional breakdown of 
the state’s Public Investment Programme (PIPR) have provided the opportunity to have 
an analytical dimension for the role of such investment at the prefectural (nomos) level.
This chapter provides a detailed analysis of the PIPR. Section 3.2 outlines a 
general description of the PIPR, and section 3.3 presents the historical and legal 
framework under which it was created and developed. Section 3.4 examines the basic 
categories of infrastructure that constitute the PIPR investment expenditure, as well as 
those aggregate categories that will be used in the subsequent chapters for the empirical 
analysis. This section has a sub-component in which the PIPR is compared to other 
macroeconomic variables. The regional distribution of public infrastructure investment 
has also been analysed with a particular emphasis on the regional inequalities of this 
distribution. Section 3.5 contains a brief discussion of the method that has been followed 
for the construction of the public capital stocks, which are again used subsequently in the 
analytical phases of the study. The final part summarises the PIPR presentation.
It has to be noted that there are some aspects of the PIPR which have not been 
analysed here, mainly due to space limitations. Questions concerning the finance 
dimension of the PIPR, and especially its relation to public borrowing and EU (former
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EEC) funding, are of great importance generally within Greece. The interested reader can 
find an exhaustive analysis in Psyharis (1990).
3.2 The PIPR as an estim ate of the Public Capital in Greece
There are several empirical ways through which it is possible to investigate the 
relationship between infrastructure and regional development. In this research, the PIPR 
has been used as the basic source of information on the public infrastructure capacity in 
Greece and its regions. This programme was, and still is, the main channel by which the 
state is investing in the public infrastructure.
Empirical estimation of public investment in infrastructure has long been 
problematic and a number of difficulties usually have to be overcome. For instance, the 
estimation of infrastructure investment in terms of physical capacity (roads, airports, 
ports, etc.) has the inherent difficulty of an adequate description of the qualitative features 
of the infrastructure stock. There are several methods for the estimation of these 
qualitative parameters, for example weighting the length of a highway by the number of 
lanes. However, here it was decided to use actual investment flows and these can be 
calibrated using the PIPR expenditure. This is the monetary approach of measurement of 
public capital, which has been the dominant method in recent examples of infrastructure 
research (for a more extensive presentation of the physical and monetary approach, as 
well as a hybrid method, see chapter 2, section 2.2.2). Its major advantage is that it makes 
inter-temporal and inter-regional comparisons possible, with care.
The use of the PIPR as an estimate of the public infrastructure capacity, 
nevertheless, is not unproblematic. Using the PIPR exclusively, the level of the actual 
investment is underestimated because in Greece there are some alternative sources of 
public investment. Their contribution to the public capital formation is not captured by 
the exclusive use of the PIPR. These alternative sources of infrastructure investment are 
via the Public Companies and Corporations (DEKO) and Local Governments (OTA)1. 
Table 3.1 gives an estimation of the percentage of each source of Gross Investment in 
Fixed Capital during the period 1976-1987:
1 There is a complex relationship between PIPR and DEKO. Indeed part of DEKO's investment has been 
financed by the PIPR. For an extensive analysis of the subject, see Psyharis (1990), Part n, Chapter 2.
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Table 3.1 Source o f gross investment in fixed capital in Greece, 1976-1987
Y ear P IP R DEK O  
(Public E nterprises)
OTA
(Local G overnm ent)
1976 60.36 33.88 5.76
1977 59.95 31.41 8.65
1978 51.05 41.43 7.51
1979 44.75 48.60 6.65
1980 34.10 59.49 6.41
1981 39.29 52.54 8.17
1982 33.78 57.88 8.34
1983 37.41 53.33 9.26
1984 40.59 48.72 10.69
1985 38.79 51.01 10.20
1986 42.59 46.81 10.60
1987 43.34 47.10 9.56
Source: Psyharis 1990
This underestimation will inevitably subsequently lead to the underestimation of the 
magnitude of the actual infrastructure stock and its effects on regional productivity.
However, there is a rationale justifying the exclusive use of the PIPR. Even 
though the magnitude of the investment of public companies and enterprises is 
substantial, there are several reasons why it makes sense not to lake it into account. First, 
in other countries most of these companies belong to the private sector - water or electric 
power companies for example in the United States, telecommunication companies in the 
United Kingdom, etc. In Greece, however, they are owned by the public sector for various 
economic and historical reasons2. Their inclusion would make the comparison with 
similar research carried out in other countries difficult. Secondly, these companies have 
their own agenda for investment, especially in terms of the spatial distribution of 
investment projects, dictated by the particular aims of the company. For instance, DEH 
(Public Company for Electricity) and OTE (Greek Telecommunication Enterprise) have 
on many occasions invested in a specific prefecture or region, because of the existence of 
raw materials. More specifically it is the case that DEH allocates much of its investment 
to regions with lignite deposits.
2 In Greece, it has been the responsibility of the public sector to accomplish the necessary investment 
projects in telecommunications, electric power, or water supply. The main reason for this has been that the 
private sector would be unable to manage and undertake such public works, simply given its small size in 
comparison with the sector elsewhere. Concurrently, constant international difficulties with neighboring 
countries made it necessary (for reasons of national safety) for the control of telecommunications and 
electric power to remain in the hands of the public sector.
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More generally, while investigating the role of public capital in regional 
development, there is always the problem of spreading the benefits of an infrastructure 
investment located specifically in one region over other regions which receive the 
resultant service. This problem would be magnified if public companies were included in 
the calculations. It is in the nature of a public telecommunications or an electricity 
company, for example, to produce their goods in a specific location and distribute them in 
other regions. In Greece the public companies that produce electric power, utilise oil 
deposits, exploit the railway services or mail services, as well as telecommunications, 
operate on a national scale only and have no regional public or private competitors. In 
order to estimate the regional effects of such infrastructure investment, it would be 
necessary to use proxies, for example the number of telephone lines in a region. This 
would have made for extreme difficulties in making these data compatible with those of 
the PIPR.
The case of the OTA (Local Governments) infrastructure investment is different. 
They invest in many of the PIPR categories. However, the data for their investments are 
simply not available. Instead, what is available are figures relating to the central 
government aid3 to the local state for their investment projects (since this aid is given via 
the PIPR) and especially the prefectural expenditures (a more extensive analysis of this 
category will follow shortly).
Another problem arising from the use of PIPR is that not all amounts included 
represent real investment projects. Some PIPR categories reflect operational costs, or 
other costs, such as interest to be paid, as the public sector has been sometimes forced to 
borrow money in order to finance the PIPR. Nevertheless, as the PIPR is divided into 
categories of expenditure, it has been possible to exclude the amounts that do not 
represent real investment in infrastructure (as will be demonstrated later in this chapter).
3 For a more extensive analysis, see Greek Company for the Local Development and Government (1989), 
chapter 4. It must be emphasised that the works financed and completed solely by local government in 
Greece are limited to the development of common spaces, construction of sports centers, building 
infrastructure for the needs of local government, etc.
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3.3 The Origins o f the Public Investment Programme
3.3.1 The historical background of public capital in Greece
The Greek public sector became the dominant actor in the economic life of the 
new state shortly after the war of independence against the Ottoman rule. For whatever 
the reasons4, the fact remains that during the nineteenth century the Greek public sector 
expanded significantly, as table 3.2 indicates.
Even though the public sector was relatively large, public works and infrastructure 
investment was not a high priority in this early economic history of the modem state. 
According to Svoronos (1972) there were only 450 kilometres of public roads until 1864, 
and the remaining public works were insignificant (cited in Tsoukalas 1989, p. 65). In 
1864, 853 kilometres of roads were added to the existing road system, as the Ionian 
Islands were annexed to Greece5. Subsequently, the policy implemented by the Prime 
Minister Trikoupis, who considered the construction of the necessary infrastructure as a 
prerequisite for the economic development of Greece, resulted in 2750 kilometres of 
roads, a railway network, various ports, and the Korinthian canal being added.
Table 3.2 Public expenditure per capita in selected nations
(in golden francs)
1830 1840 1850 1870 1881
Great Britain 57.5 50 50 56.2 58.7
France 31.2 42.5 43.7 62.5 85
Germany 15 18.7 21.2 31.2 50
Russia 11.2 12.5 16.2 23.7 25
Italy 18.7 25 38.7 42.5 50
Sweden 12.5 12.5 12.5 21.2 27.5
Spain 20 22.5 25 50 50
USA 5 7.5 8.7 37.5 26.2
Portugal 13.7 21.2 25 30 45
Belgium 22.5 31.2 33.7 35 52.5
Greece 25 25 25 42.5 56.2
Source: Mulhall (1886), cited in Tsoukalas (1989) p.45
4 See Tsoukalas (1989).
5 The road network of these islands was constructed by the British.
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The first half of the twentieth century was characterised by the (successful) efforts 
of the Greek state to expand its borders to Macedonia, and less successfully to Minor 
Asia. During this period, the national objective was to absorb the great influx of Greek 
refugees from Minor Asia after 1922, and to create the necessary industrial and social 
infrastructure at the same time. During the Second World War the public infrastructure 
stock was severely damaged. It can be argued, then, for most contemporary economic 
analytical purposes that the real history of the existing stock of public capital in Greece 
begins after 1950.
3.3.2 The creation of the Public Investment Programme
By the end of the war the network of roads was extremely restricted. Most of the 
roads and bridges were destroyed by the German army during its retreat from Greece. 
Ports and railways were only partially in operation, and only two or three of the major 
Greek cities had a water and sewerage network. The first attempt to build anew the 
infrastructure capacity was the Programme for the Reconstruction of Greek Economy, 
initiated in 1947. This programme was implemented by several ministries, but it was set 
up by the ministry of Co-ordination (Decree 1125/1949 and Law 2540/1950).
The Public Investment Programme (PIPR) itself commenced in 1952, regulated 
under the Law 2212/1952. In 1954, the Decree 2957 awarded the responsibility for the 
implementation of this programme to the Ministry of Co-ordination6 (which in 
contemporary times has been renamed as the Ministry of National Economy). This 
Decree made clear five crucial points for the subsequent history of PIPR. First, the terms 
under which public works are included in the PIPR were determined. Second, the way by 
which the total budget for the PIPR is assessed was clarified. Third, the expenditure on 
those public works requiring more than one fiscal year’s finance was reallocated into 
successive fiscal years. Fourth, special programmes were set up for a) alterations and 
extensions to already approved works, which were not possible to be included in the 
initial budget, and b) minor public works. The fifth, and probably the most important
6 For a more extensive analysis of the legal framework, and especially of the changes with regard to 
ministerial responsibility, see: Greek Company for the Local Development and Government (1989): Local 
Government and. the Programme of Public Investment.
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point, was an operational definition of public investment. This definition is of great 
importance as it still regulates whether a project will be classified as a public investment 
or not. According to this definition, a public investment is considered to be a public 
expenditure of the Greek state, or of the public enterprises7, or the local state in the 
following cases: (i) permanent or semi-permanent constructions (buildings are included in 
this category); (ii) capital assets and machinery procurements as long as they are needed 
for the previous category; (iii) research expenditures concerning the previous categories. 
The Decrees 120 and 498/1960, and 4355/1964 introduced further modifications, 
especially with regard to ministerial responsibilities.
The Law 1235/1982 significantly changed the legal framework of the PIPR and 
shaped its present form. The current formulation of the annual budget for public 
investment is, in brief, as follows: each year the Ministry of National Economy sends 
instructions to every responsible agent (government ministries, prefectures, and local 
governments) for the proposals of potential works which will be financed by the PIPR 
during the following fiscal year. The Ministry of National Economy also assesses the 
maximum limit for the finance of each particular agent. These bodies gather data and 
develop a budget for their potential works. The next step is to send the proposals to the 
Divisions of Public Investment in the Ministry of National Economy where a draft of the 
PIPR is drawn up (they sketch a general proposal for every particular Ministry). The draft 
is next sent to the General Accounts Office, which is responsible for the formation of the 
details of PIPR. The Budget Division of the General Accounts Office will form these 
details and forward individual budgets to each agent.
The annual PIPR is determined and approved by special ministerial decisions 
called Collective Decisions (Syllogikes Apofases). They are classified into four general 
categories: i) Collective Decisions for Works (SAE). This category includes constructions, 
procurements, and special programmes, ii) Collective Decisions for Research (SAM). 
These include the expenditure for the necessaiy research for the works of the PIPR, iii) 
Collective Decisions for Prefectural Funds (SANT). These are the decisions for the 
works, research, and other expenditure at the prefectural level - meaning that there is a 
specific SANT for every particular nomos in Greece, iv) Collective Decisions for
7 Such as OTE, DEH, ELTA, EYDAP, etc.
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Administrative Expenditure (SAD). This final category involves approvals for 
administrative expenditure in regard to the implementation of the PIPR. The decisions of 
this category also need the approval of the Minister of Finance.
Collective Decisions are also divided into different PIPR sub-sectors (a detailed 
analysis will follow). For instance, there are several Collective Decisions for ports, roads, 
civil aviation etc., under the heading Transportation. The number of Collective Decisions 
varies every year depending on the division of sectors but the average is approximately 
two hundred Collective Decisions per year. Each Decision always embodies similar 
works, and research and administrative expenditure of the same Ministry.
3.4 The Public Investment Programme in aggregate
3.4.1 The basic categories of the Public Investment Programme
Three different breakdowns of the PIPR data are available from the Ministry of 
National Economy in Greece. The first presents investment expenditure in a particular 
year for every ministry in each prefecture. In the second, each project is classified under 
the respective ministry. The problem with this breakdown, unfortunately, is that it does 
not have a spatial dimension. The third is the one selected for use in this research that 
supplies the investment expenditure for every investment category in every prefecture in 
every region of Greece. This breakdown was chosen because all investments are 
classified under an investment category or sector (that is the particular type of 
infrastructure) and there are detailed data for every single prefecture in Greece.
The data that will be used in the present analysis cover the period from 1976 to 
1992. A matrix of statistics has been created for every year. In this matrix each row 
shows investment expenditure per prefecture (nomos), while columns show investment 
expenditure per infrastructure category.
The prefecture vector contains all Greek prefectures with the exception of the 
semi-autonomous region of Agion Oros (Holly Mountain), inhabited only by monks, but 
with the addition of some extra categories. Each prefecture is assessed together with other 
neighbouring prefectures forming a region. However, this taxonomy does not correspond 
to the nine official regions in use until 1988, nor to the new thirteen official regions
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formed in 1988 (which are still in use). As table 3.3 shows, there are nine ‘real’ regions in 
use in the PIPR (in the sense that they correspond to a geographical area) and one 
‘account’ region (category ‘Rest’ in table 3.3) that includes expenditures for investment 
that cannot be classified to a single region. In this latter category, investment projects, 
which have not been materialised in a specific spatial unit, have been grouped together.
Table 3.3 Spatial units in use in the Public Investment Programme of Greece
Sterea Ionian Islands Macedonia Aegean Islands
More than one Pref. More than one Pref. More than one Pref. More than one Pref.
Aitoloakamania Zakynthos Drama Dodecanissos
Attica Kerkyra Imathia Kyclades
Viotia Kephalonia Thessaloniki Lesvos
Evia Lefkada Kavala Samos
Evritania Kastoria Chios
Fthiotis Enirus Kilkis
Fokida More than one Pref. Kozani Crete
Athens Arta Pella More than one Pref.
East Attika Thesprotia Pieria Iraklio
West Attika Ioatmina Serres Lasithi
Piraeus Preveza Fiorina Rethimno
Halkidiki Chania
Pelooonnese Thessalv Grevena
More than one Pref. More than one Pref. Rest
Argolida Kaiditsa Thrace Other
Arcadia Larissa More than one Pref. More than one Region
Achaia Magnisia Evros Whole Greece
Ilia Trikala Xanthi Abroad
Korinthia Rodopi
Laconia
Messinia
Source: Ministry of National Economy
The Rest category is constituted of four sub-categories: a) ‘Other’ - where projects that 
cannot be classified under any other category have been included, b) ‘More than one 
Region’ - which includes projects which have been materialised as the name would 
indicate, and in this way they cannot be classified under the inter-prefectural category in 
each region, c) ‘Whole Greece' - which covers investment projects planned for the entire 
country. However, a large part of the PIPR expenditure classified under this heading does 
not constitute real investment activity, but is much more concerned with the operational 
costs of the programme. For example, the ‘Miscellaneous’ and ‘Administrative’ sub­
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categories of the PIPR, which are accounting categories and not true physical investment 
(see following section), cover the great bulk of the Whole Greece category, d) ‘Abroad’ - 
which deals with the financing of the construction, purchase, etc., of buildings, 
machinery, and materials for Greek embassies, consulates and Greek schools abroad. 
There is also an additional ‘account’ entry -  ‘More than one Prefecture’ - in every region, 
in which investment programmes are materialised in that particular region and in more 
than one prefecture are classified.
The different categories of infrastructure investment are shown in Table 3.4 and 
Table 3.5. After 1981 some categories have been merged into broader categories (for 
example Forest and Fishery to Forest/Fishery, and Roads-Bridges, Ports, Civil Aviation, 
Urban Transportation, Athens Works all to Transportation). For the purpose of this 
research, infrastructure categories for the period 1976-1980 have been added together in 
order to correspond with the broader categories of the period 1981-19928. Thus, inter­
temporal comparisons (between the two periods) are made possible. There was, however, 
an additional reason for which the pre-1981 categories should correspond to those of the 
second period, and that is the need to estimate the public capital stocks, the construction 
of which are considered later in this chapter.
Monetary values for all the data available have been deflated using the GDP 
(Gross Domestic Product) deflators. There existed the alternative possibility of using 
different deflators for every single category of infrastructure investment. In this way, 
however, the deflators would have been estimated arbitrarily, as in many cases the 
composition of every category is not absolutely clear. For instance, in transportation, it is 
not always possible to estimate what was the percentage of materials used for the 
construction of a highway, especially at the regional level. It was decided that the use of 
the aggregate GDP deflators formed a good approximation, as the differences between the 
particular deflators for every single category would be at the third or fourth decimal level. 
The deflators of GDP (and generally most of the deflators in use by the ESYE National 
Statistical Service of Greece), have taken 1970 as the base year (which is also the base 
year for the deflation of the Public Investment Programme data).
8 For a detailed description of the how the 1976-1980 categories have been added to correspond to those of 
the subsequent period 1981-1992, see Appendix H
71
THE EVOLUTION OF PUBLIC INVESTMENT PROGRAMME
Table 3.4 Investment categories o f the Public Investment Programme o f Greece, 1976-1980
Agriculture Rest Education
Forest Housing
Fishery Health
Irrigation Programme Ministry of Agriculture Welfare
Irrigation Programme Ministry of Public Works Water/Sewage
Mines etc. Public Administration
Industry/Energy/Handicraft Technical Co-operation
Roads-Bridges Research Institutions
Ports Greek Committee Atomic Energy
Aviation (Civil) Prefectural works
Urban Transportation Borderline Programmes
Athens Works Special Programme for Evros Prefecture
Railways Miscellaneous
Tourism Special Works
Museums Administrative Expenditures
Higher Education Special works Athens/Thessaloniki
School Buildings Prefectural Programmes
Table 3.5 Investment categories o f the Public Investment Programme of Greece. 1981-1992
Agriculture Public Administration
Forest/Fishery Research and Technology
Irrigation Prefectural works
Industry/Energy/Handicraft Miscellaneous
Transportation Special works Athens/Thessaloniki
Railways Administrative Expenditures
Tourism/Museums/Monuments Special Works
Education Prefectural Programmes
Housing Prefectural Programme financed by the MIP*
Health/Welfare OTA(Local Government) Programmes
Water/Sewage
•Mediterranean Integrated Programmes
3.4.2 Temporal evolution of the PIPR and its aggregate categories
The subsequent three chapters present the empirical analysis based on the 
infrastructure data of PIPR. However, it could never be possible to use all the 
aforementioned categories due to the space limitations that the thesis necessarily has to 
work to. Thus, it was deemed necessary to impose a meaningful aggregation of all of
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these categories. The most obvious, and frequently used, classification in empirical 
research on public capital is the one based on whether an infrastructure category aims to 
facilitate directly production activities or to satisfy social needs. Hence, the sub­
categories presented in table 3.5 have been classified under three major headings. The 
first is productive infrastructure, which consists of the categories of Agriculture, Forestry 
and Fishery, Industry, Energy and Handicrafts, Irrigation, Research and Technology, 
Special Works (plus those of Athens/Thessaloniki), Transportation (plus those for 
Railways), Water/Sewage Works, and Prefectural Works/Programmes9. The second is 
social infrastructure which includes Education, Health and Welfare, Housing, Public 
Administration, and Tourism sub-categories. Finally, there are Miscellaneous and 
Administrative Expenditures sub-categories that refer to the operational expenditures of 
the PIPR. It has to be stressed that in the subsequent analysis total infrastructure 
investment (denoted by G) is the sum of productive and social infrastructures (denoted by 
P(G) and S(G) respectively). This means that the Miscellaneous and Administrative 
Expenditures sub-categories have been subtracted from the total PIPR expenditures in 
order to have the ‘real* investment, purged of accounting expenditures. The evolution 
over time of these categories is presented in tables 3.6 and 3.7. To repeat, all data have 
been deflated using 1970 as base.
Table 3.6 shows that the total PIPR expenditure fell between 1977 and 1983 from 
its 1976 level. This tendency was reversed during the eighties as the total PIPR 
expenditure regained the 1976 level. It can be argued that the PIPR has been a reliable 
source of investment when compared to the significant decline of private investment 
during the eighties (discussed later). Regarding the composition of the PIPR, it is obvious 
from table 3.7 that real infrastructure investment (G) and especially the productive 
categories (column 4) dropped during the early eighties only to increase significantly after 
1983. The exact opposite was the case in the trend for Miscellaneous and Administrative 
Expenditures categories (the non-investment operational part of PIPR). From an 11 
percent share of the overall Programme budget in 1976, it peaked at 31 in 1982, only to 
fall back to 5 percent by 1992).
9 This category includes the Border (mainly in the Evros prefecture) Programmes.
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Table 3.6 Evolution o f public investment in Greece, 1976-1992
(1976 as base year, constant prices)
Year PIPR
(3+4+5)
G
(4+5)
Misc. and 
Adm. Exp.
P(G)
(Productive)
S(G)
(Social)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
1976 100 100 100 100 100
1977 88 86 103 88 80
1978 86 84 102 83 86
1979 90 75 206 75 76
1980 75 66 147 70 54
1981 91 67 283 70 59
1982 93 72 261 76 61
1983 107 88 262 98 60
1984 115 101 228 111 73
1985 120 106 232 116 78
1986 108 100 170 113 67
1987 98 93 135 104 64
1988 99 96 117 107 68
1989 99 104 61 116 71
1990 94 95 81 109 58
1991 102 107 61 123 61
1992 110 118 49 132 78
Source of original data: Ministry of National Economy
Table 3.7 Composition of public investment in Greece. 1976-1992
(1976 as base year, constant prices)
Year PIPR
(3+4+5)
G
(4+5)
Misc. and 
Adm. Exp.
P(G)
(Productive)
S(G)
(Social)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
1976 100 89 11 65 24
1977 100 87 13 65 22
1978 100 87 13 63 24
1979 100 75 25 55 20
1980 100 79 21 61 18
1981 100 66 34 51 16
1982 100 69 31 53 16
1983 100 73 27 60 14
1984 100 78 22 63 15
1985 100 79 21 63 16
1986 100 83 17 68 15
1987 100 85 15 69 16
1988 100 87 13 71 16
1989 100 93 7 76 17
1990 100 91 9 76 15
1991 100 93 7 79 14
1992 100 95 5 78 17
Source of original data: Ministry of National Economy
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3.4.3 The PIPR compared to other macroeconomic indicators
It is interesting to examine the relationship of the PIPR to two other 
macroeconomic variables in Greece, the Gross Domestic Product (GDP) and the private 
fixed asset formation. Table 3.8 gives the total PIPR expenditure (both investment and 
administrative-operational expenditures) as a percentage of GDP. It is evident from these 
data that the PIPR fluctuated between 3.576 percent of GDP in 1980 (minimum) to 5.560 
in 1976 (maximum). The fluctuation may, at first glance, seem not to have a discernible 
pattern. However, it could be the case that the years 1981 and 1990, being election years 
of great importance, are an indication that the fluctuation is the result of the political 
business cycle10. It is possible that Greek governments in years just before elections 
decide to decrease levels of public investment, which of course are likely to stimulate 
results in the long run, in favour of more general public spending having an immediate 
return. This is a point that probably begs further future research in the field of 
government.
Table 3.8 Basic infrastructure categories as percentage* o f GDP in Greece
YEAR PIPR Productive Social
1976 5.560 3.617 1.339
1977 4.745 3.105 1.038
1978 4.345 2.730 1.049
1979 4.391 2.403 0.892
1980 3.576 2.184 0.627
1981 4.352 2.198 0.677
1982 4.405 2.348 0.704
1983 5.053 3.015 0.686
1984 5.288 3.332 0.814
1985 5.333 3.367 0.842
1986 4.726 3.210 0.709
1987 4.306 2.985 0.676
1988 4.140 2.923 0.683
1989 4.018 3.052 0.696
1990 3.838 2.910 0.568
1991 4.038 3.192 0.582
1992 4.298 3.359 0.732
+The percentage is based on deflated (1970) prices 
Source of original data: National Statistical Service of Greece
10 For the concept of political business (or trade) cycles, see Lipsey (1989) orMankiw (1998).
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Table 3.8 also presents details of investment in Productive and Social public 
capital respectively (note that the Productive and Social percentages do not add to the 
total PIPR percentage, the difference being the percentage of Miscellaneous and 
Administrative expenditures). The share of the Productive category as a percentage of 
GDP has followed, as might be expected, the fluctuations of the total PIPR spending. In 
the early eighties, it showed its lowest levels, falling in 1980 to its minimum (2.184 
percent). For the remainder of the period, it has oscillated around three percent. The 
picture for the Social category is, however, different. Social infrastructure as a percentage 
of GDP was around one during the seventies, and this fell to an average of around seven 
tenths of a percent for the period 1980-1992.
As far as public infrastructure as a percentage of the total fixed asset formation is 
concerned, table 3.9 gives the relative temporal changes. The National Statistical Service 
of Greece (NSSG) classifies as ‘total fixed asset formation’ the sum o f ‘asset formation in 
dwellings, other buildings constructions and works, transport and other types of 
equipment’ (as described in the statistical yearbooks of the NSSG).
Table 3.9 Basic infrastructure categories as percentage+ o f total fixed asset formation in
Greece
YEAR PIPR Productive Social
1976 25.127 16.347 6.049
1977 20.483 13.403 4.479
1978 18.830 11.832 4.548
1979 18.125 9.918 3.680
1980 16.107 9.836 2.826
1981 21.177 10.695 3.293
1982 22.045 11.751 3.523
1983 25.724 15.348 3.493
1984 29.365 18.505 4.518
1985 29.101 18.374 4.595
1986 27.979 19.002 4.198
1987 26.721 18.525 4.195
1988 24.745 17.469 4.083
1989 22.630 17.191 3.923
1990 19.510 14.792 2.888
1991 22.193 17.546 3.201
1992 23.702 18.521 4.036
+The percentage is based on deflated (1970) prices 
Source of original data: National Statistical Service of Greece
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The PIPR investment as percentage of the total fixed asset formation dropped in 
the late seventies from around 25 percent in 1976 fell to about 13 in 1980. However, in 
the following years, it has recovered reaching its highest value in 1984 (29.365 percent). 
It has since never again fallen below twenty percent (with the single exception of 1990 
when it dipped to 19.510 percent). The trends for the Productive and Social categories of 
the PIPR are similar. It is notable, in terms of a low point, that in 1980 the Productive and 
Social percentages were just 9.836 and 2.826 (respectively) of the total fixed asset 
formation in Greece.
3.4.4 Temporal evolution of the basic PIPR categories
Even though the basic categories of the PIPR have not been used in the 
subsequent analysis, save for those aggregated as Productive and Social infrastructure 
(and the Miscellaneous and Administrative Expenditure) classifications, it is useful here, 
by way of context, to give a brief description of the evolution of such spending (table 
3.10).
Five categories consistently seem to account for the lion’s share of the spending at 
around ten percent or more. These are Prefectural Works (19.05 percent on average), 
Miscellaneous (15.77 percent on average, and if the Administrative Expenditures are 
added this reaches 16.9 percent on average), Transportation (14.58 percent on average), 
Industry-Energy-Handicraft (11.62 percent on average), and Education (9.17 percent on 
average).
The temporal evolution for the Administrative and Miscellaneous Expenditures 
has already been presented (as a sum). Agriculture has had a rather erratic spending 
history. The Border Programme was a scheme that stopped by 1980 (targeted to develop 
the border prefectures and especially Evros). The investment in Educational infrastructure 
has declined slowly, from a share of around 15 percent in the seventies, to almost the half 
this amount for the eighties. Forestry and Fishery is one of the categories that retains 
almost the same share for the whole of the period. Health and Welfare has increased 
modestly its share from 1.5 percent in the seventies to almost 4 in the eighties. Housing 
infrastructure investment has remained stable with an average 1.15 percent.
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Table 3.10 The evolution o f public capital spending in Greece by categories, 1976-1992
Constant 1970 prices
Years Administ.
Expend
iture
Agriculture Borderline
Program.*
Education Forest-
Fishery
Health-
Welfare
1976 0.87 3.77 1.26 14.33 1.86 1.57
1977 1.14 2.30 0.96 13.82 2.12 1.61
1978 1.32 10.01 1.27 15.39 2.86 1.90
1979 1.64 3.78 1.12 12.89 1.79 1.91
1980 1.42 3.33 1.75 10.22 1.88 2.04
1981 1.36 1.84 0.00 8.17 1.67 3.22
1982 2.16 1.87 0.00 8.73 1.59 2.14
1983 2.47 0.98 0.00 6.65 2.33 2.56
1984 2.33 0.99 0.00 8.23 2.70 2.93
1985 2.10 1.01 0.00 6.69 2.95 4.07
1986 0.47 0.68 0.00 7.08 2.16 3.98
1987 0.43 0.85 0.00 7.98 2.30 4.10
1988 0.35 1.04 0.00 8.52 2.29 4.10
1989 0.38 2.90 0.00 8.12 2.48 3.08
1990 0.42 0.74 0.00 7.03 2.02 2.55
1991 0.16 1.01 0.00 7.35 2.31 2.80
1992 0.06 1.22 0.00 7.59 2.66 3.66
Average 1.13 2.13 0.33 9.17 2.26 2.90
*For the composition of this category see Appendix II 
Source of Original Data: Ministry of National Economy
One of the categories illustrating interesting changes in its percentage share is that 
of Industry, Energy, and Handicraft. Up until mid eighties (1985) its share was around 6 
percent. In 1986, however, it was launched to 15.67, to reach 22.97 by 1989. In the early 
nineties this has now dropped to around 15 percent. Thus, the Industry, Energy, and 
Handicraft category has become over the years one of the most significant components of 
(aggregate) Productive public capital spending. In contrast, Irrigation’s role in public 
investment has been diminished over the years, from a high 11.54 percent in 1976, to a 
low of 3.72 in 1988 (there was a small recovery of the percentage of this category 
reaching 6.75 by 1992).
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Table 3.10 The evolution o f public capital spending in Greece by categories, 1976-1992
(Continued)
Years Housing Industry-
Energy-
Handicraft
Irrigation Miscell
aneous*
Prefectural
Works*
Public
Administrat
ion
1976 1.19 5.32 11.54 10.00 9.69 1.89
1977 1.25 6.52 10.26 11.56 8.17 1.48
1978 1.09 4.77 8.76 11.69 7.85 1.55
1979 1.86 5.57 7.76 23.33 9.91 1.08
1980 0.96 7.67 8.75 19.96 13.12 1.22
1981 0.80 4.83 5.13 32.59 15.15 1.00
1982 1.80 4.70 6.69 28.55 15.47 1.09
1983 1.24 6.96 5.22 24.29 23.88 1.23
1984 1.29 8.83 3.99 19.27 25.71 1.14
1985 1.44 7.42 4.66 18.98 26.64 1.36
1986 1.17 15.67 4.81 16.61 25.11 1.01
1987 1.03 22.22 3.99 14.54 19.59 0.84
1988 0.98 19.15 3.72 12.55 20.23 0.69
1989 1.59 22.97 4.60 6.32 21.88 0.63
1990 0.70 22.82 4.55 8.96 21.12 0.47
1991 0.75 15.58 4.88 6.36 24.43 0.35
1992 0.45 14.23 6.75 4.78 26.10 1.06
Average 1.15 11.62 6.11 15.77 19.05 1.06
*For the composition of these categories see Appendix II 
Source of Original Data: Ministry of National Economy
The Prefectural Works category, which incorporates the ‘Prefectural 
Programmes’, ‘Prefectural Works’, ‘Prefectural MOP’ and ‘OTA Programmes’ sub- 
categories, is one of the most important components of the PIPR. As argued earlier in this 
section, it is clearly the largest category of public capital spending. It is also important, 
however, from another point of view. The decisions for the actual investment projects that 
can be materialised for this category are not taken directly by the central state, as is the 
case for the other categories of PIPR, but instead are decided at prefectural level, after 
consultation with local governments11. As it is evident from table 3.10 the percentage of 
the Prefectural Works component has increased significantly during the eighties, and 
especially after 198212.
11 For an analysis of this point, see Psyharis (1990).
12 This is the starting year of the Socialist administration.
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Table 3.10 The evolution of public capital spending in Greece by categories, 1976-1992
(Continued)
Constant 1970 prices
Years Research & 
Technology
Special
Works*
Tourism-
Museums-
Monuments
Transport
ation*
Water-
Sewage
PIPR
(Total)
1976 0.07 0.00 5.10 23.83 7.70 100
1977 0.09 0.00 3.72 27.53 7.49 100
1978 0.11 0.00 4.22 18.59 8.62 100
1979 0.45 0.00 2.56 16.24 8.11 100
1980 4.43 3.57 3.10 13.94 2.63 100
1981 3.93 6.75 2.35 10.21 1.01 100
1982 2.91 6.35 2.22 11.65 2.08 100
1983 2.32 4.53 1.91 11.20 2.25 100
1984 2.60 4.42 1.80 10.47 3.29 100
1985 2.10 3.28 2.22 12.18 2.90 100
1986 2.62 3.31 1.76 10.55 3.01 100
1987 2.02 3.04 1.75 10.85 4.47 100
1988 2.99 3.44 2.22 13.78 3.96 100
1989 3.13 3.34 3.91 10.68 3.99 100
1990 1.99 2.54 4.06 14.56 5.48 100
1991 3.31 2.17 3.17 18.56 6.82 100
1992 3.27 1.92 4.27 15.83 6.17 100
Average 2.26 2.90 2.93 14.58 4.65 100
♦For the composition of these categories see Appendix II 
Source of Original Data: Ministry of National Economy
The percentage for the Public Administration category has been, more or less, 
stable around one percent. Investment in the Research and Technology element has two 
separate phases. Before 1979 the share is less than half of one percent. From 1980 
onwards, however, this varies from 1.99 to 4.43 percent. The Special Works scheme 
(which incorporates Special Works for Athens-Thessaloniki) starts in 1980 and has since 
varied around a 2.9 average. Public investment in Tourism, Museums, and Monuments 
has been rather stable, fluctuating modestly around 2.93 percent.
One of the most significant categories, at least the one for which the theoretical 
and empirical research has paid special attention, is Transportation. This is the third 
largest category of PIPR for the whole period of analysis and was the largest, by far, in 
the mid-seventies (peaking to a staggering 27.53 percent in 1977). In the early eighties it 
has dropped to around 11 percent, but in the nineties there has been a recovery of its share 
reaching 18.56 percent by 1991. Another crucial category is that of Water and Sewage 
public capital. In the eighties there was a drop of its percentage (from around eight
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percent in the seventies), but, as for Transportation, there has been a substantial recovery 
in the late eighties and early nineties.
3.4.5 Regional distribution of the public infrastructure categories
The estimation of the regional infrastructure capital in Greece is not as simple as 
might be expected given the fact that most of the PIPR works have a specific spatial 
designation. This difficulty stems from the fact that a part of the PIPR investment 
expenditure is allocated to a larger spatial unit than a prefecture (normally to a NUTS II 
level region, instead the NUTS III region level that a prefecture represents)13. Table 3.11 
elucidates the problems involved in deriving an adequate estimation of regional 
(prefectural) public capital. Column (1) presents the percentage of infrastructure 
investment at a higher than prefectural regional level. It is apparent that with the 
exception of the first year (1986) this percentage is rather low.
The ‘non-spatial’ category in column (2) gives the percentage of investment 
projects that either have materialised in more than two regions of NUTS II level, or have 
not been classified for accounting reasons in a specific area. The percentage of this 
category is high, its average for the examined period being around 40 percent of the total 
PIPR. If to this category is added the non-prefectural amounts in column (1), then the 
total part of the Programme, which cannot be estimated at prefectural level is generated 
and shown in column (3). However, it has to be noted that a significant part of this sum 
corresponds to the Miscellaneous and Administrative categories, which do not constitute 
real investment. Column (5) provides the percentage of the PIPR that cannot be estimated 
at prefectural level after the deduction of the Miscellaneous and Administrative categories 
given in column (4). This means that the final percentage of PIPR unaccountable at 
prefectural level averages around 28 percent and thus constitutes a significant part of the 
PIPR. This has important implications for the data panels based on the prefectural 
estimation of public capital stocks in that the regional infrastructure is underestimated.
13 A potential alternative would be to estimate the regional infrastructure capital at NUTS II level.
However, the adoption of this higher spatial level would mean that valuable information about the variation 
of infrastructure at the prefectural level would have been lost. Additionally and from a statistical point of 
view, this lost information would be translated into a reduction of the number of degrees of freedom in the 
econometric analysis in the subsequent chapters.
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However, this is not a problem in the case of the sectoral panels (for a detailed analysis of 
these panels, see chapter 5).
Table 3.11 Non-spatially allocatable percentages of the Public Investment Programme of
Greece
Y ears Non- Non-Spatial Total Non- Miscel. & N on-Prefect.
P refectural Prefectural A dm instr. m inus Misc.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
1976 13.30 36.20 49.50 10.87 38.63
1977 5.54 33.83 39.37 12.70 26.68
1978 4.53 40.85 45.39 13.01 32.38
1979 4.51 40.33 44.84 24.97 19.87
1980 5.69 41.17 46.86 21.39 25.47
1981 5.18 50.64 55.81 33.95 21.87
1982 5.37 50.25 55.62 30.71 24.91
1983 4.57 41.45 46.02 26.76 19.26
1984 3.77 36.48 40.26 21.60 18.66
1985 3.62 36.32 39.94 21.07 18.87
1986 2.94 36.99 39.93 17.08 22.85
1987 2.88 44.61 47.49 14.97 32.52
1988 3.20 42.21 45.41 12.90 32.50
1989 4.26 41.73 45.98 6.70 39.28
1990 4.53 43.37 47.90 9.38 38.52
1991 4.43 35.63 40.06 6.52 33.55
1992 5.28 37.98 43.26 4.83 38.43
Average 4.88 40.39 45.27 16.90 28.37
Source of Original Data: Ministiy of National Economy
Public infrastructure investment is rarely distributed evenly in space. In most 
countries the spatial distribution of infrastructure is influenced by the existing dispersion 
of the economic activity and population. Greece is no exception. Some prefectures have 
concentrated the lion’s share of the overall infrastructure spending allocated at prefectural 
level. Table 3.12 gives the relevant information about the regional (prefectural) 
distribution of the total investment in the overall public capital. The term ‘total’ means 
that the comparison between the prefectures is made based on the total sum of public 
infrastructure spent in each prefecture. The term ‘overall’ refers to the fact that table 3.12 
is based on the figures for all public spending in infrastructure (for both productive and 
social public capital), having excluded the administrative and operational costs.
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This table, as well as those to come, was constructed as follows. First, the 
investment for each year was deflated to constant prices (with a base year 1970). Then, all 
the years were added. Finally, the prefectures were ranked according to their 
performance. The table presents the percentage over the average prefectural investment 
for the study period for every prefecture, as this comparison may be more meaningful 
than one based on the ‘real’ amounts. In any case, the real total investment can be easily 
recovered as the base section of the table provides details of average prefectural 
investment (in constant 1970 prices in thousands of drachmas).
An examination of table 3.12 shows some interesting characteristics of the 
regional distribution of infrastructure. The prefectures of the major urban centres of the 
country have received the great bulk of the nation’s public capital investment. The first 
two prefectures Attiki and Thessaloniki, which have achieved percentages well above the 
average, contain the two most significant metropolitan areas of Greece. Viotia, which is 
in seventh position, is a prefecture adjacent to Attiki, and it can be argued that here the 
investment pattern is influenced by the proximity to Athens. Achaia, in fourth place, 
contains the third major urban centre, Patra. Ioannina and Iraklio, at fifth and sixth 
positions respectively, contain also the largest cities in their wider areas. The only 
exception in this pattern is Evros, which was ranked as the third prefecture. However, this 
is a rather special area, as it is on the border with Turkey. For both political and economic 
reasons all Greek administrations have paid special attention to the infrastructure needs of 
this prefecture.
The base of table 3.12 (as well of the following tables in this section) details some 
overall statistics based on the real total amounts (in constant 1970 prices) spent for each 
prefecture. The average in this table, as mentioned earlier, is the average total prefectural 
investment. The maximum and minimum total prefectural investment values refer to the 
Attiki and Lefkada prefectures respectively. The maximum - minimum ratio, variance and 
standard deviation are the standard statistics of the variation in the data14. However, the 
most interesting statistic15 seems to be the coefficient of variation (CV). This measure is 
equal to:
14 For a useful evaluation of these measures in the context of regional analysis, see Molle et al. (1980), 
appendix 2.
15 As Molle et al. have argued, “the coefficient of variation has the advantage over variance” (1980, p. 258).
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C V = °  (3.4.3.1)
X
where, cr, is the standard deviation, and x, is the average.
The coefficient of variation will be used latter to compare inequalities in regional 
distributions between the different types of public capital.
However, analysis such as that presented in table 3.12 cannot reveal potential 
regional clustering of public capital at a regional level higher than that of prefectures. For 
this reason the data from this table have been also presented as map 3.1. This map 
illustrates some of the points made earlier. It is obvious that there is a clustering of 
infrastructure investment around the three major urban poles, of Athens, Thessaloniki, 
and Patras (darker shaded areas correspond to higher infrastructure investment in all maps 
presented here).
Table 3.12 Prefectural total (overall) infrastructure spending in Greece, 1976-1992
NOMOS Rank Perc. Over 
the Average
NOMOS Rank Perc. Over 
the Average
NOMOS Rank Perc. Over 
the Average
Attiki 1 15.53 Kavala 18 0.71 Imathia 35 0.44
Thessalon. 2 3.47 Karditsa 19 0.69 Korinthia 36 0.42
Evros 3 1.55 Kyclades 20 0.64 Laconia 37 0.42
Achaia 4 1.47 Drama 21 0.60 Arta 38 0.40
Ioannina 5 1.42 Kozani 22 0.58 Pieria 39 0.40
Iraklio 6 1.23 Rethimno 23 0.57 Evritania 40 0.39
Viotia 7 1.22 Lesvos 24 0.57 Chios 41 0.39
Messinia 8 1.13 Halkidiki 25 0.56 Samos 42 0.38
Serres 9 1.09 Fthiotis 26 0.56 Kastoria 43 0.38
Aitoloakar. 10 1.09 Rodopi 27 0.56 Fokida 44 0.35
Dodecan. 11 1.04 Xanthi 28 0.53 Thesprotia 45 0.34
Larissa 12 0.95 Lasithi 29 0.53 Kilkis 46 0.34
Chania 13 0.92 Trikala 30 0.52 Kephalonia 47 0.33
Evia 14 0.91 Argolida 31 0.50 Grevena 48 0.33
Ilia 15 0.84 Arcadia 32 0.46 Fiorina 49 0.32
Pella 16 0.84 Preveza 33 0.46 Zakynthos 50 0.19
Magnisia 17 0.80 Kerkyra 34 0.44 Lefkada 51 0.18
Average 3,592,369 Variance 6.E+13
Maximum 55,800,106 Max-Min Ratio 84 Stand. Deviation 7,685,373
Minimum 660,673 Coef. Of Variation 2.139
The statistics at the foot of the table refer to the actual (deflated and in thousands) data and not their percentages
Source of Original Data: Ministry of National Economy
Map 3.1 shows also the higher investment for Ioannina and Iraklio prefectures. 
There are, nevertheless, some points which can be seen best in the map. For instance, the
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Map 3.1 Total overall infrastructure spending, 1976-1992
Constant 1970 prices
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western part of the Peloponnese (Achaia, Ilia, and Messinia prefectures) seems to have 
received a much higher percentage of infrastructure investment than the eastern part 
(Korinthia, Argolida, Arcadia, Laconia). It is also apparent that the west-central 
prefectures of mainland Greece have received a lower percentage than the prefectures 
having the bigger urban centres.
In tables 3.13 and 3.14 the overall infrastructure investment has been 
disaggregated into the productive and social categories respectively. The prefectural 
ranking for the productive category is almost identical to that of table 3.12. The only 
notable exception is that Iraklio is not one of the high ranking prefectures, dropping to 
twelfth position. Two prefectures of the central and eastern Peloponnese - Arcadia and 
Argolida - appear to have a relatively better percentage of productive infrastructure in 
comparison to the overall public capital spending. The same is true for the eastern Aegean 
prefecture of Dodekanissos. These differences can again being seen graphically in map
3.2.
Table 3.13 Total productive infrastructure spending by nomos in Greece, 1976-1992
______________________________________________________________________Constant 1970 prices
NOMOS Rank Perc. Over 
the Average
NOMOS Rank Perc. Over 
the Average
NOMOS Rank Perc. Over 
the Average
Attiki 1 12.24 Kyclades 18 0.81 Korinthia 35 0.51
Thessalon. 2 3.06 Karditsa 19 0.76 Imathia 36 0.51
Evros 3 1.90 Kavala 20 0.74 Kerkyra 37 0.49
Viotia 4 1.55 Drama 21 0.72 Kastoria 38 0.47
Serres 5 1.37 Lesvos 22 0.70 Evritania 39 0.46
Aitoloakar. 6 1.31 Kozani 23 0.65 Pieria 40 0.46
Ioannina 7 1.25 Rethimno 24 0.63 Samos 41 0.46
Messinia 8 1.24 Fthiotis 25 0.62 Chios 42 0.45
Dodecan. 9 1.17 Halkidiki 26 0.62 Thesprotia 43 0.44
Larissa 10 1.06 Argolida 27 0.61 Kilkis 44 0.43
Achaia 11 1.04 Rodopi 28 0.60 Fokida 45 0.43
Iraklio 12 1.02 Lasithi 29 0.59 Grevena 46 0.42
Ilia 13 1.00 Arcadia 30 0.58 Kephalonia 47 0.41
Chania 14 0.98 Trikala 31 0.57 Fiorina 48 0.40
Pella 15 0.97 Xanthi 32 0.56 Arta 49 0.39
Evia 16 0.96 Preveza 33 0.56 Zakynthos 50 0.24
Magnisia 17 0.84 Laconia 34 0.52 Lefkada 51 0.02
Average 2,608,264 Variance 2.E+13
Maximum 31,913,834 Max-Min Ratio 53.504 Stand. Deviation 4,366,128
Minimum 596,472 Coef. Of Variation 1.674
The statistics at the foot of the table refer to the actual (deflated and in thousands) data and not their percentages 
Source of Original Data: Ministry of National Economy
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Map 3.2 Total productive infrastructure spending, 1976-1992
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The case of total social infrastructure is analysed in table 3.14 and illustrated in 
map 3.3. It can be seen that prefectures with large urban centres and higher percentage of 
population have achieved the higher percentages (above the average) of social capital 
investment. An inspection of map 3.3 shows that the general picture is not dramatically 
different than that of productive infrastructure distribution. The most important feature of 
table 3.14, however, is presented in the statistics at the foot of the table. It is obvious from 
both the max-min ratio, and the coefficient of variation (CV) that the investment in social 
capital is more unequally distributed among the prefectures than in the case of productive 
capital. The CVSOCiai is equal to 3.069, while the CV productive is much smaller (1.674).
Table 3.14 Total social infrastructure spending by nomos in Greece, 1976-1992
Constant 1970 prices
NOMOS Rank Perc. Over 
the Average
NOMOS Rank Perc. Over 
the Average
NOMOS Rank Perc. Over 
the Average
Attiki 1 21.73 Rethimno 18 0.50 Evritania 35 0.20
Thessalon. 2 4.44 Ilia 19 0.49 Laconia 36 0.19
Achaia 3 3.19 Karditsa 20 0.49 Korinthia 37 0.19
Ioannina 4 2.40 Kozani 21 0.44 Preveza 38 0.18
Iraklio 5 2.23 Fthiotis 22 0.43 Trikala 39 0.18
Messinia 6 0.93 Lasithi 23 0.43 Fokida 40 0.17
Chania 7 0.85 Serres 24 0.41 Kyclades 41 0.17
Evia 8 0.83 Viotia 25 0.39 Kephalonia 42 0.17
Dodecan. 9 0.80 Kerkyra 26 0.37 Samos 43 0.16
Magnisia 10 0.78 Drama 27 0.36 Fiorina 44 0.13
Larissa 11 0.74 Imathia 28 0.29 Kastoria 45 0.11
Kavala 12 0.74 Halkidiki 29 0.27 Kilkis 46 0.11
Pella 13 0.61 Arta 30 0.27 Arcadia 47 0.11
Aitoloakar. 14 0.59 Lesvos 31 0.26 Thesprotia 48 0.09
Xanthi 15 0.59 Chios 32 0.24 Lefkada 49 0.08
Rodopi 16 0.51 Pieria 33 0.24 Zakynthos 50 0.08
Evros 17 0.51 Argolida 34 0.23 Grevena 51 0.07
Average 741,060 Variance 5.E+12
Maximum 16,102,983 Max-Min Ratio 329.094 Stand. Deviation 2,273,951
Minimum 48,931 Coef. Of Variation 3.069
The statistics at the foot of the table refer to the actual (deflated and in thousands) data and not their percentages 
Source of Original Data: Ministry of National Economy
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Map 3.3 Total social infrastructure spending, 1976-1992
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Next, table 3.15 and map 3.4 do not present the allocation of an actual investment 
category, but provide, in a manner similar to previously, information about regional 
differences in the total miscellaneous and administrative expenditures of the PIPR. Only 
Attiki, Thessaloniki, and Trikala (only just) are above the average. It has to be pointed out 
again that a great part of the miscellaneous and administrative expenditures does not 
correspond to a specific prefecture but it is accounted for at the national level 
(approximately 70 percent).
Table 3.15 Total miscellaneous and administrative expenditure o f the Public Investment 
Programme by nomos in Greece, 1976-1992
NOMOS Rank Perc. Over 
the Average
NOMOS Rank Perc. Over 
the Average
NOMOS Rank Perc. Over 
the Average
Attiki 1 32.02 Preveza 18 0.32 Pella 35 0.13
Thessalon. 2 4.92 Kavala 19 0.31 Drama 36 0.13
Trikala 3 1.02 Rodopi 20 0.28 Grevena 37 0.12
Halkidiki 4 0.91 Ioannina 21 0.27 Kastoria 38 0.12
Evros 5 0.90 Ilia 22 0.25 Korinthia 39 0.12
Arta 6 0.89 Serres 23 0.24 Argolida 40 0.12
Achaia 7 0.81 Evritania 24 0.24 Lesvos 41 0.10
Evia 8 0.69 Kyclades 25 0.21 Lasithi 42 0.09
Karditsa 9 0.52 Samos 26 0.20 Thesprotia 43 0.09
Chania 10 0.50 Imathia 27 0.19 Fokida 44 0.08
Messinia 11 0.45 Kozani 28 0.19 Kephalonia 45 0.06
Iraklio 12 0.45 Viotia 29 0.18 Kilkis 46 0.05
Magnisia 13 0.42 Aitoloakar. 30 0.18 Laconia 47 0.05
Larissa 14 0.38 Pieria 31 0.18 Zakynthos 48 0.04
Arcadia 15 0.35 Chios 32 0.18 Xanthi 49 0.04
Fthiotis 16 0.34 Rethimno 33 0.17 Fiorina 50 0.04
Dodecan. 17 0.33 Kerkyra 34 0.15 Lefkada 51 0.02
Average 243,045 Variance l.E+12
Maximum 7,783,289 Max-Min Ratio 1670.918 Stand. Deviation 1,090,151
Minimum 4,658 Coef. Of Variation 4.485
The statistics at the foot of the table refer to the actual (deflated and in thousands) data and not their percentages
Source of Original Data: Ministry of National Economy
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Map 3.4 Total miscellaneous and administrative expenditure of PIPR, 1976-1992
Constant 1970 prices
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A totally different picture is apparent for the regional distribution of infrastructure 
if the spending per inhabitant16 is considered. Table 3.16 shows that Evritania is, in this 
case, the prefecture with the highest total infrastructure spending per head in Greece. The 
borderline prefecture of Evros occupies the second position, the island prefecture of 
Kephalonia is in the third place, and Viotia comes fourth. This last prefecture is adjacent 
to Attiki (with the metropolitan area of Athens). Regional inequality, as measured by the 
coefficient of variation, is much smaller in the per inhabitant infrastructure case compared 
to the absolute spending picture (0.383 and 2.139 respectively).
Table 3.16 Total (overall) infrastructure spending per inhabitant by nomos in Greece, 1976-1992
NOMOS Rank Perc. Over 
the Average
NOMOS Rank Perc. Over 
the Average
NOMOS Rank Perc. Over 
the Average
Evritania 1 2.50 Messinia 18 1.10 Aitoloakar. 35 0.78
Evros 2 1.70 Dodecan. 19 1.08 Iraklio 36 0.78
Kephalonia 3 1.68 Halkidiki 20 1.05 Evia 37 0.74
Viotia 4 1.55 Drama 21 1.01 Attiki 38 0.72
Ioannina 5 1.49 Zakynthos 22 1.00 Laconia 39 0.71
Samos 6 1.48 Pella 23 0.99 Arcadia 40 0.70
Grevena 7 1.44 Fiorina 24 0.97 Kerkyra 41 0.69
Rethimno 8 1.38 Xanthi 25 0.95 Magnisia 42 0.67
Lefkada 9 1.37 Serres 26 0.90 Kilkis 43 0.66
Preveza 10 1.29 Karditsa 27 0.87 Kozani 44 0.62
Thesprotia 11 1.28 Lesvos 28 0.87 Thessalon. 45 0.61
Fokida 12 1.27 Rodopi 29 0.85 Trikala 46 0.61
Chios 13 1.23 Argolida 30 0.84 Larissa 47 0.58
Lasithi 14 1.19 Kavala 31 0.84 Pieria 48 0.57
Chania 15 1.14 Achaia 32 0.82 Fthiotis 49 0.54
Kastoria 16 1.14 Arta 33 0.81 Imathia 50 0.52
Kyclades 17 1.12 Ilia 34 0.80 Korinthia 51 0.51
Average 22,416 Variance 7.E+07
Maximum 55,970 Max-Min Ratio 4.932 Stand. Deviation 8,577
Minimum 11,348 Coef. Of Variation 0.383
The statistics at the foot of the table refer to the actual (deflated and in thousands) data and not their percentages 
Source of Original Data: Ministry of National Economy
An examination of map 3.5 shows that the peripheral prefectures in Greece obtain 
the higher percentages of per inhabitant infrastructure spending, with the exception of 
Viotia, Evritania, Fokida, and Messinia.
16 The total infrastructure spending (for each category) has been divided by the prefectural population. The 
latter is the average of the population given in the censuses of 1981 and 1991, given in table 3.22.
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Map 3.5 Total overall infrastructure spending per inhabitant, 1976-1992
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The per inhabitant productive infrastructure investment is reproduced in table 
3.17. Again Evritania, Evros, Kephalonia, and Viotia are the prefectures with the highest 
percentages. However, the most interesting fact here is that the prefectures with the three 
major centres, Attiki, Thessaloniki, and Achaia, and which together concentrate half of 
the Greek population, receive the lowest per capita spending percentage of the productive 
public capital component.
Table 3.17 Total productive infrastructure spending per inhabitant by nomos
in Greece, 1976-1992
Constant 1970 prices
NOMOS Rank Perc. Over 
the Average
NOMOS Rank Perc. Over 
the Average
NOMOS Rank Perc. Over 
the Average
Evritania 1 2.57 Messinia 18 1.06 Arcadia 35 0.76
Evros 2 1.82 Dodecan. 19 1.06 Kilkis 36 0.74
Kephalonia 3 1.79 Chania 20 1.06 Arta 37 0.69
Viotia 4 1.72 Fiorina 21 1.05 Evia 38 0.68
Grevena 5 1.61 Drama 22 1.05 Kerkyra 39 0.66
Samos 6 1.56 Pella 23 1.00 Magnisia 40 0.62
Lefkada 7 1.49 Halkidiki 24 1.00 Kozani 41 0.61
Thesprotia 8 1.43 Serres 25 0.98 Trikala 42 0.58
Preveza 9 1.36 Lesvos 26 0.94 Pieria 43 0.58
Fokida 10 1.35 Argolida 27 0.90 Larissa 44 0.56
Rethimno 11 1.32 Xanthi 28 0.88 Iraklio 45 0.56
Kastoria 12 1.25 Karditsa 29 0.84 Korinthia 46 0.54
Kyclades 13 1.24 Aitoloakar. 30 0.82 Imathia 47 0.52
Chios 14 1.24 Ilia 31 0.82 Fthiotis 48 0.52
Lasithi 15 1.17 Rodopi 32 0.79 Achaia 49 0.50
Ioannina 16 1.15 Laconia 33 0.76 Attiki 50 0.50
Zakynthos 17 1.08 Kavala 34 0.76 Thessalon. 51 0.47
Average 18,667 Variance 6.E+07
Maximum 47,932 Max-Min Ratio 5.464 Stand. Deviation 8,012
Minimum 8,772 Coef. Of Variation 0.429
The statistics at the foot of the table refer to the actual (deflated and in thousands) data and not their percentages
Source of Original Data: Ministry of National Economy
This important fact is illustrated in map 3.6 where it can be seen that prefectures 
with high population density are well below the average per inhabitant investment in 
productive infrastructure (the non-shaded areas of the map).
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Map 3.6 Total productive infrastructure spending per inhabitant, 1976-1992
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The pattern of overall and productive total investment per inhabitant is more or 
less the same. The regional distribution of social investment per inhabitant, presented in 
table 3.18 and map 3.7, is, however, significantly different. The first ten to fifteen of the 
highest ranked prefectures include some of the most significant urban areas of the 
country, when for the overall and productive components the first places in rank are 
occupied generally by less populated areas. As table 3.18 shows, Attiki, Thessaloniki, 
Achaia, Iraklio, and Ioannina, (prefectures of greater population density) are in the upper 
one third of the classification. A comparison of maps 3.6 and 3.7 well illustrates the 
difference between the spatial distribution of productive and social public capital.
Table 3.18 Total social infrastructure spending per inhabitant by nomos in Greece, 1976-1992
Constant 1970 prices
NOMOS Rank Perc. Over 
the Average
NOMOS Rank Perc. Over 
the Average
NOMOS Rank Perc. Over 
the Average
Ioannina 1 3.82 Evia 18 1.02 Fthiotis 35 0.63
Achaia 2 2.70 Magnisia 19 1.00 Fiorina 36 0.61
Iraklio 3 2.14 Samos 20 0.95 Zakynthos 37 0.61
Evritania 4 1.89 Fokida 21 0.95 Lesvos 38 0.59
Rethimno 5 1.84 Karditsa 22 0.94 Argolida 39 0.59
Xanthi 6 1.61 Drama 23 0.92 Pieria 40 0.53
Chania 7 1.60 Lefkada 24 0.91 Imathia 41 0.52
Attiki 8 1.53 Kerkyra 25 0.86 Serres 42 0.52
Lasithi 9 1.47 Evros 26 0.85 Kastoria 43 0.52
Messinia 10 1.38 Arta 27 0.82 Thesprotia 44 0.52
Kavala 11 1.33 Halkidiki 28 0.77 Laconia 45 0.48
Kephalonia 12 1.26 Viotia 29 0.76 Kyclades 46 0.45
Dodecan. 13 1.26 Preveza 30 0.75 Grevena 47 0.44
Thessalon. 14 1.19 Kozani 31 0.72 Korinthia 48 0.34
Rodopi 15 1.18 Ilia 32 0.71 Kilkis 49 0.34
Chios 16 1.17 Larissa 33 0.69 Trikala 50 0.31
Pella 17 1.09 Aitoloakar. 34 0.65 Arcadia 51 0.25
Average 3,046 Variance 4.E+06
Maximum 11,621 Max-Min Ratio 15.121 Stand. Deviation 1,960
Minimum 768 Coef. Of Variation 0.643
The statistics at the foot of the table refer to the actual (deflated and in thousands) data and not their percentages
Source of Original Data: Ministry of National Economy
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Map 3.7 Total social infrastructure spending per inhabitant, 1976-1992
Constant 1970 prices
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A comparison between the coefficient of variation of the per inhabitant 
infrastructure categories (tables 3.16 to 3.18) with the respective statistics for the absolute 
spending (tables 3.12 to 3.14) shows that the per inhabitant regional distribution is 
considerably less unequal than for absolute spending.
The final set of tables 3.19 to 3.21 provide the prefectural ranking according to per 
unit of area (per square kilometre, given in table 3.22) investment for each of the public 
capital categories. As might be expected, the Attiki and Thessaloniki prefectures have 
been ranked first and second for all three categories of public capital (overall, productive, 
and social). This is a result of the fact that Greek prefectures are more of less of the same 
size, with the possible exception of some of the island prefectures (see table 3.22 for 
details of prefectural size). Table 3.19 shows that from the list of prefectures ranked first 
to tenth, more than half are islands. Similar is the case for productive infrastructure per 
unit area (table 3.20). However, it is somewhat different for social public capital because, 
as table 3.21 reveals, the most endowed prefectures are those with large urban centres.
Table 3.19 Total (overall) infrastructure spending per unit area by nomos in Greece, 1976-1992
Crawtarrtl97^rices
NOMOS Rank Perc. Over 
the Average
NOMOS Rank Perc. Over 
the Average
NOMOS Rank Perc. Over 
the Average
Attiki 1 10.85 Kavala 18 0.89 Rodopi 35 0.58
Thessalon. 2 2.51 Pella 19 0.89 Kastoria 36 0.58
Kerkyra 3 1.84 Ilia 20 0.86 Evritania 37 0.56
Lefkada 4 1.37 Magnisia 21 0.81 Aitoloakar. 38 0.53
Samos 5 1.31 Xanthi 22 0.79 Halkidiki 39 0.51
Zakynthos 6 1.27 Lasithi 23 0.77 Korinthia 40 0.49
Iraklio 7 1.24 Ioannina 24 0.76 Larissa 41 0.47
Achaia 8 1.19 Serres 25 0.73 Drama 42 0.46
Preveza 9 1.18 Lesvos 26 0.70 Fiorina 43 0.44
Chios 10 1.15 Pieria 27 0.70 Fokida 44 0.44
Viotia 11 1.10 Karditsa 28 0.69 Kozani 45 0.44
Chania 12 1.03 Imathia 29 0.69 Trikala 46 0.41
Dodecan. 13 1.02 Kyclades 30 0.66 Grevena 47 0.38
Rethimno 14 1.01 Arta 31 0.64 Kilkis 48 0.36
Messinia 15 1.00 Argolida 32 0.62 Fthiotis 49 0.34
Kephalonia 16 0.99 Thesprotia 33 0.60 Laconia 50 0.30
Evros 17 0.97 Evia 34 0.58 Arcadia 51 0.28
Average 1,350,412 Variance 4.E+12
Maximum 14,653,389 Max-Min Ratio 38.766 Stand. Deviation 1,977,835
Minimum 377,995 Coef. Of Variation 1.465
The statistics at the foot of the table refer to the actual (deflated and in absolute numbers) data and not their percentages 
Source of Original Data: Ministry of National Economy
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Table 3.20 shows that the prefectural allocation (per unit area) of the productive 
category is similar to that of the overall infrastructure investment. The first four 
prefectures are the same for overall and productive investment. However, the regional 
disparities of productive investment are smaller compared to total infrastructure, as shown 
by the coefficients of variation (1.095 and 1.465 respectively).
Table 3.20 Total productive infrastructure spending per unit area by nomos in Greece, 1976-1992
Constant 1970 prices
NOMOS Rank Perc. Over 
the Average
NOMOS Rank Perc. Over 
the Average
NOMOS Rank Perc. Over 
the Average
Attiki 1 8.15 Ilia 18 0.97 Aitoloakar. 35 0.61
Thessalon. 2 2.11 Kavala 19 0.89 Arta 36 0.60
Kerkyra 3 1.95 Serres 20 0.87 Rodopi 37 0.59
Lefkada 4 1.63 Lesvos 21 0.83 Evia 38 0.58
Zakynthos 5 1.51 Lasithi 22 0.83 Korinthia 39 0.57
Samos 6 1.51 Magnisia 23 0.81 Halkidiki 40 0.54
Preveza 7 1.36 Achaia 24 0.80 Drama 41 0.52
Viotia S 1.33 Kyclades 25 0.80 Fiorina 42 0.52
Chios 9 1.27 Xanthi 26 0.80 Fokida 43 0.51
Kephalonia 10 1.15 Pieria 27 0.78 Larissa 44 0.50
Evros 11 1.14 Imathia 28 0.76 Kozani 45 0.47
Dodecan. 12 1.10 Thesprotia 29 0.73 Grevena 46 0.47
Rethimno 13 1.06 Karditsa 30 0.73 Kilkis 47 0.43
Messinia 14 1.06 Argolida 31 0.72 Trikala 48 0.43
Chania 15 1.05 Kastoria 32 0.70 Laconia 49 0.36
Pella 16 0.98 Ioannina 33 0.64 Fthiotis 50 0.35
Iraklio 17 0.98 Evritania 34 0.63 Arcadia 51 0.33
Average 1,027,870 Variance l.E+12
Maximum 8,380,734 Max-Min Ratio 24.627 Stand. Deviation 1,126,007
Minimum 340,303 Coef. Of Variation 1.095
The statistics at the foot of the table refer to the actual (deflated and in absolute numbers) data and not their percentages 
Source of Original Data: Ministry of National Economy
The situation is slightly different for public investment per area regarding the 
social category. Here, all of the top prefectures are the most densely populated ones. For 
instance, the small island of Samos, ranked fifth in the overall classification per area, has 
a below average percentage social spending (placed at 18 in the list). Also, in this case, 
regional inequalities are higher (the coefficient of variation for the spending per area on 
social infrastructure is 2.397).
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Table 3.21 Total social infrastructure spending per unit area by nomos in Greece, 1976-1992
ConstontJ^TO^grices
NOMOS Rank Perc. Over 
the Average
NOMOS Rank Perc. Over 
the Average
NOMOS Rank Perc. Over 
the Average
Attiki 1 17.07 Samos 18 0.62 Argolida 35 0.32
Thessalon. 2 3.61 Rodopi 19 0.60 Evritania 36 0.31
Achaia 3 2.92 Evia 20 0.60 Serres 37 0.31
Iraklio 4 2.53 Zakynthos 21 0.58 Drama 38 0.31
Kerkyra 5 1.71 Ilia 22 0.56 Fthiotis 39 0.29
Ioannina 6 1.44 Karditsa 23 0.55 Halkidiki 40 0.28
Chania 7 1.08 Kephalonia 24 0.55 Korinthia 41 0.24
Kavala 8 1.05 Imathia 25 0.51 Fokida 42 0.24
Rethimno 9 1.01 Preveza 26 0.51 Fiorina 43 0.21
Xanthi 10 0.99 Arta 27 0.48 Kyclades 44 0.20
Messinia 11 0.93 Pieria 28 0.48 Kastoria 45 0.20
Magnisia 12 0.89 Larissa 29 0.41 Thesprotia 46 0.18
Dodecan. 13 0.88 Viotia 30 0.40 Trikala 47 0.16
Chios 14 0.81 Kozani 31 0.38 Laconia 48 0.15
Pella 15 0.73 Evros 32 0.36 Kilkis 49 0.13
Lasithi 16 0.70 Lesvos 33 0.35 Grevena 50 0.09
Lefkada 17 0.68 Aitoloakar. 34 0.33 Arcadia 51 0.07
Average 247,672 Variance 4.E+11
Maximum 4,228,725 Max-Min Ratio 228.061 Stand. Deviation 593,766
Minimum 18,542 Coef. Of Variation 2.397
The statistics at the foot of the table refer to the actual (deflated and in absolute numbers) data and not their percentages 
Source of Original Data: Ministry of National Economy
Table 3.22 Population* and size of Greek prefectures
Millions and s<
NOMOS Popula
tion
Area in 
sq.km
NOMOS Popula
tion
Area in 
sq.km
NOMOS Popula
tion
Area in 
sq.km
Achaia 287,636 3,271 Halkidiki 86,345 2,918 Lefkada 21,487 356
Aitoloakamania 223,972 5,461 Ilia 169,867 2,618 Lesvos 104,851 2,154
Arcadia 106,621 4,419 Imathia 136,842 1,701 Magnisia 190,328 2,636
Argolida 95,328 2,154 Ioannina 152,749 4,990 Messinia 163,391 2,991
Arta 79,382 1,662 Iraklio 254,264 2,641 Pella 135,574 2,506
Attiki 3,446,416 3,808 Karditsa 125,892 2,636 Pieria 111,811 1,516
Chania 129,815 2,376 Kastoria 52,927 1,720 Preveza 57,272 1,036
Chios 51,025 904 Kavala 135,578 2,111 Rethimno 66,365 1,496
Dodecanissos 154,274 2,714 Kephalonia 31,886 904 Rodopi 105,574 2,543
Drama 95,663 3,468 Kerkyra 103,535 641 Samos 41,242 778
Evia 198,409 4,167 Kilkis 81,636 2,519 Serres 194,538 3,968
Evritania 25,245 1,869 Korinthia 132,433 2,290 Thesprotia 42,733 1,515
Evros 146,119 4,242 Kozani 148,719 3,516 Thessaloniki 909,222 3,683
Fiorina 52,789 1,924 Kyclades 91,232 2,572 Trikala 136,577 3,384
Fokida 44,203 2,120 Laconia 94,457 3,636 Viotia 125,642 2,952
Fthiotis 166,635 4,441 Larissa 262,454 5,381 Xanthi 89,920 1,793
Grevena 36,609 2,291 Lasithi 70,666 1,823 Zakynthos 31,286 406
Average 196,067 2,581
+Average of the population given in the censuses of 1981 and 1991 
Source: National Statistical Service of Greece
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3.5 Estimation of the public capital stocks
The original data of the Public Investment Programme utilised here can provide a 
reliable source of information for the study of infrastructure capacity in Greece, both at a 
national and a regional level. The next step is to use these data for the estimation of the 
national and regional capital infrastructure stocks. There are no such existing estimations, 
but Greece is by no means unusual in this respect.
It can be safely argued that one of the contributions of the recent resurgence in 
research into public infrastructure is the construction of reliable estimations of such 
capital stocks, as the following examples illustrate. Munnell has estimated the public 
capital stocks for the United States at ‘state-by-state’ level (1990b, Appendix A). Holtz- 
Eakin, also for the United States, extended Munnell’s work for the capital stocks at a 
local government level (1993b). Mas and her team have calculated the infrastructure 
stocks at autonomous community (regional) level for Spain (Mas et al. 1995).
The dominant approach for the estimation of the public capital stocks in the 
infrastructure literature is the perpetual inventory accounting method. This approach uses 
the flow of infrastructure investment for the estimation of stocks, assuming that a 
percentage of the existing stock has been depreciated. The formula for the estimation of 
the capital stocks to be used here is:
Gt = ( l - 8 ) G t_1+It (4.5.1)
where,
Gt is the end of year public capital stock in year t,
8  is the geometric rate of depreciation,
and It is real investment in public capital during years t
(For more details on this fairly standard method of capital stock construction see for 
example Holtz-Eakin 1993b).
It is apparent from equation (4.5.1) that three pieces of information are necessary 
for the estimation of public capital stocks. The real investment in infrastructure (//) can be 
approximated by the monetary sums paid by the PIPR. Regarding the geometric rate of
101
THE EVOLUTION OF PUBLIC INVESTMENT PROGRAMME
depreciation (S), it was assumed that the rate remained constant for all of the examined 
period, and that it equals 0.05. This is similar to the depreciation rate used by Bajo-Rubio 
and Sosvilla-Rivero for the estimation of the Spanish infrastructure stocks (1993, 
Appendix 1). This figure is arbitrary, but it has chosen assuming that Greek infrastructure 
capital is not much different from the Spanish, and that in addition the depreciation rate 
for fixed assets (buildings) given by the NSSG (see Xenaki 1997) is not dissimilar. 
Finally, as there were no existing stock estimates at regional level, it was decided to build 
on the first year of the available data17.
This process has been used for the estimation of total public capital, as well as for 
the productive and social categories. The next table (3.23) outlines regional inequalities in 
the estimated prefectural infrastructure capacity (at the middle year -1984 - of the period 
examined, so that a meaningful comparison with the previous tables, where the averages 
for the 1976-1992 period were used, is feasible).
Table 3.23 Prefectural total (overall) infrastructure capital stock in Greece, 1984
Constant 1970 prices
NOMOS Rank Perc. Over 
the Average
NOMOS Rank Perc. Over 
the Average
NOMOS Rank Perc. Over 
the Average
Attiki 1 15.88 Kyklades 18 0.64 Laconia 35 0.42
Thessalon. 2 3.76 Kozani 19 0.58 Preveza 36 0.41
Evros 3 2.06 Lesvos 20 0.57 Evritania 37 0.40
Achaia 4 1.48 Argolida 21 0.56 Kastoria 38 0.40
Ioannina 5 1.42 Halkidiki 22 0.55 Samos 39 0.37
Ilia 6 1.23 Rodopi 23 0.55 Serres 40 0.37
Aitoloakar. 7 1.19 Karditsa 24 0.54 Kilkis 41 0.36
Iraklio 8 1.16 Fthiotis 25 0.51 Kephalonia 42 0.35
Pella 9 1.12 Lasithi 26 0.51 Kerkyra 43 0.35
Viotia 10 1.06 Korinthia 27 0.49 Chios 44 0.35
Dodekan. 11 1.00 Rethimno 28 0.48 Grevena 45 0.34
Larisa 12 0.94 Drama 29 0.48 Thesprotia 46 0.34
Messinia 13 0.91 Arcadia 30 0.47 Arta 47 0.33
Magnisia 14 0.89 Xanthi 31 0.47 Fiorina 48 0.32
Evia 15 0.85 Imathia 32 0.47 Fokida 49 0.28
Chania 16 0.84 Pieria 33 0.44 Zakynthos 50 0.19
Kavala 17 0.69 Trikala 34 0.44 Lefkada 51 0.18
Average 1,319,947 Variance 8.5E+12
Maximum 20,966,494 Max-Min Ratio 86.070 Stand. Deviation 2,907,097
Minimum 243,599 Coef. Of Variation 2.202
The statistics at the foot of the table refer to the actual (deflated and in thousands) data and not their percentages
Source of Original Data: Ministry of National Economy
17 This is a common practice in the estimation of capital stocks. See for instance Corrales and Taguas 
(1991).
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The prefectural classification and the overall statistics are similar to those of table 
3.12, where the total (overall) infrastructure spending was presented for the whole of the 
period examined (1976-1992). Thus, the Attiki, Thessaloniki, and Evros prefectures are 
again in the three top places of the classification, while Zakynthos and Fokida occupy the 
bottom two. Even though there are some differences in the other places of the 
classification, these can be attributed to the fact that the statistics for them are based on 
the mid-year (1984) capital stocks. The overall conclusion is that the regional distribution 
of capital stock depends, as would be expected, on the levels of prefectural spending (as 
the capital stocks reflect accumulated investment flows). This is also true for the 
classifications of the productive and social public capital stocks, which are not present 
here due to space limitations.
3.6 Conclusions
The main provider of public infrastructure investment in Greece is to all intents 
(for all the post-Second World War period) the Public Investment Programme. Even 
though it is not the only source for public capital investment, it is by far the most 
important. The PIPR data provides not only valuable information for the estimation of 
public capital stocks at the national level, but also have made possible the construction of 
infrastructure stocks at the (never before available) regional or prefectural level.
If the spatial allocation of public investment is one dimension given by the data of 
PIPR, another available dimension is the type of infrastructure in which this investment 
has been materialised. The PIPR is divided to several categories, but in order to simplify 
the empirical analysis undertaken in the next three chapters, these basic categories have 
been grouped under two major headings - productive and social infrastructure investment. 
If these two categories are added, then total (overall) infrastructure investment can be 
obtained. This overall public capital investment is smaller than the total PIPR 
expenditure, as the Miscellaneous and Administrative expenditures categories have been 
subtracted. The exclusion of these categories is necessary, as they do not represent actual 
investment in fixed capital, but do in fact constitute the operational costs of the 
Programme.
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The share of these Miscellaneous and Administrative expenditures in the eighties 
became extremely high and this meant that the percentage, and unfortunately the absolute 
level, of ‘real’ (fixed capital) investment fell. In the late eighties and early nineties the 
upward trend of these operational costs was reversed and, thus, the percentage and 
absolute level of productive infrastructure investment has significantly increased. 
However, this is not also the case for social infrastructure investment, which has not 
regained its seventies level.
One of the problems concerning the assessment of the role of public infrastructure 
in regional economic development and productivity is the fact that a significant part of 
the PIPR is not allocated at prefectural level (NUTS III), but instead at a higher spatial 
level. This means that some investment projects have been materialised in more than one 
prefecture (inter-prefectural level), some at prefectures belonging in more than one NUTS 
II region (inter-regional level), and some are public expenditure at the national level. 
However, a significant part of the PIPR expenditure that cannot be allocated at prefectural 
level does not relate to actual investment, but to Miscellaneous and Administrative 
operational expenditure. Thus it can be argued that the constructed regional stocks are an 
underestimation of the existing public infrastructure. However, in the estimation of 
infrastructure stocks at national level (used for the assessment of the effects of public 
capital on the manufacturing sectors) all ‘real’ investment expenditures at the NUTS II 
regional or national level have been included.
It has been demonstrated that the regional distribution of public investment in 
infrastructure capital is far for equal. Some prefectures have received a significantly 
higher percentage of public capital than others. Prefectures with high population density, 
that is those containing the large urban centres of the country, are the main beneficiaries 
of total infrastructure investment. The unequal allocation of total infrastructure is also 
reflected in the regional distribution of the productive and social categories. If, however, 
instead of the absolute amount of infrastructure, the per capita prefectural spending is 
examined, the situation is totally different. Peripheral and low population density 
prefectures have had the highest per inhabitant infrastructure investment, for total and 
productive categories. But the per capita social public capital distribution is different. For 
this category prefectures with significant urban centres have higher social capital 
endowment.
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Despite these regional inequalities in the spatial distribution of public capital, the 
fact remains that the PIPR has been for the most recent decades the most important and 
most reliable source of investment at both the national and the regional level.
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Chapter 4
Public Infrastructure Investm ent and National 
and Regional Economic Growth in Greece: A 
Production Function Analysis
4.1 Introduction
The renewed interest for the relationship between public infrastructure capital and 
economic development has already produced a substantial body of empirical research in 
the United States and in many other countries. The majority of this work has been based 
on the use of an analytical framework based on production functions, and more 
particularly the Cobb-Douglas production function variant.
This chapter attempts to assess the impact of public infrastructure on national and 
regional economic development in Greece, and more specifically on the manufacturing 
sector of the economy, utilising such an analytical framework. The analysis conducted 
here has used relatively recent developments of econometric theory, and especially the 
contemporary understanding of estimating production functions using time series - cross 
section data analysis.
Section 4.2 presents the theoretical framework, as well as an inquiry into the 
origin of the production functions in general and the Cobb-Douglas specification in 
particular. Some of the relevant recent empirical findings from other countries are also 
presented. A concise presentation of the Greek industrial sector is offered in the next 
section (4.3). The development of a number of the key characteristics of this sector is 
analysed here and a picture of the regional distribution of the industry presented. Section 
4.4 sets out the econometric calibration of the Cobb-Douglas production function, which 
is to be used later for the empirical research on the Greek case. This section also contains
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a description of several statistical and econometric tests to be used in the aforementioned 
analysis.
Section 4.5 introduces the presentation of the empirical results for the Greek case. 
This section contains the findings at the national level, along with the results for several 
different econometric specifications. The analysis is not restricted to the aggregate 
estimates of infrastructure stocks, but also includes consideration of the two major 
categories of public capital - productive and social infrastructure. The following section 
(4.6) investigates the possibilities for different types of returns to scale. Such an analysis 
is deemed necessary here, as these can reveal whether the market operates under perfect 
competition (as the neoclassical theory would require for the long run) or not. Section 4.7 
shifts the spatial level from the national to the regional. Different levels of spatial 
aggregation, as well as some aggregations based on the level of industrial performance of 
the Greek prefectures, have been used. The last empirical section (4.8) is an excursion 
into the role of infrastructure networks. The difference compared to the previous analysis 
is that in this section the effects of the infrastructure endowment in adjacent spatial units 
have been taken under consideration.
The last section summarises the empirical findings of this chapter. The overall 
conclusion is that public infrastructure appears to play a strong positive role in industrial 
development, at least at national level. It seems that the larger the spatial scale of analysis 
the larger is the impact of public capital. This is in accordance to the empirical findings 
from other countries. The probable reason why this might be so is that the analysis of 
larger spatial units captures the potentially important spillover effects of public 
infrastructure capital.
4.2 The production function analytical framework
The majority of the recent research on the role of public infrastructure on 
economic and regional development is based on the production function analytical 
framework. The Cobb-Douglas specification of the production function appears to be 
especially popular. In chapter 2 an introductory review of the production function 
approach has been presented, as well as a discussion of the recent empirical findings. For
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a concise presentation of the dimensions of this type of research reference should be made 
to table 2.1. All of this work begs the question why production functions and why the 
popularity of the Cobb-Douglas form? The answers probably lie in the concept of the 
production function per se.
The production function concept is, probably, the basic building block for the 
orthodox (neoclassical) economic theory of production. A production function which is 
“the simplest and most common way to describe the technology o f a firm” (Varian 1992, 
p. 1), is “the set o f possible efficient relations between inputs and outputs given the 
current state o f technological knowledge” (Heathfleld et al. 1987, p. 12). For a more 
formal definition see Takayama 1996, Varian 1992, or Chambers 1988. Chambers also 
provides an excellent, concise, but formal, analysis of the theoretical properties of the 
production function (1988).
The development of the production function concept is one of the most interesting 
in the history of economic theory. An excellent overview of this development can be 
found in Bemdt 1991, section 9.1. The idea of the production function has been central to 
an economic analysis of production even during the time of Alfred Marshall (see his 
seminal work Principles o f Economics 1961, first published in 1870). However, it was 
Douglas and Cobb1 who developed one of the most celebrated (and most frequently used 
in empirical research at both at micro and macro levels of analysis) forms of production 
function.
Paul Douglas, who was not only an eminent economist but also a politician2, 
worked on labour economics. One of the questions he tried to answer was the relationship 
between movements of labour productivity and real wages over a long period of time, and 
more particularly if labour was receiving the value of its marginal product. This query 
was of great importance given the political and economic context of the era (the late 
1920s). Douglas wanted to test the marginal productivity theory for this question, but 
probably felt that an enhanced mathematical aptitude was required for the task. Thus, he 
enlisted the help of one of his colleagues at Amherst College - an applied mathematician
1 Wicksell has used this type of equation earlier on. However, it was Douglas who made it popular (for this 
point see Heathfield et al. 1987).
He was US senator for Illinois from 1949 to 1966 (cited in Mankiw 1998; this reference provides also a 
presentation of the use of Cobb-Douglas production function in macroeconomics).
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called Charles Cobb. Together they published one of the most seminal papers in 
economics (1928) testing the marginal productivity theory empirically. They concluded 
that the shares of private capital and labour of national income had remained, for the US 
economy, more or less constant over a long period of time3. The interpretation of this 
result is that “as the economy grew more prosperous over time, the income o f workers 
and the income o f capital owners grew at almost the same rate” (Mankiw 1998, p. 76). 
The formulation that they used was the celebrated Cobb-Douglas equation. This is a 
theoretical construction that gives constant factor shares if the production factors obtain 
their marginal product.
As this equation is used extensively in the public capital literature and also in this 
empirical chapter, it will be useful to present some of its basic properties. The generic 
Cobb-Douglas production function has the form4 (see equation 2.3.1 in chapter 2):
Q = AKaLb (4.2.1)
where:
Q is output,
K  is the private capital input,
L is the labour input,
and A is a measure of technological progress
As was mentioned in section 2.3, the parameters a and b measure the elasticities 
of output with respect to private capital and labour. It is assumed that these parameters are 
constant and their value is between zero and unity. The Cobb-Douglas function is
3 They formulated the Cobb-Douglas equation, and estimated the coefficients for private capital and labour, 
which were 0.25 and 0.75 respectively. (It has to be noted that these shares for the US economy for the 
period 1946 to 1994 were 0.3 and 0.7 respectively, as it cited in Mankiw 1998, pp. 77-78). The R square for 
their regression was 0.97. It has to be mentioned, however, that an alternative formulation they used, which 
was inconsistent to the usual theory of production, as it did not permit diminishing returns, ‘achieved’ a 
similar high R square of 0.97 (for these points see Berndt 1991, chapter 9).
4 This equation can be alternatively expressed in terms of capital or labour productivity (see equations 2.3.4 
and 2.3.5 respectively in chapter 2).
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homogeneous of degree (a+b\ and if it is assumed that a+b=l (constant returns of scale), 
then is linearly homogeneous5.
The marginal product6 of private capital (MPK) will be:
^  = aAK-'L” = a — (4.2.2)
3K K
and the marginal product of labour (,MPL) will be:
^  = bAK,Lb~1 = b — (4.2.3)
8L L
As mentioned previously, it is assumed that parameters a and b take values between zero 
and unity. That means that the quantities a~l and b-1 are both negatives, and, thus, the 
second terms of expressions 4.2.2 and 4.2.3 are diminishing. This, in turn, means that 
both MPK and MPL are diminishing as the relevant input (K, or L) increases.
Another crucial feature of the Cobb-Douglas production function is that its 
elasticity of substitution is constant and equal to one (a formal proof of this characteristic 
of Cobb-Douglas can be found in Heathfield et al. 1987, pp. 80-81). The constant 
elasticity of substitution implies that a k percent change in the ratio of production factor 
prices would lead, in turn, to a k percent change in quantity terms in the opposite 
direction. For example, a k percent increase of the price of private capital (relative to the 
price of labour), would lead to k percent decrease in the quantity of private capital input 
relative to labour.
The Cobb-Douglas production function is related to Cobb-Douglas isoquants, 
factor demand functions, and cost functions. Due to space limitations it will suffice to say 
at this point that in Heathfield et al. 1987 a whole chapter can be found devoted to the 
Cobb-Douglas function, where these relations are analysed. Also to be found here is an
3 For an analysis of the terms ‘homogeneous’ and ‘linearly homogeneous’ see section 4.6 of this chapter, 
where there is an attempt to investigate empirically types of returns of scale.
6The marginal products presented in equations (4.2.2) and (4.2.3) refer to a homogeneous Cobb-Douglas 
function. For the marginal products in the case where the Cobb-Douglas is not just homogeneous, but 
linearly homogeneous (the case of constant returns of scale) see Chiang 1984, pp. 414-417.
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analysis of the aggregation of Cobb-Douglas functions. Another useful treatment of the 
empirical problems in the aggregation and estimation of production functions can be 
found in Thomas (1993).
As noted in chapter 2, the Cobb-Douglas is not the only type of production 
function available. There are others, perhaps more sophisticated types, such as the 
Constant Elasticity of Substitution (CES) production function, or the Transcendental 
Logarithmic (translog) production function. Bemdt (1991), Heathfield et al. (1987), 
Thomas (1993), and Varian (1992) all offer excellent introductory presentations of these 
types of production functions, as well as, in some, examples of empirical research 
utilising them. Chambers (1988) has also been responsible for putting these forms of 
production function into a more theoretical framework. Section 2.3 offers some examples 
of recent public infrastructure research based on translog production functions, in 
addition to its basic formulation.
Chapter 2 also provides an explanation of why the Cobb-Douglas specification 
has been the dominant form of production function in empirical public capital research. 
The reasons seem to stem less from a fundamental conceptual advantage of the Cobb- 
Douglas function, and more to rather mundane issues. The Cobb-Douglas can be 
formulated and estimated rather easily, it is less data demanding, and the results give 
immediately a direct picture of infrastructure impact on private sector production activity 
(in comparison with, say, the more complicate ways of estimation using the cost function 
approach7).
To be more specific, the operational form of the Cobb-Douglas production 
function where public capital has also been added would be:
InQ = InA + alnK + blnL + clnG + e (4.2.4)
The coefficients for the independent variables in equation 4.2.4 - a, b, and c - as argued 
earlier are the elasticities of output with respect to private capital, labour, and public 
capital respectively. This empirical calibration of the Cobb-Douglas equation is called in
7 See next chapter.
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econometrics log-linear8 and has the interesting feature that the slope and elasticity 
coefficients estimated are the same, something which is not the case in the linear model 
(see for this point, Gujarati 1995). The fact that these coefficients measure the elasticity 
of output with respect to the production inputs makes the interpretation of the empirical 
simple. If, for instance, the estimated coefficients were 0.30, 0.50, and 0.20 for private 
capital, labour, and infrastructure capital respectively this means that an increase of the 
infrastructure stock by one percent would have a subsequent increase on the production 
output by 20 percent. It is clear that this feature of the log-linear form of the Cobb- 
Douglas allows for an immediate comparison of the impact of public capital to that of the 
private factors of the production (private capital, and labour).
These advantages constitute the main reasons explaining the fact that the majority 
of the existing research on infrastructure effects has used the Cobb-Douglas production 
function. More than half of the reported studies in table 2.1 have used the Cobb-Douglas 
approach. It is true to say, however, that the actual calibration of the Cobb-Douglas varies 
significantly among researchers. This fact has the implication that a direct comparison of 
the actual estimates of the effects of the infrastructure variable in these studies could be 
misleading9. With this caveat in mind, table 4.1 presents some of the estimated 
infrastructure coefficients in some of the most frequently cited pieces of research. Table 
4.1 shows that the estimated elasticities for public infrastructure range from a ‘sky-high’ 
0.39 estimated by Aschauer (1989a) to zero or near zero coefficients obtained by Holtz- 
Eakin (1992a) and Tatom (1991b). What it is not immediately obvious from such a table 
are the underlying difficulties of comparison. Every study can have a slightly different 
empirical calibration of the Cobb-Douglas equation and sometimes a significantly 
different definition of public capital.
8 Sometimes the terms, log-log, or double-log are used alternatively (see, for instance, Gujarati 1995). It has 
to be mentioned, however, that some authors reserve the term log-linear just for the semilog models (see 
Ramanathan 1992), where only the dependent variable is in logarithmic form.
9 See, however, the interesting meta-analysis of public capital investment studies developed by Button 
(1998).
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Table 4.1 Estimated Output Elasticities of Public Infrastructure Capital from Selected Studies
Author Year Country Level of Aggregation Elasticity of Public capital*
Aschauer 1989a US National 0.39
Baltagi and Pinnoi 1995 US Panel of the 48 contiguous 
states
0.16-0.39+
Eisner 1991 us National-Regional (States) 0.165
Garcia-Mila and 
McGuire
1992 us National-Regional (States) 0.045-0.165+
Garcia-Mila, 
McGuire, Porter
1996 us National no significant effect
Holtz-Eakin 1992a us National-Regional almost zero
Mera 1973 Japan Regional 0.20
Munnell 1990a US National 0.15
Tatom 1991b US National 
(Business sector)
almost zero
+ Range depending on the specification and the infrastructure aggregation
Switching the discussion next to the empirical context of the present research, the 
only previous works on this topic for Greece are due to Dalamagas (1995), and Segoura 
and Christodoulakis (1997). Both these pieces of research use time-series data at the 
national level10 and an all-encompassing definition of public capital. Dalamagas used a 
translog production function, adding Energy into the explanatory variables. Thus, his 
research findings are not directly comparable with those from this thesis. Infrastructure in 
Segoura and Christodoulakis’ research comprises the public capital in transportation, 
telecommunications, and the energy sector. It is obvious that this definition is very 
different from the one used in the present study (see chapter 3). The problem with such a 
broad measure of infrastructure capital is that the telecommunications and energy sectors 
are already in the process of privatisation and also that the vast majority of the public 
capital literature only refers to a much narrower band of public investment. Thus, useful 
though this research is, it is difficult to make detailed comparisons with other research if 
somewhat different definitions are adopted. The infrastructure elasticity obtained by the 
Cobb-Douglas equation used by Segoura and Christodoulakis (0.42) is, as might be 
gathered from Table 4.1, extremely high indeed.
10 However, the time-series dataset of Segoura and Christodoulakis, is not complete as some intermediate 
observations are missing (see Segoura et al. 1997, footnote 13).
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These different guises of the Cobb-Douglas production function may constitute 
one of its principal disadvantages, as sometimes it makes for severe difficulties in 
comparing the results from different studies. The Cobb-Douglas function has several 
other theoretical restrictions, already addressed in section 2.3. Despite its shortcomings, 
however, it may be regarded as ‘almost compulsory’ to at least explore this theoretical 
and empirical tool in any research of this sort and a consequence it will form the basis of 
the rest of this chapter. In the following two chapters, however, some more up-to-date, 
and in many ways more ‘sophisticated’, methods of analysing role of public capital on the 
development of the economy will be considered.
4.3 The Greek secondary sector: regional distribution and 
temporal growth
The temporal evolution and regional distribution of the Public Investment 
Programme of Greece (PIPR) have been extensively analysed in chapter 3. It would be 
helpful to offer at this point a similar, although concise, presentation of the temporal 
performance and regional distribution of the manufacturing industry of Greece.
The data on manufacturing used in this analysis refer to large-scale industry and, 
more particularly, to establishments with average annual employment of twenty persons 
and over. This definition of ‘large-scale industry’ is the official one, used by the National 
Statistical Service of Greece (NSSG), which has provided the data. It has to be noted, 
however, that this scale of industry cannot be considered large-scale even in the Greek 
context. But, overall, it is true to say that this scale of manufacturing amounts to almost 
90 percent11 of all secondary activity in Greece.
Data for capital investment, as well as employment and value-added, together 
with other variables, are collected via the census questionnaire survey. Data for smaller 
establishments (which are not available at the regional level and therefore not used here) 
are collected via a sample. As a result, it can be stated that the regional manufacturing 
data, which have been used here, are as accurate as can be obtained.
11 This is true (on average) for the whole of the examined period, irrespectively of which indicator (total 
employment, remuneration of employment, gross production value, or added value) is chosen.
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However, there is a crucial difference between these data and the official data 
published by the National Statistical Service. In the published data and for reasons of 
confidentiality, in cases where there is only one firm in a prefecture, this prefecture is 
then added to an adjacent one. However, it has been possible to use here the original 
unpublished data, thus circumventing this problem. The use of these data was, in a sense, 
obligatory, as there were no other data available for private sector investment activity at a 
regional level. This most certainly was needed in order to construct a panel. Other data, 
which were available, did not have a sufficient time dimension for the proper estimation 
of capital stocks.
Table 4.2 shows the evolution of some basic indicators of Greek industrial 
performance from 1976-1991, using 1976 as a base year of deflation. The principal 
problem of Greek industry, and the Greek economy generally, has clearly been the 
decline of private investment. This tendency was accentuated in the second half of the 
eighties, reaching a low in 1987, when the gross asset formation of Greek industry 
represented only the 76 percent that of 1976. It is interesting to compare this trend with an 
opposite one, that of productive infrastructure capital, shown in table 3.6, column 4 (in 
chapter 3), which increases significantly from the early eighties and by 1991 was 32 
percent above the 1976 level.
It is also evident that since 1980 average annual employment has been decreasing, 
but in fact the remuneration of employment, in real terms, has actually increased and this 
is problematic, in terms of production costs. The product of Greek industry, either in the 
form of gross production value or as added value (the form used here later), exhibits a 
significant increase after 1979, followed by a modest fallback in the early eighties and 
subsequent recovery and more growth by the end of the decade. The nineties have seen 
modest upward progress for value-added but declines in gross production value.
115
P r o d u c t io n  f u n c t io n  a na ly sis a p p r o a c h
Table 4.2 Employment, labour remuneration, industrial production, and gross asset formation in 
the private industrial sector in Greece (establishments with 20 persons and over), 1976-1992
Year Average
Annual
Employment
Remuneration
of
Employment*
Gross
Production
Value
Value Added Gross
Asset
Formation
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
1976 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00
1977 101.60 108.59 102.03 103.32 87.09
1978 101.51 116.56 90.18 ++ 77.62
1979 101.37 119.10 97.41 ++ 95.63
1980 107.76 128.71 131.49 123.21 103.70
1981 107.05 130.02 137.24 121.40 119.10
1982 102.94 133.63 123.79 110.62 98.15
1983 99.64 130.20 128.28 114.09 113.61
1984 99.84 136.92 136.57 118.15 85.49
1985 98.64 136.17 141.37 119.11 87.78
1986 96.29 129.84 133.15 124.67 79.29
1987 98.12 129.94 127.64 124.00 76.05
1988 97.04 134.22 127.67 127.90 79.33
1989 96.85 143.70 130.77 131.23 84.53
1990 94.62 143.63 128.49 129.89 89.16
1991 88.37 138.52 122.06 130.20 79.05
1992 84.77 134.11 116.44 133.27 77.10
Source of original data: National Statistical Service 
+ In real (deflated with year base 1970) terms. ++ No data available
Table 4.3 develops a classification of prefectures according to development levels 
that are defined in terms of average yearly absolute manufacturing value-added (deflated 
to 1970 prices).
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Table 4.3 Classification of prefectures in Greece based on value-added performance, 1976-1992
High Output* Intermediate Output** Low Output***
Attiki Kozani Zaky.-Kepha.
Thessaloniki Iraklio Thesprotia
Viotia Aitoloakamania Arcadia
Achaia Serres Arta
Magnisia Argolida Evritania
Evia Evros Kastoria
Korinthia Pieria Lesvos
Larissa Ioannina Samos
Imathia Kyclades Fokida
Fthiotis Ilia Kerkyra
Kavala Halkidiki Chios
Pella Trikala Lasithi
Xanthi Rodopi Laconia
Kilkis Preveza Fiorina
Messinia Chania Rethimno
Drama Dodecanissos
Karditsa
Grevena
+ Output greater than 450 million drachmas (average value for the period 1976-1992, in constant 1970 prices) 
++ Output greater than 100 million drachmas (average value for the period 1976-1992, in constant 1970 prices) 
+-H- Output under 100 m illion d rach m as (average value for the period 1976-1992, in constant 1970 prices)
There are three levels - high output (greater than 450 million drachma - the value 
for Drama was 493 million), intermediate output (greater than 100 million drachmas - 
Karditsa’s value is 123 million drachma) and low output (under 100 million drachmas). 
As it is expected, Attiki and Thessaloniki dominate the rankings. This classification will 
be helpful in later analysis.
Private capital stocks for prefectural manufacturing have been used as a proxy for 
the quantity of private capital input (K), in the calibration of the Cobb-Douglas function 
for the Greek case in the following sections. The estimation method is again (see chapter 
3 for the case of public capital) via the method of perpetual inventory accounting:
Kjt = (1 -  8p)Kjt_j + IPit (4.3.1)
where:
Kit is the end-of-year private capital stock in year t in prefecture i,
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8P is the geometric rate of depreciation,
and IPu is real investment in private capital during years t in prefecture /.
As there were no available estimates of the previous capacity of private capital (for the 
spatial levels used here) the method used by Corrales and Taguas (cited in Appendix 1 in 
Bajo-Rubio and Sosvilla-Rivero 1993, p. 185) was employed. With this method the initial 
year is considered as a basis12, and the stock of the subsequent years is built upon it, with 
the help of the perpetual inventory method.
4.4 Model specification of links between private production  
and public capital in Greece
The general analytical framework used here is similar to that developed by US 
researchers - Aschauer, Munnell, and Holtz-Eakin. To repeat, the adoption of the Cobb- 
Douglas vis-a-vis other forms of production or cost function can be justified in two ways. 
First, it is straightforward to estimate, as it does not require the vast amount of 
information needed, for example, by the cost function approach, and because fewer 
degrees of freedom are lost in comparison with, say, the translog production function. 
Second, it makes for convenient inter-study, often cross-national, comparison as the 
overwhelming majority of infrastructure research projects have used this approach to 
date.
A Cobb-Douglas production function was estimated for Greece as a whole, and its 
spatial components - the two large regions of the North and the South, and then for the ten 
regions approximating to the NUTS II level (see table 4.10). Aschauer (1989a) expressed 
his Cobb-Douglas function in terms of capital productivity, while Munnell (1990a) 
preferred a calibration in terms of labour productivity for her research on the US as a 
whole. However, here another slightly modified specification of the Cobb-Douglas 
function has been selected, one in which changes in the production output are explained
12 This initial year can be multiplied by a number k (e.g. k = 3,5, or 10) for the approximation of the level of 
public capital (in this case the multiplication by 10 gave the highest coefficients for public capital). It has to 
be noted that the private capital stocks for the several spatial levels of sectoral industrial panels, which have 
been used in subsequent chapters, such a problem does not occur, as the data for private sectoral investment 
are sourced many years back in time.
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by changes in the production inputs. Such a specification was used by Munnell (1990b) in 
her regional analysis of US infrastructure.
The general idea in using a Cobb-Douglas production function in the examination 
of public infrastructure capital is to extend it, adding the public capital variable as 
follows:
Qi, = a l ; k ‘g j (4.4.1)
where:
A = an efficiency parameter (which can be regarded as an a indicator of the technology 
level),
Qit = total value added of the private industrial sector in prefecture i at year t,
Lit = average annual employment in the private industrial sector in prefecture i at year t,
= private capital input to the industrial sector in prefecture / at year /,
Gu = public capital input to the industrial sector in prefecture i at year t-113.
It is assumed that private and public capital inputs are proportionate to private and 
public capital stock respectively. In order to have a linear relationship capable of 
econometric estimation equation (4.4.1) is expressed in logarithmic form:
lnQit - Ac + a lnKit + b lnLit + c Git + u it (4.4.2)
In the Cobb-Douglas function, the exponents a, b, and c of equation (4.4.1) are the 
relative shares of the respective factors of the total product, under the assumption that 
each production factor is paid by the amount of its marginal product. (In other words it is 
assumed that there is a perfectly competitive market for each production factor). This 
means that the estimation of the coefficients of equation (4.4.2) provides these shares, or 
put it differently, the partial elasticity of output for the respective inputs of production.
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The exact specification of equation (4.4.2) in the subsequent analysis has the form:
lnQit = A + a lnKit + b lnLit + c Git + dt + e InCU + u it (4.4.3)
where:
A = the constant term, 
t = a time trend
CU~  the capacity utilisation of capital stock,
uit = the error term, and the other parameters are as above.
The capacity utilisation rate is used to control the influence of the business cycle. 
The values for this variable were obtained from the Organisation of Economic Co­
operation and Development (OECD), and refer to national industrial averages. 
Unfortunately regional capacity utilisation rate estimates are not available. This is a 
similar formulation to that of Aschauer (1989a). An alternative proxy for the latter could 
be the unemployment rate (Munnell 1990b), but in the Greek case it seems to be less 
reliable. In addition, Ford and Poret (1991) have emphasised the importance of the 
inclusion of a capacity utilisation term, as the residuals from regressions excluding this 
term were highly auto-correlated in their study. The desired use of capacity utilisation 
was one of the time-constraints of the panel as there are no available data prior to 1982.
The use of panel data analysis in the infrastructure literature is widespread. It 
provides considerable advantages, such as lower collinearity among the variables, more 
degrees of freedom and more efficiency, controlling for individual heterogeneity to name 
but a few. For a more extensive analysis of these advantages see Appendix I, or Baltagi 
(1995). However, there is a continuing controversy, especially in the regional 
infrastructure literature, as to the choice of panel model. In particular, Holtz-Eakin has 
argued that the standard OLS procedures used by Munnell produce biased and 
inconsistent results. He suggested that it is necessary to include in the specification of the 
error term a component that would capture the regional characteristics of the spatial panel 
units (Holtz-Eakin, 1992a). This argument has been supported by Evans and Karras
13 Public capital enters as an ‘instrument’, which is lagged one year. The reasoning for this is that in this 
way is safeguarded that all infrastructure investment has been materialised into fixed public capital 
providing services for the production process.
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(1994b), who have criticised Aschauer’s international comparative research, arguing that 
in his panel analysis he did not allow for fixed or random effects for country or time.
Here, a least squares dummy variable model (LSDV) is used in which a number of 
dummy variables has been added to the simple ordinary least squares (OLS) version. The 
former differs from the latter in that the error term has been specified as follows:
Uit = mi + vit (4.4.4)
where:
Hi is the unobservable regional specific effect, and vit is the remainder disturbance. 
Alternatively, expression (5) can be written as:
u = Mflp + v  (4.4.5)
where:
u '  =  ( u n , . . . ,  uit, U21 , . . . ,  U2t , . . . ,  U ji ,.. . ,  uu), with the observations stacked in such way that 
the first index is over regions, and the second over time.
= h ® it, where is an identity matrix of dimension ® is Kronecker product,
and it is a vector of ones dimension t.
In other words, it has been assumed that are fixed parameters, and a number of dummy 
variables equal to the number of regions has been used to estimate these effects, p ' = 
(pn>...,P it,P 2i,...,P 2t,...,Pii,...,Pit),andv' = (vii,..., vu, v2i,..., v2t,..., V ii , . . . ,  vit). Fora 
more formal presentation of the structure of error term see, for instance, Baltagi (1995) or 
Judge et al. (1985).
These binary variables are expected to capture differences between the spatial 
units - differences due to the different endowment of the spatial units in location, climate, 
raw materials, industrial and economic structure, etc14. The results for these dummy 
variables are not reported on here (due to space limitations). The results for the OLS 
regressions are also not reported on as there are several hundred sets (including the 
specifications for testing the type of returns of scale). However, it has to be noted that a
14 There has been an extended debate in the infrastructure literature regarding the formulation of locational 
characteristics using a panel dataset and a Cobb-Douglas production function (Holtz-Eakin 1992a; 1993c 
and Kelejian et. al. 1997).
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simple Chow test (F-test) was used to discriminate between the OLS and LSDV models. 
This test is based on the residual sum of squares15:
f =  ( e 'e -e 'e ) / (N - l)  
(e'e)/(NT - N - K ')
where:
(e'e) = the residual sum of squares from the OLS model, 
(e'e) = the residual sum of squares from the LSDV model, 
N-l = the number of linear restrictions,
NT-N-K' = degrees of freedom in the LSDV model
In all cases this F-test rejected the OLS formulation in favour of the LSDV model. 
An interesting point here is that there are two different formulations of the LSDV model 
available. One is without a constant term and with as many dummy variables as the 
number of the spatial units. The alternative, which is adopted here, includes a constant 
term, but drops one of the dummy variables. Even though the interpretation of the dummy 
variable coefficients is different, the results for the other coefficients are the same 
whichever formulation is chosen16.
Although the Cobb-Douglas is the dominant form of production function in the 
infrastructure literature, there are no a priori theoretical reasons for its selection over the
13 It would be the same if the R squares instead of sum of squares residuals and a slightly different 
formulation were used.
16 There are some cases, not only in the infrastructure literature, where the results for such dummy variables 
are reported without mention of the following caveats. In the formulation without a constant term, every a, 
dummy variable coefficient shows the unobservable regional specific effects in region /. However, this 
coefficient represents a separate intercept for the respective region and not a deviation from average 
behaviour. In the alternative case where a constant term has been included in the regression (and one 
dummy has been dropped), each dummy variable coefficient is an estimate of a, - ah This means that one 
region (the one for which the respective dummy has been omitted) has been used as a benchmark from 
which the behaviour of the other regions has been measured. In both cases the presentation of the estimated 
regional dummies cannot be useful without a previous transformation of the coefficients. Such a 
transformation can be achieved by adding a chosen constant to each of the coefficients. It has also to be said 
that in logarithmic regressions these constants should be selected in such a manner that the antilogs of the 
dummy coefficients are forced to equal unity. (For a more extensive analysis of these points, see Suits 
1984).
Another misconception about these dummy variables is to exclude insignificant t-values associated with 
individual coefficients. Judge et al. (1985, p.521) argue that it is better to use the conventional F-test (as 
used here) for testing the joint significance of these dummy variables, as “two different parameterizations of 
the same problem can lead to different dummy variables being omitted”.
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translog or, indeed, any other form. It must be kept in mind that the Cobb-Douglas form 
has some restrictive properties - its returns to scale are the same for all levels of output, 
and its elasticity of substitution is constant and equal to unity. Its supremacy in public 
capital research has more to do with the fact that it is relatively straightforward to 
estimate and understand rather than its theoretical superiority. It is possible, however, that 
the functional form of the Cobb-Douglas specification to be inconsistent with the 
empirical data. The functional assumption can be tested with the use of the RESET test 
suggested by Ramsey and Schmidt (1976). It can be generalised for multiple regression as 
follows, although for a more extensive presentation see Stewart (1991) or Thomas (1993). 
If the original equation to compute is of the form:
Y ^Po+ fcX B +fcX * (4.4.7)
then, if the squares of the predicted values of this equation (Y?) are included as an 
additional regressor in the previous equation, then it is possible to test the significance of 
the parameter of this variable. If more than one power of Y2 is added, a % test or an F  test
can be used. If one power of Y2 is used, equation (4.4.7) will take the form:
Y* = P0 + P(XU + P'X2i + p4Yj2 + 8i (4.4.8)
A A
and in this case the F  test is equivalent to the square of the simple t test of the added Y; 
parameter (the t test of $  in equation 4.4.8). One limitation of the RESET test is that even 
in the case where the statistic of the test is significant, it provides no indication of an 
alternative appropriate form. It is for this reason that RESET is considered “a test of 
general misspecification, as opposed to a test of specification” (Stewart, 1991, p.71).
It has to be noted that the following analysis does not include the Durbin-Watson 
test for autocorrelation. As Kelejian and Robinson have argued “the test is not valid in the 
presence o f current or lagged endogenous variables...Furthermore, the test should not be
123
P r o d u c t io n  f u n c t io n  a n a ly sis  a p p r o a c h
applied in panel data framework unless very strong assumptions are made” (Kelejian et 
al. 1997, p. 128).
4.5 Measuring the contribution of public infrastructure 
capital in Greece: the impact at the national level and 
alternative specifications
This section is presented in two parts. In the first (tables 4.4 to 4.6), the LSDV 
model is compared to alternative models. In the second (table 4.7), the data set has been 
partitioned temporally. The following key will be convenient for the interpretation of 
these tables.
Constant = constant term of regression
InQ = natural logarithm of output
InK — natural logarithm of private capital
InL = natural logarithm of labour input
InG = natural logarithm of public capital
InPG = natural logarithm of productive public capital
InSG = natural logarithm of social public capitalA .
Y* = predicted values of the dependant variable
time trend = a simple time trend
InCU = natural logarithm of capacity utilisation
K? = adjusted R square for degrees of freedom
SSR = error sum of squares
SE = standard error
The results of tables 4.4 to 4.6 compare the LSDV model with the OLS 
alternative, present an equation by which the RESET test is conducted, and the LSDV 
model estimated in first differences. The results concern the unconstrained Cobb-Douglas 
function (for the constrained versions, see section 4.6, in this chapter). Three sets of 
equations are compared, all referring to the results for Greece as a whole. These findings 
are based on panel of 49 prefectures for eleven years. The first model (table 4.4, la) is the 
fixed-effects formulation with labour input, private capital, a time trend, and the capacity 
utilisation. The elasticities of both private capital and labour are highly statistically
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significant. The share of labour input in the production process is much larger at 0.828,
while private capital elasticity is only 0.093. This means that say a one-percent increase in
the labour input factor would result in an approximately 80 percent increase in the
industrial output. On the other hand, a similar increase of public capital input would only
oq
increase output by around tea percent. Thus, an increase of labour input is eight times 
more ‘productive’ than the respective increase of private capital input.
This is a rather unsurprising result given that during the eighties private 
investment had sharply declined. These results are not much different from the OLS 
formulation (2a), which, however, is rejected with a simple Chow test (even at the 1 
percent level). The third variant (3a) is not comparable with either the LSDV or OLS 
formulations, and is the formulation in which the squares of the predicted values of the
dependent variable (Yj ) from the fixed effects variant (la) have been used as a regressor 
(Yj2), in order to perform the RESET test. As it is clear from the /-statistic of (Y2), or its 
equivalent F-test in last column, that the null hypothesis of linear specification (in this 
case specification la) cannot be rejected. Specification (4a) is exactly the same as (la), 
but here the data are in first differences (note that first-differencing reduces the number of 
observations). The labour input coefficient becomes smaller, and that for private capital 
becomes slightly higher. However, the overall fitness of the specification, as measured by 
the adjusted R2, is extremely low. In all cases the private sector inputs coefficients are 
statistically significant.
Table 4.4 Industrial output as a function of private capital stock (InK) and labour (InL), 1982-1992
Equation for Output (InQ)
Specif!
cation
Constant InK InL Time
trend
InCU Aa
V R2
SSE SE F-test
LSDV 20.019 0.093 0.828 0.028 -1.870 0.985 23.784 0.221
(la) (5.057)*** (2.125)** (16.800)*** (5.020)*** (-2.068)**
OLS 17.692 0.177 0.865 0.029 -1.906 0.966 57.994 0.330 14.563
(2a) (3.054)*** (9.592)*** (40.143)*** (3.477)*** (-1.417)
RESET EQ. 16.051 0.067 0.555 0.018 -1.192 0.009 0.985 23.775 0.221 0.179
(3a) (1.575) (0.864) (0.854) (0.763) (-0.648) (0.423)
FDLSDV 0.054 0.169 0.557 -0.950 0.061 27.745 0.252
(4a) (0.677) (2.298)** (6.525)*** (-1.299)
Note: /-statistics in parentheses (and henceforth in all tables)
*** Statistically significant at 1% level, ** Statistically significant at 5% level, * Statistically significant at 10% level
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In the next set of comparisons (table 4.5, lb to 4b), the public capital variable has 
been introduced into every equation. Thus, specification (lb) is the LSDV model with
17public capital . Here, the coefficient for public capital is high relative to that of private 
capital (the introduction of public capital makes little difference to the private input 
coefficients, reducing them both marginally, and all are statistically significant). Again 
the OLS variant (2b) has been rejected with the use of a Chow F-test. The linear 
specification cannot be rejected, as the RESET test shows in equation (3b). Finally, the 
LSDV estimation of the first-differences (variant 4b) gives a high coefficient for public 
infrastructure, when at the same time the labour coefficient appears to be relatively low.
Table 4.5 Industrial output as a function of private capital stock (InK), labour (InL), and 
infrastructure capital stock (InG), 1982-1992
Equation for Output (InQ)
Specif!
cation
Constant InK InL InG Time
trend
biCU R2 SSE SE F-test
LSDV 14.131 0.088 0.811 0.202 0.004 -1.385 0.985 23.473 0.220
(lb) (3.091)*** (1.999)** (16.387)*** (2.534)** (0.353) (-1.507)
OLS 16.151 0.178 0.849 0.052 0.023 -1.771 0.966 57.588 0.329 14.685
(2b) (2.769)*** (9.692)*** (36.679)*** (1.938)* (2.515)** (-1.318)
RESET EQ. 12.836 0.071 0.631 0.155 0.003 -1.045 0.006 0.985 23.469 0.220 0.085
(3b) (2.014)*** (1.010) (1.021) (0.864) (0.257) (-0.704) (0.292)
FD LSDV -0.008 0.166 0.531 0.451 -0.752 0.072 27.366 0.250
(4b) (-0.090) (2.265)*** (6.210)*** (2.462)*** (-1.028)
*** Statistically significant at 1% level, ** Statistically significant at 5% level, * Statistically significant at 10% level
17 A possible problem for time-series analysis is the potential collinearity between these variables. The 
simple correlations between them (as well the infrastructure variables used in the following set of 
equations) were low. However, such a measure of multicollinearity is weak and cannot reveal more 
complex interrelationships between the independent variables. For this reason, a matrix decomposition 
(variance-decomposition proportions) of the independent variables matrix was conducted. Again there was 
no evidence that there is linear dependency between the variables (for both the matrix with the total public 
capital, and for that where infrastructure is divided into its productive and social parts). Nevertheless, even 
with matrix decomposition, it can be difficult to separate linear relations. (For a frill presentation of these 
problems refer to Judge et al. (1985)). In any case, panel data sets naturally seem to exhibit less collinearity, 
as the cross-section dimension adds considerable variability between the spatial unit of the analysis (Baltagi 
1995).
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In the third set of equations (table 4.6), instead of the total public infrastructure, its 
two components - productive and social public capital - are introduced. In equation (lc), 
which is the LSDV variant, the results are according with expectations. The productive 
part of infrastructure appears to have a positive and significant impact on private sector 
production processes, whereas its social counterpart is statistically insignificant. As in the 
previous sets of equations, the fixed effects variant is superior to the OLS specification, 
the latter being rejected by the F-test. Also the RESET test shows that the Cobb-Douglas 
specification cannot be rejected (variant 3c). Finally, in the fixed-effects version of the 
first-differences (4c), the social component of infrastructure appears to have an extremely 
high coefficient, but again the adjusted R2 is low.
Table 4.6 Industrial output as a function of private capital stock (InK), labour (InL), productive 
(InPG) and social infrastructure capital stock (and InSG), 1982-1992
Specifi
cation
Constant InK InL InP(G) InS(G) Time
trend
InCU SSE SE F-test
LSDV 13.481 0.089 0.806 0.170 0.060 0.002 0.304 0.985 23.402 0.220
(lc) (2.942)*** (2.035)** (16.188)*** (2.526)** (0.942) (0.180) (-1.445)
OLS 16.145 0.178 0.847 0.037 0.018 0.023 -1.773 0.966 57.482 0.329 14.684
(2c) (2.756)*** (9.660)*** (36.447)*** (1.010) (0.841) (2.416)** (-1.317)
RESET EQ. 11.882 0.067 0.563 0.116 0.043 0.001 -0.883 0.008 0.985 23.395 0.220 0.157
(3c) (1.946)* (0.938) (0.912) (0.760) (0.573) (0.109) (-0.607) (0.397)
FDLSDV -0.016 0.172 0.532 0.278 0.400 -0.883 0.079 27.091 0.249
(4c) (-0.194) (2.362)** (6.256)*** (1.787)* (2.528)** (-1.204)
*** Statistically significant at 1% level, ** Statistically significant at 5% level, * Statistically significant at 10% level
A first tentative conclusion from these comparisons is that the fixed-effects 
formulation (LSDV) must be favoured and in the following analysis (tables 4.7 to 4.14) 
only the fixed effects model has been used. A second conclusion is that the labour
1 ftcoefficient is higher than that obtained by time-series analysis (see Segoura and 
Christodoulakis, 1997), while the private and public capital coefficients are much lower. 
However, and given that the time period of the analysis of these authors is almost three 
times longer than that used here, such differences can be attributed to two main reasons.
18 The high labour share is similar to the findings of Holtz-Eakin (1992a), and Kelejian and Robinson 
(1997, pi 28) who argue that “the coefficient of the labor variable is, in many cases, too high and so one 
expects that it may be at least partially, a proxy for some omitted factors”.
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Segoura and Christodoulakis incorporate totally different stages of Greek economic 
development, namely those of the sixties and early seventies19, where, arguably, public 
capital has played a greater role than in the later period. Also, as pointed out earlier in this 
chapter, their definition of infrastructure capital is much broader than the one used here. 
A third conclusion is that when public capital is disaggregated into its productive and 
social parts, it seems that the results accord with expectations. Productive infrastructure 
has a positive and significant impact on private production, while the social component is 
not significant. Finally, if the results obtained, and more particularly public capital’s 
elasticity generated by the LSDV version (0.202 in table 4.5) is compared to empirical 
findings from other countries (see table 4.1), it seems that this coefficient is close to the 
norm, for the studies where positive results have reported.
Table 4.7 presents a comparison of the two different periods constituting the 
overall time dimension of this analysis. The first is from 1982 to 1987 and the second 
from 1988 to 1992. Again there are three sets of equations to be compared. In the first 
pair, the production function is examined without public infrastructure. Between 1982- 
1987 (la) Greek manufacturing seems to exhibit decreasing returns to scale. This is 
probably due to the significant decline of private investment in this period, possibly 
caused by the adjustment shock due to the intensified competition from imported 
manufactured goods from the EU, arising out of new membership. It can be seen that 
private investment is the likely culprit because the coefficient of private capital is only 15 
percent. The corresponding coefficient for the period 1988-1992 is 45 percent. In this 
latter period industry exhibits constant returns of scale (lb). When public capital is added 
to the equations it is shown to be statistically insignificant for both time periods, either for 
total infrastructure (2a and 2b), or in its productive and social parts (3a and 3b). These 
results confirm the argument that impact of public capital on economic development can 
be detected only over long time periods.
19 During the period 1960-1985 the secondary sector in Greece increased its share of GDP from 25.7 to 29 
percent. However, two thirds of this increase occurred during the period 1960-1970. As Vaitsos and 
Giannitsis (1987, p. 31) remark “after 1970, under the strain of economic crisis, and the general 
characteristics-problems of the development course of the Greek economy, there was a deceleration of both 
the quantitative and qualitative performance of the secondary sector, and the economy in general”.
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Table 4.7 Industrial output as a function of private capital stock (InK), labour (InL), infrastructure 
capital stock (InG) and productive and social infrastructure capital stock (InPG and InSG),
1982-1987 and 1988-1992
Equation for Output (InQ) according to specified time intervals
Time
period
Constant InK Inf. InG InP(G) lnS(G) Time
trend
InCU R2 SSE SE
1982-87 11.450 0.149 0.641 0.044 0.124 0.988 9.252 0.196
(la) (2.305)** (2.623)*** (6.411)*** (6.183)*** (0.110)
1988-92 12.740 0.455 0.562 0.010 -1.366 0.989 6.665 0.186
(lb) (1.880)* (3.466)*** (7.152)*** (0.907) (-0.930)
1982-87 6.811 0.138 0.645 0.224 0.006 0.222 0.988 9.187 0.196
(2a) (1.114) (2.397)** (6.457)*** (1.299) (0.219) (0.197)
1988-92 22.284 0.475 0.559 -0.515 0.038 -1.189 0.989 6.607 0.186
(2b) (2.228)** (3.601)*** (7.131)*** (-1.296) (1.564) (-0.807)
1982-87 8.951 0.126 0.666 0.226 -0.115 0.007 0.223 0.988 9.177 0.195
(3a) (1.475) (2.159)** (6.618)*** (1.580) (-1.141) (0.256) (0.197)
1988-92 19.747 0.489 0.554 -0.512 0.141 0.032 -1.286 0.989 6.562 0.186
(3b) (2.054)** (3.695)*** (7.054)*** (-1.451) (1.006) (1.383) (-0.874)
*** Statistically significant at 1% level, ** Statistically significant at 5% level, * Statistically significant at 10% level
4.6 Measuring the contribution of public infrastructure 
capital in Greece: Investigating the possibilities for 
constant and non-constant returns of scale
One of the most common assumptions in economic modelling is that of constant 
returns of scale (which reflects in essence the assumption of perfect competition). On the 
other hand, “the basic problem with doing theory in economic geography has always been 
the observation that any sensible story about regional and urban development must hinge 
crucially on the role o f increasing returns” as Fujita, Krugman, and Venables have 
argued (forthcoming). It is evident that the type of returns of scale that the production 
process is a subject well worth pursuing.
The Cobb-Douglas production function is homogeneous20 of degree a+b if it has 
the standard form of the two input variables. With private capital (K) and labour (L) it 
becomes:
20A function is homogeneous of degree r, if once each of its independent variables is multiplied by a 
constant X, then the value of the function will be altered by the proportion Xr.
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Q(XK, AL) = A(XK)a(AL)b = A,a+bAKaLb = ATbQ(K,L) (4.6.1)
If the public capital input (G) is added it will be homogeneous of degree a+b+c as 
follows:
Q(XK, XL, AG) = A(A,K)a(AL)b(AG)c = A,a+b~AKaLbGc = A,a+b+cQ(K,L,G) (4.6.2)
The degree of homogeneity means that if a+b=l21 then constant returns to scale 
apply, if a+b>l there are increasing returns, and if a+b<l then there are decreasing 
returns to scale for the two input (K, L) production function. The respective formulations 
for the function in which public capital is added (K, L, G) are a+b+c=l for constant 
returns, a+b+c>l for increasing returns, and a+b+c<l when decreasing returns to scale 
apply.
The returns to scale concept is important because it represents the type of 
technology of the production function. Constant returns of scale mean that if the amount 
of all inputs (and not just one of them as is the case of the diminishing returns) is 
increased by a constant factor, then the output will be increased by the same factor. In the 
long run, this is the expected type of returns of scale, as the replication of the production 
process will normally give twice the product. In the case of increasing returns, output 
increases will be greater than the increase in production factors (normally this can happen 
only for a limited range of output). Finally, in the case of decreasing returns, the output 
increase will be smaller (something like this can occur, normally, only in the short run).
To test for the type of returns of scale, a restricted least squares method of 
estimation was used. The first two rows of table 4.8 presents the results for the simple 
Cobb-Douglas production function, where output (Q) is a function of two inputs, private 
capital (K) and labour (L), where the first row is referring to the OLS model, and the 
second the LSDV specification. The results for these regressions have been already 
presented in table 4.4, and are given again here to compare them with the restricted 
version. It has also to be mentioned that the last column of table 4.8 gives the results for
21This case is sometimes called as linearly homogeneous.
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the Chow test (F-test) which is used in order to discriminate between the OLS and LSDV 
models.
Table 4.8 Industrial output as an unrestricted and constrained function of private capital stock (K) 
and labour (L), with the (unrestricted) addition of public capital infrastructure stock (G),
1982-1992
^E u^ationJo^ ut^ u^ O^Q^
Row
No.
Specif!
cation
Restriction Constant InK InL Time
trend
InCU R2 SSE SE F-test
1 OLS no
restriction
17.692
(3.054)***
0.177
(9.592)***
0.865
(40.143)***
0.029
(3.477)***
-1.906
(-1.417)
0.966 57.994 0.330
2 LSDV no
restriction
20.019
(5.057)***
0.093
(2.125)**
0.828
(16.800)***
0.028
(5.020)***
-1.870
(-2.068)**
0.985 23.784 0.221 14.563
3 OLS a+b=l 17.619
(2.981)***
0.190
(10.260)***
0.810
(43.620)***
0.028
(3.323)***
-1.860
(-1.355)
0.964 60.508 0.336
4 LSDV a+b=l 19.349
(4.916)***
0.126
(3.311)***
0.874
(23.010)***
0.029
(5.159)***
-1.910
(-2.112)**
0.985 23.888 0.221 15.553
*** Statistically significant at 1% level, ** Statistically significant at 5% level, * Statistically significant at 10% level
In the last rows of table 4.8 the same equation is tested for constant returns of 
scale (<z+&=7). In this case, if the constraint is rearranged (b=l-a), the original equation 
will be:
Q = AKaL1-a (4.6.3)
(t, CU, e, and subscripts i and t from hereon will be omitted for clarity of the presentation)
which when expressed in logarithmic form becomes:
InQ = A + alnK + (l-a)lnL, (4.6.4a)
or
InQ = A + a(lnK-lnL) + l(lnL) (4.6.4b)
where the coefficient of the last term of the right-hand side of the equation is constrained 
to be equal to one (the error term, time trend, and CU, are omitted for clarity of 
presentation).
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It has to be mentioned at this point that in empirical work, there are two ways by 
which an equation with such kind of restrictions can be estimated. It can be either directly 
estimated by an econometric computer program, with the restriction imposed (in this case 
it can be estimated as an equation of the 4.6.4 form), or an equation of the following type 
can be used instead:
InQ-lnL = A + a(lnK-lnL) (4.6.5)
However, if this last form is being used (instead of equation 4.6.4) some care is needed, 
as some statistical tests might not be interpreted correctly.
For instance, it may be desirable to compare the restricted equation (with the 
assumption of constant returns of scale and, thus, the coefficients restricted to equal one) 
and the equation without such a restriction. One option is to use the F-test based on the R 
square results . In this case, however, it has to be taken into account the fact that the 
dependent variable of these two equations is different (despite that these are essentially 
the same equation differently formulated). Thus, the results for the R squares and adjusted 
R squares would be different. Nevertheless, the results for the estimated coefficients, 
standard errors, variance of the estimate, sum of squared errors, and all the other statistics 
would be the same irrespective of which of the forms is chosen (for an extensive analysis 
of these points see Greene 1993, chapter 7). In order to avoid any confusion here equation 
4.6.4 has been used, and not only for the case of constant returns of scale, but also for all 
the other cases examining the returns to scale considered in this section.
To return to the results of table 4.8, the first conclusion that can be drawn is that 
the LSDV calibrations must to be preferred to the OLS alternatives, based on the Chow 
tests (F-tests). The unrestricted LSDV equation in row 2 (the odd numbered rows 
generally give the OLS and the even numbered the LSDV specification) appears to 
exhibit slightly decreasing returns of scale, and the reason for this seems to be the poor 
performance of private capital. If this equation is compared to the LSDV version, where 
the restriction of constant returns of scale is imposed (row 4), then the latter appears to 
have a more reasonable coefficient for private capital (0.126 and statistically significant).
22 If, however, an F-test based on the sum of squared residuals is used then there would not be a problem 
(see Greene 1993, pp. 208-209).
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The coefficients for the labour input are more or less at the same level - that is 0.828 and 
0.874 for the unconstrained and constrained versions respectively (both are statistically 
significant). The overall measures of performance (adjusted R square, sum of squared 
errors, and standard error of the estimate) of these regressions do not help to judge which 
variant is the best as they are almost all identical.
Table 4.9 gives the results for the unconstrained and several constrained versions 
of the Cobb-Douglas production function when the public capital variable is added into 
the equation. The unconstrained form will be:
InQ = A + alnK + blnL + clnG (4.6.7)
The results for this equation are given in the first and second rows of table 4.9, 
and refer to the OLS and LSDV formulations respectively. Again a Chow test helps to 
discriminate between these two variants. These results have been already reported in table 
4.5. The next rows give the empirical findings for the different constraints imposed on 
equation (4.6.7). Rows 3 and 4 give the results for the case where there are constant 
returns of scale only for the private inputs (a+b=l). Rows 5 and 6 deals with constant 
returns of scale over all the production inputs (a+b+c=l). Rows 7 and 8 relate to constant 
returns of scale over all the production inputs but with the elasticities of private and 
public capital the same (a+b+c=J, and a=c).
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Table 4.9 Industrial output as a constrained function of private capital stock (K), labour (L), and 
public capital infrastructure stock (G), 1982-1992
Equation for Output (InQ)
Row Specif! Restriction 
No. cation
Constant InK InL InG Time
trend
InCU I f SSE SE F-test
1 OLS no
restriction
16.151
(2.769)***
0.178
(9.692)***
0.849
(36.679)***
0.052
(1.938)*
0.023
(2.515)**
-1.771
(-1.318)
0.966 57.588 0.329
2 LSDV no
restriction
14.131
(3.091)***
0.088
(1.999)**
0.811
(16.387)***
0.202
(2.534)**
0.004
(0.353)
-1.385
(-1.507)
0.985 23.473 0.220 14.685
3 OLS a+b=l 14.903
(2.556)**
0.184
(10.090)***
0.816
(44.660)***
0.094
(4.641)***
0.017
(1.975)***
-1.647
(-1.222)
0.966 58.162 0.330
4 LSDV a+b=l 14.018
(3.059)***
0.129
(3.407)***
0.871
(23.000)***
0.177
(2.246)**
0.008
(0.716)
-1.497
(-1.628)
0.985 23.642 0.221 14.784
5 OLS a+b+c=l 18.847
(3.217)***
0.180
(9.669)***
0.860
(37.050)***
-0.040
(-3.555)***
0.034
(3.939)***
-1.995
(-1.468)
0.%5 59.109 0.333
6 LSDV a+b+c=l 16.549
(4.089)***
0.074
(1.762)*
0.7%
(16.710)***
0.130
(2.696)***
0.012
(1.475)
-1.539
(-1.693)*
0.985 23.535 0.220 15.304
7 OLS a+b+c=l
&b=c
20.244
(3.128)***
0.010
(0.912)
0.979
(43.280)***
0.010
(0.912)
0.029
(3.059)***
-1.968
(-1.310)
0.957 72.304 0.368
8 LSDV a+b+c=l 
& b=c
16.984
(4.247)***
0.100
(4.228)***
0.801
(16.990)***
0.100
(4.228)***
0.016
(2.457)**
-1.615
(-1.789)*
0.985 23.560 0.220 20.991
9 OLS b=c 14.243
(2.418)**
0.139
(8.863)***
0.866
(37.580)***
0.139
(8.863)***
0.012
(1.413)
-1.580
(-1.161)
0.965 59.268 0.333
10 LSDV b=c 16.214
(3.817)***
0.115
(3.077)***
0.809
(16.340)***
0.115
(3.077)***
0.014
(l.%6)**
-1.586
(-1.753)*
0.985 23.546 0.220 15.361
*** Statistically s ign ifican t at 1% level, ** Statistically significant at 5%  level, * Statistically significant at 10%  level
Finally, in rows 9 and 10, the only restriction is that the elasticities of private and public 
capital are the same (a=c). The corresponding equations to these constraints will be:
a + b = 1: InQ = A + a(lnK-lnL) + l(lnL) + clnG, (4.6.8)
a + b + c = 1: InQ -  A + a(lnK-lnL) + l(lnL) + c(lnG-lnL), (4.6.9)
a + b + c = 1, and a = c: InQ = A + a(lnK+lnG-21nL) + l(lnL), (4.6.10)
a = c: InQ = A + a(lnK+lnL) + b(lnL), (4.6.11)
All Chow tests (F-tests) in table 4.9 show that the OLS variations must be rejected 
in favour of the LSDV alternatives, as was also the case for the equations in table 4.8. 
However, as in table 4.8, the overall measures of performance do not help to distinguish 
the best LSDV version (among the even rows of table 4.9). All three measures appear to 
be extremely close. In any case, the unconstrained specification of row 2, the one in
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which there are constant returns of scale only for the private inputs (row 4), and the 
version with constant returns of scale over all the production inputs (row 6), appear to be 
much the same, in terms of the estimated coefficients. Only private capital’s elasticity 
appears to be somewhat higher in row 4 (0.129), in comparison to the results in versions 
of rows 2 and 6 (0.088 and 0.074 respectively). The results for the last two versions, in 
rows 8 and 10, are also very close.
Overall the results presented in tables 4.8 and 4.9 can be summarised as follows. 
In all cases, with and without the presence of the infrastructure variable in the equations, 
with and without the constraints regarding the returns of scale, the OLS specifications 
were rejected in favour of the LSDV alternatives. This is in accordance to the findings of 
section 4.5 of this chapter. The other important conclusion is that the results for the 
unconstrained versions, for both the equations with and without public capital, are very 
similar to those obtained by the different versions with constraints regarding the type of 
returns of scale. Given the fact that the overall measures of performance of these 
regressions are so similar, it can at least be argued that the unconstrained equations 
cannot be rejected.
4.7 Measuring the contribution o f public infrastructure 
capital in Greece: the impact on regional growth
This part of the chapter forms the regional analysis of the impact of public 
infrastructure. Table 4.10 presents the 51 prefectures of Greece (plus the 49 used in the 
analysis) and the way in which they are combined to form the thirteen official regions of 
Greece and the ten regions of analysis. Actually, the ten analytical regions are identical to 
the official thirteen, with only three exceptions. Attica was added to the Central Greece 
prefectures, Peloponnese and West Greece regions have been merged to form a bigger 
region, and the same was the case for the North and South Aegean Islands. These larger 
regions were dictated first by the need for larger regional panels (in order to increase the 
degrees of freedom), and secondly by the economic geography of Greece. Attica’s 
economic influence can be extended at least into the adjacent prefecture of Viotia, and 
even though for administrative reasons it is justifiable to treat Attica as a single region, in 
economic analysis of this type, the interaction between the metropolitan area of Athens
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and its economic hinterland (in adjacent prefectures) is significant. In addition, it would 
be impossible, technically, to have a panel for a region constituted by only one prefecture.
Table 4.10 Official Regions of Greece (NUTS II), and Regions used in the Analysis
REGION PREFECTURE REGION PREFECTURE
LEAST MACEDONIA- Evros 7. WEST GREECE Aitoloakamania
THRACE Xanthi Achaia
Rodopi Ilia
Drama 8. CENTRAL GREECE Viotia
Kavala Evia
2.CENTRAL Imathia Evritania
MACEDONIA Thessaloniki Fthiotis
Kilkis Fokida
Pella 9. ATTIKI Attica
Pieria 10. PELOPONNESE Argolida
Serres Arcadia
Halkidiki Korinthia
3. WEST MACEDONIA Kastoria Laconia
Kozani Messinia
Fiorina 11. NORTH AEGEAN Lesvos
Grevena Samos
4. EPIRUS Arta Chios
Thesprotia 12. SOUTH AEGEAN Dodecanissos
Ioannina Kyclades
Preveza 13. CRETE Iraklio
5. THESSALIA Karditsa Lasithi
Larissa Rethimno
Magnisia Chania
Trikala
6. IONIAN ISLANDS Zakynthos*
Kerkyra
Kephalonia*
Lefkada**
*These prefectures were merged for analytical reasons 
**This prefecture was excluded from the analysis as there was no industrial activity
Regions Used in the Regression Analysis
1 EAST MACEDONIA-THRACE
2 CENTRAL MACEDONIA
3 WEST MACEDONIA
4 EPIRUS
5 THESSALIA
6 IONIAN ISLANDS
7 PELOPONNESE AND WEST GREECE (NUTS II regions 7 and 10)
8 ATTIKI AND CENTRAL GREECE (NUTS II regions 8 and 9)
9 AEGEAN ISLANDS (NUTS II regions 11 and 12)
10 CRETE
North Greece is comprised by regions (used in this analysis) 1 ,2 ,3 ,4 , 5 
South Greece is comprised by regions (used in this analysis) 6, 7, 8,9,10
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Table 4.11 begins the presentation of the empirical results. The first row repeats 
the results for the elementary Cobb-Douglas specification, without public infrastructure, 
for Greece as a whole. As above, labour elasticity is high, when at the same time that for 
private capital is low. Labour’s elasticity is slightly higher in the Northern panel (0.970 
and statistically significant) compared to the Southern panel (0.781). However, private 
capital’s coefficient for the Southern panel appears to be insignificant. At first sight this 
result seems to be counterintuitive in that Attica (including the metropolitan area of 
Athens) not only concentrates more than 40 percent of the labour force, but has attracted 
the most skilled workers in the country. The explanation may, in part, lie in the nature of 
the panel. Even though Attica produces, on an average, 42 percent of the total national 
value added, and secures some 35 percent of all the private capital investment during the 
period of analysis, it is just one prefecture among many in this Southern panel.
Table 4.11 Industrial output as a function of private capital stock (InK), and labour (InL),
1982-1992
Equation for Output (InQ)
REGION Constant InK InL Time
trend
InCU R2 SSE SE
Greece 20.019 0.093 0.828 0.028 -1.870 0.985 23.784 0.221
(as a total) (5.057)*♦• (2.125)** (16.800)*** (5.020)*** (-2.068)**
North 13.832 0.185 0.970 0.028 -1.241 0.991 5.256 0.149
(3.574)*** (3.940)*** (14.149)*** (5.171)*** (-1.424)
South 22.234 0.038 0.781 0.027 -2.342 0.981 18.074 0.271
(3.299)*** (0.544) (10.803)*** (2.736)*** (-1.509)
High 18.575 0.107 0.550 0.035 -1.208 0.992 1.411 0.095
Output (5.471)*** (1.379) (6.533)*** (7.903)*** (-1.775)*
Intermediate 3.610 0.335 0.969 0.017 0.476 0.865 4.906 0.172
Output (0.666) (3.346)*** (10.225)*** (2.216)** (0.399)
Low 33.255 0.107 0.793 0.032 -4.943 0.868 16.242 0.323
Output (3.317)*** (1.410) (9.059)*** (2.160)** (-2.135)**
East Maced 16.876 0.039 0.623 0.034 -0.616 0.974 0.506 0.105
& Thrace (2.717)*** (0.373) (3.629)*** (3.463)*** (-0.458)
Central 13.064 0.270 0.759 0.033 -1.066 0.988 1.257 0.138
Macedonia (1.692)* (1.383) (5.861)*** (3.514)*** (-0.710)
West 22.372 0.151 1.166 0.030 -3.430 0.985 1.495 0.204
Macedonia (1.757)* (1.053) (4.433)*** (1.406) (-1.171)
Epirus 19.711 0.185 1.073 0.044 -2.672 0.899 1.222 0.184
(1.689)* (2.228)** (5.455)*** (2.609)** (-1.003)
Thessaly 3.827 0.210 1.022 0.024 0.880 0.995 0.327 0.095
(0.589) (1.646) (6.897)*** (2.765)*** (0.644)
Ionian 46.123 0.313 0.957 0.079 -9.057 0.806 1.247 0.279
Islands (1.617) (0.807) (3.112)*** (1.483) (-1.512)
West Greece 23.048 0.159 0.608 0.038 -2.558 0.987 2.268 0.173
& Peloponn. (2.819)*** (0.921) (7.632)*** (3.045)*** (-1.464)
Sterea 11.179 -0.155 1.045 0.006 0.992 0.982 5.456 0.312
(0.701) (-0.999) (4.036)*** (0.265) (0.271)
Aegean 24.447 -0.094 1.044 0.012 -2.538 0.892 4.424 0.310
Islands (1.328) (-0.260) (5.329)*** (0.394) (-0.640)
Crete 19.869 -0.035 0.575 0.043 -1.322 0.963 2.888 0.283
(1.107) (-0.243) (2.524)** (-0.316)
*** Statistically significant at 1% level, ** Statistically significant at 5% level, * Statistically significant at 10% level
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The panel for Northern Greece contains (it is said) some of the most dynamic 
industrial districts in Greece, while the Southern panel has some of the most backward 
prefectures in terms of economic and industrial development, as well as the majority of 
the prefectures solely oriented towards tourism. However, these results may simply 
reflect the reality of economic performance in the eighties. Other research has 
demonstrated that output and employment in prefectures such as Attica have been in 
heavy decline in this period, in total contrast with many areas in Northern Greece 
(Melachroinos and Spence, 1997).
Table 4.11 also reports the results for the three groups of prefectures characterised 
by high, intermediate, and low levels of manufacturing output defined in section 4.3. It is 
interesting to observe that the roles of the basic factor inputs are significantly different 
across these classes of prefectures. Intermediate output prefectures have the highest 
elasticity for labour 0.969, while for high and low output prefectures it is only 0.550 and 
0.793 respectively. Again private capital’s elasticity in intermediate output prefectures is 
0.335 and significant, while for both high and low performance prefectures it is 
insignificant. The next ten regressions give the estimations for the most disaggregated 
spatial breakdown presented. It is obvious that there are notable differences between the 
coefficients for both private capital and labour. High labour elasticities are found in the 
regions of West Macedonia, Epirus, Thessaly, the Ionian Islands, Sterea (which includes 
Athens), and the Aegean Islands. The remaining regions also have a significant labour 
coefficient. In contrast, private capital’s coefficient is statistically significant only for the 
Epirus region. These high labour coefficients and insignificant private capital elasticities 
can have two potential explanations. This picture may be a reflection of the decline of 
private investment in manufacturing (with labour using the existing capital stock). 
Another, possibility is that these regional panels are just not large enough - too few 
prefectures per panel to give a truly accurate picture of the true regional production 
functions.
In the next set of equations in table 4.12 the infrastructure variable has been 
added. The results for the private inputs of production are not greatly altered. From the 
second and third equations where the north-south divide is compared, it seems that public 
infrastructure has had a larger impact on the Southern part of the country. The coefficient 
for public capital is 0.153 for the North (and statistically significant only at the 10 percent
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level), while in the South it is a substantial 0.329 (significant at 5 percent). The 
breakdown of prefectures based on output levels shows that infrastructure plays an 
important role for high output levels (0.158), and even more important (0.644) for low 
output prefectures, while it is not statistically significant for those at an intermediate level 
of output. The coefficient for low output regions is extremely high and it is possible that 
industries located there are extremely sensitive to perhaps modest changes of 
infrastructure levels.
Table 4.12 Industrial output as a function of private capital stock (InK), labour (InL), and public
infrastructure capital stock (InG), 1982-1992
REGION Constant InK InL InG Time
trend
InCU R2 SSE SE
Greece 
(as a total)
14.131
(3.091)***
0.088
(1.999)**
0.811
(16.387)***
0.202
(2.534)**
0.004
(0.353)
-1.385
(-1.507)
0.985 23.473 0.220
North 8.908
(1.919)*
0.200
(4.217)***
0.950
(13.753)***
0.153
(1.896)*
0.010
(0.915)
-0.828
(-0.927)
0.991 5.117 0.148
South 13.212
(1.730)*
0.005
(0.071)
0.756
(10.462)***
0.329
(2.430)**
-0.014
(-0.708)
-1.605
(-1.024)
0.981 17.649 0.268
High
Output
13.631
(3.502)***
0.145
(1.856)*
0.511
(6.058)***
0.158
(2.475)**
0.017
(1.998)**
-0.899
(-1.319)
0.992 1.358 0.094
Intermediate
Output
0.025
(0.004)
0.368
(3.488)***
0.942
(9.559)***
0.104
(0.995)
0.005
(0.377)
0.728
(0.597)
0.865 4.876 0.172
Low
Output
13.676
(1.153)
0.061
(0.806)
0.748
(8.621)***
0.644
(2.926)***
-0.052
(-1.607)
-3.107
(-1.324)
0.875 15.392 0.315
East Maced. 
& Thrace
12.172
(1.537)
0.075
(0.671)
0.636
(3.688)***
0.125
(0.959)
0.019
(1.034)
-0.302
(-0.218)
0.974 0.496 0.105
Central
Macedonia
10.965
(1.143)
0.286
(1.422)
0.744
(5.447)***
0.057
(0.373)
0.028
(1.522)
-0.920
(-0.590)
0.988 1.254 0.139
West
Macedonia
23.321
(1.325)
0.145
(0.887)
1.173
(4.198)***
-0.027
(-0.079)
0.033
(0.713)
-3.507
(-1.123)
0.984 1.494 0.207
Epirus 8.376
(0.573)
0.164
(1.946)*
1.079
(5.532)***
0.405
(1.270)
-0.007
(-0.168)
-1.775
(-0.649)
0.901 1.168 0.183
Thessaly -3.434
(-0.447)
0.255
(1.999)*
0.811
(4.225)***
0.251
(1.671)
-0.008
(-0.367)
1.569
(1.124)
0.995 0.303 0.093
Ionian
Islands
12.040
(0.567)
-0.023
(-0.083)
0.913
(4.295)***
1.508
(4.307)***
-0.102
(-1.821)*
-6.607
(-1.582)
0.908 0.557 0.193
West Greece 
& Peloponn.
16.698
(1.798)*
0.194
(1.119)
0.608
(7.682)***
0.199
(1.410)
0.018
(0.973)
-2.202
(-1.255)
0.987 2.209 0.172
Sterea -3.803
(-0.203)
-0.161
(-1.046)
0.919
(3.408)***
0.551
(1.488)
-0.062
(-1.207)
1.878
(0.513)
0.982 5.245 0.309
Aegean
Islands
19.173
(0.808)
-0.084
(-0.231)
1.017
(4.807)***
0.177
(0.358)
-0.010
(-0.145)
-2.132
(-0.512)
0.890 4.411 0.313
Crete 18.432
(0.861)
-0.045
(-0.271)
0.581
(2.463)**
0.049
(0.127)
0.036
(0.585)
-1.180
(-0.269)
0.962 2.887 0.287
*** Statistically significant at 1% level, ** Statistically significant at 5% level, * Statistically significant at 10% level
The regional breakdown to the NUTS II level does not give statistically significant 
results for any region, with the exception of the Ionian Islands, where the estimated
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coefficient is unrealistically high (1.508). These results probably mean that these 
production functions suffer from the limited dimensions of the respective panels23.
Table 4.13 provides the results for the breakdown of public capital into its 
productive and social categories. The results for Greece as a whole and for the North are 
in line with both theoretical expectations and empirical results from other countries (for 
instance Munnell, 1990b for the US and Mas et al., 1993, 1994, and 1996 for Spain). 
Productive infrastructure has a positive and significant impact on the private sector, while 
social public capital is insignificant. However, for the Southern panel both productive and 
social categories of public capital appear to be positive, even though significant only at 10 
percent. The results for prefectures classified by development level confirm the expected 
role of productive infrastructure having a positive and significant impact on high and low 
output levels (0.121 and a high 0.436 respectively). Insignificant results are recorded for 
all output classes of region for social infrastructure. The results for the regions give 
positive and significant productive infrastructure coefficients in West Macedonia, Epirus 
(only at the 10 percent level), the Ionian Islands, West Greece and Peloponnese, and 
Sterea (10 percent). The results for the social category are mixed. Some regions seem to 
have negative coefficients at the same time as others have positive values. (West 
Macedonia and the Ionian Islands have negative elasticities for social infrastructure, and 
Epirus, Sterea, and the Aegean Islands have the reverse.) If these coefficients are be taken 
at face value (and several are highly significant), it could be argued that social public 
capital has a positive effect in regions which are dominated by backward prefectures in 
terms of economic and industrial development or are predominately oriented towards 
tourism. Other research has demonstrated that output and employment in prefectures such 
as Attica (which is in Sterea) have been in heavy decline in this period, in total contrast to 
many areas in the supposedly more dynamic North of Greece (Melachroinos and Spence, 
1997).
23 The results from US research show that the larger the level of analysis, the greater is the estimated impact 
of public capital (Aschauer 1993), or at least this is the case for some infrastructure categories (Haughwout 
1994). One potential explanation is that a larger scale analysis reveals spillover effects, which otherwise 
would remain undetectable. Indeed there are examples of research in which the existence of such spillovers 
has been specifically investigated (Mas 1996).
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Table 4.13 Industrial output as a function of private capital stock (InK), labour (InL), and 
productive and social infrastructure capital stock (InPG and lnSG), 1982-1992
^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ E g u a t i M ^ o r O u t g u K l n ^
REGION Constant InK InL InP(G) InS(G) Time
trend
InCU R2 SSE SE
Greece 13.481 0.089 0.806 0.170 0.060 0.002 -1.329 0.985 23.402 0.220
(as a total) (2.942)*** (2.035)** (16.188)*** (2.526)** (0.942) (0.180) (-1.445)
North 9.001 0.199 0.956 0.148 -0.010 0.009 -0.780 0.991 5.146 0.148
(1.880)* (4.100)*** (13.523)*** (2.210)** (-0.169) (0.807) (-0.869)
South 11.865 0.001 0.741 0.228 0.204 -0.017 -1.656 0.981 17.454 0.268
(1.566) (0.018) (10.196)*** (1.954)* (1.751)* (-0.898) (-1.058)
High 14.516 0.153 0.521 0.121 -0.019 0.020 -0.902 0.992 1.355 0.094
Output (3.638)*** (1.944)* (6.205)*** (2.418)** (-0.390) (2.327)** (-1.317)
Intermediate -1.382 0.387 0.929 0.119 0.023 0.001 0.833 0.865 4.847 0.172
Output (-0.210) (3.569)*** (9.330)*** (1.192) (0.238) (0.062) (0.683)
Low 14.918 0.055 0.744 0.436 0.238 -0.042 -3.384 0.874 15.404 0.316
Output (1.266) (0.724) (8.507)*** (2.339)** (1.604) (-1.350) (-1.432)
East Maced. 6.750 0.104 0.674 0.166 0.141 0.003 -0.044 0.974 0.482 0.105
& Thrace (0.684) (0.910) (3.746)*** (1.446) (0.749) (0.102) (-0.032)
Central 14.367 0.255 0.742 0.060 -0.101 0.031 -1.051 0.988 1.225 0.138
Macedonia (1415) (1.249) (5.556)*** (0.485) (-1.046) (1.660) (-0.673)
West 26.792 0.236 1.354 0.716 -0.790 -0.025 -5.048 0.989 0.992 0.171
Macedonia (1.886)* (1.709)* (5.817)*** (2.341)** (-4.133)*** (-0.616) (-1-951)
Epirus -4.427 0.228 1.031 0.415 0.538 -0.035 -1.197 0.915 0.972 0.169
(-0.313) (2.799)*** (5.624)*** (1.796)* (2.705)** (-0.886) (-0.468)
Thessaly -1.796 0.256 0.859 0.170 0.000 0.000 1.486 0.995 0.309 0.095
(-0.199) (1.708)* (4.026)*** (1.327) (-0.002) (0.010) (1.029)
Ionian 34.353 -0.590 0.962 1.338 -0.612 -0.015 -6.128 0.933 0.337 0.164
Islands (1.840)* (-2.031)* (5.294)*** (5.249)*** (-1.971)* (-0.288) (-1.720)
West Greece 17.779 0.248 0.606 0.347 -0.262 0.010 -2.215 0.987 2.128 0.170
& Peloponn. (1.967)* (1.418) (7.752)*** (2.205)** (-1.425) (0.543) (-1.279)
Sterea -15.869 -0.146 0.745 0.508 0.740 -0.098 1.494 0.984 4.651 0.294
(-0.869) (-0.995) (2.822)*** (1.870)* (2.866)*** (-1.992)* (0.428)
Aegean -8.699 0.041 0.888 -0.105 1.751 -0.111 -1.783 0.925 2.943 0.259
Islands (-0.430) (0.135) (5.061)*** (-0.289) (4.705)*** (-1.765)* (-0.518)
Crete 15.490 -0.073 0.592 -0.119 0.422 0.021 -1.437 0.962 2.812 0.288
(0.717) (-0.429) (2.476)** (-0.347) (0.957) (0.332) (-0.327)
*** Statistically significant at 1% level, ** Statistically significant at 5% level, * Statistically significant at 10% level
4.8 Measuring the contribution of public infrastructure 
capital in Greece: an analysis of the regional network 
effects
In the last two tables the outcomes of the network analysis24 are presented. Table 
4.14 gives the results for public capital in general. Here there is no analysis of Greece as a 
whole, nor of the north-south breakdown because it is expected that these panels as they 
stand can capture the network effects as they contain all or a large fraction of the 
prefectures. An examination of the findings shows that there are no spectacular changes
24 As it was mentioned earlier (section 4.1), in network analysis the infrastructure endowment in the 
adjacent prefectures has been taken under consideration. This is also the case for islands-prefectures (where 
the infrastructure of the most proximate prefectures has been used).
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between the results of table 4.14 (networks) from those of table 4.12 (prefectural 
infrastructure only without public capital network effects). The only significant changes 
in public capital coefficients when network infrastructure is used are for Epirus (0.609 
significant at 10 percent) and Thessaly (0.433 at 5 percent).
Table 4.14 Industrial output as a function of private capital stock (InK), labour (InL), and 
infrastructure capital stock networks (InG), 1982-1992
REGION Constant InK InL InG Time
trend
biCU R2 SSE SE
East Maced. 11.320 0.070 0.623 0.151 0.017 -0.228 0.974 0.494 0.105
& Thrace (1.385) (0.643) (3.629)*** (1.044) (0.908) (-0.163)
Central 16.774 0.232 0.783 -0.097 0.042 -1.279 0.988 1.253 0.139
Macedonia (1.467) (1.088) (5.553)*** (-0.442) (1.895)* (-0.807)
West 14.897 0.167 1.110 0.221 0.003 -2.801 0.984 1.479 0.206
Macedonia (0.839) (1.136) (3.950)*** (0.610) (0.061) (-0.895)
Epirus 1.918 0.172 1.026 0.609 -0.030 -1.447 0.905 1.119 0.179
(0.127) (2.121)** (5.327)*** (1.791)* (-0.678) (-0.541)
Thessaly -9.926 0.273 0.792 0.433 -0.029 1.972 0.9% 0.272 0.088
(-1.254) (2.267)** (4.889)*** (2.668)** (-1.328) (1.484)
Ionian 40.827 -0.451 0.738 1.168 0.039 -10.246 0.833 1.005 0.259
Islands (1.535) (-0.837) (2.401)** (1.901)* (0.728) (-1.833)*
West Greece 21.591 0.164 0.603 0.050 0.033 -2.487 0.986 2.266 0.174
& Peloponn. (2.047)** (0.936) (7.262)*** (0.221) (1.254) (-1.390)
Sterea 8.763 -0.159 1.029 0.095 -0.003 1.101 0.981 5.452 0.315
(0.444) (-1.009) (3.787)*** (0.212) (-0.067) (0.2%)
Aegean 21.335 -0.086 1.029 0.099 0.000 -2.311 0.889 4.420 0.313
Islands (0.845) (-0.236) (4.813)*** (0.183) (-0.002) (-0.551)
Crete 24.447 -0.034 0.570 -0.138 0.063 -1.706 0.962 2.879 0.287
(1.082) (-0.230) (2.467)** (-0.341) (0.962) (-0.389)
*** Statistically significant at 1% level, ** Statistically significant at 5% level, * Statistically significant at 10% level
Table 4.15, which presents the breakdown of public capital to productive and 
social categories with network effects, can be compared with table 4.13. The results are, 
at first sight, rather peculiar. The productive category is now significant only for the 
Ionian Islands, whereas in table 4.13, other regions such as West Macedonia, Epirus, 
West Greece and Peloponnese, and Sterea have significant productive coefficients 
(though some were only at the 10 percent level). Also the results for the social component 
of infrastructure have changed, both in terms of the sign of the coefficient and the level of 
significance. For instance, the negative and significant sign of the social infrastructure 
coefficient for West Macedonia when the network effects are taken under consideration 
becomes insignificant. The coefficients for some other regions (such as Epirus, the Ionian 
Islands, Sterea, and the Aegean Islands) have also changed. The only explanation, other 
than that the production functions are inadequate at this level of aggregation, is that the
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composition of the productive and social categories for the network aggregation is such 
that it transforms the respective coefficients. For instance, assume that the composition of 
infrastructure in a prefecture was such as to generate a positive and significant productive 
coefficient, then, if the infrastructure composition of the adjacent prefecture was 
dominated by non-productive categories, this might result in a negative network effect. 
Perhaps it is necessary to further disaggregate the productive and social categories into 
the basic sub-categories of public capital.
Table 4.15 Industrial output as a function of private capital stock (InK), labour (InL), and 
productive and social infrastructure capital stock networks (InPG and InSG), 1982-1992
REGION Constant InK Ini. hP(G) InS(G) Time
trend
InCU R 2 SSE SE
East Maced. 21.069 0.055 0.532 0.083 -0.296 0.045 -0.536 0.975 0.479 0.104
& Thrace (1.733)* (0.499) (2.800)** (0.659) (-1.020) (1.400) (-0.376)
Central 0.336 0.140 0.851 -0.186 0.831 0.015 -0.782 0.988 1.218 0.138
Macedonia (0.022) (0.629) (5.697)*** (-0.973) (1.389) (0.550) (-0.488)
West 14.020 0.106 1.139 -0.197 0.582 0.015 -2.975 0.984 1.445 0.206
Macedonia (0.809) (0.652) (4.003)*** (-0.343) (0.862) (0.287) (-0.941)
Epirus 3.792 0.160 1.040 0.804 -0.545 -0.034 -0.147 0.903 1.113 0.181
(0.254) (1.920)* (5.278)*** (1.275) (-0.528) (-0.739) (-0.044)
Thessaly -15.111 -0.035 0.864 0.209 0.857 -0.052 1.444 0.996 0.234 0.083
(-1.961)* (-0.205) (5.611)*** (1.639) (2.506)** (-2.322)** (1.120)
Ionian 69.709 -0.618 1.107 1.141 -1.736 0.086 -8.535 0.872 0.720 0.227
Islands (2.691)** (-1.275) (3.648)*** (2.485)** (-2.210)** (1.718) (-1.728)
West Greece 22.505 0.158 0.603 0.070 -0.056 0.033 -2.507 0.986 2.264 0.175
& Peloponn. (1.960)*** (0.882) (7.242)*** (0.333) (-0.212) (1.228) (-1.390)
Sterea -17.972 -0.033 0.940 0.088 1.052 -0.058 1.372 0.982 5.187 0.310
(-0.722) (-0.189) (3.446)*** (0.239) (1.673) (-0.970) (0.374)
Aegean 4.913 -0.195 1.034 -0.400 1.665 -0.065 -3.043 0.894 4.163 0.308
Islands (0.184) (-0.535) (4.922)*** (-0.729) (1.658) (-0.758) (-0.734)
Crete 25.333 -0.032 0.576 -0.074 -0.098 0.065 -1.786 0.961 2.876 0.291
(1.076) (-0.217) (2.348)*** (-0.129) (-0.124) (0.989) (-0.400)
*** Statistically significant at 1% level, ** Statistically significant at 5% level, * Statistically significant at 10% level
4.9 Conclusions
In this chapter an attempt has been made to estimate the impact of public 
infrastructure on the economic development in Greece at the national and regional level. 
This was achieved by using a Cobb-Douglas production function analysis. This type of 
production function has been the dominant specification upon which the majority of the 
recent empirical work on infrastructure research has been based. The main reasons for 
this are that the Cobb-Douglas function provides a simple, easily applicable analytical 
framework, and the empirical results give a direct picture of the impact of public capital
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on private economic activity. It has to be kept always in mind, however, that Cobb- 
Douglas function concept is underpinned by several restrictive assumptions.
The empirical calibration of a Cobb-Douglas production function in the Greek 
case was based in the construction of panel data, for Greece as whole, as well as for 
several different regional levels. Infrastructure capital stocks were estimated using data 
for infrastructure investment from the Public Investment Programme, and the research 
also utilised data on the production inputs of the private manufacturing sector.
The formulation of a Cobb-Douglas production function that incorporated public 
capital was compared with an alternative in which infrastructure was excluded. As it is 
possible to estimate the data panels either using an OLS or a LSDV approach, using the 
data either in ‘row’ or first differences form, several econometric tests were used in order 
to discriminate and select between all the alternative formulations. There was also 
presented an extensive analysis of the type of the returns of scale, which the Cobb- 
Douglas function can exhibit.
Based on the empirical analysis presented here, several substantive points can be 
made about the infrastructure and development relationship in the Greek context. First, it 
is clear that there is some evidence of an overall positive and significant relationship 
between infrastructure provision and industrial output in Greece. The strength of the 
relationship varies between different model specifications. However, the estimated 
elasticities, for both overall infrastructure and its components (productive and social 
categories), do seem to be more moderate compared to the only previous attempt to assess 
the development impact of public capital in Greece. These elasticities are much more in 
line with the theoretical expectations and the empirical findings from other countries.
Second, it can be advanced that either the analytical framework provided by the 
Cobb-Douglas production function is problematic in the Greek case, or that there are 
some peculiarities apparent concerning the role of private capital. The rather low 
estimated coefficients for private capital, especially at the regional scale, can be 
interpreted in either way. One feature, however, is certain. Private investment dropped 
significantly during the eighties and this must be reflected in these coefficients.
Third, the spatial scale of analysis seems to affect greatly the results for the effect 
of public capital. The impact of infrastructure investment is larger when Greece is
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examined as a whole or when the country is divided broadly into North and South. When 
the regional breakdown is ten regions, it seems that it is more difficult to obtain 
coefficients of substantial value or significance. For that reason, additional panels were 
constructed in an attempt to capture the network effects of public capital. However, there 
was no notable difference in the results arising from this initiative. The phenomenon of 
better results for infrastructure at larger geographical scales is in line with the experience 
from other countries.
And finally, the breakdown of infrastructure into its productive and social parts 
generated results as expected. The productive part of infrastructure provision presents 
positive and significant coefficients, while the social component has a negative or/and 
insignificant impact on private sector production in most cases. The regional analysis 
showed only one exception - the Aegean Islands - where social infrastructure appears to 
play a vital role.
This research has selected the Cobb-Douglas production function framework and 
necessarily the results are dependent on such a choice. They must be read, then, within 
the caveat of the limitations of this analytical framework. This study has also specially 
constructed a new series on regional public infrastructure spending not previously 
available. Although they are the best that can be developed, these data are not without 
problems and again the results should be evaluated in this light.
In the following chapters (5 and 6), more sophisticated tools of analysis have been 
used in order to complement this production function analysis, as well as to shed light on 
some other aspects of the public infrastructure capital and development relationship.
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Chapter 5
Using duality theory and cost function analysis to 
understand the influence o f public capital on 
m anufacturing production costs in  Greece.
5.1 Introduction
The dominance of production function analysis in the infrastructure debate is not 
uncontested. An alternative analytical framework is provided by the duality theory and 
cost function approach. This approach can provide an insight into the effects of 
infrastructure on private sector production costs. The use of cost functions in some senses 
can be seen as a potential remedy for some of the problems that plague production 
function analysis. In the latter, output is considered as endogenous, and the production 
inputs as exogenous. As Bemdt and Hansson (1991a, pp. 10-11) have argued, referring 
specifically to infrastructure research, “the right-hand side variables in the various 
equations estimated by Aschauer and Munnell... should be treated as endogenous, not 
exogenous; in such a case estimation by OLS produces biased and inconsistent parameter 
estimates”. This, along to the fact that “the desire to account for possible heterogeneity o f 
production technologies among industries” (Bemdt 1991, p. 460) are some of the reasons 
for which “most recent econometric studies o f substitution relationships between inputs 
employ general cost or profit functions”.
Cost function analysis is based on the dual cost function of the (primal) 
production function. This former embodies all the parameters of the latter, but with a 
crucial difference. In cost function analysis, it is input quantities and production costs 
which are endogenous, and the level of output and input prices that are exogenous. An 
additional advantage of cost function analysis in comparison to the production function 
analytical framework is that it allows the use of more flexible functional forms. For 
instance, the use of Cobb-Douglas production function implies that the elasticity of
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substitution is equal to unity, while a cost function does not apply such an a priori 
restriction (for this point see, for instance, Sturm1 1998).
Despite these advantages, the cost function approach has been less popular in 
recent research than the production approach, probably due to the fact that the latter is 
easier to estimate and is less data-demanding. For a concise historical presentation of the 
cost function approach see Bemdt (1991) and for a more extended theoretical analysis 
see, for example, Diewert2 (1986) and Chambers (1988). At this point it would be useful 
to quote the last mentioned author’s observation that it "... is striking... that it took the 
economics profession so long to realize the ability o f the cost function to characterize 
completely cost-minimizing behaviour since this was clearly outlined in Samuelson's 
(1948) Foundations o f Economic Analysis and exhaustively investigated in Shephard's 
(1953) classic exposition o f duality” (Chambers 1988, p. 49).
However, there is now, in existence, a substantial body of work on the effects of 
infrastructure using the cost function approach. Nadiri and Mamuneas (1994) using a 
panel of industrial sectors in the United States found that public capital had a positive 
impact on private sector productivity. Lynde and Richmond (1992, and 1993a) and 
Morrison and Schwartz (1992, and 1996) have also reported beneficial effects of the 
provision of the US infrastructure. Similar research has been conducted for Europe. 
Bemdt and Hansson (1991a) have investigated the Swedish case and Lynde and 
Richmond (1993b) looked at the United Kingdom. Conrad and Seitz (1994) have 
provided a sectoral analysis for Germany, while Seitz and Licht (1995) focused on a 
regional analysis for the (West) German states, and Seitz (1993 and 1994) analysed the 
effects of the total public capital and road infrastructure respectively. In all these cases, 
infrastructure capital appears to have, once again, a positive role regarding the private 
sector production costs and productivity.
1 Sturm calls cost function analysis the ‘behavioural approach’, as “one can describe the behaviour of 
agents (firms) by assuming that they minimize costs” (1998, p. 97).
2 W.E. Diewert not only introduced and developed some of the functional forms used in duality theory, 
which still form the basis for applied research (see for instance, his University of Califomia-Berkley thesis 
in 1969 and his seminal article in the Journal of Political Economy [1971] ‘An application of the Shephard 
duality theorem: A generalized linear production function’), but he has also provided a cost function 
analytical framework for public capital research (Diewert 1986).
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Similarly positive results have been obtained for Greece in the previous attempts 
to analyse the impact of infrastructure at the national level using cost function analysis. 
Dalamagas (1995), and Segoura and Christodoulakis (1997) used time-series data, a 
translog form of cost function, and an ‘all-encompassing’ definition for public 
infrastructure capital. The time period of the empirical research, however, as well as the 
results obtained differ. The Segoura and Christodoulakis dataset spans 1963 to 1990, 
while Dalamagas analysed data over the period 1950 to 1992. This means that both these 
research projects have included very different periods of economic development from the 
analysis in hand. Furthermore, the rather general definition of infrastructure capital makes 
extremely problematic a direct comparison with the results of this chapter. That said, 
Segoura and Christodoulakis concluded that public infrastructure is both labour and 
intermediate inputs ‘saving’, and private capital ‘using’ in its influences. Dalamagas, on 
the other hand, argues that public capital is strongly competitive (substitutive) with labour 
and private capital, and a weak complement to energy (the author does not use an 
intermediate inputs variable, but energy instead). Both of these earlier pieces of research, 
then, have shown that there is a positive impact of public capital on the private sector’s 
cost structure.
The following chapter utilises a different definition and data representation for 
infrastructure capital (see previous chapters) and additionally uses panel data analysis. 
Employing of the latter gives crucial information about the structure of the manufacturing 
industry at regional, urban, and sectoral levels. The next section presents a brief outline of 
the cost function analytical framework and the duality theory that underpins it. Section 
5.3 shows how this theoretical framework can be used for an empirical investigation of 
the infrastructure impact on manufacturing costs. In the following section the presentation 
of the actual empirical results starts with the regional industry analysis. In section 5.5 the 
findings for a sectoral panel for Greece as a whole are presented. Similar analyses for the 
manufacturing sectors in the metropolitan area of Athens and a residual Rest of Greece 
region’ follow in subsequent sections. The final part tries to assess the empirical findings 
and summarise the most important points. It has to be noted that due to space limitations, 
in the following sections public capital enters the cost equations only in terms of the 
‘productive’ and ‘social’ categories. Thus, the aggregated public infrastructure category 
has been not used, as the presentation would have been rather cumbersome.
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5.2 The cost function analytical framework: From  
production functions to cost functions and duality theory
The analytical framework of production functions can be extended with duality 
theory if it is assumed that firms in the private sector choose input quantities in such way 
that they minimise the cost of their production process, given the prices of these inputs. 
Let the production function be:
Yj = fiCL^KjjMjjGjjt) (5.2.1)
where,
Yi is the output (gross production value) in sector /,
Lt is the labour input,
Ki is the private capital input,
Mi are the intermediate inputs,
Gi is public capital input,
t is a time counter which functions as a proxy for disembodied technical change3, 
and the subscript i is a regional (or sectoral) index.
Then the cost function of an industry in region (or sector) i will be:
Ci = C i(wi,pk,pm,Yi,Gi,t) (5.2.2)
where,
Ci is the private cost of production in sector /, 
Wj is the wage in region (or sector)
Pk is the rental price of private capital, 
pm is the price of intermediate inputs, 
and the others are as above.
Cost function (5.2.2) can be derived by minimising the private production cost function:
Ci = wiLi + p lKi + p iMi (5.2.3)
3 For a basic discussion on the notion of disembodied technical change refer to Bemdt (1991).
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subject to the production function (5.2.1).
From cost equation (5.2.2) is possible to derive the cost minimising factor demand 
equations using Shephard’s Lemma (see for instance Takayama (1985) or Chambers 
(1988)) for labour L*u private capital AT*, and intermediate inputs M*. These equations 
would be:
L* = 0Q / (5.2.4)
K ^ a c . / a p k  (5.2.5)
M: = dCi /d p m (5.2.6)
The private costs of production for the optimising firms, using the left-hand side of
equations (5.2.4) to (5.2.6), would be:
Ci = w iL*-fpkK; + pmM; (5.2.7a)
or, using the right hand sides, which is the application of Shephard’s lemma, of equations
(5.2.4) to (5.2.6) the equivalent expression would be:
dC: dC, 3K* 0M*
a o ; ~ y,' W l h W ~ PmW
dC
—  = -w eLi -  pks^  -  p ^  (5.2.7b)
— S Li -*_ S Ki + S Mi ~  S Gi (5.2.7c)
A measure of the impact of public capital on private cost is the cost elasticity with 
respect to public infrastructure ( ecch). This elasticity can be construed as the amount by
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which infrastructure capital will reduce the costs of industries operating in the region (or 
sector). More formally, ecGi is the percentage change of the private cost of production as a 
result of a unitary change in the public capital stock, ceteris paribus. The elasticity £cgi 
would be:
S CGi —
a q
_Q_
a o ,
G:
a q
a ^
G:
(5.2.8)
Closely linked with cost elasticity with respect to public infrastructure ( ccg)  is the 
concept of the ‘shadow value’ of public capital. As the flow of services from public 
capital can be considered as a free public good, there is no market price for these 
services4. Nevertheless, it is possible to have an estimate of their shadow value5 (s<3i). The 
shadow value of public capital is a measure of the impact on private cost of an exogenous 
change in the level of services delivered by public capital, ceteris paribus. It shows 
private sector willingness to pay in order to obtain an additional unit of service from 
public capital. This shadow value of public capital would be:
s =_ (wt, Pfc, p m ,Yj, Gt, ^ ) 2 q\
G' dGt
If there is such an exogenous increase in infrastructure services, it is expected that 
there will be a corresponding increase in private sector productivity ( dY{ / dG; > 0). The
value scg is directly linked with the shadow value soi. Expression (5.2.8) can be derived 
by (5.2.9) and the reverse:
4 There is, of course, the case where the value of these services can be assessed with the use of a toll 
mechanism. It is assumed here that public capital services are a free public capital good. However, the 
arguments for the introduction of efficient toll mechanisms as the centrepiece of an efficient infrastructure 
policy are most relevant (see Holtz-Eakin 1993a, 1993c).
‘Shadow value’ is also sometimes called ‘shadow price’ (see Seitz 1994), or ‘marginal benefit’ of public 
capital (see Nadiri and Mamuneas, 1994).
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® L
S CGi ■" S Gi q  0 f
S o i ^ c o i f -  (5 .2 .1 0 )
It is also possible to have a measure of infrastructure’s impact on the private input 
shares (labour, private capital, or intermediate input) to production. If an increase (or 
decrease, or no change) of the stock of public capital has an effect of an increase (or 
decrease, or no change) of a private factor of production, then it can be argued that 
infrastructure is using this input (or saving it or has a neutral effect, respectively). A 
measure of the this cost share change is the ‘factor bias effect’ (see Nadiri and 
Mamuneas, 1994) and the respective effects in the case of three private inputs would be:
for labour,
tiasm = ^  (5 .2 .1 1 )
for private capital,
(5 .2 .1 2 )
and for intermediate inputs,
b‘a*LG = T T 7 T  (5 .2 .1 3 )om&i
The total infrastructure effect on the demand for private inputs can be estimated 
using private input elasticities with respect to public infrastructure (exo), where X = L, K, 
M. These elasticities would be:
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dQ:
Qx dlnQ x
XG* “ dG; dlnG :
G;
(5.2.14)
where,
Qx is the quantity of inputs L, K, M)
The total impact of public capital on input demand ( s x g )  is the sum of the 
productivity effect (cost elasticities) and the factor bias effect. Thus, in an applied 
research context these elasticities can be easily calculated for labour and private capital 
inputs6 (8lg and 8kg respectively) by the following formula (see Nadiri et al. 1994, p.32):
’XGi ~  S CGi +
XG (5.2.15)
where,
X  is L, K  (but not M)
The intermediate inputs’ elasticity with respect to public infrastructure (8mg) can also 
calculated given the following equation (ibid.):
'M G ~  S CG ~
]^ LxPxg
' - I s , (5.2.16)
where,
Sx is the cost share of L, K
6 This is because in the empirical calibration of the model the equation for the intermediate inputs’ share is 
the one that has been selected for exclusion (due to the homogeneity restriction for the econometric system 
of estimated equations). For an analysis of this point, see the next section in this chapter.
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Again the sign of the private input elasticities with respect to public capital (s x g )  indicates 
the type of relation between the public infrastructure and private input. If sxg has a 
positive (zero, or negative) sign, then public capital would be complementaiy (neutral, or 
substitutive, respectively) to the X  private input. As sxg is the sum of two different 
components (cost elasticities and factor bias effect), Cxg sign and the magnitude would 
depend on the signs of the respective cost elasticities and the bias effect over share (ibid.).
5.3 Issues o f empirical calibration within a duality  
theoretical framework
This section presents the generic form of the empirical calibration for the cost and 
shares functions, as well as some econometric tests that will help to distinguish between 
alternative (and competing) formulations. There are several empirical forms that the 
general cost function can take. According to Bemdt (1991), in his review of the history of 
the development of such functional forms, it was Diewert who first introduced the 
generalised Leontief form, which is used in infrastructure research by Bemdt and 
Hansson (1991a) for Sweden and Seitz (1993; 1994) for Germany. An alternative form is 
the translog cost function used by Conrad and Seitz (1994), and Seitz and Licht (1995) for 
sectoral and regional analyses of the role of German public capital respectively. Another 
potential empirical form is the Generalised Cobb-Douglas cost function used by Nadiri 
and Mamuneas (1994) in their analysis of the effects of public infrastructure on US 
manufacturing costs.
It is exactly this last form which has been used in the subsequent analysis here. 
This is because a full translog calibration (which was employed initially) generated rather 
poor results (insignificant /-ratios for some of the estimated variables), even without the 
introduction of public capital into the equation. The cost function used here has the 
following form:
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ln - i-  = £ a 0,iDi + S “ u  In —1 Di + £ a K,i In 
Pm i=l i=l V Pm J
Pk
+ Plk1«
' w '
+ (3ky In
P m)
fry ^Pk
P m ,
In^Pk^
p<J
+  P ly  In
i-l
vP my
V.Pm J
In Yj + Plq In
*Dj + a Y In Y; + a G lnGj + a Tt
^W: ^
VPmJ
lnGj +PLT In
r \  w.
In Y; + pKG In InG: + PKT In
\P » J
Pk
VPm/
t + Pyj. In Yit + uc (5.3.1)
(for notational definitions, see previous section)
The respective cost share equations then would be:
for the labour input,
s, = wL
C~
ij
== ^ a L,i^i + P lK ^
^Pk^
i=l
**" Ply I*1 "*■ Plg biGj + Plt^  (5.3.2)
VHm y
and for private capital input,
Sv —_ v X  _ Y
C; “  + PlKi i=l V. Pm y
+ PKY In Yj + PKG lnGj + PKTt + uK (5.3.3)
It is also possible to have a third share equation - that for intermediate inputs (sm). 
However, as the cost shares add to unity ( s l  + Sk + sm = 1), it is necessary to exclude one 
of the cost share equations, because otherwise the system of equations would be singular7. 
The system of equations that is estimated comprises the set (5.3.1)-(5.3.3)8. This is the 
homogeneity restriction for the estimated system.
7 For an illustration of this point see Bemdt (1991, chapter 9) or Greene (1993, chapter 17).
8 Note that the estimated set of equations has been divided by the price of the intermediate goods (pm).
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An additional set of restrictions, regarding symmetry conditions across equations 
(5.3.1) to (5.3.3), has also been imposed. For instance, the coefficient Pkl obtained by the 
cost share equation (5.3.2) has been constrained to be equal to coefficient Pkl obtained by 
the cost share equation (5.3.3), and to Plk obtained by the cost function (5.3.1). The 
parameters for the excluded equation, dealing with the cost share of intermediate inputs, 
can be derived from the estimated parameters of the cost equation and the labour and 
private capital share equations, given the aforementioned restrictions.
It is assumed that the error terms in equations (5.3.1) to (5.3.3) (uc, ul, and uk 
respectively) are jointly normally distributed with zero expected value, and also that the 
covariance matrix is positive definite symmetric. The estimation method selected is that 
of iterative seemingly unrelated regression (SUR)9.
The basic premise of this method is that, instead of estimating a set of equations 
separately (i.e. estimate the coefficients for each equation), it is better to ‘stack’ them 
together10 and estimate the coefficients simultaneously. The theoretical assumption 
behind the SUR approach is that “the disturbances in those different equations at a given 
time are likely to reflect some common unmeasurable or omitted factors, and hence could 
be correlated... Correlation between disturbances from different equations at given time is 
know as contemporaneous correlation. It is distinct from autocorrelation... When 
contemporaneous correlation exists, is may be more efficient to estimate all equations 
jointly, rather than to estimate each one separately using least squares” (Judge et al. 
1988, p. 443). In the case of the cost function (5.3.1) it is obvious that common 
unmeasurable or omitted factors that have affected its disturbances would have also 
affected the disturbances of the cost share equations (5.3.2) and (5.3.3), as the these 
equations have been directly derived from equation (5.3.1).
A concise delineation of the stacking process can be described as follows. If 
equation (5.3.1) is written compactly:
ya,i = Xa,ibi+ea,i (5.3.1a)
9 For an extensive presentation of this method see Bemdt (1991) or Greene (1993).
10 In the case of panel data analysis, an initial ‘stacking’ of data is used, as different regional or sectoral 
units have been already added in order to have a single dataset.
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where,
Cya,i is the In—K  
P m
Xa,i is the right hand side data of equation (5.3.1),
b} is the set of coefficients that we want to estimate (aoi, ay, aia, ay, aG, etc.), 
ea>J and is the disturbance
(subscripts a, and 1 are referring to the number of equation [a in this case is equation 
5.3.1] and to the year of observation [/ in this case denotes the first year-observation]).
If the other years-observations are added, then equation (5.3.1a) can be estimated (with 
the use of OLS, for instance).
ya,l Xajbi+ea,]
ya,2 = Xa>2b2+ea,2
ya,3 = Xa,3b3+ e a,3 (5.3.4)
ya,T ~  Xa j b i + e a,T
Similarly, in order to estimate equation (5.3.2) T observations are needed:
yb,i= Xb,ibi+eb,i 
yb,2 = Xb,2b2+eb,2
yb,3 “  Xb,3b3+eb,3 (5.3.5)
yb,T — Xbjbx+ebj
and T observations are needed for equation (5.3.3):
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y c,i X c.jb l+ e*!  
y c,2 =  Xc,2b2+ec>2
yc,3 = Xc,3b3+eCf3 (5.3.6)
yc.T — Xcjbr+ecj
Equations (5.3.4) to (5.3.6) can be estimated with OLS separately. If, however, the 
SUR method is used then all these observations will be stacked together:
ya,l Xa.lbi+eaj
y&a = Xa>2b2+ea,2
y a,3 =  Xa,3b 3+ e a,3
ya,T =  X a jb r+ ea j
yb.1 =  Xb,ibi+eb,i 
yb,2 =  Xb,2b2+eb,2
yb,3 “  Xb,3b 3+eb,3 ( 5 .3 .7 )
yb,T ~ Xbjbi+ebj
y c,i X c5ib i+ e c,i 
y c,2 =  X c;2b2+ec>2 
yc2 = 'XeJ>i+eca
yc,T -  X c jb x + ec j
The (Zellner’s) SUR estimator for coefficients b is given in Appendix HI. For the 
moment it is sufficient to say that these coefficients are estimated with an iterative 
method (also presented in Appendix III), and that they are 'numerically equivalent to 
those o f the maximum likelihood estimator ’ (see Bemdt 1991, p. 463).
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As the analysis is based on a panel of regional data, the estimated set of equations 
has to be calibrated in such a way that ensures that the specific nature of the dataset has 
been taken into consideration. Thus, every equation of the system (5.3.1) to (5.3.3) has 
been appended with a set of regional-specific dummies A  (where i is a regional [sectoral] 
indicator, and the regional dummy is equal to one in region [sector] i, and zero in all other 
regions [sectors]). Such a formulation is necessary in order to capture the regionally 
[sectorally] specific characteristics (see, for instance, Hsiao 1986, or Baltagi 1995). Some 
examples of the infrastructure research literature, where comparable datasets have been 
employed for the estimation of similar sets of equations, have extended the use of dummy 
variables such as these to the cases of a ^ , and cck,, coefficients (see Nadiri and 
Mamuneas, 1994; Seitz, 1993, 1994; Seitz and Licht, 1995). Such a formulation has also 
been followed here, as it ensures that the labour and private capital demand equations can 
be consistently derived by the cost equation.
Even though a cost equation similar in form to that of Nadiri and Mamuneas 
(1994) is used here, there is one significant difference. Here there is no a priori 
assumption that there are constant returns of scale (CRS). In contrast to the Nadiri and 
Mamuneas approach, a CRS variant is compared to a version without such a restriction. 
Such a comparison has been proposed and tested by Seitz (1994) and, in a regional 
context, by Seitz and Licht (1995). In order to compare the two versions, with and 
without the CRS restriction, a log-likelihood ratio test (LRT) has been used. The LRT is a 
rather simple test, which can be briefly described as follows: if the values of the 
maximised log-likelihood functions are lnLr for the restricted (the CRS model), and lnLu 
for the unrestricted model, then the likelihood ratio statistic is given by:
X s= -2(ln Lr -  In Lu) (5.3.8)
This statistic is asymptotically distributed as chi-squared and the degrees of 
freedom are equal to the imposed number of restrictions11.
11 For a more formal presentation of log-likelihood ratio test see Greene (1993) and for its implementation 
in a cost function analysis context see Bemdt (1991).
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The LRT has been also used here to compare the unrestricted model with regional 
dummy variables to an alternative specification where such variables have been excluded. 
Following Seitz (1994) and Seitz and Licht (1995), the log-likelihood ratio test has also 
been utilised in order to discern if the public capital variable should be included in the 
estimated equations or not. Again, the unrestricted model is the one with the inclusion of 
infrastructure and the restricted the version is without public capital.
5,4 A cost function analysis for the regions of Greece
In this section the cost function theoretical framework has been used to analyse 
public infrastructure’s impact on Greek manufacturing industry at the prefectural level. 
The empirical specification of the cost function has been already discussed. The 
following sub-section 5.4.1 gives a description of the used data in the analysis, as well as 
some technical details. The results come next in section 5.4.2. and the overall conclusions 
are left until the end of the chapter.
5.4.1 Calibrating regional cost functions in Greece
The dataset used in this analysis is a panel with a time dimension from 1982 to 
1991 and a cross-sectional vector of 49 prefectures. There is an extensive description of 
this dataset in chapter 4, and of the original data of the Public Investment Programme in
17chapter 3. It is worthwhile recalling again that even though there are 51 prefectures in 
the Greek administrative and statistical system the spatial units of the analysis have been 
reduced to forty-nine. This is due to the fact that for one prefecture there was no industrial 
activity and, thus, was excluded from the analysis, and two others were merged, as the 
industrial activity in the one of them only commenced in 1984 (for a detailed analysis, see 
section 4.7). The infrastructure variable enters the estimated equations (throughout this 
chapter) as an instrument lagged one year13 (for the reasons, see the previous chapter).
12 After the exclusion of the semi-autonomous prefecture of Agion Oros.
13 The results of the estimation of a system of equations, where the infrastructure variable is not lagged, are 
not very different.
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The economic variables that enter the cost function representing the private sector 
have been constructed as follows. The quantity of labour (L) is the total working hours in 
manufacturing in prefecture i. Total working hours, in turn, were estimated by 
multiplying the average annual employment in the manufacturing industry by the number 
of hours worked14. The price of the labour input (w,) has been calculated by dividing the 
total remuneration15 of labour input in prefectural industry i by the quantity of labour 
input (L). It has to be noted that w, enters the system of equations normalised to equal one 
for the first year of the panel.
Private capital stocks for prefectural manufacturing have been used as a proxy for 
the quantity of private capital input (K). The estimation method is again via the method of 
perpetual inventory accounting:
Kit= ( l - 8 p)Kit_1+IPit (5.4.1)
where,
Ku is the end-of-year private capital stock in year t in prefecture /', 
dp is the geometric rate of depreciation,
and IP a is real investment in private capital during years t in prefecture /.
Even though there is not a price for private capital, in the sense that a price can be 
defined for the labour or intermediate inputs, a user cost of capital Pk can be calculated as 
follows16:
14 As there are no available data, at least not known to this author, about the number of working hours it has 
been assumed here that all workers in manufacturing have worked the same number of working days per 
year for the same number of hours per day.
The published data on labour remuneration refer to the wage bill paid to workers and employees 
excluding the employers’ (insurance) contributions. However, the unpublished data from the National 
Statistical Service of Greece provide information specifically about these contributions. There is the 
possibility that sectoral differences in the level of such payments might create anomalies in relation to the 
data that excludes them. In this analysis both datasets were tested and the results were similar. The 
subsequent results refer to the dataset that includes employers’ contributions.
16 For this method of estimation of private capital price see Bemdt and Hansson (1991a).
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pK=(r + 5p)<lK (5-4.2)
where,
Sp is as in equation (5.4.1),
r is the long-term lending rate for the industrial sector (nominal, referring to loans for 
more than a year),
and qx is the investment deflator for capital goods.
This capital goods investment deflator is a weighted measure of the national price 
indexes of building and equipment investment in manufacturing17. The price of private 
capital (px) has been normalised18 to be equal to one for the first year of the panel -1982.
The quantity of intermediate inputs M  is the sum of materials, energy, and 
services that were consumed during the production process, divided by the price index of 
intermediate inputs (pm). This index is a weighted average of the raw materials and semi­
finished products index, and the fuel and lubricant index (again obtained from the 
National Statistical Service of Greece). The price index of intermediate inputs is also 
normalised to be equal to one for the first year of the panel.
Output quantity is estimated as the total value of gross regional manufacturing 
output divided by the output price index. This is the final products index as provided by 
the National Statistical Service of Greece, normalised here to be equal to one for 1982.
The cost variable (C) is the sum of the cost of the labour input (L * w j, private 
capital input (K * pij, and intermediate inputs (M * pm). The value Sl is the percentage of 
the labour input to the total cost, while Sk is the percentage of private capital, and the Sm 
the percentage of intermediate inputs.
5.4.2 Interpreting the results of regional cost functions in Greece
As mentioned earlier, the estimation model consists of the cost equation (5.3.1), 
and the share equations (5.3.2) and (5.3.3), for labour and private capital inputs
17 These, as well as all other, indices and data were obtained from the National Statistical Service of Greece.
18 This normalisation process is necessary for an accurate estimation of the equations’ system. For the 
‘mechanics’ of this procedure see Bemdt (1991).
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respectively. Table 5.4.1 presents the results from the estimation of the system of 
equations, where productive public capital has been included19, as well as the test 
statistics from the comparison of this specification to alternative formulations.
The ‘fitness’ measures appear to be satisfactory, either in terms of explained 
variance or standard errors, for the equations of the system. However, the coefficients for 
ag, bLK, bur, b o , and byT appear not to be statistically significant. It has to be noted at this 
point that the standard errors of the coefficients are asymptotically estimated. This is a 
result of the method of estimation employed (see Bemdt and Hansson 1991a).
The last part of table 5.4.1 gives the results from the comparisons of the 
formulation with public infrastructure, fixed effects, and without the restriction of 
constant returns to scale, with alternative formulations. The comparison with a 
specification without fixed effects (region-specific dummy variables) gives a value for 
LRTd as 2,076.86 (with 147 degrees of freedom). For the formulation where public 
infrastructure has been excluded, the LRTG is 76.02 (with 3 degrees of freedom), and for 
the alternative, where the assumption of constant returns to scale is imposed, the LRTy is 
137.26 (with 4 degrees of freedom). In all cases the alternative specifications have been 
rejected decisively (the associated probability value is 0.000).
19 Some researchers have argued that it is imperative to adjust public capital for capacity utilisation (Hilton 
1990, Ford et al. 1991, Nadiri et al. 1994). In this research, however, the results with infrastructure adjusted 
for capacity utilisation (these figures for Greece are available only after 1982 and obtainable from the 
OECD) were similar to those for unadjusted public capital. The latter that are used here.
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Table 5.4.1 Regional cost function for manufacturing in Greece: results of panel-estimation 
incorporating the effects of productive infrastructure capital, 1982-1991
V ariable Estim ated
Coefficient
T-Ratio"
aO 14.171 237.854
aL 0.232 12.979
aK 0.292 8.228
aY 7.87E-01 32.980
aG -5.93E-02 -1.545
aT 3.02E-02 5.487
bLK 3.13E-03 0.149
bLY -3.33E-02 -4.989
bLG -2.37E-02 -2.043
bLT 1.96E-03 1.160
bKY -1.28E-01 -10.620
bKG 1.10E-01 5.373
bKT 1.04E-03 0.344
bYT -1.67E-04 -0.241
R-Square Standard Error
Cost function 0.996 0.113
Labour share 0.785 0.033
Capital share 0.818 0.059
Log o f  Likelihood 2228.86
LRTd
LRTq
LRTy
Likelihood ratio test6 
2076.86 
76.02 
137.26
Decrees o f freedom 
147
3
4
"Value of Ratio of Parameter Estimate to Asymptotic Standard Error. 
The total number of observations is 490. 
bThe associated p-values for all tests are 0.000.
It has to be mentioned here that a similar analysis was conducted to generate 
results for the social category of public capital. Again the formulation with social 
infrastructure and regional fixed effects (the unrestricted model) was tested against a 
formulation with public capital but without fixed effects (LRTd), one with fixed effects 
but no public capital (LRT0), and one similar to the unrestricted version but with no 
constant returns to scale imposed (LRTy). The assumption that social public capital is a 
part of the estimated system has to be rejected in favour of the alternative hypothesis 
(LRTq = 4.72, with 3 degrees of freedom, as it is shown in table 5.4.2). For this reason all 
of the subsequent analysis presented here refers only to productive public capital.
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Table 5.4.2 Regional cost functions for manufacturing in Greece: likelihood ratio-tests for panel 
estimation results incorporating the effects of social infrastructure capital, 1982-1991
Likelihood ratio  test Degrees o f freedom
LRTd 2019.4 147
LRTq 4.72 3
LRTy 268.42 4
The total number of observations is 490.
As argued earlier, the effect of public capital on regional manufacturing can be 
estimated using the cost elasticity with respect to public infrastructure (8 c g ). The results 
for the different prefectures of the analysis are presented in table 5.4.3. In all cases the 
sign of the prefectural cost elasticity is negative, which means that infrastructure tends to 
reduce the manufacturing costs in all cases. However, this cost reduction seems rather 
small and certainly is without significant regional variation. The highest cost elasticity is 
that of Zakynthos-Kephalonia (-0.071), followed by Ioannina (-0.066)20, Low values are 
recorded for Chios (with -0.059), and Evros, Kozani, and Serres (-0.058). It is somewhat 
disappointing to discern no clear pattern in these elasticities. It is also difficult to compare 
these results to the findings of other research, as there are few similar analyses at the 
regional level. In the research conducted by Seitz and Licht (1995), the 11 (West) 
Germany states (Bundeslander) are far larger than the Greek prefectures. (Bavaria is not 
much smaller than Greece as a whole, both in geographical and economic terms.) All 
German regions appear to have significantly larger cost elasticities, and only for Berlin 
and Bremen are the figures similar to those of Greek prefectures. It has to be noted, 
however, that it is likely that the fact that the regional data refer only to aggregate 
manufacturing has played an important role here.
20 A point o f  confusion concerning the estimation o f  elasticities (whatever the type) in economics is when 
the estimated elasticity has a negative sign. As Varian has puts it “from an algebraic point of view -3 is 
smaller than -2, but economists tend to say that the... elasticity of -3  is 'more elastic ’ than the one with - 2 ” 
(1993, p.266). This convention has been followed here.
165
COST FUNCTION ANALYSIS APPROACH
Table 5.4.3 Regional cost function for manufacturing in Greece: cost elasticities of manufacturing 
with respect to productive infrastructure capital, 1982-1991
Prefecture 8cg Prefecture Ecg Prefecture EcG
Achaia -0.062 Halkidiki -0.062 Magnisia -0.062
Aitoloakaman. -0.062 Ilia -0.064 Messinia -0.061
Arcadia
r*H
'Ooot Imathia -0.061 Pella -0.065
Argolida -0.063 Ioannina -0.066 Pieria -0.062
Arta -0.061 Iraklio -0.064 Preveza -0.064
Attiki -0.064 Karditsa -0.062 Rethimno -0.062
Chania -0.063 Kastoria -0.061 Rodopi -0.064
Chios -0.059 Kavala -0.061 Samos -0.064
Dodekanissos -0.061 Kerkyra -0.062 Serres -0.058
Drama -0.064 Kilkis -0.064 Thesprotia -0.063
Evia -0.062 Korinthia -0.064 Thessaloniki -0.062
Evritania -0.063 Kozani -0.058 Trikala -0.063
Evros -0.058 Kyklades -0.064 Viotia -0.061
Fiorina -0.063 Laconia -0.065 Xanthi -0.062
Fokida -0.065 Larisa -0.062 ZakyKepha -0.071
Fthiotis -0.064 Lasithi -0.062 Total Average -0.063
Grevena -0.063 Lesvos -0.060
The effect of infrastructure on the cost shares of the production inputs is measured 
by the factor bias effects, which are equal to the coefficients of private inputs to public 
capital, (3lg and (3kg respectively for labour and capital, plus the derived coefficient Pmg 
for intermediate inputs. Table 5.4.4 presents these effects divided by the corresponding 
private input share, following the form of presentation favoured by Nadiri and Mamuneas
(1994). The overall result, from a first look at these figures, is that for all prefectures 
public capital appears to be labour and intermediate inputs saving, and private capital 
using. The first column of table 5.4.4 (biasLG) gives the estimations21 for labour input. 
The highest values (that is the greatest cost reduction) appear to be in Korinthia (biasLG 
= -0.589), Lasithi (-0.482), and Laconia (-0.370). The lowest values are those for 
Kyklades (-0.051), Grevena (-0.096), and Drama (-0.100). There is no discernible spatial 
pattern in these figures. The fact that the regional manufacturing under examination is the 
sum of all manufacturing sectors may, in part, be contributory factor in this respect. 
Certainly, it is not difficult to argue from a theoretical standpoint that sectoral
21 As the coefficients are divided by each year’s share in each prefecture, this means that for a specific 
prefecture there will be 10 such shares. The results refer to the average for every prefecture, as well as the 
total average.
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composition should play a significant role, as some industrial sectors are expected to be 
more affected by changes in infrastructure stock levels than others.
Table 5.4.4 Regional cost function for manufacturing in Greece: productive infrastructure factor 
bias effects over respective private input shares, 1982-1991
Prefecture bias LG bias KG bias MG Prefecture bias LG bias KG bias MG
Achaia -0.165 0.285 -0.185 Kerkyra -0.188 0.455 -0.160
Aitoloakaman. -0.184 0.602 -0.131 Kilkis -0.164 0.450 -0.145
Arcadia -0.165 0.746 -0.138 Korinthia -0.589 0.599 -0.113
Argolida -0.196 0.412 -0.143 Kozani -0.146 0.196 -0.335
Arta -0.164 0.511 -0.171 Kyklades -0.051 0.503 -0.277
Attiki -0.132 0.485 -0.153 Laconia -0.370 0.284 -0.164
Chania -0.221 0.871 -0.113 Larisa -0.161 0.387 -0.152
Chios -0.171 0.339 -0.168 Lasithi -0.482 2.217 -0.100
Dodekanissos -0.119 0.425 -0.164 Lesvos -0.173 0.797 -0.127
Drama -0.100 0.591 -0.154 Magnisia -0.226 0.348 -0.151
Evia -0.177 0.288 -0.178 Messinia -0.175 0.614 -0.130
Evritania -0.137 1.005 -0.163 Pella -0.188 0.415 -0.143
Evros -0.150 0.488 -0.152 Pieria -0.132 0.274 -0.214
Fiorina -0.164 0.716 -0.125 Preveza -0.147 0.599 -0.137
Fokida -0.196 1.391 -0.110 Rethimno -0.144 0.416 -0.207
Fthiotis -0.222 0.351 -0.149 Rodopi -0.167 0.296 -0.178
Grevena -0.096 0.237 -0.313 Samos -0.220 0.250 -0.197
Halkidiki -0.187 0.496 -0.133 Serres -0.170 0.535 -0.138
Ilia -0.233 0.313 -0.158 Thesprotia -0.142 0.295 -0.416
Imathia -0.197 0.569 -0.128 Thessaloniki -0.188 0.514 -0.132
Ioannina -0.232 0.401 -0.138 Trikala -0.167 0.535 -0.135
Iraklio -0.240 0.406 -0.139 Viotia -0.247 0.215 -0.225
Karditsa -0.266 0.847 -0.111 Xanthi -0.192 0.308 -0.165
Kastoria -0.113 2.192 -0.123 ZakyKepha -0.212 0.450 -0.141
Kavala -0.168 0.307 -0.174 Total Average -0.193 0.556 -0.165
The results for private capital bias (KG) are all positive, which can be interpreted 
as public capital being private capital using. However, here the variation amongst 
prefectures is greater in terms of magnitude, than for the case of the labour input. The 
highest factor bias effects for private capital can be found in Lasithi (biasKG = 2.217), 
which has one of the highest values for labour input. The next highest bias effect for 
private capital is that of Kastoria, which in contrast is one of the lowest cases for labour. 
Other prefectures with high bias effects for private capital are Fokida (1.391) and
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Evritania (1.005). The lowest values can be found in Samos (0.250), Viotia (0.215), and 
Kozani (0.196). The last column of table 5.4.4 presents the factor bias effects for 
intermediate inputs (biasMG). The sign for all prefectures is negative, which means that 
public infrastructure is intermediate inputs saving. The highest savings can be found in 
Thesprotia (biasMG = -0.416), Kozani (-0.335) - which has one of the lowest effects for 
capital, and Grevena (-0.313). The lowest values are observed in Chania, Korinthia 
(biasMG = -0.113 for both regions), Karditsa (-0. I l l )  and Fokida (-0.110).
The cost elasticity with respect to public capital can be considered the 
‘productivity’ effect of infrastructure and, if this measure is combined with the factor bias 
effect, the total effect of infrastructure on private inputs can be obtained. This measure 
(table 5.4.5), as indicated previously, is the private input elasticity with respect to public 
infrastructure. There is, of course, the possibility that the two components of these 
elasticities - the productivity and the factor bias effects - could offset each other, in terms 
of magnitude and sign. But for the Greek prefectures, all private input elasticities have the 
same sign as the respective factor bias effects. A comparison of these figures to those of 
table 5.4.4 shows that the demand elasticities are determined, at least in most cases, by 
the factor bias effects, as the magnitudes of cost elasticities with respect to public capital 
are rather small. Thus, the majority of those prefectures that have high (low) bias effects 
also have high (low) demand elasticities. All prefectures have a negative sign for labour 
and intermediate inputs cost elasticities (elg and Bmg respectively), and a positive sign for 
private capital ( ek g ). In economic terms, this means that an expansion of the 
infrastructure stock results in a decline in the demand for labour and intermediate inputs, 
and an increase in the demand for private capital input.
The prefectures with the highest labour demand elasticity are Korinthia ( s l g  =  -  
0.653), Lasithi (-0.544) and Laconia (-0.436). On the other hand, the lowest values are 
recorded for Drama (-0.163), Grevena (-0.159) and Kyklades (-0.115). The second 
column of table 5.4.5 presents the findings for private capital demand elasticity. Here, as 
for the bias effects for capital, there is a greater spatial variation in the elasticities 
compared to those for labour input. The largest elasticities were observed in Lasithi ( sk g  
= 2.155), Kastoria (2.131 -  which, in contrast, has a low labour elasticity) and Fokida 
(1.326). At the opposite extreme are prefectures such as Samos (0.185), Grevena (0.174,
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which also has one of the lowest elasticities for labour), Viotia (0.154) and Kozani 
(0.138). Finally, table 5.4.5 offers the demand elasticities for intermediate inputs where 
the highest are observed in Thesprotia (-0.479), Kozani (-0.393), Grevena (-0.376) and 
Kyklades (-0.341). Prefectures with low demand elasticities for intermediate inputs are 
Korinthia (-0.178), Fokida (-0.175), Karditsa (-0.173) and Lasithi (-0.162).
Table 5.4.5 Regional cost functions for manufacturing in Greece: private input demand elasticities 
with respect to productive infrastructure capital, 1982-1991
Prefecture Slg SkG SMG Prefecture Slg SKG Smg
Achaia -0.227 0.223 -0.247 Kerkyra -0.250 0.393 -0.221
Aitoloakaman. -0.246 0.540 -0.193 Kilkis -0.228 0.386 -0.209
Arcadia -0.226 0.685 -0.199 Korinthia -0.653 0.535 -0.178
Argolida -0.258 0.350 -0.206 Kozani -0.204 0.138 -0.393
Arta -0.226 0.449 -0.232 Kyklades -0.115 0.439 -0.341
Attiki -0.196 0.421 -0.216 Laconia -0.436 0.219 -0.229
Chania -0.284 0.808 -0.176 Larisa -0.223 0.325 -0.214
Chios -0.230 0.280 -0.227 Lasithi -0.544 2.155 -0.162
Dodekanissos -0.180 0.364 -0.225 Lesvos -0.234 0.736 -0.187
Drama -0.163 0.528 -0.217 Magnisia -0.289 0.286 -0.213
Evia -0.239 0.226 -0.240 Messinia -0.236 0.553 -0.191
Evritania -0.200 0.942 -0.227 Pella -0.253 0.350 -0.208
Evros -0.209 0.430 -0.210 Pieria -0.194 0.212 -0.276
Fiorina -0.226 0.653 -0.188 Preveza -0.212 0.535 -0.202
Fokida -0.261 1.326 -0.175 Rethimno -0.206 0.355 -0.269
Fthiotis -0.285 0.288 -0.213 Rodopi -0.231 0.232 -0.242
Grevena -0.159 0.174 -0.376 Samos -0.285 0.185 -0.261
Halkidiki -0.248 0.435 -0.194 Serres -0.228 0.476 -0.196
Ilia -0.296 0.249 -0.222 Thesprotia -0.205 0.232 -0.479
Imathia -0.258 0.508 -0.189 Thessaloniki -0.249 0.452 -0.194
Ioannina -0.298 0.336 -0.204 Trikala -0.230 0.472 -0.198
Iraklio -0.305 0.342 -0.203 Viotia -0.308 0.154 -0.286
Karditsa -0.328 0.785 -0.173 Xanthi -0.254 0.246 -0.227
Kastoria -0.174 2.131 -0.184 ZakyKepha -0.282 0.379 -0.212
Kavala -0.230 0.246 -0.235 Total Average -0.255 0.493 -0.228
The private input elasticities with respect to public infrastructure obtained from 
this analysis can be compared to those obtained from similar research. Seitz and Licht
(1995) have found that private capital (which they divide into two categories) has a 
complementary relationship with public infrastructure, while labour is substitutive. This is
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also the case in this study. Similar relationships have been identified for Sweden by 
Bemdt and Hansson (1991a). Nadiri and Mamuneas (1994), on the other hand, find that 
although infrastructure has a substitutive effect for labour, in their research private capital 
also appears to have a substitutive relationship with public capital, while intermediate 
inputs are complementary.
The final results describe the estimations of the shadow values (sgD for 
infrastructure capital in the different prefectures. Thus, table 5.4,6 shows the differences 
in the amounts that regional manufacturing is willing to pay in order to have an additional 
unit of public capital. Here, in contrast to the other measures of the impact of 
infrastructure, it looks as if a clear regional pattern emerges. There is a substantial 
variation in these shadow values and it seems that those prefectures that are adjacent to 
the two main metropolitan areas - Athens and Thessaloniki - have the highest shadow 
values. The only prefecture that is not adjacent to a principal economic centre and has a 
high value is Magnesia and this contains the significant industrial area of Volos.
Table 5.4.6 Regional cost functions for manufacturing in Greece: shadow values o f productive
infrastructure capital, 1982-1991
Prefecture Sc.l Prefecture Sgi Prefecture SGI
Achaia 1.098 Halkidiki 0.070 Magnisia 1.121
Aitoloakaman. 0.090 Ilia 0.097 Messinia 0.150
Arcadia 0.056 Imathia 1.133 Pella 0.301
Argolida 0.186 Ioannina 0.134 Pieria 0.212
Arta 0.072 Iraklio 0.214 Preveza 0.084
Attiki 0.713 Karditsa 0.110 Rethimno 0.007
Chania 0.067 Kastoria 0.039 Rodopi 0.118
Chios 0.028 Kavala 0.509 Samos 0.076
Dodekanissos 0.035 Kerkyra 0.044 Serres 0.280
Drama 0.264 Kilkis 0.429 Thesprotia 0.068
Evia 1.211 Korinthia 2.645 Thessaloniki 1.093
Evritania 0.056 Kozani 0.364 Trikala 0.143
Evros 0.046 Kyklades 0.066 Viotia 1.654
Fiorina 0.018 Laconia 0.028 Xanthi 0.602
Fokida 0.079 Larisa 0.473 Zaky-Kepha 0.036
Fthiotis 0.934 Lasithi 0.020 Total
Grevena 0.004 Lesvos 0.038 Average 0.353
170
COST FUNCTION ANALYSIS APPROACH
5.5 A cost function analysis for the manufacturing sectors 
of the whole of Greece
In the previous section the cost function analytical framework was used to assess 
the impact of public infrastructure on prefectural manufacturing industry. These data, as 
demonstrated, refer only to the sum of all manufacturing sectors for the respective 
prefecture. There are also available three additional datasets, with a detailed sectoral 
breakdown, one for Greece as whole, another for the metropolitan area of Athens, and 
finally one that refers to the rest of Greece. In this section the analysis will be focused on 
the first of these.
5.5.1 Manufacturing activities in Greece
The sectoral breakdown of manufacturing is available from the National Statistical 
Service of Greece (NSSG) both for industries employing more and less than twenty 
employees (the cut-off for large scale industry). Here, the dataset that is based on more 
than twenty employees has been employed for two reasons. First, as it is argued in 
chapter 4, data for the large scale industry are more ‘accurate’, as they are collected via a 
full census questionnaire survey, while those for the smaller establishments are collected 
via a sample. Second, given the fact that the prefectural-regional data for manufacturing 
are available only for the large scale industry and have already been used here for the 
regional analysis, it makes sense to be consistent. Thus, the sectoral panel can be directly 
compared to the prefectural-regional one. The only caveat is that the information for the 
nation refers to the 20 two-digit sectors of manufacturing, while for the regions it refers 
only to total manufacturing.
The classification of the different manufacturing sectors, as provided by the 
NSSG, is presented in table 5.5.1. A more detailed presentation of the composition of 
these sectors, at three-digit level, is given in appendix IV.
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Table 5.5.1 National Statistical Service of Greece classification o f manufacturing sectors
(branches).
20 Food and Kindred Products
21 Beverages
22 Tobacco Manufactures
23 Textile Mill Products
24 Apparel and Other Textile Products
25 Lumber, Wood and Cork Products
26 Furniture and Fixtures
27 Paper and Allied Products
28 Printing and Publishing
29 Leather, Leather Products and Furs
30 Rubber and Miscellaneous Plastics Products
31 Chemicals and Allied Products
32 Petroleum and Coal Products
33 Non-metallic Minerals and Allied Products
34 Primary Metal Industries
35 Fabricated Metal Products, except for Machinery and Transport Equipment
36 Machinery Except Electrical
37 Electric and Electronic Equipment
38 Transportation Equipment
39 Miscellaneous Manufacturing Establishments
Source: National Statistical Service of Greece (Annual industrial survey)
Some of the most important descriptive statistics relating to Greek manufacturing 
sectors are given in table 5.5.2. covering the average percentage of each measure for the 
period 1982 to 1991 for each of the twenty sectors of large scale industry. Column (2) 
presents the average percentage of establishments per sector. The footwear, food, and 
textiles have the largest numbers of establishments, and the metal and petroleum 
industries, as expected, the smallest. The next column (3) gives the percentages for the 
average annual employment. The highest percentages are again observed for the textiles, 
food, and footwear industries (a slightly different order from the previous ranking). 
However, the lowest percentages here are somewhat different - the miscellaneous, and 
leather sectors featuring prominently. Similar is the sectoral ranking in column (4), which 
gives the average remuneration of employment. One notable difference is that transport 
equipment sector now occupies third rank.
The two measures for the production activity of the sectors are given in columns 
(5) and (6). In terms of gross production, the food, petroleum, and textiles sectors are the
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highest achievers. At the other end of the spectrum are the furniture, leather, and 
miscellaneous industries. These industries have also the lowest percentages in terms of 
added value (even though in a different rank order). The highest value added percentage 
here belongs to the textile industry, followed by the food and chemical industries.
The highest percentages in intermediate inputs use, shown in column (7) are taken 
by the food, and petroleum sectors. Leather, furniture, and miscellaneous sectors have the 
lowest percentages of intermediate inputs use. Column (8) gives one of the most 
important measures of all - that of gross asset formation. The transport equipment, food, 
textiles, and petroleum sectors have the highest investment percentage, while, the 
furniture, miscellaneous, and leather industries the lowest.
Table 5.5.2 Descriptive statistics (average percentages) for manufacturing sectors (establishments
with 20 persons and over) in Greece, 1982-1991
Sector Number of 
Establism.
Av.Annual
Employment
Remuneration 
of Employm.
Gross Prod. 
Value
Value
Added
Intermediate
Inputs
Total Gross 
Asset Form.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
20 (food) 14.873 13.672 12.038 16.911 13.292 18.573 12.407
21 (beverages) 2.928 3.146 3.603 4.033 5.011 3.588 6.114
22 (tobacco) 1.682 2.808 2.631 3.433 2.878 3.693 1.671
23 (textiles) 13.739 17.237 15.023 12.233 14.671 11.113 10.360
24 (footwear) 16.250 11.248 7.243 4.070 5.948 3.217 2.335
25 (wood) 2.205 1.722 1.601 1.293 1.535 1.186 1.448
26 (furniture) 3.234 1.289 0.947 0.567 0.887 0.422 0.586
27 (paper) 2.058 2.666 2.774 2.603 2.723 2.546 2.130
28 (printing) 2.853 2.577 2.816 1.557 2.417 1.165 1.652
29 (leather) 1.735 0.657 0.512 0.551 0.532 0.558 0.267
30 (rubber) 4.076 3.254 3.233 2.745 3.411 2.445 2.613
31 (chemical) 5.647 6.805 8.532 8.253 9.377 7.733 6.199
32 (petroleum) 0.817 1.577 2.332 13.607 3.682 18.122 10.212
33 (mineral) 6.673 6.259 7.260 5.561 7.632 4.625 9.157
34 (metal) 1.232 3.300 5.323 8.168 6.712 8.819 9.366
35 (fabr.metal) 5.600 5.864 6.107 5.054 5.547 4.831 5.119
36 (machinery) 4.010 1.946 1.843 1.029 1.486 0.819 0.920
37 (electrical m.) 4.249 4.314 4.504 3.986 4.607 3.705 2.918
38 (transport eq.) 4.491 8.833 11.025 3.898 6.971 2.502 14.137
39 (miscellaneous) 1.649 0.828 0.652 0.446 0.681 0.338 0.391
Total 100 100 100 100 100 100 100
Source: National Statistical Service of Greece (Annual industrial survey)
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5.5.2 Interpreting the results of national manufacturing cost 
functions in Greece
The cost function used for the sectoral panels is exactly the same as that used for 
the regional panel, the only difference being the i subscript where in the regional set of 
equations it signifies regions and here it refers to sectors. Table 5.5.3 presents the 
estimation results for the system’s parameters. All coefficients are significantly different 
from zero, with the only exception being the interaction parameter for output and time 
(Pyt). It has to be emphasised, again, that the standard errors of the coefficients are 
asymptotically estimated. The overall fitness of the formulation is highly satisfactory 
given the results of the R-Square and t-ratio statistics.
The last part of table 5.5.3 presents the results of the log-likelihood ratio tests 
(LRT). The purpose of these tests, as mentioned above, is to test the employed 
formulation against other alternatives. The log of the likelihood for the employed 
specification (with public infrastructure and dummy variables) is 1,586.13. Using the 
LRT this specification is initially compared to the alternative without dummy variables22 
(LRTd = 1,591.79), and the latter was rejected. The next likelihood ratio test compared 
the full unconstrained model to one where the parameters regarding public capital were 
constrained to be equal zero (both models were formulated with n dummy variables). This 
test rejected the constrained specification (LRTg = 90.34, with 3 degrees of freedom). 
Finally, the unconstrained specification was compared to an alternative with constant 
returns of scale (with respect to private sector inputs). This means that ay was 
constrained to be equal to one, and Ply, Pky , and Pyt were constrained to be equal to 
zero. Both for models n dummies were included, and the alternative was rejected as the 
LRTy equalled 217.46, with 4 degrees of freedom.
22 The unconstrained model was formulated as follows: each term is multiplied with a dummy variables 
matrix of n-1 dummies (where n is the number of cross sectional units, sectors in this case) and the n 
dummy variable is a constant. The constrained model has the n-1 dummies dropped. The degrees of 
freedom in this LRTd were 57, as the n-1 dummies equalling 19 were multiplied by three.
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Table 5.5.3 National sectoral manufacturing cost functions in Greece: results of panel estimation 
incorporating the effects of productive infrastructure capital, 1982-1991
Variable Estimated
Coefficient
T-Ratio“
aO 16.563 52.236
aL 1.080 9.082
aK 1.440 7.088
aY 0.702 33.941
aG -0.271 -5.015
aT 0.024 3.983
bLK -0.035 -2.145
bLY -0.025 -4.057
bLG -0.145 -7.102
bLT 0.015 6.972
bKY -0.134 -13.093
bKG -0.119 -3.375
bKT 0.019 4.935
bYT -0.001 -0.755
R-Square Standard Error
Cost function 0.998 0.034
Labour share 0.976 0.011
Capital share 0.963 0.017
Log of Likelihood 1586.13
LRTd
LRTg
LRTy
Likelihood ratio test” 
1591.79 
90.34 
217.46
Degrees of freedom 
57
3
4
“Value of Ratio of Parameter Estimate to Asymptotic Standard Error. 
bThe associated p-values for all tests are 0.000.
The total number of observations is 200.
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The cost elasticities with respect to public infrastructure ( £ c g ) ,  for the twenty 
manufacturing sectors, are given in table 5.5.4. These elasticities range from -0.283 to - 
0.258, and they are higher than those reported by Nadiri and Mamuneas (1994) for US 
industrial sectors. The highest is that of miscellaneous manufacturing - followed closely 
by wood industries (-0.281). At the other side of the spectrum, that for printing and 
publishing is the smallest (-0.258), and the next smallest (-0.261) is leather products. It is 
difficult to discern a pattern from these figures, as both industrial sectors achieving high 
and low elasticities are not dissimilar. One possible difference is that the high achievers 
have a higher capital/labour ratio, but it has to be kept in mind that there are other 
industrial sectors with equally high ratio which have a more ‘average’ cost elasticity.
Table 5.5.4 National sectoral manufacturing cost functions in Greece: cost elasticities of 
manufacturing sectors with respect to productive infrastructure capital, 1982-1991
Sector Scg Sector Scg
20 (food) -0.270 30 (rubber) -0.275
21 (beverages) -0.277 31 (chemical) -0.271
22 (tobacco) -0.270 32 (petroleum) -0.263
23 (textiles) -0.270 33 (mineral) -0.268
24 (footwear) -0.269 34 (basic metal) -0.266
25 (wood) -0.281 35 (fabr. metal) -0.271
26 (furniture) -0.266 36 (machinery) -0.269
27 (paper) -0.270 37 (electrical m.) -0.275
28 (printing) -0.258 38 (transport eq.) -0.271
29 (leather) -0.261 39 (miscellaneous) -0.283
Total Average -0.270
The factor bias effects over share are reported in table 5.5.5 - the column with 
heading ‘bias LG’ presents the results for labour input, and that with heading ‘bias LK’ 
those for private capital. The last column of the table presents the derived bias over share 
for the intermediate inputs. Again the results resemble those for US manufacturing, if not 
in absolute figures, at least in the sense that public capital seems to save labour and 
capital inputs, but is using intermediate inputs in each industrial sector. It seems that there 
is a large labour bias (labour saving) in the case of the petroleum and coal refining and, to 
a lesser extent, for basic metal industries, the food sector, and tobacco manufactures. The
176
COST FUNCTION ANALYSIS APPROACH
larger capital bias effects (capital saving) can be found for petroleum and coal refining 
(which seems to be heavily affected in both labour and capital bias), leather and fur 
products, tobacco manufactures, manufacturing of footwear, and the food sector. As 
already mentioned, public capital seems to have an opposite bias effect for the 
intermediate inputs share (it is using, instead of saving, intermediate goods). The highest 
bias effect is for the case of non-metallic mineral products, followed closely by the 
transport equipment sector, and the machinery and appliances except electrical sector.
Table 5.5.5 National sectoral manufacturing cost functions in Greece: productive 
infrastructure factor bias effects over respective private input shares, 1982-1991
Sector bias LG bias KG bias MG
20 (food) -1.636 -0.509 0.391
21 (beverages) -1.404 -0.303 0.525
22 (tobacco) -1.422 -0.696 0.367
23 (textiles) -1.056 -0.331 0.527
24 (footwear) -0.595 -0.529 0.497
25 (wood) -1.083 -0.315 0.542
26 (furniture) -0.691 -0.362 0.574
27 (paper) -1.149 -0.397 0.461
28 (printing) -0.623 -0.412 0.557
29 (leather) -1.120 -0.712 0.380
30 (rubber) -1.022 -0.363 0.499
31 (chemical) -1.103 -0.433 0.447
32 (petroleum) -6.741 -0.956 0.317
33 (mineral) -1.264 -0.227 0.732
34 (basic metal) -1.990 -0.361 0.445
35 (fabr. metal) -1.048 -0.376 0.490
36 (machinery) -0.704 -0.352 0.606
37 (electrical m.) -0.994 -0.461 0.445
38 (transport eq.) -0.443 -0.390 0.724
39 (miscellaneous) -0.781 -0.393 0.519
Total -1.344 -0.444 0.502
The total impact of public capital on input demand is given by the private input 
elasticities with respect to public infrastructure ( b xg , where X = L, K, M). The results for 
all three private input elasticities are presented in table 5.5.6. Again the overall picture, at 
least in terms of signs, is similar to the findings of Nadiri and Mamuneas (1994, table 6). 
The Swedish results, reported by Bemdt and Hansson (1991b) differ from both the US
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and the Greek cases in that Swedish public capital is complementary to private capital. 
The results from Germany for private capital demand complementarity are similar to the 
Swedish case (see Seitz 1994, but with the caveat that here a Leontief cost function was 
estimated).
The highest labour demand elasticity is that for petroleum and coal refining, 
followed by that for the basic metal industries sector. High labour demand elasticities are 
also generated for the food, beverage, and tobacco industries. High capital demand 
elasticities have been observed for the petroleum and coal refining sector, tobacco, and 
leather and fur products. Infrastructure seems to have a positive effect on the demand for 
intermediate inputs, especially for industries such as non-metallic mineral products, 
transport equipment, and machinery and appliances except electrical.
Table 5.5.6 National sectoral manufacturing cost functions in Greece: private input demand 
elasticities with respect to productive infrastructure capital, 1982-1991
Sector Blg 6kg Emg
20 (food) -1.906 -0.778 0.121
21 (beverages) -1.681 -0.580 0.248
22 (tobacco) -1.692 -0.966 0.097
23 (textiles) -1.326 -0.601 0.257
24 (footwear) -0.864 -0.798 0.228
25 (wood) -1.364 -0.596 0.261
26 (furniture) -0.957 -0.628 0.308
27 (paper) -1.419 -0.666 0.192
28 (printing) -0.881 -0.671 0.298
29 (leather) -1.381 -0.974 0.118
30 (rubber) -1.297 -0.638 0.224
31 (chemical) -1.374 -0.704 0.176
32 (petroleum) -7.004 -1.219 0.054
33 (mineral) -1.533 -0.496 0.463
34 (basic metal) -2.256 -0.627 0.179
35 (fabr. metal) -1.319 -0.647 0.218
36 (machinery) -0.973 -0.621 0.337
37 (electrical m.) -1.269 -0.737 0.170
38 (transport eq.) -0.713 -0.660 0.453
39 (miscellaneous) -1.064 -0.676 0.236
Total -1.614 -0.714 0.232
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The estimations for the shadow values of the Greek manufacturing sectors are 
presented in table 5.5.7 These range from an extremely high 0.202 for the food sector, 
through 0.159 for textile manufacturing, 0.148 for petroleum and coal refining, and 0.106 
for the basic metal industries, to the comparatively low value of 0.007 for furniture and 
fixture industries, 0.006 for leather and fur, and 0.005 for the miscellaneous industries. 
These sectoral results are in some cases significantly larger than those reported by Nadiri 
and Mamuneas for the US economy (1994, table 7). However, the Greek results closely 
approximate the shadow values estimations for the German manufacturing sector reported 
by Conrad and Seitz (1994, table 3).
Table 5.5.7 National sectoral manufacturing cost functions in Greece: shadow values of 
productive infrastructure capital, 1982-1991
Sector Sgi Sector Sgi
20 (food) 0.202 30 (rubber) 0.034
21 (beverages) 0.054 31 (chemical) 0.095
22 (tobacco) 0.038 32 (petroleum) 0.148
23 (textiles) 0.159 33 (mineral) 0.091
24 (footwear) 0.044 34 (basic metal) 0.106
25 (wood) 0.018 35 (fabr. metal) 0.064
26 (furniture) 0.007 36 (machinery) 0.013
27 (paper) 0.032 37 (electrical m.) 0.047
28 (printing) 0.017 38 (transport eq.) 0.050
29 (leather) 0.006 39 (miscellaneous) 0.005
Total Average 0.062
The next set of tables replicates the analysis immediately above, but here the 
productive public capital is replaced by its social counterpart. Table 5.5.8 reports the 
coefficients from the estimation of the respective system of equations. The results are not 
greatly different than those for the productive infrastructure for the sectoral panel. Two of 
the estimated coefficients, however, now appear to be statistically insignificant (Plk and 
Pyt, at the five-percent level). The general measures (R-squares) of the system’s 
equations are completely satisfactory. The likelihood ratio tests again reject the 
alternative specifications, the first without specific sectoral effects (sectoral dummies),
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. the second constraining the infrastructure variable to equal zero, and the third assuming 
constant returns to scale.
Table 5.5.8 National sectoral manufacturing cost functions in Greece: results of panel estimation 
incorporating the effects of social public capital, 1982-1991
Variable Estimated T-Ratio*
Coefficient
aO 16.709 46.585
aL 1.139 8.766
aK 1.378 6.048
aY 0.701 33.770
aG -0.360 -4.824
aT 0.022 3.753
bLK -0.022 -1.413
bLY -0.025 -4.056
bLG -0.189 -6.943
bLT 0.014 6.765
bKY -0.135 -13.060
bKG -0.131 -2.721
bKT 0.016 4.338
bYT -0.001 -0.731
R-Square Standard Error
Cost function 0.999 0.035
Labour share 0.976 0.010
Capital share 0.962 0.017
Log of Likelihood 1585.1
Likelihood ratio testb Degrees of freedom
LRTd 1589.776 57
lrtg 88.28 3
LRTy 216.9 4
*Value of Ratio of Parameter Estimate to Asymptotic Standard Error. 
bThe associated p-values for all tests are 0.000.
The total number of observations is 200.
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The cost elasticities with respect to social public capital are presented in table 
5.5.9. These are slightly higher than those reported for productive infrastructure. The 
estimation of the cost elasticities hinges on the estimated coefficients, a G ,  1 > l g ,  and bfCG, 
and the values lnw, lnpk, and lnpm for the various sectors. Thus, it is logical that as the 
coefficients for social infrastructure are not dissimilar to those for productive public 
capital (the values for the sectors are, of course, the same) the estimated sectoral cost 
elasticities also will be similar to the respective measures for productive infrastructure. 
The rank order of these elasticities is also much the same, with the highest being that of 
miscellaneous industries (8cg = -0.376) and the lowest (-0.345) for printing and 
publishing industry. The average elasticity for social public capital is -0.360, which is 
significantly higher than that for productive infrastructure (-0.270). In common sense 
terms this means that social infrastructure investment tends to reduce the costs in all 
industrial sectors to a larger degree than is the case for productive infrastructure.
Table 5.5.9 National sectoral manufacturing cost functions in Greece: cost elasticities of 
manufacturing sectors with respect to social infrastructure capital, 1982-1991
Sector Ecg Sector £cg
20 (food) -0.360 30 (rubber) -0.366
21 (beverages) -0.369 31 (chemical) -0.361
22 (tobacco) -0.359 32 (petroleum) -0.351
23 (textiles) -0.359 33 (mineral) -0.358
24 (footwear) -0.358 34 (basic metal) -0.355
25 (wood) -0.374 35 (fabr. metal) -0.361
26 (furniture) -0.355 36 (machinery) -0.358
27 (paper) -0.359 37 (electrical m.) -0.367
28 (printing) -0.345 38 (transport eq.) -0.360
29 (leather) -0.349 39 (miscellaneous) -0.376
Total Average -0.360
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Table 5.5.10 presents the factor bias effects over shares for social public capital. 
Social infrastructure is labour and private capital saving, and intermediate inputs using, as 
indeed was the case for productive public capital. The sector with the highest labour 
‘saving bias’ is the petroleum industry, and the one with the lowest is the transport 
equipment industry. The average labour bias effect for social infrastructure is 
significantly higher than the respective bias effect for productive infrastructure (-1.751 
and -1.344, respectively). The highest private capital bias effect is observed for 
petroleum and coal refining and the lowest for non-metallic mineral products. The 
average private capital bias effect for social infrastructure (-0.489), however, is not much 
different from its productive counterpart (-0.444). Finally, in the case of intermediate 
inputs, the highest value bias effect belongs to the non-metallic mineral industry (factor 
using at 0.887) and the lowest is for the petroleum and coal refining. The average 
intermediate inputs bias effect is somewhat higher than was the case for the productive 
one (0.609 and 0.502, respectively).
Table 5.5.10 National sectoral manufacturing cost functions in Greece: social infrastructure factor 
bias effects over respective private input shares, 1982-1991
Sector bias LG bias KG bias MG
20 (food) -2.132 -0.560 0.473
21 (beverages) -1.830 -0.333 0.637
22 (tobacco) -1.854 -0.767 0.445
23 (textiles) -1.376 -0.365 0.638
24 (footwear) -0.776 -0.583 0.603
25 (wood) -1.412 -0.347 0.657
26 (furniture) -0.901 -0.399 0.696
27 (paper) -1.498 -0.437 0.559
28 (printing) -0.812 -0.454 0.675
29 (leather) -1.459 -0.785 0.461
30 (rubber) -1.332 -0.400 0.605
31 (chemical) -1.438 -0.477 0.541
32 (petroleum) -8.786 -1.053 0.384
33 (mineral) -1.648 -0.250 0.887
34 (basic metal) -2.593 -0.397 0.540
35 (fabr. metal) -1.366 -0.414 0.594
36 (machinery) -0.918 -0.388 0.734
37 (electrical m.) -1.295 -0.508 0.540
38 (transport eq.) -0.577 -0.429 0.878
39 (miscellaneous) -1.018 -0.433 0.629
Total -1.751 -0.489 0.609
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The total effects of social infrastructure interpreted this way are presented in table 
5.5.11. These measures, as already mentioned, are the sum of the cost elasticities and the 
bias effects. The results for the private input elasticities with respect to social 
infrastructure are, not surprisingly given what has gone before, similar to those for 
productive public capital. The labour input elasticities are all negative (social 
infrastructure is a substitute for labour input). Similarly, all private capital elasticities are 
negative. The intermediate inputs elasticities are, nevertheless, all positive, which implies 
that these inputs are complements to social capital services. Generally speaking, the 
average values of the private input elasticities for social infrastructure are higher than the 
respective elasticities of productive public capital. The average labour elasticity for social 
is -2.111 (against -1.614 for productive) and the average private capital elasticity is -0.849 
(-0.714 for productive). In the case of intermediate inputs, however, the difference is 
rather insignificant (0.249 for social and 0.232 for productive infrastructure respectively).
Table 5.5.11 National sectoral manufacturing cost functions in Greece: private input demand 
elasticities with respect to social infrastructure capital, 1982-1991
Sector Elg Erg ■ Emg
20 (food) -2.492 -0.920 0.114
21 (beverages) -2.199 -0.702 0.268
22 (tobacco) -2.213 -1.126 0.085
23 (textiles) -1.736 -0.724 0.279
24 (footwear) -1.134 -0.941 0.244
25 (wood) -1.786 -0.720 0.284
26 (furniture) -1.255 -0.754 0.341
27 (paper) -1.857 -0.796 0.200
28 (printing) -1.156 -0.799 0.330
29 (leather) -1.808 -1.133 0.112
30 (rubber) -1.699 -0.766 0.239
31 (chemical) -1.799 -0.838 0.181
32 (petroleum) -9.137 -1.404 0.033
33 (mineral) -2.006 -0.608 0.530
34 (basic metal) -2.948 -0.752 0.185
35 (fabr. metal) -1.727 -0.776 0.232
36 (machinery) -1.275 -0.746 0.377
37 (electrical m.) -1.662 -0.875 0.173
38 (transport eq.) -0.938 -0.790 0.517
39 (miscellaneous) -1.394 -0.810 0.253
Total -2.111 -0.849 0.249
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Finally, table 5.5.12 gives the shadow values of the industrial sectors regarding 
social infrastructure. A comparison of these shadow values with those for productive 
public capital shows that the manufacturing sectors appear more willing to pay for an 
additional unit of social infrastructure than for a unit of productive capital. However, 
what is more impressive is the magnitude of this difference. The average shadow value 
for productive infrastructure is 0.062, whereas the average for social infrastructure is 
several times higher at 0.284. The food, textiles, and petroleum sectors are those with the 
highest shadow values.
Table 5.5.12 National sectoral manufacturing cost functions in Greece: shadow values of social
infrastructure capital, 1982-1991
Sector Sc.i Sector
20 (food) 0.936 30 (rubber) 0.159
21 (beverages) 0.250 31 (chemical) 0.437
22 (tobacco) 0.174 32 (petroleum) 0.670
23 (textiles) 0.733 33 (mineral) 0.419
24 (footwear) 0.206 34 (basic metal) 0.492
25 (wood) 0.084 35 (fabr. metal) 0.296
26 (furniture) 0.031 36 (machinery) 0.060
27 (paper) 0.148 37 (electrical m.) 0.215
28 (printing) 0.080 38 (transport eq.) 0.231
29 (leather) 0.026 39 (miscellaneous) 0.025
Total Average 0.284
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5.6 A cost function analysis for the m anufacturing sectors 
of the metropolitan area of Athens
The metropolitan area of Athens concentrates a significant part of the overall 
manufacturing activity of Greece (around the one third of national industrial activity). For 
this reason was deemed necessary to extend the analysis of public infrastructure impact 
on manufacturing costs to this ‘urban’ level.
The public investment in the productive and social categories for the three spatial 
levels of Greece as a whole, the metropolitan area of Athens, and the Rest of Greece 
region is presented in table 5.6.1. What is evident from this table is the fact that the 
percentage in the social category is significantly higher than the productive for Athens, 
certainly in comparison to the respective social percentage spent invested in the Rest of 
Greece. This does not mean that the investment in social infrastructure was higher than 
the investment in productive public capital in the Athens area, but that Athens 
concentrates comparatively a higher percentage of social than productive public capital.
Table 5.6.1 Productive and social public infrastructure capital in Greece and its sub-national 
components of the metropolitan area of Athens and the Rest of Greece.
Year
Productive Social
Athens Rest Greece Athens Rest Greece
(1) (2) (3) (5) (6) (7) (8)
1976 15.88 84.12 100 25.30 74.70 100
1977 25.40 74.60 100 35.46 64.54 100
1978 19.77 80.23 100 32.48 67.52 100
1979 24.95 75.05 100 33.80 66.20 100
1980 15.89 84.11 100 31.09 68.91 100
1981 10.82 89.18 100 25.23 74.77 100
1982 8.04 91.96 100 23.15 76.85 100
1983 11.63 88.37 100 31.70 68.30 100
1984 16.33 83.67 100 30.82 69.18 100
1985 12.71 87.29 100 34.16 65.84 100
1986 16.50 83.50 100 30.44 69.56 100
1987 13.10 86.90 100 23.42 76.58 100
1988 11.87 88.13 100 23.54 76.46 100
1989 11.52 88.48 100 31.49 68.51 100
1990 8.42 91.58 100 35.35 64.65 100
1991 18.47 81.53 100 13.84 86.16 100
1992 9.04 90.96 100 12.65 87.35 100
Source of original data: Ministry of National Economy 
These percentages are based on deflated figures (base year = 1970)
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5.6.1 Manufacturing activities in the Athens region
Table 5.6.2 provides the aggregate information for the manufacturing industry in 
the metropolitan area of Athens for the period 1982 to 1991 in similar fashion to table 
5.5.2. A comparison of these two tables reveals that the sectoral composition of 
manufacturing in the Athens area is rather different from that for Greece as a whole, at 
least in terms of some of the indicators.
For instance, as column (2) of table 5.6.2 shows in the Athens area the footwear 
sector has the largest percentage of manufacturing establishments, as was the case for 
Greece as a whole. However, the percentage of food sector establishments in Athens is 
significantly lower than the average of Greece as a whole. In terms of average annual 
employment, shown in column (3), the textiles industry has the highest percentage both 
for Athens area and Greece as a whole. In second position for Athens is the transport 
equipment sector, which at the national level has a lower percentage. These differences in 
annual employment have been reflected in the remuneration of labour shown in column 
(4), where the transport equipment industry while located in third position for Greece as a 
whole has ‘jumped’ to first for the Athens area.
Regarding the gross production value percentages (shown for Athens in column 
5), the food sector has the highest percentage for both Athens and Greece as a whole. As 
it evident from this column, the great bulk of production of petroleum and coal refining is 
located out of the metropolitan area of Athens. Even though the food industry has the 
highest percentage in terms of gross production, the textiles industry has the highest 
percentage of added value for both Greece as a whole and the area of Athens. This is due 
to the fact that for both these spatial levels of sectoral aggregation, the food sector has the 
highest use of intermediate inputs (column 7). As expected, the petroleum industry, which 
is ranked second at national level, is last in the value added ranking, and second from last 
in terms of intermediate inputs use for the Athens area. Finally, while the transport 
equipment sector has the higher investment percentage at the national level, in the Athens 
area it has a very moderate percentage of the total fixed asset formation (column 8). It is 
the food industry which has the highest investment in the area of Athens, and to this 
percentage should probably be added the percentage of the related sector of beverages, 
ranked third in Athens.
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Table 5.6.2 Descriptive statistics (average percentages) for manufacturing sectors (establishments 
with 20 persons and over) in the Athens region, 1982-1991
Sector Number of 
Establishm.
Av.AnnuaI
Employment
Remuneration 
of Employm.
Gross Prod. 
Value
Value
Added
Intermediate
Inputs
Total Gross 
Asset Form.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
20 (food) 8.445 10.313 10.270 17.436 13.573 20.087 17.495
21 (beverages) 1.738 3.175 3.978 5.259 5.238 5.275 12.102
22 (tobacco) 0.574 2.057 2.204 3.838 3.329 4.192 3.580
23 (textiles) 13.391 16.171 13.715 14.402 14.000 14.651 14.197
24 (footwear) 17.784 10.226 6.888 7.256 7.397 7.158 3.749
25 (wood) 1.029 0.409 0.405 0.127 0.114 0.137 0.053
26 (furniture) 3.521 1.558 1.170 0.908 1.110 0.772 0.641
27 (paper) 2.290 3.048 3.273 3.664 3.562 3.735 3.499
28 (printing) 5.968 6.247 6.658 5.676 6.814 4.903 6.323
29 (leather) 1.253 0.556 0.470 0.782 0.626 0.884 0.377
30 (rubber) 4.931 3.909 3.570 3.593 3.427 3.711 3.774
31 (chemical) 7.631 10.109 11.412 13.494 12.879 13.867 9.940
32 (petroleum) 0.709 0.582 0.677 0.130 0.063 0.178 0.251
33 (mineral) 4.207 3.363 4.128 2.509 2.685 2.410 8.020
34 (metal) 1.059 0.804 1.126 1.561 0.803 2.069 2.076
35 (fabr.metal) 6.028 5.997 5.930 4.917 4.514 5.179 5.498
36 (machinery) 3.424 1.500 1.281 1.047 1.156 0.972 0.825
37 (electrical m.) 5.916 4.903 5.110 5.027 5.217 4.899 3.237
38 (transport eq.) 7.438 13.927 16.836 7.636 12.594 4.295 3.840
39 (miscellaneous) 2.663 1.144 0.897 0.736 0.899 0.626 0.523
Total 100 100 100 100 100 100 100
Source: National Statistical Service of Greece (Annual industrial survey)
5.6.2 Interpreting the results of manufacturing cost functions in the 
Athens metropolitan area
In a similar manner to the sectoral cost and share equations for Greece as a whole, 
a system of equations has been constructed for the panel based on the sectoral data from 
the metropolitan area of Athens. The only difference is that this panel is one sector 
‘shorter’. The petroleum and coal refining industry (sector 32) has been excluded due to 
the fact that its gross production value appears to be zero for the period 1987 to 1991 (this 
implies a negative added value for this period). This zero production value, as odd as it 
seems at first sight, is probably due to profit transfers via transfer prices23. The panel,
23 Seitz in his analysis for the impact o f public infrastructure capital on the German manufacturing 
industries (similarly at two-digit level) has also excluded the ‘mineral oil refining industry’ on the grounds 
o f  negative added value (1994, footnote 3).
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then, for the metropolitan area of Athens has a ten years time-series dimension (from 
1982 to 1991) and a nineteen two-digit sectors cross-sectional dimension.
Table 5.6.3 presents the results for the estimation of the system of equations if the 
infrastructure variable is comprised of the productive category. The measures of overall 
fitness of the system are satisfactory, but what are of more interest are the estimated log- 
likelihood ratio tests (LRTs). The full model (with dummies and public infrastructure 
capital, without being constrained to have constant returns to scale) was compared to a 
model without the sectoral dummies, and to another with dummies but constrained to 
have constant returns to scale.
Table 5.6.3 Sectoral cost function for manufacturing in Athens region: results of panel-estimation 
incorporating the effects of productive public capital, 1982-1991
Variable Estimated
Coefficient
T-Ratio"
aO 14.671 49.409
aL 1.264 4.478
aK 1.348 3.936
aY 0.728 50.740
aG -0.043 -0.598
aT 0.002 0.256
bLK -0.237 -7.490
bLY -0.151 -13.090
bLG -0.177 -2.598
bLT 0.014 2.642
bKY -0.235 -17.720
bKG -0.154 -1.851
bKT 0.025 3.577
bYT -0.001 -1.320
R-Square Standard Error
Cost function 0.998 0.044
Labour share 0.806 0.042
Capital share 0.826 0.048
Log of Likelihood 1047.87
LRTd
LRTq
LRTy
Likelihood ratio testb 
1138.292 
7.76 
331.646
Degrees of freedom 
54
3
4
*Value of Ratio of Parameter Estimate to Asymptotic Standard Error.
The total number of observations is 190. 
hThe associated p-values for LRTd and LRTy tests are 0.000.
However, in the case of LRTg the alternative hypothesis (G=0) cannot be rejected.
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Both these alternatives have been rejected, as LRTd was equal to 1138.3 with 54 
degrees of freedom, and LRTy to 331.6 with 4 degrees of freedom. However, the 
alternative model that excludes the productive infrastructure variable cannot be rejected, 
at least at 5 percent level, as the LRTg is equal to 7.76 with 3 degrees of freedom. Thus, it 
can be concluded that productive public capital does not appear to have a statistically 
significant impact on the costs of the manufacturing sectors in the metropolitan area of 
Athens.
Table 5.6.4 gives the results for the system of equations if the social category for 
the Athens area is used as the public capital variable. Again the overall fitness measures 
are satisfactory and for this system all the alternative specifications have been rejected.
Table 5.6.4 Sectoral cost function for manufacturing in Athens region: results of panel-estimation 
incorporating the effects of social public capital, 1982-1991
Variable Estimated
Coefficient
T-Ratio"
aO 14.806 49.646
aL 1.577 5.432
aK 1.701 4.586
aY 0.726 50.640
aG -0.086 -1.047
aT 0.004 0.644
bLK -0.256 -7.500
bLY -0.154 -13.510
bLG -0.290 -3.611
bLT 0.021 3.629
bKY -0.238 -18.040
bKG -0.274 -2.665
bKT 0.032 4.160
bYT -0.001 -1.199
R-Square Standard Error
Cost function 0.998 0.044
Labour share 0.812 0.041
Capital share 0.829 0.048
Log of Likelihood 1051.39
LRTd
LRTg
LRTy
Likelihood ratio testb 
1145.468 
14.8 
337.628
Degrees of freedom 
54
3
4
‘Value of Ratio of Parameter Estimate to Asymptotic Standard Error. 
The total number of observations is 190. 
bThe associated p-values for all tests are 0.000.
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The likelihood ratio test for the model without dummies (LRTd) is equal to 1145.5 
with 54 degrees of freedom, for the model in which social infrastructure is excluded 
(LRTq) it is equal to 14.8 with 3 degrees of freedom, and for the formulation assuming 
constant returns to scale (LRTy) it is equal to 337.6 with 4 degrees of freedom. Thus, the 
formulation with the social category, with sectoral dummy variables, and no constraint 
about the type of returns of scale imposed, has been accepted.
The estimated cost elasticities for social infrastructure in the Athens region are 
given in table 5.6.5. It may be useful to be reminded that for the Athens area the panel 
sectors are not twenty, but nineteen, as the petroleum and coal refining sector has been 
excluded. Consequently, the sectoral measures presented in the following tables have also 
been reduced to nineteen sectors. The highest elasticity is that for the wood industry with 
an elasticity egg equal to -0.159 (the highest elasticity for Greece as a whole belongs to 
miscellaneous industries, with £cg = -0.376), and the smallest is for printing and 
publishing (-0.064). These elasticities (their average is -0.089) are significantly smaller 
than those for both the productive and social categories for Greece as a whole (averaging 
-0.270 and-0.360 respectively).
Table 5.6.5 Sectoral cost function for manufacturing in Athens region: cost elasticities of 
manufacturing with respect to productive infrastructure capital, 1982-1991
Sector Bcg Sector eco
20 (food) -0.088 30 (rubber) -0.093
21 (beverages) -0.102 31 (chemical) -0.097
22 (tobacco) -0.084 33 (mineral) -0.074
23 (textiles) -0.075 34 (basic metal) -0.082
24 (footwear) -0.081 35 (fabr. metal) -0.083
25 (wood) -0.159 36 (machinery) -0.071
26 (furniture) -0.071 37 (electrical m.) -0.088
27 (paper) -0.092 38 (transport eq.) -0.085
28 (printing) -0.064 39 (miscellaneous) -0.103
29 (leather) -0.093 Average -0.089
The factor bias effects (over share) of social public capital in Athens are given in 
table (5.6.6). The general direction of the relationship between social infrastructure and 
the private inputs is the same as was the case for productive and social public capital for
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Greece as a whole. Thus, social capital appears to be a substitute for labour and private 
capital inputs as the signs in all the respective bias effects (bias LG and KG, respectively) 
are negative, and a complement for the intermediate inputs (as all the signs for the MG 
bias are positive). These bias effects for social infrastructure in Athens, in terms of 
average magnitude, are higher than the respective effects for Greece as a whole. The sole 
exception is the average bias effect for labour (-1.572 for Athens compared to -1.751 for 
Greece as a whole). However, the higher average for Greece as a whole is due to the very 
high bias effect for the petroleum sector. This sector has been excluded from the Athens 
panel, and if the average of the Athens bias effect is compared to an average for Greece 
from which also the petroleum industry is excluded, then the former is higher than the 
latter. For Athens the most important labour bias effects are those for basic metal 
industries and the tobacco sector. The highest bias effects for private capital input belong 
to the leather and fur sector and the footwear industry. Finally, the highest factor bias 
effect for the intermediate inputs is observed for the sectors of wood and non-metallic 
minerals.
Table 5.6.6 Sectoral cost function for manufacturing in Athens region: social infrastructure 
factor bias effects over respective private input shares, 1982-1991
Sector bias LG bias KG bias MG
20 (food) -2.292 -1.392 0.843
21 (beverages) -2.022 -0.835 1.089
22 (tobacco) -2.370 -1.161 0.901
23 (textiles) -1.783 -0.757 1.210
24 (footwear) -1.366 -1.445 0.947
25 (wood) -0.989 -0.627 2.208
26 (furniture) -1.102 -1.038 1.199
27 (paper) -1.587 -1.098 0.804
28 (printing) -1.213 -0.986 1.180
29 (leather) -2.050 -2.024 0.787
30 (rubber) -1.599 -0.905 1.112
31 (chemical) -1.665 -1.132 0.977
33 (mineral) -1.462 -0.578 1.875
34 (basic metal) -2.485 -0.954 0.985
35 (fabr. metal) -1.373 -0.981 1.145
36 (machinery) -1.394 -0.809 1.289
37 (electrical m.) -1.337 -1.249 1.046
38 (transport eq.) -0.644 -1.161 1.840
39 (miscellaneous) -1.132 -1.078 1.161
Total -1.572 -1.064 1.189
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The combination of the cost elasticity and factor bias effects generates the demand 
elasticities with respect to the infrastructure capital. The computation of these elasticities 
for social infrastructure in Athens area is provided in table 5.6.7. Here social public 
capital appears to be a substitute for labour and private capital inputs, and complement for 
intermediate inputs, as was the case for the bias effects. The highest demand elasticities 
are, for labour, basic metal industries (slg equal to -2.567), for private capital, leather 
goods manufacture (-2.117), and, for intermediate inputs, wood based industry (2.050). 
All the average demand elasticities with respect to social capital are higher than the 
respective elasticities for Greece as a whole, with the exception of labour.
Table 5.6.7 Sectoral cost functions for manufacturing in Athens region: private input 
demand elasticities with respect to social infrastructure capital, 1982-1991
Sector 8 l g 6 k g S m g
20 (food) -2.380 -1.480 0.755
21 (beverages) -2.124 -0.936 0.987
22 (tobacco) -2.454 -1.246 0.817
23 (textiles) -1.858 -0.833 1.135
24 (footwear) -1.447 -1.526 0.866
25 (wood) -1.148 -0.786 2.050
26 (furniture) -1.173 -1.109 1.129
27 (paper) -1.679 -1.190 0.712
28 (printing) -1.277 -1.050 1.116
29 (leather) -2.143 -2.117 0.694
30 (rubber) -1.693 -0.998 1.018
31 (chemical) -1.762 -1.229 0.880
33 (mineral) -1.536 -0.652 1.801
34 (basic metal) -2.567 -1.035 0.903
35 (fabr. metal) -1.455 -1.064 1.063
36 (machinery) -1.466 -0.880 1.217
37 (electrical m.) -1.425 -1.338 0.958
38 (transport eq.) -0.729 -1.246 1.755
39 (miscellaneous) -1.235 -1.181 1.058
Total -1.661 -1.152 1.101
The last consideration for the Athens region (table 5.6.8) is the shadow value of 
social infrastructure capital for the manufacturing sectors. These values, as indicated
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previously, show the ‘willingness’ of the different sectors to pay for the additional units 
(services) of the particular infrastructure input. The highest shadow value appears to be 
that of the food sector (sGi equal to 0.192). Chemicals and textiles manufactures closely 
follow (0.157 and 0.144, respectively). However, overall these values of social 
infrastructure capital for Athens are significantly lower, on average, than those for the 
social category at the national level.
Table 5.6.8 Sectoral cost functions for manufacturing in Athens region: shadow values of
social infrastructure capital, 1982-1991
Sector SGi Sector Sc.)
20 (food) 0.192 30 (rubber) 0.043
21 (beverages) 0.074 31 (chemical) 0.157
22 (tobacco) 0.039 33 (mineral) 0.039
23 (textiles) 0.144 34 (basic metal) 0.020
24 (footwear) 0.066 35 (fabr. metal) 0.052
25 (wood) 0.005 36 (machinery) 0.009
26 (furniture) 0.008 37 (electrical m.) 0.044
27 (paper) 0.042 38 (transport eq.) 0.082
28 (printing) 0.046 39 (miscellaneous) 0.009
29 (leather) 0.008 Average 0.057
5.7 A cost function analysis for the manufacturing sectors 
of the Rest o f Greece region
For the metropolitan area of Athens it was shown that the basic indicators for the 
manufacturing activities in this area were somewhat different from the respective 
indicators at the national level. This discrepancy was as expected for there is no doubt 
that the economy of Athens is much different from that of the remaining parts of Greece. 
For the region that constitutes the Rest of Greece24 table 5.7.1 shows (column 2) that it is 
the food sector that has the highest percentage of manufacturing establishments. The 
footwear and sewing of fabric industry (for which it should repeated that has the highest 
number of establishments in the Athens area) then follows, and the similar sector of 
textiles ranks third. These three sectors do not only have the highest (double figure)
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percentages in terms of establishments, but they also have the highest percentages of 
average annual employment, even though in somewhat different rank order (the textiles 
industry coming first). Not surprisingly, the percentage for employment remuneration in 
the textiles and food sectors also are among the most important, but this is not the case for 
the footwear and sewing sector. The average salaries in this last mentioned sector are then 
clearly lower in comparison with others, for instance the non-metallic minerals or 
transport equipment industries, where remuneration percentages are much higher than 
their employment fractions.
Table 5.7.1 Descriptive statistics (average percentages) for manufacturing sectors (establishments 
with 20 persons and over) in the Rest of Greece region, 1982-1991
Sector Number of 
Establishments
AvAnnual
Employment
Remuneration 
of Employment
Gross Prod. 
Value
Value
Added
Intermediate
Inputs
Total Gross 
Asset Form.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
20 18.693 15.437 13.031 16.757 13.175 18.201 11.344
21 3.635 3.130 3.393 3.672 4.917 3.173 4.863
22 2.341 3.202 2.871 3.313 2.690 3.570 1.273
23 13.946 17.797 15.758 11.594 14.950 10.242 9.559
24 15.338 11.785 7.442 3.132 5.345 2.247 2.039
25 2.903 2.412 2.274 1.636 2.125 1.444 1.740
26 3.063 1.148 0.822 0.467 0.795 0.336 0.574
27 1.919 2.466 2.494 2.291 2.374 2.253 1.843
28 1.002 0.648 0.657 0.344 0.591 0.244 0.676
29 2.021 0.710 0.535 0.483 0.493 0.477 0.244
30 3.568 2.910 3.043 2.495 3.404 2.133 2.370
31 4.468 5.069 6.914 6.710 7.921 6.223 5.417
32 0.882 2.100 3.262 17.576 5.186 22.541 12.293
33 8.139 7.780 9.021 6.460 9.688 5.170 9.394
34 1.334 4.612 7.681 10.114 9.167 10.481 10.889
35 5.346 5.794 6.206 5.095 5.977 4.745 5.040
36 4.357 2.180 2.158 1.024 1.623 0.781 0.939
37 3.258 4.004 4.164 3.680 4.354 3.411 2.851
38 2.739 6.156 7.760 2.797 4.635 2.061 16.289
39 1.046 0.661 0.514 0.361 0.590 0.267 0.363
Total 100 100 100 100 100 100 100
Source: National Statistical Service of Greece (Annual industrial survey)
24 This dataset is derived by subtracting the Athens data from those at national level.
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The different sectoral composition is also reflected in the production indicators. In 
the Rest of Greece the petroleum and coal sector has the highest percentage of gross 
production value (column 5), followed by the food industry. It has to be mentioned again 
that the petroleum sector in Athens has the second from lowest percentage of gross 
production. The petroleum sector has this high ranking as a result of its high use of 
intermediate inputs (column 7). Thus, in terms of value added this sector has a relatively 
poor ranking. It is the textiles and food industries that have the higher value added 
performance. On the investment front, the two heavy industrial sectors of transport 
equipment and petroleum figure prominently in terms of gross asset formation, followed 
by a light industrial food sector.
5.7.2 Interpreting the results o f manufacturing cost functions in the 
Rest of Greece region
This last section of empirical results presents the empirical findings for the 
manufacturing sectors in the Rest of Greece region. The former set of tables analyses the 
case of productive infrastructure and the latter the results for the social category.
Table 5.7.2 presents the estimation results, including productive infrastructure 
capital, of the cost and share functions. In similar fashion to the previous cost analyses the 
specification with the infrastructure variable has been tested against several alternatives. 
These alternative formulations, that of no sectoral effects, that of constant returns of scale, 
and that productive capital has no effect, have been rejected in favour of the model with 
public capital and sectoral effects. The respective log-likelihood ratio tests are LRTd = 
1362.04 (57 degrees of freedom), LRTy = 134.8 (4 degrees of freedom), and LRTg = 
95.58 (3 degrees of freedom). As the overall statistics of the productive public capital 
model are most satisfactory, the next step is to estimate the various measures of 
infrastructure impact on costs in private sector manufacturing.
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Table 5.7.2 National sectoral cost function for manufacturing in Rest of Greece region: results of 
panel-estimation incorporating the effects of productive infrastructure capital, 1982-1991
Variable Estimated
Coefficient
T-Ratio"
aO 16.409 45.815
aL 1.191 9.826
aK 1.641 7.501
aY 0.751 36.690
aG -0.300 -4.657
aT 0.030 4.132
bLK -0.084 -5.040
bLY -0.019 -3.253
bLG -0.180 -8.270
bLT 0.021 8.679
bKY -0.105 -10.290
bKG -0.183 -4.599
bKT 0.028 6.077
bYT -0.001 -1.328
R-Square Standard Error
Cost function 0.998 0.043
Labour share 0.959 0.012
Capital share 0.946 0.022
Log of Likelihood 1482.63
LRTd
LRTg
LRTy
Likelihood ratio testb 
1362.044 
95.58 
134.8
Dearees of freedom 
57
3
4
‘Value of Ratio of Parameter Estimate to Asymptotic Standard Error. 
The total number of observations is 200. 
bThe associated p-values for all tests are 0.000.
One of the measures of infrastructure’s impact on private costs is cost elasticity 
with respect to public capital ( s c g ). These average elasticities for the twenty 
manufacturing sectors for the Rest of Greece are given in table 5.7.3. Here, the highest 
elasticity can be found for the miscellaneous manufacturing industries with a value of 8cg 
equalling -0.321. The next highest come the electrical appliances (-0.311) and beverages 
sectors (-0.310). At the other end of the spectrum is printing and publishing (-0.279), 
leather and fur (-0.280) and petroleum and coal refining (-0.288). There seems, then, little
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distinct patterning in these elasticities, but, on the other hand, the variation around the 
total manufacturing average is rather small.
Table 5.7.3 National sectoral cost function for manufacturing in Rest of Greece region: 
cost elasticities of manufacturing with respect to productive infrastructure
capital, 1982-1991
Sector See Sector Scg
20 (food) -0.297 30 (rubber) -0.304
21 (beverages) -0.310 31 (chemical) -0.293
22 (tobacco) -0.300 32 (petroleum) -0.288
23 (textiles) -0.301 33 (mineral) -0.299
24 (footwear) -0.299 34 (basic metal) -0.293
25 (wood) -0.309 35 (fabr. metal) -0.301
26 (furniture) -0.297 36 (machinery) -0.297
27 (paper) -0.294 37 (electrical m.) -0.311
28 (printing) -0.279 38 (transport eq.) -0.299
29 (leather) -0.280 39 (miscellaneous) -0.321
Total Average -0.299
In order to obtain the factor bias effects over share (table 5.7.4) the respective 
estimated coefficients from table 5.7.2 were divided by the corresponding private input 
share. Public capital appears to be labour and private capital saving, and intermediate 
inputs using for all industrial sectors. For petroleum and coal refining there seems to be a 
very high negative bias (-9.416), which means that public capital is labour saving in this 
sector. Other sectors having a high negative bias, which can be translated as large 
decreases of the labour input given increased infrastructure, are the basic metal industries 
(-2.558) and the food and beverage sectors (-2.308 and -2.101 respectively). Relatively 
low bias effect sensitivity for the labour input occurs in footwear manufacturing (-0.686), 
the transport equipment sector (-0.739) and the machinery and appliances industries, 
excluding electrical appliances (-0.902).
All the results for productive public capital bias are, as just mentioned, negative. 
This implies that productive public capital is saving private capital input and the highest 
bias can be found again for the petroleum and coal refining (-1.472). Similar bias occurs 
in the tobacco industries and the leather and fur (-1.234 and -1.015 respectively. At the 
opposite end of the ranking are non-metallic mineral products, beverages, and wood
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based industries (-0.346, -0.437, and -0.486 respectively. The bias effects for private 
capital, even though trending in the same direction, are much smaller in value than those 
for labour bias. The case for intermediate inputs bias is different. It seems that productive 
public capital appears to use, instead of saving, intermediate inputs. Thus, the high levels 
of bias for intermediate inputs are provided by non-metallic mineral products, transport 
equipment and the machinery and appliances industries, excluding the electrical 
appliances (0.989, 0.914, and 0.837 respectively). The lower saving bias for intermediate 
inputs comprises the sectors of petroleum and coal refining (0.434), tobacco industries 
(0.484) and leather and fur products (0.531).
Table 5.7.4 Sectoral cost function for manufacturing in Rest of Greece region: productive 
infrastructure factor bias effects over respective private input shares, 1982-1991
Sector bias LG bias KG bias MG
20 (food) -2.308 -0.751 0.536
21 (beverages) -2.101 -0.437 0.733
22 (tobacco) -1.920 -1.234 0.484
23 (textiles) -1.416 -0.509 0.708
24 (footwear) -0.686 -0.738 0.743
25 (wood) -1.423 -0.486 0.732
26 (furniture) -1.006 -0.501 0.800
27 (paper) -1.760 -0.568 0.640
28 (printing) -0.917 -0.536 0.802
29 (leather) -1.456 -1.015 0.531
30 (rubber) -1.455 -0.537 0.678
31 (chemical) -1.688 -0.625 0.609
32 (petroleum) -9.416 -1.472 0.434
33 (mineral) -1.750 -0.346 0.989
34 (basic metal) -2.558 -0.550 0.612
35 (fabr. metal) -1.547 -0.557 0.660
36 (machinery) -0.902 -0.539 0.837
37 (electrical m.) -1.504 -0.664 0.601
38 (transport eq.) -0.739 -0.520 0.914
39 (miscellaneous) -1.241 -0.553 0.702
Total -1.890 -0.657 0.687
The combined effect of the cost elasticities 8cg (which can be considered as the 
‘productivity effect’ of infrastructure) and the bias effect is measured by the private input 
elasticities with respect to public infrastructure ( s x g , presented in table 5.7.5), where X  =
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L, K, A/(see theoretical section). In this light, it is not surprising that the high bias effect 
for labour input has determined the labour input elasticity for petroleum and coal refining, 
with 8lg equal to -9.703. Basic metal industries have the second largest labour demand 
elasticity (-2.851) and the food sector closely follows (-2.605). The lowest labour demand 
elasticities can be found in footwear manufacturing (-0.985) and transport equipment (- 
1.038). The private capital elasticity demand is again highest in petroleum and coal 
refining industries where skg is -1.759, and this is followed by the values for tobacco (- 
1.535) and leather and fur manufacturing (-1.295). The lowest private capital elasticity 
demand figures in non-metallic mineral industries (-0.645). Other industries with low 
capital elasticity demand are beverages (-0.747), and wood (-0.795). It has already been 
said that the bias effect was positive in the case of the intermediate inputs for all industrial 
sectors. As the intermediate elasticity demand is the combined effect of this positive bias 
effect annd the negative cost elasticity (it was negative for all sectors), the intermediate 
elasticity demand could be either negative or positive. However, the larger absolute value 
of intermediate inputs bias effect has given positive values for the intermediate elasticity 
demand ( s m g )  of all industrial sectors. This means that an increase of public capital has a 
positive effect (increase) on demand for intermediate inputs. This effect is largest in non 
metallic mineral industries, with smg = 0.690, followed by that in transport equipment 
(0.615), and the machinery and appliances industries, excluding electrical appliances 
(0.540). The lowest intermediate elasticity demand is observed for petroleum and coal 
refining (0.147) and other relatively low values occur in the tobacco and food industries 
(0.183 and 0.239 respectively). The overall conclusion, not only from the analysis of the 
private input elasticities with respect to productive public infrastructure, but also 
corroborated by the bias effects and the cost elasticities, is that labour and private capital 
inputs are substitutes to public capital, and intermediate inputs are complementary. This is 
similar to the general conclusion about US manufacturing (Nadiri and Mamuneas 1994, 
table 6) but different to the results of the German and Swedish cases (see Seitz 1994, 
p.305 and Bemdt et al. 1991b), where public capital appears to be complementary to 
private capital.
199
COST FUNCTION ANALYSIS APPROACH
Table 5.7.5 Sectoral cost functions for manufacturing in Rest of Greece region: private 
input demand elasticities with respect to productive infrastructure capital, 1982-1991
Sector 6 l o 6 k O 6 m g
20 (food) -2.605 -1.047 0.239
21 (beverages) -2.410 -0.747 0.424
22 (tobacco) -2.220 -1.535 0.183
23 (textiles) -1.718 -0.811 0.407
24 (footwear) -0.985 -1.037 0.443
25 (wood) -1.732 -0.795 0.423
26 (furniture) -1.303 -0.798 0.503
27 (paper) -2.053 -0.862 0.346
28 (printing) -1.196 -0.815 0.523
29 (leather) -1.736 -1.295 0.251
30 (rubber) -1.759 -0.841 0.374
31 (chemical) -1.981 -0.918 0.316
32 (petroleum) -9.703 -1.759 0.147
33 (mineral) -2.049 -0.645 0.690
34 (basic metal) -2.851 -0.843 0.319
35 (fabr. metal) -1.849 -0.859 0.359
36 (machinery) -1.199 -0.837 0.540
37 (electrical m.) -1.815 -0.975 0.291
38 (transport eq.) -1.038 -0.819 0.615
39 (miscellaneous) -1.562 -0.874 0.381
Total -2.188 -0.956 0.389
In table 5.7.6 the estimates for the average shadow prices for the twenty two-digit 
industrial sectors for this version of the analysis are given. As in the previous sections, 
here is presented only the average values of these elasticities, as every sector for every 
year has a different such elasticity. High shadow values are found in food production ( sg  
= 0.206), followed by petroleum and coal refining (0.191) and textile manufacturing 
(0.154). The sectors with the lowest shadow prices are printing and publishing (0.004), 
and leather/fur products and miscellaneous manufacturing (both 0.005). It is again 
difficult do discern a pattern in these values. However, it can be argued that one potential 
explanation is that the industries having high shadow prices are those with relatively high 
capital/labour ratios, and high output (measured in gross production value) to labour ratio. 
The opposite holds for those sectors with low shadow prices.
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Generally speaking, the shadow prices for the Rest of Greece are they higher than 
those reported by Nadiri and Mamuneas (1994, table 7) for US manufacturing but much 
closer to those for Germany reported in Conrad and Seitz (1994, table 3).
Table 5.7.6 Sectoral cost functions for manufacturing in Rest of Greece region: shadow 
values of productive infrastructure capital, 1982-1991
Sector *GI Sector *Gi
20 (food) 0.206 30 (rubber) 0.031
21 (beverages) 0.051 31 (chemical) 0.077
22 (tobacco) 0.037 32 (petroleum) 0.191
23 (textiles) 0.154 33 (mineral) 0.106
24 (footwear) 0.036 34 (basic metal) 0.132
25 (wood) 0.023 35 (fabr. metal) 0.066
26 (furniture) 0.006 36 (machinery) 0.013
27 (paper) 0.029 37 (electrical m.) 0.046
28 (printing) 0.004 38 (transport eq.) 0.040
29 (leather) 0.005 39 (miscellaneous) 0.005
Total Average 0.063
The final set of tables (5.7.7 to 5.7.11) offers the analysis for the impact of social 
public capital on manufacturing costs in the region that constitutes the Rest of Greece. In 
similar fashion to its productive counterpart, the specification which introduces the social 
infrastructure category in the system of estimated equations, with sectoral dummy 
variables, and unconstrained in regard the returns of scale, has proved to be the most 
successful alternative. The alternative formulation that excluded sectoral effects (i.e. 
without dummy variables) was rejected based on the log-likelihood ratio test (LRTd = 
1,343.84). The version in which it was assumed that the social infrastructure has no 
impact on the manufacturing costs was also rejected with a log-likelihood ratio test 
(LRTg =77.08 with 3 degrees of freedom). Finally, the alternative assuming constant 
returns of scale was also rejected, as the respective log-likelihood ratio test (LRTy) was 
equal to130.62 (with 4 degrees of freedom). The overall measures for the system of 
equations are, as in the case of productive infrastructure highly satisfactory.
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Table 5.7.7 National sectoral cost function for manufacturing in Rest of Greece region: results of 
panel-estimation incorporating the effects of social infrastructure capital, 1982-1991
Variable Estimated
Coefficient
T-Ratio*
aO 16.748 39.777
aL 1.143 8.099
aK 1.592 6.340
aY 0.754 36.710
aG -0.460 -4.758
aT 0.031 4.202
bLK -0.059 -3.684
bLY -0.018 -3.101
bLG -0.218 -6.744
bLT 0.017 7.158
bKY -0.106 -10.270
bKG -0.220 -3.796
bKT 0.023 5.231
bYT -0.001 -1.183
R-Square Standard Error
Cost function 0.988 0.043
Labour share 0.956 0.012
Capital share 0.946 0.022
Log of Likelihood 1473.38
LRTd
LRTg
LRTy
Likelihood ratio test1* 
1343.84 
77.08 
130.62
Deerees of freedom 
57
3
4
"Value of Ratio of Parameter Estimate to Asymptotic Standard Error. 
The total number of observations is 200. 
bThe associated p-values for all tests are 0.000.
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The cost elasticities with respect to social infrastructure for the Rest of Greece are 
shown in table 5.7.8, where it can be seen that the highest value relates to miscellaneous 
industries. On average, the respective cost elasticities for this national residual region are 
higher than those for Greece as whole, and significantly higher than those for Athens.
Table 5.7.8 National sectoral cost function for manufacturing in Rest of Greece region: 
cost elasticities of manufacturing with respect to social infrastructure capital, 1982-1991
Sector Sco Sector £cg
20 (food) -0.456 30 (rubber) -0.465
21 (beverages) -0.472 31 (chemical) -0.451
22 (tobacco) -0.460 32 (petroleum) -0.445
23 (textiles) -0.462 33 (mineral) -0.459
24 (footwear) -0.459 34 (basic metal) -0.452
25 (wood) -0.470 35 (fabr. metal) -0.462
26 (furniture) -0.457 36 (machinery) -0.457
27 (paper) -0.453 37 (electrical m.) -0.473
28 (printing) -0.434 38 (transport eq.) -0.459
29 (leather) -0.436 39 (miscellaneous) -0.485
Total Average -0.458
The factor bias effects over share, presented in table 5.7.9, show that the type of 
relationships between the private inputs and social infrastructure in the Rest of Greece are 
the much the same as those seen nationally and in Athens. This confirms that social 
infrastructure is a substitute for labour and private capital, and a complement to the 
intermediate inputs, for all manufacturing sectors. In terms of magnitude, the highest bias 
effect for the labour input is that for the petroleum industry (-11.397) and this is also the 
case for private capital (-1.775) For the intermediate inputs the highest value is achieved 
by non-metallic mineral products (1.194).
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Table 5.7.9 Sectoral cost function for manufacturing in Rest of Greece region: social 
infrastructure factor bias effects over respective private input shares, 1982-1991
Sector bias LG bias KG bias MG
20 (food) -2.793 -0.905 0.647
21 (beverages) -2.543 -0.527 0.886
22 (tobacco) -2.324 -1.489 0.584
23 (textiles) -1.714 -0.614 0.856
24 (footwear) -0.830 -0.890 0.897
25 (wood) -1.722 -0.587 0.884
26 (furniture) -1.218 -0.604 0.967
27 (paper) -2.130 -0.685 0.773
28 (printing) -1.110 -0.646 0.969
29 (leather) -1.762 -1.224 0.641
30 (rubber) -1.762 -0.647 0.820
31 (chemical) -2.043 -0.754 0.736
32 (petroleum) -11.397 -1.775 0.525
33 (mineral) -2.118 -0.417 1.194
34 (basic metal) -3.097 -0.663 0.740
35 (fabr. metal) -1.873 -0.672 0.798
36 (machinery) -1.091 -0.651 1.011
37 (electrical m.)
csOO1 -0.801 0.727
38 (transport eq.) -0.894 -0.627 1.105
39 (miscellaneous) -1.503 -0.668 0.848
Total -2.287 -0.792 0.830
The overall effect of social infrastructure, provided by the private input demand 
elasticities, is given in table 5.7.10. The nature of the relationships is the same as for the 
factor bias effects and again it can be seen that the results for the Rest of Greece are much 
higher than those for Athens. Individually, the highest sectoral demand elasticity in this 
part of the analysis for the labour input is for the petroleum sector (slg equal to -11.843, 
demonstrating that social infrastructure saves labour). The same is the case for the private 
capital input (-1.775 again saving private capital). The highest elasticity for intermediate 
inputs is that for non-metallic mineral products (0.736, which implies that the 
infrastructure is using intermediate inputs).
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Table 5.7.10 Sectoral cost functions for manufacturing in Rest of Greece region: private 
input demand elasticities with respect to social infrastructure capital, 1982-1991
Sector SlG 6kg 6mG
20 (food) -3.250 -1.362 0.191
21 (beverages) -3.015 -0.999 0.414
22 (tobacco) -2.785 -1.949 0.124
23 (textiles) -2.176 -1.076 0.394
24 (footwear) -1.289 -1.349 0.438
25 (wood) -2.193 -1.057 0.413
26 (furniture) -1.675 -1.061 0.510
27 (paper) -2.583 -1.138 0.321
28 (printing) -1.545 -1.081 0.534
29 (leather) -2.198 -1.660 0.206
30 (rubber) -2.227 -1.112 0.355
31 (chemical) -2.494 -1.205 0.285
32 (petroleum) -11.843 -2.220 0.080
33 (mineral) -2.577 -0.876 0.736
34 (basic metal) -3.548 -1.115 0.288
35 (fabr. metal) -2.335 -1.134 0.336
36 (machinery) -1.548 -1.107 0.555
37 (electrical m.) -2.294 -1.274 0.253
38 (transport eq.) -1.353 -1.086 0.646
39 (miscellaneous) -1.988 -1.153 0.363
Total -2.746 -1.251 0.372
The shadow values of social public capital in the Rest of Greece are generally 
higher than for nation (the average for the latter is 0.284 compared to 0.402 for the 
national residual having excluded Athens). The highest individual values are for the food 
and petroleum industries (sg equal to 1.322 and 1.205, respectively).
Table 5.7.11 Sectoral cost functions for manufacturing in Rest of Greece region: shadow 
values of social infrastructure capital, 1982-1991
Sector *GI Sector Sg i
20 (food) 1.322 30 (rubber) 0.201
21 (beverages) 0.328 31 (chemical) 0.493
22 (tobacco) 0.238 32 (petroleum) 1.205
23 (textiles) 0.980 33 (mineral) 0.675
24 (footwear) 0.232 34 (basic metal) 0.850
25 (wood) 0.145 35 (fabr. metal) 0.419
26 (furniture) 0.038 36 (machinery) 0.084
27 (paper) 0.187 37 (electrical m.) 0.294
28 (printing) 0.026 38 (transport eq.) 0.253
29 (leather) 0.032 39 (miscellaneous) 0.030
Total Average 0.402
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5.8 Conclusions
Duality theory and cost function analysis is an alternative to the production 
function analytical framework. Despite the fact that the estimation of cost functions is 
more data demanding, this type of analysis has several significant advantages. It can 
provide an insight into the way in which infrastructure investment affects private sector 
costs. Another advantage is that it can produce unbiased and consistent results in 
comparison with the production function approach. Additionally, the cost function 
analytical framework is not characterised by some of the restrictive assumptions that 
underlie production functions, and especially the Cobb-Douglas variant.
For the empirical investigation of the infrastructural impact on manufacturing 
costs four different datasets were used. The first is familiar from the previous chapter 
regional panel and is based on prefectural data for total manufacturing. The second does 
not have a regional dimension, but instead was constructed from the data concerning 
manufacturing sectors in Greece at the national level. The third is again a sectoral set and 
refers to manufacturing industries in the metropolitan area of Athens. The last dataset is 
comprised of the remaining national manufacturing having excluded the Athens area. 
This ‘region’ has been labelled ‘Rest of Greece’. Thus, there is one regional panel and 
three sectoral panels. The regional panel, undoubtedly, is richer in information about the 
variations of the infrastructure variable. However, the sectoral panels contain all the 
necessary information about the differential impacts of public capital on the various 
manufacturing sectors.
The public infrastructure variable has entered into the estimated systems of 
equations either as productive or as social public capital for all estimated panels of data. 
The formulation comprising the infrastructure variable and dummy variables (supposed to 
capture the specific regional/sectoral effects) and with no constraint about the type of 
returns of scale, was tested against three alternatives. In the first, it was supposed that 
there are no regional/sectoral effects; in the second, that public capital has no effect on 
private costs, and in the third, it was assumed that manufacturing operates under constant 
returns of scale. Again, these alternative hypotheses were tested with all four different 
datasets. In all cases the hypotheses for constant returns of scale and no regional/sectoral 
specific effects have been rejected.
206
COST FUNCTION ANALYSIS APPROACH
The empirical findings based on the regional dataset have shown that productive 
infrastructure does have a significant and positive impact on the performance of private 
manufacturing, measured in terms of the cost elasticity with respect to public (productive) 
capital. In contrast, the social category of public capital does not appear to have an impact 
on private costs at regional level. It seems that productive capital has a substitutive 
relationship with labour and intermediate inputs, and complementary one for private 
capital input. Put somewhat differently, infrastructure provision tends to save labour and 
other intermediate costs and it tends to lever additional investment in the private sector.
These results are in accordance with the results based on the production function 
analysis for the same period and same spatial analysis (Rovolis and Spence, 1997a and 
1997b). However, a significant limitation of the dataset employed here is that it refers to 
the aggregate form of manufacturing only. Supplementary analysis extended to regional 
sectors of manufacturing, as well as to other activities of the private sector, has not been 
possible here due to lack of data. Data limitations have also restricted the time dimension 
of this analysis to only 10 years.
As a concluding comment, one further set of findings can be reported, about 
which certainly more investigation is needed. If the values for simple single factor 
productivity are calculated (output per private input ratio), then these seem to be highly 
correlated with private input demand elasticities with respect to public infrastructure 
capital. Taking labour costs first, there is a distinct tendency for those regions with higher 
levels of labour productivity to substitute more infrastructure input for labour inputs. 
Areas with high labour productivity tend to be associated with high negative elasticities 
for labour. A plausible explanation is that in remote locations the opportunities for 
externalising parts of the production process are small. Add extra infrastructure and the 
possibilities are raised and if taken up might possibly lead to labour shedding. Much the 
same can be said for intermediate private inputs into the production process, Conversely, 
there is a tendency for those regions with higher levels of capital productivity to benefit 
more, in terms of the leverage of private capital, from an additional unit of infrastructure 
investment. High capital productivity is associated with high positive elasticities for 
capital.
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The analysis for the sectoral panel of Greek manufacturing sectors has produced 
results that are in some ways contradictory, and in others complementary, to those 
obtained by the regional panel. First, the empirical findings from the sectoral analysis 
confirm that infrastructure capital reduces the costs of manufacturing. In the sectoral 
analysis it is not only the productive infrastructure that plays a significant role in cost 
reduction, but also the social dimension of public capital. In fact, the latter appears to 
have a larger impact than the former. It has to be remembered that at the regional level 
social infrastructure has no significant impact.
The sectoral ranking according to the various measures used in this analysis do 
not seem to follow a pattern in the same way that the values of simple factor productivity 
accord with the input demand elasticities (with respect to public infrastructure) obtained 
regionally.
Another point of difference between the sectoral and regional results concerns the 
actual magnitudes of the estimated measures. The average cost elasticity with respect to 
productive infrastructure, for instance, in the regional panel estimation is much smaller 
than the respective measure for the sectoral panel. What appears, however, to be most 
problematic between the two panels is the difference in direction of the relationship 
between productive infrastructure and private capital and intermediate inputs. In the 
regional panel the overall effect (measured by the private input demand elasticities) of 
public capital shows that it is a substitute for intermediate inputs and a complement for 
the private capital. These two relationships are exactly opposite in the case of the sectoral 
panel. A point of stability in these two analyses is that public infrastructure appears to be 
a substitute for labour input (saving labour).
The potential source of these discrepancies is the different nature of the two 
panels. Even though both refer to large-scale industry, the information contained in each 
panel is different. The regional panel contains the regional differences of total 
manufacturing, without uncovering the sectoral dimension, while the sectoral panel lacks 
the regional dimension. There is, however, a most important difference concerning the 
way in which public infrastructure ‘enters’ into the two panels. In the regional panel there 
is rich information about prefectural differences in infrastructure levels, as in every 
regional unit there corresponds a different regional stock of public capital. In the sectoral
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panel each sectoral unit ‘faces’ the same national stock of infrastructure. It is obvious that 
in an ideal world the NSSG should provide a regional breakdown for the sectoral data 
(such data are available for many other countries). Unfortunately, the metropolitan area of 
Athens is the only spatial unit for which such data are available. Thus, logically, the next 
step was to estimate infrastructure impact on the manufacturing sectors in the Athens 
area.
In the Athens region the productive category seems to play no great role in the 
cost structure of manufacturing. The social category’s impact, too, is smaller than the 
same respective effect at the national level. The relationships between social 
infrastructure and private inputs are similar to the respective relationships at national 
level. If the Athens area is expected, a priori, to provide a different environment for 
private sector companies due to agglomeration economies, it is interesting to see how 
public capital affects manufacturing sectors elsewhere in the country.
The results obtained for the Rest of Greece, as expected, reflect the sectoral panel 
results at national level, if the results for the area of Athens are taken into consideration. 
Thus, both the productive and social categories seem to have a significant impact on the 
cost structure of this residual region’s manufacturing. The magnitude of this impact is 
higher for both categories than at the national level regardless of the measure used. This 
also means that the direction of infrastructure relationship with the private inputs is 
similar to that of the national level.
The bigger effects discovered for infrastructure categories in the Rest of Greece 
compared to the lesser impact on the more advanced economy of the metropolitan area of 
Athens, is, probably, an indication that public capital has a more significant effect on 
economies at an intermediate stage of development. This point may help to explain some 
of the differences between the results of the regional panel on the one hand, and the three 
sectoral panels on the other.
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Chapter 6
Public Capital, Scale Economies, and Returns to 
Variety: Investigating Alternative Channels o f 
Infrastructure Effects at Different Spatial Levels
6.1 Introduction
The recent resurgence of infrastructure research has basically used production and 
cost function analytical frameworks. The empirical results obtained by these approaches 
have given some indications as to the relationship between the public infrastructure and 
economic and regional growth, even though the direction of this relation still remains 
somewhat unclear in some cases (see chapter 2 for a more extensive presentation of the 
theoretical debate). More recently a different way analysing this relationship has been 
formulated that basically involves the construction of economic models incorporating 
public capital as one of their basic parameters.
Several such models have been proposed with the objective of combining 
infrastructure research with dynamic growth modelling. Barro and Sala-i-Martin have 
used the production function approach, as well as attempting to model the impact of 
infrastructure on different economic growth rates. Their overall conclusion was that 
public capital could well have a positive effect on the growth process (Barro 1990, and 
Barro and Sala-i-Martin 1992). Similar to these models is that presented by Alogoskoufis 
and Kalyvitis (1996), the main difference being that these authors did not assume that the 
economy achieves a new steady growth rate1 immediately.
1 For an introductory analysis of the term ‘steady growth rate’ see Jones (1998) or Mankiw (1997).
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Holtz-Eakin and Schwartz (1994), also using a neoclassical growth model for the 
(48 contiguous) US states, concluded that infrastructure does not play “an important 
quantitative role in the explaining the growth patterns o f the states” (p. 20). However, 
they noted that their results must be viewed with the caveat that the model does not allow 
for any interaction between public capital and private investment incentives. Erenburg 
(1993), on the other hand, using a rational expectations model, concluded that the 
relationship between the investment behaviour of private and public sector in the United 
States was positive.
All the aforementioned models have shed some light on the mechanisms by which 
public capital transmits its effects to the economy of the private sector. Some of them are 
at a totally theoretical level. Others have been used for empirical research. However, it 
has not been possible to use any of them to analyse the different spatial levels of the 
Greek economy due to the existing data limitations. Instead, a complete model of a small 
open economy is has been used here which incorporates public infrastructure capital, and 
is similar to that presented by Holtz-Eakin and Lovely (1996). Section 2 of this chapter 
offers the theoretical construction and assumptions of the model.
Following this, the next part presents the empirical results for the different sectors 
and spatial levels of the Greek economy. These results can be classified under two major 
headings. First, the findings for the non-manufacturing sector of the economy are 
provided. More specifically the role of the public capital in impacting upon the regional 
Gross Domestic Product (GDP) and its sub-categories, has been analysed with the use of 
quasi-production functions.
Secondly, the results for the manufacturing sector of the economy are presented. 
The Holtz-Eakin and Lovely model delineates two channels by which infrastructure 
affects the secondary sector: one by altering the scale of production (and subsequently the 
level of total manufacturing output), and the other by affecting the equilibrium number of 
manufacturing establishments, perhaps better described by the phrase ‘returns to variety’. 
There are again four different spatial levels for the empirical investigation of the Greek 
case. The first refers to a regional panel based on the Greek prefectures, though, at this 
level there is no sectoral breakdown. The second is that of a sectoral breakdown for
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Greece as a whole. Third, is the sectoral breakdown for the metropolitan area of Athens. 
The findings for Athens are then compared to those obtained in the fourth and last level 
that represents the sectoral breakdown for manufacturing in the Rest of Greece.
The final part of this chapter draws some basic conclusions from the empirical 
analysis based on the modelling. These results are then compared to those of the Holtz- 
Eakin and Lovely paper for the US economy, and have been also used to put this analysis 
in perspective. More particularly, the results for the infrastructure’s impact on a number 
of establishments are compared to recent findings and research.
6.2 Scale economies, returns to variety, and public capital
One of the most important recent models used in public capital research was that 
constructed by Holtz-Eakin and Lovely (1996). There follows a concise presentation of 
this model, which has been the basis for the empirical analysis for the Greek case. It has 
to be noted that the origin of the model can be attributed to the research by Ethier (1979, 
1982). The economy of the model is sketched as a small, open one, with two sectors, one 
producing consumption goods (‘wheat’ in the Holtz-Eakin and Lovely terminology2) and 
the other finished manufactured goods (‘manufactures’ as they call them). In this 
economy there are two production inputs (factors of production), labour and capital3.
In the model, consumption goods are produced by firms that operate under perfect 
competition. The perfect competition framework implies constant returns to scale (in the 
use of the two production inputs). The model ascribes a sector for the production of 
intermediate goods (‘components’ as they are termed. These intermediates are necessary 
for the production of the final goods of the manufacturing sector. It is hypothesised again 
that the intermediate goods sector is operating under perfect competition.
The two production factors, labour and private capital, can be used either for the 
production of consumption goods (W), or for the production of ‘factor bundles’ (m). The 
latter are used as inputs for the production of the intermediate goods. It is assumed that
2 Here, some of the terminology is different to that of Holtz-Eakin and Lovely.
3 This model can easily extended for the case of three production inputs, private capital, labour, and land (see 
Holtz-Eakin and Lovely (1996), footnote 6)._______ __________________________________________
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there is the following transformation function4 for the economy (as the quantities of the 
production factors are given):
W = f{ni) (6.1)
In the Holtz-Eakin and Lovely model consumption goods (wheat) are used as 
numeraire (p. 108). As consumption goods and factor bundles are produced and sold 
under conditions of perfect competition, their relative price will be:
(6.2)
This comprises the opportunity cost for the production of factor bundles.
As was mentioned earlier, factor bundles are used for the production of 
intermediate goods. Intermediate goods, in turn, are used for the production of the final 
goods of the manufacturing sector, in a manner described by the following production 
function:
M  = na
“T ni=1
(6.3)
where xt is the input of intermediate good / into the production of final goods of the 
manufacturing sector, M. It is supposed that there are rt varieties of intermediate goods in 
the model economy. Parameter a  is a measure of economies of scale with respect to the
4 The ‘transformation function’ is a description of the technologically efficient plans (of the particular 
economy), or, equivalently, this function picks out the maximal vectors of net outputs (Varian 1992). 
Equation 6.1 may be represented by a production possibilities frontier, which is convex to the origin. This 
implies that the first derivative of equation 6.1 is f '(m) < 0 , and the second derivative is f  ff(m) < 0 (see, 
for this point, Holtz-Eakin and Lovely (1996), p. 108, and for the convexity of transformation functions in a 
multioutput context refer to Chambers (1988), pp. 260-261).____________________________________
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range of intermediate goods (a>  1 denotes increasing returns to variety). Parameter fi is a 
measure of the degree of differentiation between any pair of intermediate goods, as it has 
been assumed that they are imperfect substitutes5. Higher (lower) values of /? denote less 
(more) differentiation among the intermediate goods. Holtz-Eakin and Lovely pointed out 
that ‘intermediate goods’ (components in their terminology) have been interpreted in 
different ways in the existing examples of similar economic modelling6. In any case, the 
crucial point is that the final goods production process is dependent on a wide variety of 
specialised services and goods (see for this point Holtz-Eakin and Lovely 1996, p. 109). 
They assumed that all varieties of intermediate goods have identical production 
technologies, and argue that “since each variety enters symmetrically into the production 
offinished manufactures, in equilibrium an identical quantity, x0, will be supplied o f each 
variety” (ibid.). Under this assumption, 6.3 will become:
M  -  naxr (6.4)
It is obvious from this last equation that the final goods of the manufacturing 
sector are linearly homogeneous in input x0, and homogeneous to degree a in n. It is 
assumed that there are many competitive firms which produce final goods using the 
intermediate factor bundles. For this reason Holtz-Eakin and Lovely (1996, p. 109) argue 
that “each o f [these firms] takes n as given” and, more crucially, that the n varieties of 
intermediate goods can be viewed as an index of the range of economic activity in an 
economy. Higher values for n, in this context, indicate a more dynamic economy.
An increase of the public infrastructure can raise x07. But even in cases where 
there is no such increase, there is the possibility of an indirect increase of productivity, as 
there is the possibility that a change of infrastructure capacity can increase the number of 
n (therefore, the range of economic activity).
5 The elasticity of substitution between any pair of intermediate goods is 1/(1 -0).
6 See, for instance, Holtz-Eakin and Lovely’s own interpretation (1996), Ethier’s (1982) as specialised 
intermediate inputs, or Markusen’s (1989) as producer services.
7 This case corresponds to the increases in productivity usually considered with production and cost function 
analyses.____________________________________________________________________________
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There are several other assumptions for the model used here. It is assumed that 
unlimited quantities of consumption and finished manufactured goods can be traded at Pm 
price. In the Holtz-Eakin and Lovely model it is assumed that intermediate goods are not 
tradeable8. It is also assumed that the producers of intermediate goods behave as 
monopolistic competitors (n is adequately large and there is free entry into this sector of 
the economy).
Each variety of intermediate goods (x) is produced by factor bundles, under the 
relationship ax+b, where a, b > 0. A certainpart of the necessary factor bundles in the 
economy, such as road networks, sewage systems, etc, can be provided by the public 
sector. This will save private resources that would, otherwise, have been directed to the 
production of this infrastructure.
As Holtz-Eakin and Lovely point out, public infrastructure can decrease either 
fixed or variable costs, or both. If F  is the reduction in fixed costs, and v the reduction in 
variable costs, then the production of x units of any variety of intermediate goods would 
require the use of a quantity of factor bundles given by:
Q(x) = (a -  v)x + b -  F  (6.5)
The private cost of these factor bundles will be:
Cft,=Pm(.(a-v)x + b - F ) (6.6)
The marginal private cost for the intermediate goods producers will be:
8 This assumption is important for spatial analysis. Ethier (1979,1982) assumed that intermediate goods can 
be traded. However, Markusen (1991) and Holtz-Eakin and Lovely (1996) presumed that intermediate 
goods (and services) that contribute to the manufacturing sector are unique to the local economy.
Thus, finished manufactured goods are “assembled from intermediate goods and services produced
exclusively in the home jurisdiction” (Holtz-Eakin and Lovely 1996, p. 110)._________________________
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MPC = Pm{a -v )  (6.7)
and the marginal revenue will be9:
MR = $PC (6.8)
where,
Pc is the price of each intermediate good.
This price can be expressed in the terms of the Pm numeraire. As the producers of 
intermediate goods will equate their marginal cost to their marginal revenue, Pc will be:
Pc = P m ( p  V)' [as P J a - v )  = PPJ (6.9)
The equation for the profit of each intermediate goods producer will be:
n  = pcx0 - pm((a - VK  + b - F )  (6.10)
In equilibrium there will be free entry and exit of producers, and the profit ;rwill be equal 
to zero. Equating equation 6.10 to zero and replacing Pc with the right hand side of 
equation 6.9, equation 6.10 will be:
9 For the derivation of this marginal revenue, see Holtz-Eakin and Lovely (1996), footnote 9.____________
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Pm(a V)x0- P m((a-v)x0+ b - F )  = 0 (6.11)
Rearranging equation 6.11 means that:
_ E - £ 1 _
( l - P ) ( a - v )
Equation 6.12 can be interpreted as follows. As x0 is increasing in /?, the more a 
variety of intermediate goods can be substituted from other varieties, the more each firm 
will produce that particular variety.
In this model the demand for factor bundles comes from the producers of 
intermediate goods and the public sector (for the creation of the infrastructure stock). 
There are two extreme possibilities regarding the nature of the public capital. One 
possibility is for it to be a pure public good. Such goods are not excludable and non-rival, 
i.e. “people cannot excluded from consuming them... and one person's consumption does 
not reduce the amount available to other consumers” (Varian 1992, p. 414). Another 
possibility is for it to be a public sector good that is little different from those produced in 
the private sector (in this case the goods are ordinary, that is both excludable and rival)10.
Holtz-Eakin and Lovely, in order to capture the whole range of possibilities 
(including the two extremes), sketched the total demand for factor bundles as:
m = n((a -  v)x0 + b -  F) + ri1 (vx0 + F) (6.13)
In the above equation it is parameter /tha t denotes the nature of infrastructure. If / =  0, v 
and F  are pure public goods. If /=  1, v and F  are pure private goods.
10 There can be many in between cases. On such intermediate type are the ‘club’ goods (nonrival, but
excludable [see Varian 1992, p. 415])._______________________________________________________________
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The supply price of the finished manufactured goods must be equal to Pm (prices 
are measured in terms of wheat)11. The profits in the sector of the economy where the 
intermediate goods are assembled into final manufactured goods will be zero. This means 
that:
PmM  -  P x0tn c vn (6.14)
The above relationship can be transformed, with the use of equation 6.4, to become:
P. = nl~°R (6.15)
It is apparent from the last equation that an increase in n will have, as a result, an 
increase in productivity, and subsequently a decrease in the supply price of finished 
manufactured goods. An increase of Pc, will have the opposite effect - that is it will 
increase Pm.
Holtz-Eakin and Lovely asked the question, what would be the effects of an 
increase of public capital in the context of this particular model. The system of basic 
equations of the model (equations 6.9, 6.12, 6.13, and 6.15) can be used for the purpose 
of answering this question.
An increase in public capital would have, as a result, a change in the cost structure 
of intermediate goods (by changing the preferred levels of output). Equation 6.16 can be 
derived from equation 6.12 by total differentiation:
11 As is usually the norm in economic modelling, a good (in this case wheat) ‘plays’ the role o f  money, and 
the prices for the other goods are calculated on the basis o f how many units o f  wheat can be bartered for one 
unit o f  the particular good in question.
12 It has to  be noted that Holtz-Eakin and Lovely, in order to clarify the effects o f an infrastructure increase, 
abstracted “from issues o f distortionary-tax financing and assumed that government spending is funded by 
lump-sum taxation o f households” (Holtz-Eakin and Lovely 1996, p. 111)._______________________________
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(6.16)
A  _  p A
xo  ------- F-\-------
b - F  a - v
- v  = - 8 f  F+ 8 v v
where,
the symbol {A} denotes proportional changes.
Equation 6.16 shows that increases in F  will reduce x0, and increases of v will raise x0. 
Similarly, total differentiation of the other basic equations (equation 6.9, 6.13, and 6.15) 
provides that:
A  A
Pc =£,m- 8vv (6.17)
and
A A A
m = tynn+ <j>x (J)v v- <()F F  (6.18)
[where, ^  = M(a-v)xQ + b -  F) + y ^  (vXo + F)  (6.19)
m
n({a -  v ) jc0 + nyvx0)
m
m
m
(6.20)
(6 .22)]
Pm = ( \ - a ) n + P c =0 (6.23)
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Equation 6.17 shows the changes in the price of intermediate goods as a result of 
a change of public capital provision (the subsidy to variable costs, v). This equation also 
shows that Pc is affected by changes in m (factor bundles). Holtz-Eakin and Lovely 
argued that if resources are withdrawn from the production of consumption goods (the
A
case where m> 0), then the price of factor bundles will rise. The magnitude of this 
increase depends on the curvature of the production possibility frontier, £ (see Holtz- 
Eakin and Lovely, p. 112).
The changes in the demand for factor bundles are given by equation 6.18. It is 
clear from this equation that there are three sources of such changes. One results from 
changes in the number of intermediate goods producers (shown by the first term of the 
right-hand side of equation 6.18). Another source is changes of the production level of 
these producers (shown by the second term). Finally, government purchases can affect the 
demand for factor bundles (shown by the third and fourth terms).
Equation 6.23, which closes the system, shows the external price constraint on the 
supply price of finished manufactured goods. As this equation demonstrates, an increase 
(decrease) in the number [varieties] of intermediate goods will decrease (increase) the 
supply price (if a > 1). This change must be offset by the positive (negative) effect in the 
price of the intermediate goods.
Holtz-Eakin and Lovely, using this theoretical model, studied the effects of 
changes in public capital on the level of output and productivity in equilibrium. They first 
examined changes in that part of infrastructure that decreases fixed costs (that is, F). If 
the system of equations 6.16, 6.17, 6.18, and 6.23 is solved, it is possible to derive the 
proportionate changes in the price of intermediate goods, the demand for factor bundles, 
and the number of intermediate goods. These changes are given in equations 6.24, 6.25, 
and 6.26 respectively:
A
A
F
( a -!)£(<!> A r  +(M
D
>0 (6.24)
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A
m  _  +<|)F )  ^ Q (6.25)
A DF
A
n _ + §f ) > q
F ~  D
(6.26)
where,
The provision of public capital attracts production factors into the production 
process of intermediate goods. This has, as a consequence, an increase in the marginal 
cost of factor bundles (in terms of consumption goods). The producers of intermediate 
goods would pass on this cost, ceteris paribus, but only to the extent of their market 
power and in terms of a mark-up percentage). Holtz-Eakin and Lovely observed that “an 
increase in component prices must be accompanied by an expansion in varieties i f  the 
economy is to retain a competitor in finished manufactures” (Holtz-Eakin and Lovely 
1996, p. 113). Due to the mark-up, the intermediate goods industry will have profits at the 
initial phase of the economy (the phase with n varieties). These profits will generate entry 
of new firms into the sector producing intermediate goods. As Holtz-Eakin and Lovely 
argue “an increase in public infrastructure increases the number o f component producers 
and enhances any external economies o f the finished manufactures industry” (ibid.).
13 This condition is necessary in order to have a positive price-output relation for the manufacturing sector. 
This assumption restricts the analysis to the concave part o f the production frontier for the consumption and 
manufactured goods (for further analysis, see Holtz-Eakin and Lovely 1996, footnote 11).________________
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From equation 6.4 the proportionate change in finished manufactured goods is:
A  A  A
M  = an+ xo (6.27)
An increase in the number of the firms producing intermediate goods does not 
ensure an expansion of the sector producing manufactured goods. It can also be seen in 
equation 6.16 that a public capital increase which reduces the fixed costs (F) will 
decrease the level of output of the manufacturing sector that is maximising profits. If the
A  A
solutions for n and x0 are substituted in the above equation, the effect of F  on the 
manufacturing sector can be derived as:
M  480 H>, -  4>„) + <4<t>F + (a -  l)8p ,62g,
F  D
The sign of the numerator of the right-hand side of equation 6.28 depends on the sign of 
quantity atyx -(J)w (as all the other terms are positive). If this quantity is positive then
A
M  will be positive. This will be the case if:
( a - l ) >  — & (6.29)14
As Holtz-Eakin and Lovely helpfully point out “the left-hand side o f this equation is the 
rate at which the economy realizes returns to variety (see Ethier, 1982) while the right- 
hand side is a measure o f the firms' market power: the percentage mark-up over 
marginal cost. I f  the return to variety dominates the ability offirms to capture the returns
14 For the derivation of this equation, see Holtz-Eakin and Lovely (1996), p. 114.
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to restricting output M  will rise. Alternatively, i f  firms have sufficient market power to 
enforce greater mark-ups, the contraction o f x0 will dominate and M  will fall ” (Holtz- 
Eakin and Lovely 1996, p. 114).
In summary, it can be argued that changes in the provision of public capital can 
affect the economy in different ways depending, on the one hand, upon market structure, 
and, on the other, on technological factors.
Holtz-Eakin and Lovely argue that infrastructure changes do not affect the 
economy only by reducing the fixed costs (F), but also by reducing the variable costs (v). 
For the study of the effects of the latter they reproduced the aforementioned analysis for 
v. These effects are given by the following set of equations:
(6.30)
D
(6.31)
6  v - < l > v ) - S v )
D
(6.32)
Equation 6.30, 6.31, and 6.32 give the effects of the price of intermediate goods, factor 
bundles used in the production process of manufactured goods, and the variety of 
intermediate goods, respectively. It has to be emphasised that all these expressions can be 
either > 0, or = 0, or < 0.
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Generally speaking, as these equations show, the net effects of the reduction of 
variable costs, due to an increase of public capital, are not too clear15. This can be seen in 
the following equation, which is the counterpart for variable costs of equation 6.28:
M  _ aej»v +8V - s 8 v(gfrv - f r ,)
D
This equation can be either > 0, or = 0, or < 0. The sufficient condition in order to have 
M  > 0 is that a$x — <|>w < 0 16.
Holtz-Eakin and Lovely concluded that, in this model’s context, the effects of public 
capital on the manufacturing sector “are far from direct and clear-cut. Reductions in 
fixed costs will have far different effects than reduction in variable cost, and the effects o f  
the latter are quite complex” (Holtz-Eakin and Lovely 1996, p. 115).
Similar were their results for the impact of infrastructure on the consumption 
goods sector. The production of consumption goods would increase (decrease) due to the 
release (acquirement) of factor bundles from the manufacturing sector. Equations 6.25 
and 6.31 show that if fixed costs (F) are increased, then the volume of consumption 
goods will drop. In contrast, an increase of variable costs (v) would have results that are 
unclear.
15 See Holtz-Eakin and Lovely (1996), p 114-115, for an analysis of these ambiguities.
16 Holtz-Eakin and Lovely (1996) point out that this is exactly the opposite of the sufficient condition fori7.
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6.3 Infrastructural impacts on the non-manufacturing 
sector o f the Greek economy
As already mentioned, Holtz-Eakin has written extensively on how infrastructure 
affects the productivity of the private sector (Holtz-Eakin 1992a, 1993a, and Holtz-Eakin 
and Schwartz 1995) He was also one of the prominent figures in the camp advocating that 
public capital does not have any significant impact on private output. However, all this 
body of work was restricted to the investigation of this single potential ‘channel’ of 
influence (the direct impact via a production function) between infrastructure and 
development.
Holtz-Eakin and Lovely (1996) in contrast have used the theoretical model 
presented in the previous section for the study of potentially alternative channels of 
influence in the relationship. Namely, they calibrate their model for the examination of 
infrastructure effects on the consumption goods sector (as the majority of the existing 
empirical research has studied the effects on the manufacturing sector), as well as on of 
how public capital affects the range of varieties (the range of intermediate goods). For the 
study of the latter they used the number of manufacturing establishments as a proxy.
The following analysis tries to utilise the theoretical model of Holtz-Eakin and 
Lovely for the investigation of such alternative channels in the Greek context, placing 
special emphasis on the spatial dimension. However, there are significant obstacles in 
undertaking this task, due to limitations of the available data, both at the regional and the 
national level.
This section assesses the impact of infrastructure on the non-manufacturing 
sector, which includes both the primary and tertiary sectors. In the next section the 
analysis focuses on the manufacturing sector of the economy and investigates the role of 
public capital on the increase or decrease of varieties, using the number of establishments 
as a proxy for the latter.
Even though there is now a small body of work on the results of public capital on 
the industrial sector of Greek economy (see Dalamagas 1995, Rovolis and Spence 1995, 
1997a, 1997b, 1998, Segoura and Christodoulakis 1997) there is a notable absence (here
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as elsewhere) of research regarding effects on the non-manufacturing sector. The main 
reason for this is the absence of some key data regarding private capital investment and 
employment in sectors other than manufacturing. Thus, the application of production 
function analysis, not to mention the more data demanding cost function approach, seems 
impossible in this important part of the economy. However, there is an alternative 
approach, such as the use of quasi-production functions, which can give some indication 
for the impact of public capital.
Quasi-production functions have already been used in infrastructure research. In 
fact one of the most significant pieces of research at the regional level - the Biehl report 
(1986) for the EU - has used this approach extensively. However, here a slightly different 
implementation of quasi-production functions has been followed (forced upon by the data 
limitations), which in no small measure follows and develops upon that of Cutanda and 
Paricio (1994). These authors, interested in the relationship between public capital and 
regional economic growth in Spain, estimated a function of the type:
Yt =a + bxEi + b2I i + e (6.35)
where:
Y, is the per capita regional income, 
Ei the employment rate in industry, 
/, an infrastructure indicator, 
and e the error term.
One of the problems with the empirical analysis of Cutanda and Paricio is that, 
due to their data limitations, the time dimension they used is restricted to a specific point 
in time. It is, effectively, a cross sectional analysis.
Here for Greece, a panel data model is used in order to provide the necessary 
information for both the time and spatial dimensions. More particularly, data for 49 
prefectures of Greece were used for the period 1982 to 1991. The prefectures vector is
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derived from the official Greek prefectures (NUTS HI according to the EU classification). 
However, the industrial data for employment, which are used in the analysis, imposed 
several limitations. Thus, as a result, it proved necessary to exclude Lefkada, where there 
was no industrial activity during the period, and to add the statistics for Kephalonia to 
those of the adjacent prefecture of Zakynthos (for a more extensive analysis, see chapter 
4). The data for infrastructure have been purged of purely accounting expenditures 
(represented by Miscellaneous and Administrative Expenditures sub-categories) and what 
remains is pure investment in the public capital (as in previous chapters). The various 
categories of public capital expenditure have been again classified into the two important 
components of ‘productive’ and ‘social’ infrastructure. Total infrastructure investment is 
the sum of these two categories. The infrastructure capital stocks have been estimated 
with the way described in chapter 4, and the public capital variable always refers to the 
previous year (lagged one year).
The output data comprise the regional Gross Domestic Product (GDP). These data 
were provided by the National Statistical Service of Greece (NSSG) and are supplied with 
a breakdown into the various sub-categories which comprise the regional GDP. These are 
Agriculture-Farming-Forestry-Fishery (henceforth Agriculture), Mines, Electricity- 
Lighting-Water Companies (henceforth Electricity), Constructions, Transportation- 
Telecommunications (henceforth Transportation), Commerce, Banking-Insurance-Land 
Estate sectors (henceforth Banking), Housing, Public Administration, Health-Education 
(henceforth Health), Services (which includes various categories of services), and 
Manufacturing. As the impact of public capital on the latter has been analysed in detail in 
chapters 4 and 5, the following analysis focuses only on the infrastructure effects on the 
other categories of regional GDP.
It has to be noted that all the quasi-production functions of this section, as well as 
the analysis regarding the returns of variety for the manufacturing sector (next section), 
have been formulated with regional specific effects and a time trend. These are least 
squares dummy variable models (LSDV), similar to those described in chapter 4. This 
means that the error term of equation 6.35 should be written as:
227
ALTERNATIVE CHANNELS OF INFRASTRUCTURE EFFECTS
eit= A + vi (6.36)
where:
Hi is the unobservable regional specific effect, and vit is the remainder disturbance (for a 
further analysis of how the dummy variables, which capture these regional specific 
effects, are organised see chapter 4, section 4.4). However, the results for these dummy 
variables are not reported here due to space limitations. Thus, the panel of data used in 
this analysis has an N  regional dimension, and a T time dimension.
There are three tables of results regarding the effects of public capital on the non­
manufacturing sector. Table 6.1 presents the findings for the total of infrastructure taken 
as a whole, table 6.2 examines only the productive part of public capital, and table 6.3 the 
social component.
In all these tables a Hausman specification test has been performed. This test can 
demonstrate if the hypothesis of the exogeneity public capital is valid or not. Usually the 
question of whether infrastructure investment in a specific geographical area is 
exogenous or not, is circumvented in empirical work. A potential theoretical justification 
for this could be that public investment has been decided on by a central state 
mechanism, without any relation to the regional output. Another reason could be the fact 
that when the effects of infrastructure on the output of the secondary sector of the 
economy are examined, the latter can constitute only a rather small part of the regional 
economy (when the primary and/or the tertiary sectors are the most significant). However, 
in the case where the whole regional GDP is the dependent variable, there is a strong 
possibility that GDP disparities are the source of public capital disparities.
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The way in which the Hausman specification test is conducted can be found in 
most econometrics texts17. In a nutshell, the test principle is that the regressor (of an 
original regression), which is to be tested for exogeneity, should be used in an auxiliary 
regression as the dependent variable, in which the other regressors (of the original 
regression) are the explanatory variables. The residuals of this auxiliary regression are 
then used as another regressor in the original regression. If the coefficient of the residuals 
in this augmented regression is statistically significant, then there is a simultaneity 
problem.
The first column of Table 6.1, which deals with the total public capital stock, 
refers to the regional GDP categories, which are the dependent variables for the 
respective regressions. The second column gives the estimates for the constant term, the 
third for the labour input (which refers to the employment of the manufacturing sector), 
the fourth for the infrastructure variable, and the fifth for the time trend. The next three
columns give the usual measures of the regressions, the adjusted R square, the error sum
1 $2squares, and the standard error of the regression, respectively . The last column presents, 
under the h heading, the results for the Hausman specification test of the augmented 
regression (however, the rest of the results refer to the original regression). As mentioned 
above, the results for the dummy variables are not reported on here. The ‘total’ row gives 
the results for the sum of regional GDP categories (including total manufacturing). The 
infrastructure coefficient appears to be small in magnitude (0.036) and statistically 
insignificant. The h statistic shows that the hypothesis of exogeneity for public capital 
cannot be rejected. Some of the categories of regional GDP seem to have large 
infrastructure coefficients, which are also statistically significant. These are the 
Agriculture, Banking, Housing, Public Administration, Services, and to some extent the 
Health GDP categories. The signs of these coefficients in some cases is negative 
(Agriculture, Health, and Housing). However, for all the cases where the infrastructure 
variable appears to be statistically significant the h statistic shows that the hypothesis of 
exogeneity for public capital must be rejected. Thus, the overall conclusion from this
17 See for instance Bemdt 1991, pp. 379-380, Cujarati 1995 pp. 670-673, or the original paper of Hausman 
(1976), and Nakamura and Nakamura paper (1981)). For the application of the test in a panel data analysis 
context, see, for instance, Baltagi 1995, pp. 68-73).
18 These measures are from the formulation with a constant term and n-1 dummy variables.______________
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table is that the infrastructure variable does not seem to have an impact on regional GDP, 
and this is inferred from the results for the aggregate GDP category and for the individual 
sub-categories.
Table 6.1 The effect o f total public capital (G total) on the GDP of the non-manufacturing sectors
o f Greece, 1982-1991
E^iatioi^ OT^e^agita^egiOTiaHncatn^(ln^
GDP
Category
Constant InL lnG(total) time
trend
Adjust
R2
SSE SE h
TOTAL 20.671
(41.217)***
0.031
(2.009)**
0.036
(1.427)
0.017
(5.385)***
0.995 1.832 0.065 0.036
(1.426)
AGR 22.938
(18.171)***
0.073
(1.849)*
-0.154
(-2.404)**
0.024
(3.121)***
0.959 11.606 0.163 -0.154
(-2.400)**
BANK 9.524
(6.655)***
-0.079
(-1.780)*
0.420
(5.801)***
0.029
(3.266)***
0.961 14.917 0.185 0.420
(5.776)***
COMMER 18.209
(23.725)***
0.035
(1.456)
0.048
(1.245)
0.016
(3.294)***
0.989 4.291 0.099 0.048
(1.245)
CONSTR 19.507
(25.886)***
-0.002
(-0.084)
-0.010
(-0.267)
0.029
(6.131)***
0.983 4.136 0.097 -0.010
(-0.267)
HEALTH 19.279
(32.225)***
0.030
(1.635)
-0.057
(-1.877)*
0.063
(17.027)***
0.993 2.607 0.077 -0.057
(-1.878)*
HOUS 24.744
(17.600)***
0.089
(2.024)**
-0.333
(-4.681)***
0.074
(8.442)***
0.960 14.396 0.181 -0.333
(-4.681)***
MINES 36.836
(2.576)**
-0.322
(-0.724)
-0.906
(-1.252)
0.004
(0.043)
0.769 1489.66 1.844 -0.906
(-1.253)
PADMIN 14.916
(11.565)***
0.025
(0.615)
0.190
(2.910)***
0.022
(2.764)***
0.968 12.116 0.166 0.190
(2.913)***
SERV 11.686
(13.855)***
0.041
(1.547)
0.365
(8.556)***
0.003
(0.636)
0.988 5.182 0.109 0.365
(8.545)***
TRANSP 18.336
(44.261)***
0.038
(2.952)***
0.034
(1.639)
0.002
(0.854)
0.997 1.250 0.053 0.034
(1.626)
Note: /-statistics in parentheses (and henceforth in all tables)
•♦•Statistically significant at 1% level **Statistically significant at 5% level • Statistically significant at 10% level
In tables 6.2 and 6.3 the total infrastructure variable has been replaced by its 
productive and social components. The regional GDP categories, as well as the regression 
tests remain the same. Table 6.2 gives a similar picture to that of table 6.1. The 
magnitude of the coefficient for public capital, in the regression where the dependent 
variable is the total regional GDP, is small (0.031) and statistically insignificant. Again
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the coefficients for public capital are statistically significant, although with different 
signs, in cases where the GDP sub-categories, Agriculture, Banking, Housing, Public 
Administration, Services, Health were used as the dependent variable. In all these cases 
the Hausman specification tests indicated that the infrastructure variable is probably 
endogenous.
Table 6.2 The effect of productive public capital (G productive) on the GDP of the non­
manufacturing sectors of Greece, 1982-1991
^^u^tior^br^g^x^ita^egionaHncome^n)
GDP
Category
Constant InL lnG(prod) time
trend
Adjust.
R2
SSE SE h
TOTAL 20.785
(49.519)***
0.032
(2.053)**
0.031
(1.440)
0.017
(5.756)***
0.995 1.832 0.065 0.031
(1.438)
AGR 22.037
(20.818)***
0.069
(1.750)*
-0.108
(-2.016)**
0.021
(2.787)***
0.959 11.651 0.163 -0.108
(-2.013)**
BANK 11.014
(9.185)***
-0.072
(-1.615)
0.346
(5.699)***
0.033
(3.874)***
0.961 14.954 0.185 0.346
(5.680)***
COMMER 18.406
(28.648)***
0.036
(1.500)
0.039
(1.185)
0.016
(3.606)***
0.989 4.292 0.099 0.039
(1.185)
CONSTR 19.551
(31.002)***
-0.002
(-0.080)
-0.013
(-0.393)
0.029
(6.575)***
0.983 4.135 0.097 -0.013
(-0.394)
HEALTH 19.120
(38.193)***
0.030
(1.594)
-0.049
(-1.932)*
0.063
(17.919)***
0.993 2.606 0.077 -0.049
(-1.935)*
HOUS 24.084
(20.555)***
0.084
(1.943)*
-0.302
(-5.079)***
0.074
(9.027)***
0.960 14.276 0.181 -0.302
(-5.078)***
MINES 35.334
(2.953)***
-0.332
(-0.749)
-0.836
(-1.379)
0.008
(0.090)
0.769 1488.53 1.843 -0.836
(-1.379)
PADMIN 15.001
(13.948)***
0.026
(0.653)
0.187
(3.434)***
0.020
(2.619)***
0.969 12.072 0.166 0.187
(3.438)***
SERV 13.767
(19.067)***
0.050
(1.857)*
0.260
(7.116)***
0.012
(2.323)**
0.987 5.421 0.111 0.260
(7.102)***
TRANSP 18.507
(53.344)***
0.039
(3.018)***
0.026
(1.467)
0.003
(1.158)
0.997 1.252 0.053 0.026
(1-455)
•♦•Statistically significant at 1% level ••Statistically significant at 5% level *Statistically significant at 10% level
The situation is not different when the social part of infrastructure is examined. 
The results, given in table 6.3, show that for the total regional GDP the social 
infrastructure coefficient is small (0.015) and statistically insignificant. Here, only when 
the categories of Agriculture, Mines, and Services of regional GDP were used as 
regressands do the coefficients of social public capital reach high and significant levels.
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Nevertheless, as in the two previous tables, the Hausman specification test suggests that 
there is a concern for the problem of public capital endogeneity.
Table 6.3 The effect of social public capital (G social) on the GDP of the non-manufacturing
sectors of Greece, 1982-1991
Equation for per capital regional income (In)
GDP
Category
Constant InL InG(soc) time
trend
Adjust.
R2
SSE SE h
TOTAL 21.123
(57.333)***
0.032
(2.030)**
0.015
(0.706)
0.020
(13.978)***
0.995 1.838 0.065 0.015
(0.705)
AGR 22.382
(24.221)***
0.080
(2.029)**
-0.141
(-2.711)***
0.014
(3.759)***
0.959 11.565 0.162 -0.141
(-2.710)***
BANK 18.769
(17.255)***
-0.041
(-0.881)
-0.062
(-1.018)
0.081
(18.906)***
0.958 16.025 0.191 -0.062
(-0.985)
COMMER 19.060
(33.805)***
0.038
(1.556)
0.005
(0.164)
0.021
(9.497)***
0.989 4.306 0.099 0.005
(0.164)
CONSTR 18.679
(33.852)***
-0.008
(-0.318)
0.037
(1.175)
0.026
(11.846)***
0.983 4.124 0.097 0.037
(1.163)
HEALTH 18.298
(41.545)***
0.027
(1.450)
-0.007
(-0.291)
0.057
(32.934)***
0.993 2.627 0.077 -0.007
(-0.278)
HOUS 17.132
(16.239)***
0.056
(1.242)
0.066
(1.109)
0.032
(7.671)***
0.958 15.074 0.186 0.066
(L110)
MINES -10.870
(-1.045)
-0.617
(-1.386)
1.747
(2.981)***
-0.188
(.4.594)***
0.773 1465.27 1.829 1.747
(2.984)***
PADMIN 17.829
(18.685)***
0.032
(0.790)
0.045
(0.844)
0.042
(11.176)***
0.968 12.330 0.168 0.045
(0.841)
SERV 14.711
(23.082)***
0.035
(1.300)
0.237
(6.593)***
0.034
(13.551)***
0.987 5.502 0.112 0.237
(6.569)***
TRANSP 19.121
(62.758)***
0.041
(3.175)***
-0.007
(-0.395)
0.007
(5.441)***
0.997 1.257 0.054 -0.007
(-0.394)
*** Statistically significant at 1% level ** Statistically significant at 5% level * Statistically significant at 10% level
The overall conclusion from the analysis of the relationship of the total regional 
GDP and the total infrastructure is that the latter appears to have no significant impact on 
the former. This is also true for the productive and social categories of public capital. The 
breakdown of the regional GDP has not given any indication that infrastructure, in its 
total, productive, or social form, has a direct productive effect on the private economy 
whatever the GDP category, if the Hausman specification test results are taken into 
consideration.
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However, it has to be emphasised again that the quasi-production functions 
utilised here are severely constrained by the data limitations. It is probably the case that 
the labour input proxy of employment in the manufacturing sector is a poor measure of 
the employment activity in the specific regional unit in the Greek case. In some Greek 
prefectures the employment in the primary and tertiary sector is inversely related to that 
of secondary employment. For this reason, it could be argued that the aforementioned 
results could be viewed only as partial evidence.
The theoretical part of the Holtz-Eakin and Lovely model, however, assumes that 
public infrastructure would not have any significant impact on the non-manufacturing 
part of the economy. In fact their results for the US economy have corroborated this 
thesis. Thus, the Greek results presented in this section can be viewed as another 
confirmation of the model’s assumption, with the caveat that the quasi-production 
functions used here cannot describe accurately this specific part of the Greek economy.
6.4 Investigating Alternative Channels o f Infrastructure 
Effects at Different Spatial Levels in Greece
The direct impact of public capital on the manufacturing sector of the Greek 
economy has been extensively analysed in chapters 4 and 5, at national, regional, 
sectoral, and urban levels. However, it seems worthwhile to seek for other potential 
channels by which infrastructure can affect the private economy, perhaps in more subtle 
ways. The Holtz-Eakin and Lovely (1996) model suggests that there is a variety of such 
channels at least from a theoretical viewpoint. Their empirical work examined in depth 
two possible ways by which a change in public capital stock can affect the secondary 
sector. The first is by altering the scale of production for each manufacturing firm. The 
second is by influencing the equilibrium number of firms. Thus, their model can help to 
assess if the public infrastructure affects private manufacturing, either by changing the 
level or by altering the composition of its productive activity. These issues can be dealt 
with in turn.
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6.4.1 Public capital’s effects on the preferred scale of production
The theoretical model described in section 6.2 postulates that the number of 
varieties of intermediate goods in the economy can be used as a measure of the range of 
economic activity. The greater the number of these varieties the more dynamic is the state 
of the economy (see equation 6.4). The empirical counterpart of equation 6.4 is the 
following equation,
—  =n°-'x0 (6.37)
which has been calibrated by Holtz-Eakin and Lovely using as the left hand side variable 
the output per manufacturing establishment and the right hand side variables are the 
number of establishments (as proxy of n) and public infrastructure (changes in 
infrastructure increase x0, see section 6.2) and with the variables in logarithmic form. 
Thus, equation 6.37 becomes:
In
\  n j
= ln(na 1) + ln(x0) (6.38)
or in working form:
MIn—-  = (a -  l)ln«j7 + lnG„ +1 + uit 
nit
(6.39)
where:
Mit is the Gross Production Value of manufacturing (as a proxy of the finished 
manufactured goods) in a specific region or sector in time t,
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n the number of manufacturing establishments (as an index of the range of economic 
activity),
a the degree of homogeneity in equation 6.37,
Git the infrastructure variable, 
t is a time variable,
and eit the error term of the form eit = jLti Vit,
[where:
jUj is the unobservable regional or sectoral specific effect, 
and vit is the remainder disturbance]
A point that begs clarification is the fact that public capital in the above equation 
appears to be a pure public good. However, as Holtz-Eakin and Lovely (1996, p. 119, 
footnote 17) argue “entering public capital in per-firm units would not affect its 
coefficient. Instead, only the coefficient on the growth o f firms (and our estimate o f a) 
would be affected\
A similar formulation has been employed for the Greek case. However, here four 
different datasets were used. The first comprises information on manufacturing (large 
industry, employing more than 20 persons) for the 49 prefectures. (These data have been 
used before in chapters 4 and 5 and reference should be made there for a more extensive 
description.) It has to be remembered that these manufacturing data refer to the total of 
all industrial sectors, no sectoral breakdown being available. The analysis by Holtz-Eakin 
and Lovely has had the added luxury of regional data together with a sectoral breakdown.
There are, however, three other datasets at hand, which do have a sectoral 
dimension. The first provides a sectoral breakdown for Greece as a whole. The second 
has a similar breakdown for the metropolitan area of Athens, and the last refers to the 
Rest of Greece. The last mentioned is a derivative set of data, as it is the difference 
between that for the whole of Greece and the Athens panel (again for more details on 
these datasets see chapter 5). These data, along with the regional panel, allow analysis of 
the different channels by which public capital can affect manufacturing sector at four 
different spatial levels.
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Gross Production Value (GPV) has been used as a measure for manufacturing 
output in tables 6.4 to 6.7, in which are presented the results for the different datasets. 
Public capital has been introduced again either as total infrastructure (but excluding 
Miscellaneous and Administrative expenditures as before) or as a breakdown into 
productive and social infrastructure (again as defined previously). As in all previous cases 
where panel data analysis has been used, regional dummies were introduced into the 
regressions to capture the regional specific effects. This constitutes the Least Squares 
Dummy Variable model. This model and the organisation of the dummy variables 
designed to capture the regional effects (and similarly the sectoral effects for the sectoral 
panels) are described in section 4.4. Such an approach was also used by Holtz-Eakin and 
Lovely in their empirical calibration of the model (Holtz-Eakin et al. 1996).
The results for the regional panel, presented in table 6.4, reveal that public capital 
has a positive impact on output per firm. This impact is substantial in magnitude (0.383) 
and is also statistically significant. If total infrastructure is disaggregated into its 
productive and social components, it appears that the effect of the former is much larger 
than that of the latter. Productive public capital has a statistically significant coefficient 
of 0.352, while the respective magnitude for social infrastructure is only 0.041 and 
statistically insignificant. In all three regressions the variable representing the varieties of 
production, that is the number of manufacturing establishments, is negative and 
statistically significant. The respective coefficients for the regressions for total, 
productive and social infrastructure are -0.662, -0.654, and -0.654 respectively. This 
implies in turn, an a (as equation 6.39 shows, the estimated coefficient is actually a-1) of 
0.338,0.346, and 0.346 degree of homogeneity respectively.
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Table 6.4 Infrastructure effects on the scale of production: regional panel for total manufacturing,
1982-1991
Constant lnEstabl lnG(total) InG(prod) InG(social) time
trend
Adjust
R2
SSE SE
11.218 -0.662 0.383 -0.042 0.925 21.047 0.219
(6.608)*** (-13.920)*** (4.475)*** (-3.962)***
11.901 -0.654 0.352 -0.043 0.926 20.858 0.218
(8.461)*** (-13.849)*** (4.918)*** (-4.334)***
18.071 -0.654 0.041 0.001 0.922 21.993 0.224
(14.124)*** (-13.323)*** (0.576) (0.150)
Statistically significant at 1% level, ** Statistically significant at 5% level, * Statistically significant at 10% level
The findings for the sectoral panel of manufacturing for Greece as a whole are 
given in table, 6.5. Public capital appears to be statistically significant in all cases, and to 
have extremely high coefficients, namely 0.709 for total infrastructure, 0.655 and 0.892 
for the productive and social categories respectively. The results for the establishments 
variable are, in all three regressions of this table, negative and statistically significant. 
Actually, they are of the same magnitude (at three digit level), that is -0.557, with a 
degree of homogeneity of 0.443. The infrastructure results certainly imply that some of 
the industrial sectors are extremely sensitive to changes of public capital.
Table 6.5 Infrastructure effects on the scale of production: Greece panel for sectors, 1982-1991
D egenden^ariable^ntfO utp^
Constant lnEstabl InG(total) lnG(prod) lnGfsocial) time
trend
Adjust.
R2
SSE SE
1.041 -0.557 0.709 -0.057 0.987 2.713 0.124
(0.197) (-4.937)*** (3.382)*** (-2.849)***
2.580 -0.557 0.655 -0.057 0.987 2.713 0.124
(0.534) (-4.937)*** (3.390)*** (-2.851)***
-2.319 -0.557 0.892 -0.053 0.987 2.716 0.124
(-0.365) (-4.938)*** (3.345)*** (-2.782)***
*** Statistically significant at 1% level, ** Statistically significant at 5% level, * Statistically significant at 10% level
The sectoral results for the metropolitan area of Athens are in sharp contrast to 
those obtained for the national sectoral panel. As table 6.6 shows, none of the variables is 
statistically significant. This is also the case for total, productive and social public capital. 
Totally different is the picture for the panel as it refers to the manufacturing sectors of the 
Rest of Greece. Table 6.7 shows that the Rest of Greece economy appears to have high
237
ALTERNATIVE CHANNELS OF INFRASTRUCTURE EFFECTS
negative results for the number of manufacturing enterprises variable. These coefficients 
are -0.505, -0.505, and -0.502 for the regressions with the three types of public capital, 
implying a degree of homogeneity (a) of 0.495, 0.495, and 0.498 respectively. The 
coefficient for total infrastructure is high (0.985) and statistically significant. The 
respective results for the productive and social infrastructure categories are 0.909 and 
1.251, again statistically significant at the one percent level.
Table 6.6 Infrastructure effects on the scale of production: Athens panel for sectors, 1982-1991
Constant lnEstabl lnG(total) lnG(prod) lnG(sociaI) time
trend
Adjust.
R2
SSE SE
4.205 -0.090 0.515 -0.014 9.330 10.099 0.245
(0.411) (-0.637) (1.186) (-0.425)
2.556 -0.083 0.596 -0.021 0.933 10.050 0.245
(0.277) (-0.588) (1.496) (-0.680)
11.948 -0.100 0.195 0.010 0.933 10.173 0.246
(1.155) (-0.708) (0.423) (0.310)
Statistically significant at 1% level, ** Statistically significant at 5% level, * Statistically significant at 10% level
Table 6.7 Infrastructure effects on the scale of production: Rest of Greece panel for sectors,
1982-1991
Constant lnEstabl lnG(total) InGKprod) lnG(social) time
trend
Adjust.
R2
SSE SE
-6.041 -0.505 0.985 -0.082 0.983 3.880 0.148
(-0.963) (-4.648)*** (3.937)*** (-3.421)***
-3.875 -0.505 0.909 -0.082 0.983 3.880 0.148
(-0.677) (-4.653)*** (3.941)*** (-3.421)***
-10.995 -0.502 1.251 -0.078 0.983 3.881 0.148
(-1.458) (-4.619)*** (3.932)*** (-3.387)***
Statistically significant at 1% level, ** Statistically significant at 5% level, * Statistically significant at 10% level
6.4.2 The effect of public capital on total manufacturing output
The Holtz-Eakin and Lovely (1996) results relating to output per manufacturing 
establishment showed that public infrastructure in the United States had only a small, if 
any, effect on output per firm. In order to pursue this point further, they studied the 
impact of infrastructure on total manufacturing output, controlling for the private inputs
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of production and the number of firms. This strategy resulted the following form of 
equation:
^  K L Q - — + — + n + G
n n
(6.40)
where:
Q is total manufacturing output (GPV), 
K/n is private capital per firm,
L/n is labour per firm,
n is the number of firms,
and G is public infrastructure capital.
Even though in the case of Greece infrastructure capital seems to play a 
significant role in the determination of the output per manufacturing establishment, it is 
still useful to extend the analysis in this context as per Holtz-Eakin and Lovely. The 
results would then corroborate or refute the findings of the previous section. Equation 
6.40 changes for the Greek model to:
g  G  f ( 6 4 1 )
n it n tt
(notation as in previous equations)
Again there are four different levels of spatial analysis.
The estimations for the regional panel are given in table 6.8. The coefficient for 
total public capital, in the first regression of the table, is positive and statistically 
significant. Its magnitude is high (0.254), as is also the case for the coefficient of labour. 
However, the coefficient for private capital is small (0.046) and statistically significant
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only at ten percent level. The degree of homogeneity a (see section 6.2) is the magnitude 
of the estimated coefficient of the manufacturing establishments (this coefficient 
corresponds directly to a, in contrast to the previous section where the estimated 
coefficient was a-1). Here, a is equal to 0.761 (statistically significant) and is larger than 
the respective figure obtained in the previous set of regressions. The next two regressions 
present the results for the breakdown of public capital into productive and social 
categories respectively. It is interesting that at regional level productive infrastructure 
seems to account for practically all of the impact of total public capital. The results for 
this type of infrastructure are almost identical to those for the total. However, it seems 
that the social component has practically zero impact, as its coefficient is small and 
statistically insignificant (-0.048).
Table 6.8 Infrastructure effects on total output: Regional panel for total manufacturing, 1982-1991
Degendent^ ariabl&Ji^
Constant InK InL lnEstabl lnG(total) lnG(prod) lnG(social) time
trend
Adj.
R2
SSE SE
9.253 0.046 0.742 0.761 0.254 -0.026 0.990 13.824 0.178
(6.650)*** (1.695)* (14.597)*** (15.677)*** (3.573)*** (-2.982)***
9.401 0.041 0.742 0.762 0.253 -0.029 0.990 13.661 0.177
(8.078)*** (1.519) (14.698)*** (15.875)*** (4.256)*** (-3.534)***
14.779 0.062 0.760 0.793 -0.048 0.005 0.990 14.207 0.181
(12.843)*** (2.304)** (14.674)*** (16.072)*** (-0.822) (0.918)
*** Statistically significant at 1% level, ** Statistically significant at 5% level, * Statistically significant at 10% level
The results for the sectoral panel for the whole of Greece are not essentially much 
different (table 6.9). In the regression incorporating total infrastructure the coefficient for 
private capital appears to be statistically insignificant, that for labour is more or less the 
same magnitude (0.722 and statistically significant) as for the regional panel, and 
similarly for the manufacturing establishment variable (0.785 and statistically 
significant). The estimate for infrastructure is, nevertheless, much higher in magnitude 
(0.630 and statistically significant). The same can be said for the findings for the 
regression utilising productive public capital. Its coefficient is again higher than the
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respective estimate at regional level (0.583 and statistically significant for the sectoral 
panel). A crucial difference from the regional analysis can be found if the results for 
regional and sectoral social infrastructure regressions are compared. At the regional level 
the coefficient for social public capital is not statistically significant, while when sectors 
are considered it is both significant and high (0.789) - seemingly more so than is the case 
for productive infrastructure. The cost function analysis results have shown that social 
infrastructure does have a positive effect in reducing private costs at the sectoral level. 
Thus, both the model results and those of the cost analyses suggest that some sectors are 
highly affected by social public capital. This effect cannot detected by the regional 
(prefectural) panel where manufacturing industry as a whole is examined. If there were 
available sectoral data at regional level, this discrepancy (between sectoral and 
prefectural results) would be probably solved.
Table 6.9 Infrastructure effects on total output: Greece panel for sectors, 1982-1991
DegendenTVariablejliu)^
Constant InK InL lnEstabl lnG(total) lnG(prod) lnG(social) time
trend
Adj.
R2
SSE SE
-0.848 -0.015 0.722 0.785 0.630 -0.047 0.988 2.318 0.115
(-0.154) (-0.143) (5.195)*** (5.589)*** (3.183)*** (-2.398)**
0.498 -0.014 0.722 0.786 0.583 -0.047 0.988 2.317 0.115
(0.098) (-0.140) (5.196)*** (5.592)*** (3.194)*** (-2.402)**
-3.717 -0.017 0.723 0.783 0.789 -0.043 0.988 2.321 0.115
(-0.577) (-0.169) (5.201)*** (5.570)*** (3.139)*** (-2.311)**
*** Statistically significant at 1% level, ** Statistically significant at 5% level, * Statistically significant at 10% level
Even more interesting is a comparison of the results for the two regional-sectoral 
panels -  those for the metropolitan area of Athens panel (table 6.10) and the Rest of 
Greece panel (table 6.11). The results for Athens, in all three regressions for total, 
productive and social public capital, generate an insignificant coefficient for public 
capital. This is in contrast with all other results for the different spatial levels. The 
estimates for labour approximate roughly similar levels (positive and statistically 
significant) to the respective results for the regional and other sectoral panels. In contrast,
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the coefficients for the manufacturing establishments variable are much higher in 
magnitude than for any other panel. In all three regressions for Athens these estimates are 
around 1.6, which implies that the number of manufacturing firms generates a greater 
volume of industrial output. But more important for this research is the finding that, for 
Athens, infrastructure in all its guises seems to play no role, as in all the regressions its 
estimates are statistically insignificant. One potential explanation involves the fact that 
the Athens economy is much more advanced in comparison with that of the rest of 
Greece. These results seem to corroborate, at first sight, the argument that infrastructure 
investment has a smaller effect in more advanced economies that already endowed with a 
sufficient infrastructure capacity (see for instance Holtz-Eakin 1990). Conversely, there is 
the other possibility that in reality the industry of the main metropolitan area of the 
country, in fact, uses the infrastructure stock of whole of Greece.
Table 6.10 Infrastructure effects on total output: Athens panel for sectors, 1982-1991
Dejj>enden^ariableJm)fTot«^^
Constant InK InL lnEstabl InG(total) InGKprod) InG(social) time
trend
Adj.
R2
SSE SE
-7.072 0.665 0.781 1.603 0.363 -0.019 0.971 7.450 0.212
(-0.767) (4.414)*** (4.952)*** (10.383)*** (0.963) (-0.637)
-7.326 0.665 0.774 1.604 0.382 -0.021 0.971 7.437 0.212
(-0.874) (4.419)*** (4.892)*** (10.398)*** (1.099) (-0.748)
-3.750 0.663 0.794 1.600 0.231 -0.008 0.971 7.476 0.212
(-0.402) (4.394)*** (5.043)*** (10.349)*** (0.582) (-0.273)
*** Statistically significant at 1% level, ** Statistically significant at 5% level, * Statistically significant at 10% level
The final table of this set (6.11) presents the results for the panel that refer to a 
panel of industrial sectors for the Rest of Greece. The results of this panel appear to 
determine the respective findings for the sectoral panel for Greece as whole (table 6.9). 
The estimates for private capital are statistically insignificant in all three types of 
regression, while the coefficients for labour and manufacturing establishments are of high 
magnitude, positive, and significant. The coefficients for public capital, although positive 
and significant, are of even higher magnitude than the respective estimates for Greece as
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a Whole. Again here, social infrastructure appears to have a bigger impact than 
productive public capital.
Table 6.11 Infrastructure effects on total output: Rest of Greece panel
for sectors, 1982-1991
Dependent Variable: In of Total Manufacturing Output (GPV)
Constant InK InL lnEstabl InG(total) lnG(prod) lnG(social) time
trend
Adj.
R2
SSE SE
-5.944 0.013 0.852 0.806 0.797 -0.064 0.989 2.782 0.126
(-1.041) (0.137) (6.856)*** (7.526)*** (3.694)*** (-3.011)***
-4.232 0.013 0.852 0.806 0.738 -0.063 0.989 2.780 0.126
(-0.806) (0.136) (6.862)*** (7.526)*** /-“S o * * * (-3.018)***
-9.721 0.012 0.852 0.807 1.003 -0.059 0.989 2.786 0.126
(-1.435) (0.127) (6.845)*** (7.533)*** (3.653)*** (-2.933)***
*** Statistically significant at 1% level, ** Statistically significant at 5% level, * Statistically significant at 10% level
Comparing these panels clearly shows that public capital is significant at the 
regional (prefectural) level when manufacturing is considered in total. However, while 
this is also the case for sectors in Greece nationwide and the nation excluding Athens it is 
most certainly not the case for the metropolitan area of Athens. (Some of these issues will 
be reconsidered in the conclusion to the thesis.)
6.4.3 Public capital’s effects on the equilibrium number of 
manufacturing establishment
Another potential way in which public capital can influence the private economy, 
in the context of the model in hand, is its impact on the (equilibrium) number of 
manufacturing establishments. The simplest method for the examination of such an effect 
is via regression. The dependent variable is the logarithm of the number of manufacturing 
establishments, and the independent variable is the logarithm of the public infrastructure 
capital stock. The latter is again introduced as three forms (total, productive, and social) 
in each of the four spatial levels of reference. Again, the regressions have included a
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constant term, a time trend, and a set of (N-l) dummy variables capturing the regional or 
sectoral specific effects (not reported on here due to space limitations). Thus, the 
working equation becomes:
ni,= G ,,+ t + u„ (6.42)
(notation as in previous equations)
The results of tables 6.12 to 6.15 show that there is no direct impact of public 
capital on the number of establishments, as the public capital coefficients are statistically 
insignificant in all these regressions. This is true for all spatial levels. However, as Holtz-
Eakin and Lovely have argued, there is the danger that such a regression “fails to control
i
for the resources available to the manufacturing sector” (1996, p. 120).
Table 6.12 Infrastructure effects on the equilibrium number of firms (regression based 
infrastructure and time): Regional panel for total manufacturing, 1982-1991
Constant lnG(total) lnG(prod) lnG(social) time
trend
Adjust.
R2
SSE SE
-0.978 0.104 -0.004 0.976 21.276 0.220
(-0.574) (1.208) (-0.388)
0.448 0.032 0.004 0.976 21.337 0.221
(0.315) (0.445) (0.374)
-2.836 0.218 -0.003 0.977 20.869 0.218
(-2.291)** (3.168)*** (-0.582)
Statistically significant at 1% level, ** Statistically significant at 5% level, * Statistically significant at 10% level
Table 6.13 Infrastructure effects on the equilibrium number of firms (regression based 
infrastructure and time): Greece panel for sectors, 1982-1991
Dejsenden^ariableMn^ofNunibenjf^^
Constant >nG(total) lnG(prod) lnG(social) time
trend
Adjust.
R2
SSE SE
7.432 -0.130 -0.004 0.990 1.205 0.082
(2.139)** (-0.939) (-0.336)
7.139 -0.120 -0.005 0.990 1.205 0.082
(2.255)** (-0.937) (-0.347)
8.053 -0.164 -0.005 0.990 1.205 0.082
(1.928)* (-0.929) (-0.412)
*** Statistically significant at 1% level, ** Statistically significant at 5% level, * Statistically significant at 10% level
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Table 6.14 Infrastructure effects on the equilibrium number of firms (regression based 
infrastructure and time): Athens panel for sectors, 1982-1991
Dependent Variable: In of Number of Manufacturing Establishments
Constant lnGftotal) lnG(prod) lnG(social) time
trend
Adjust
R2
SSE SE
8.784 -0.212 -0.029 0.979 3.027 0.134
(1.584) (-0.897) (-1.619)
9.525 -0.248 -0.025 0.979 3.018 0.134
(1.911)* (-1.146) (-1.503)
5.443 -0.073 -0.039 0.979 3.040 0.134
(0.968) (-0.290) (-2.238)**
*** Statistically significant at 1% level, ** Statistically significant at 5% level, * Statistically significant at 10% level
Table 6.15 Infrastructure effects on the equilibrium number of firms (regression based 
infrastructure and time): Rest of Greece panel for sectors, 1982-1991
Constant lnG(total) lnG(prod) lnG(social) time
trend
Adjust
R2
SSE SE
4.954 -0.072 0.009 0.986 1.857 0.102
(1.149) (-0.420) (0.567)
4.734 -0.064 0.009 0.986 1.857 0.102
(1.205) (-0.405) (0.554)
5.795 -0.112 0.010 0.986 1.856 0.102
(1.118) (-0.511) (0.665)
Statistically significant at 1% level, ** Statistically significant at 5% level, * Statistically significant at 10% level
In order to circumvent this problem, these authors used a regression similar to the 
previous one, but with the addition of the private inputs of production, private capital, 
and labour. This method has also been followed here and the results for these augmented 
regressions are given in tables 6.16 to 6.19. The form of this equation becomes:
nu ~ Ku + Lu + Gu + t + Uu (6.43)
(notation as in previous equations)
However, even this augmented regression generally fails to produce significant 
results for the infrastructure variable. The only exceptions are the cases for social capital
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in the regional panel where a positive relationship holds (table 6.16) and for productive 
public capital in the metropolitan area of Athens, where the coefficient is negative (table 
6.18). It has to be noted, nevertheless, that both these coefficients are statistically 
significant only at the ten percent level. However, perhaps the salient point is that 
generally the coefficients are negative.
Table 6.16 Infrastructure effects on the equilibrium number of firms (augmented 
regression): Regional panel for total manufacturing, 1982-1991
Variable: In of Number of Manufacturing Establishments
Constant InK InL lnG(total) lnG(prod) lnG(social) time
trend
Adjust
R2
SSE SE
-2.502 0.098 0.536 -0.054 0.007 0.983 15.095 0.186
(-1.729)* (3.510)*** (11.555)*** (-0.730) (0.722)
-2.013 0.101 0.536 -0.083 0.011 0.983 15.053 0.186
(-1.655)* (3.631)*** (11.585)*** (-1.326) (1.246)
-5.334 0.097 0.519 0.104 -0.005 0.983 15.009 0.185
(-4.625)*** (3.559)*** (11.038)*** (1.740)* (-0.966)
*** Statistically significant at 1% level, ** Statistically significant at 5% level, • Statistically significant at 10% level
Table 6.17 Infrastructure effects on the equilibrium number of firms (augmented regression):
Greece panel for sectors, 1982-1991
Constant InK InL lnG(total) lnG(prod) lnG(social) time
trend
Adjust
R2
SSE SE
5.286 -0.075 0.595 -0.174 0.008 0.993 0.851 0.070
(1.600) (-1.220) (8.384)*** (-1.462) (0.710)
4.891 -0.075 0.595 -0.160 0.008 0.993 0.851 0.070
(1.599) (-1.220) (8.383)*** (-1.458) (0.701)
6.114 -0.075 0.595 -0.219 0.007 0.993 0.851 0.070
(1.582) (-1.211) (8.382)*** (-1.452) (0.661)
Statistically significant at 1% level, ** Statistically significant at 5% level, * Statistically significant at 10% level
Table 6.18 Infrastructure effects on the equilibrium number of firms (augmented regression):
Athens panel for sectors, 1982-1991
Variable: In of Number of Manufacturing Establishments
Constant InK InL lnG(total) lnG(prod) InG(social) time
trend
Adjust
R2
SSE SE
1.778 0.205 0.525 -0.234 -0.011 0.988 1.783 0.103
(0.395) (2.862)*** (8.039)*** (-1.281) (-0.774)
3.008 0.203 0.528 -0.292 -0.006 0.988 1.768 0.103
(0.739) (2.839)*** (8.113)*** (-1.742)* (-0.432)
-2.868 0.210 0.521 -0.040 -0.026 0.987 1.800 0.104
(-0.629) (2.917)*** (7.948)*** (-0.208) (-1.830)*
*•* Statistically significant at 1% level, ** Statistically significant at 5% level, * Statistically significant at 10% level
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Table 6.19 Infrastructure effects on the equilibrium number of firms (augmented regression): Rest
of Greece panel for sectors, 1982-1991
Constant InK InL InGftotal) InG(prod) lnG(social) time
trend
Adjust.
R2
SSE SE
5.147 -0.082 0.585 -0.186 0.022 0.991 1.208 0.083
(1.379) (-1.287) (8.504)*** (-1.315) (1.588)
4.667 -0.081 0.585 -0.169 0.022 0.991 1.208 0.083
(1.360) (-1.283) (8.500)*** (-1.295) (1.570)
6.520 -0.082 0.585 -0.254 0.022 0.991 1.206 0.083
(1.476) (-1.296) (8.522)*** (-1.418) (1.702)*
*** Statistically significant at 1% level, ** Statistically significant at 5% level, * Statistically significant at 10% level
It seems that public infrastructure does not affect the equilibrium number of firms, 
at least in this model context. There are, however, examples of other research focused on 
firm entry and exit in Greek industrial sector, in which public capital appears to be a 
significant factor of firm creation. These results, as well as comments, criticisms and 
potential extensions of this model are discussed in the next section.
6.5 Conclusions
The proliferation of empirical research on the effects of public capital investment. 
on the private sector of the economy has provided a substantial body of work. This is . 
based mainly on production function analysis, or alternatively on the duality theory and 
cost function approach. These approaches can be useful in assessing the role of 
infrastructure and can be used as a tool for the planning of public investment policies. 
Having said that, there still remains the problem of an analytical theoretical basis 
outlining the mechanisms by which public capital generates, or not, these specific effects. 
A few models by which these mechanisms can be sketched have recently become 
available. But few of them have been empirically tested for any verification or refutation 
of their theoretical assumptions.
One exception is the important paper on the US economy by Holtz-Eakin and 
Lovely (1996). The basic premises of this model have been utilised here for an analysis of
247
ALTERNATIVE CHANNELS OF INFRASTRUCTURE EFFECTS
the Greek case. The model’s empirical calibration distinguishes between two main effects 
of infrastructure on the economy - the impact on the non-manufacturing part on the one 
hand and on the manufacturing sector on the other.
However, there are significant differences between the US and the Greek 
empirical research based on the model. In the former, cross-sectional data were used for 
four years, whereas in the Greek case the time dimension of the panel data is ten years. 
Furthermore, there are no available data for the Greek case that permit a proper empirical 
modelling of the non-manufacturing part of the economy and to circumvent this problem 
quasi-production functions were used.
The basic equation was calibrated not only for the aggregate measure of the 
private non-manufacturing sector output, which was the regional GDP, but also for its 
breakdown to regional sub-categories. Three measures of public infrastructure capital 
were used, total infrastructure, and its two categories - productive and social public 
capital The results showed that there is no significant effect on the total regional GDP, 
no matter the type of infrastructure proxy in use. There are, however, some sub-categories 
of regional GDP, for which public capital at first sight seems to have a significant impact. 
However, for these categories there is the technical problem of the endogeneity of public 
infrastructure in the equations.
The analysis of the effects of infrastructure on the manufacturing sector of the 
economy has also been conducted at four different spatial levels. First, a panel of the total 
(large scale) manufacturing of the Greek prefectures is used; second, there is a sectoral 
breakdown of the manufacturing for Greece as a whole; third, comes a sectoral 
breakdown for the metropolitan area of Athens; and finally, the fourth level offers a 
sectoral breakdown for the Rest of Greece.
The empirical calibration tried to examine the two ways by which the theoretical 
model assumes that public capital affects the manufacturing sector. The first possibility is 
that changes of infrastructure provision alter the preferred scale of production for the 
firms of the manufacturing sector. The empirical counterpart of this possibility was the 
examination of the impact of public capital and . the number of manufacturing 
establishments on the output per manufacturing establishment. The results showed that
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total public capital plays a significant positive role at all spatial levels, with the exception 
of the metropolitan area of Athens. The productive infrastructure coefficients are 
similarly significant positive, again with the exception of Athens. However, the picture is 
not clear for the case of social public capital. At the regional level, where the total of 
manufacturing sectors is considered, social infrastructure appears not to play any 
important role. The same is true for the sectoral breakdown for the area of Athens. 
Nevertheless, for the sectoral breakdown for Greece as a whole, and for the Greece 
excluding the Athens area, there is a statistically significant impact of high magnitude.
Following Holtz-Eakin and Lovely (1996), the above results were double-checked 
by a second set of regressions, in which it was assumed that public capital should 
influence the total manufacturing output via its impact on output per firm and the number 
of varieties. The results for these latter regressions corroborate those obtained earlier.
The second channel by which infrastructural change affects private 
manufacturing, in the context of this model is the concomitant changes in the equilibrium 
number of manufacturing establishments. The direct regression of the number of 
manufacturing establishments on the public capital variable (either in its total, 
productive, or social form) has shown that there is no such direct impact, whatever the 
spatial level. The next step was to augment these regressions with the private inputs of 
production. Once again the results obtained generally showed that there was little 
significant impact of the infrastructure variables.
One conclusion that can be drawn from comparing these results for Greece with 
the findings from the US research is that for the more developed economy infrastructure 
works more via its effects on the composition of the manufacturing activity, whereas in 
the Greek case it seems to affect more directly the level of this activity. However, it has 
to be kept in mind that the US case refers to a huge economy in comparison to the Greek 
one, and that the US empirical work is based on four cross-sectional surveys articulated 
into a panel, while the Greek panel has a significantly longer time dimension. In any case, 
both of these empirical works show that public capital seems to have little if any impact • 
on the non-manufacturing part of the economy. However, the results for the Greek case 
must be viewed with the caveat that crucial data for this part of the analysis were
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unavailable, and that it was conducted in a rather indirect way (quasi-production 
functions).
Finally, it must be noted that the whole analysis was conducted within the 
analytical framework set by the Holtz-Eakin and Lovely (1996) model. This means that 
the results are as good as the model’s assumptions, and must be viewed in this spirit. For 
instance, the results for the impact of public capital on the equilibrium number of firms 
must not be construed as an attempt to evaluate the infrastructural role on new firm 
creation. There is now an existing body of work on this topic for Greece, and some of this 
research has incorporated the infrastructure variable into the analysis19. The results of this 
empirical work have shown that public capital, does indeed play a positive role in new 
firm creation, with a significant time lag (see Fotopoulos 1998). This implies that the 
model used here has not allowed for such lagged impact of infrastructure on the 
equilibrium number of firms.
19 For a summary of the existing bibliography on the topic, see Fotopoulos (1998); for a different perspective
on the subject, see also Katseli (1990) and Papandreou (1989).___________________________________
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Chapter 7 
Conclusions
7.1 Infrastructure and economic developm ent in Greece -  
the principal question
The main question that this thesis has attempted to answer concerns the 
relationship between infrastructure and economic development. Even a cursory look at 
recent literature reveals that there is yet to be found an uncontested theoretical and 
applied framework for the empirical analysis of this relationship that enjoys an overall 
consensus. This problem is accentuated once the parameter of ‘space’ enters the picture. 
There is a strong possibility that public capital investment does not affect all regions to 
the same degree and in the same way. As the empirical analysis of the Greek case has 
shown, differences on the degree of development of local economies can result in 
different infrastructure effects.
A common thread, at the level of empirical analysis, in this research was the 
application of panel data analysis. Even though this approach was dictated by the lack of 
time series data with sufficient time length at regional level, it has provided the empirical 
analysis with the necessary geographical information for the infrastructure effects, which, 
as will be argued later in this chapter, is essential for a proper examination of these 
impacts.
The main difference between previous attempts to assess the impact of public 
infrastructure capital on productivity and economic development from the recent ‘wave’ 
of research, spawned by the work of Aschauer, is that the latter approach has made 
possible to examine that impact at a macro level, whether this is a national economy or a 
regional unit. There are many examples analysing the effects of specific infrastructure 
projects or attempts at a theorisation of the role of public capital in Greece (see for 
instance Skayannis 1990, 1994). However, there are only two examples of research
251
CONCLUSIONS
utilising the new analytical framework. Dalamagas (1995), and Segoura and 
Christodoulakis (1997) have tried to analyse the effects of public infrastructure by using 
production and cost function analyses, based on time-series data for Greece as a whole. 
Both these pieces of empirical work have contributed towards a better understanding of 
the Greek case. Nevertheless, it has to be pointed out that there are two inherent problems 
in both these research projects.
The first refers to the nature of the time-series data. The longest time-series 
dataset of the two (used by Dalamagas and covering the period from 1950 to 1992) 
provides only 42 observations1, which pales in comparison to the richness of information 
provided by the panel datasets2 (for instance, the regional panel used here has a time 
dimension from 1982 to 1992, and a spatial dimension of 49 prefectures, which amounts 
to 539 observations) generally used in this type of analysis. In this case, information is 
restricted in a twofold way: first, in terms of the number of observations made. Second, in 
terms of the quality of information provided by the geographical dimension in the 
prefectural panel, and the information about the different effects at different industrial 
sectors (at a specific geographical scale) in the sectoral panels. As it will be discussed 
later in this chapter, the geographical/sectoral dimensions seem to be crucial in the 
analysis of the infrastructure effects.
A second problem with the previous two examples of this type of research 
undertaken in a Greek context is that both of them have used a, more or less, broad 
definition for public infrastructure (including the telecommunications and energy 
companies). The present research has been able to build and improve upon this most 
valuable experience. It was argued in chapter 3, that the adoption of a narrower definition 
for public infrastructure in this thesis makes the comparison of its results to similar 
research from other countries easier. In most studies the telecommunications and energy 
investment is excluded from definitions of public infrastructure since these usually are in 
the hands of the private sector. Having said that, though, one of the problems of recent 
infrastructure research is that different specifications can lead to different results, even if 
the same dataset is used (for a more extensive analysis, see chapter 2). There can be little
1 Even fewer degrees of freedom are provided by the dataset used by Segoura and Christodoulakis, which 
covers the periods 1963 to 1977 and 1980 to 1990 (the interim years 1978 and 1979 are missing).
2 For some of the advantages of panel data analysis (as well as of some of the problems) see Appendix I.
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doubting that the exact definition of what constitutes infrastructure in the various attempts 
to empiricise the relationship is vitally important to the final result.
7.2 Infrastructure and economic developm ent in Greece -  
the major findings.
7.2.1 The evolution of infrastructure spending and private capital 
investment.
This thesis has used the investment of the Public Investment Programme (PIPR) 
as a proxy for infrastructure capacity in Greece. The PIPR was introduced in 1952 with 
the aim of providing Greece with the necessary public capital stock for a modem 
economy, as the existing one was in poor condition after the forties (in itself, the result of 
the Second World War and the Greek Civil War). The PIPR provided -and still does- 
public investment in several categories of fixed capital (see tables 3.4 and 3.5 in chapter 
3). These categories have been classified under three major headings for the needs of this 
research. One class was comprised of the ‘productive’ categories, a second by the ‘social’ 
categories, and the third included the Administrative and Miscellaneous expenditures of 
the PIPR, which did not materialise as actual investment.
An analysis of the temporal evolution of these categories has shown that during 
the late seventies - early eighties the actual investment of the PIPR (the sum of the 
productive and social categories) had fallen significantly from its 1976 level (in real- 
deflated terms) to recover during the late eighties and early nineties. The Administrative 
and Miscellaneous category doubled its 1976 level during the eighties (reaching almost 
three times this level by 1981), only to fall significantly during the nineties. Whereas the 
productive category has remained stable or even increased by the end of the period 
examined (1976-1992), it is the social part of the PIPR that has been permanently reduced 
(since 1981, it stands at around 15 percent of the total expenditure, when in 1976 it 
represented 24 percent).
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One of the main problems in analysing the regional effects of public investment in 
Greece is that even though the PIPR investment expenditures are available in a 
prefectural (NUTS El) breakdown, part of the PIPR is either allocated to a higher spatial 
level (NUTS II), or has not been allocated to a specific regional unit at all (referring to 
Greece as a whole for accounting reasons). This non-spatial part of the PIPR amounts to 
more than 45 percent of the total programme. However, if the Administrative and 
Miscellaneous categories are excluded, this falls to around 28 percent. The implication is 
that the regional panel used in this thesis somewhat underestimates the real infrastructure 
stock. Nevertheless, in the case of the sectoral panels, either those used for Greece as a 
whole, or for the analyses at the ‘metropolitan area of Athens’ and ‘Rest of Greece’ 
regional levels, the estimated stocks do include all the public infrastructure investment.
There are significant inequalities in the regional distribution of infrastructure 
capital amongst the Greek prefectures. If the absolute overall spending in public capital 
investment is the criterion by which the Greek prefectures are classified, then the three 
prefectures containing the major urban centres (Athens, Thessaloniki, and Achaia), along 
with the border prefecture of Evros, have concentrated by far the higher percentages of 
public investment. The same pattern of spatial distribution was observed for the 
productive part of the PIPR, whereas for the social part, the concentration of such 
investment in prefectures containing the major urban centres is even more accentuated. 
However, if investment per inhabitant is examined, a different pattern appears, and some 
of the most remote prefectures of the country seem to be the main beneficiaries of 
investment decision making viewed this way.
The data used to represent the private sector relate to relatively large-scale 
manufacturing industry and this covers more than 90 percent of the total manufacturing 
sector in Greece by whatever measure chosen. A salient feature of these data is that 
private investment during the eighties has fallen sometimes even by one quarter its 1976 
level (in constant prices of course; see for this point, table 4.2, column 5).
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7.2.2 The impact of infrastructure on manufacturing production
The main tools of analysis in the recent resurgence of infrastructure research are 
production functions. In this family of functions, the most popular one is the Cobb- 
Douglas specification. This type of production function has been utilised here extensively 
- though not exclusively - to analyse the national and regional effects of infrastructure 
investment.
Chapter 4 presented several different calibrations of the Cobb-Douglas production 
function. The norm in infrastructure literature is to obtain, as a first step, the results for a 
generic Cobb-Douglas, where the public capital variable has not been introduced. At the 
next stage, the infrastructure variable is then added to the Cobb-Douglas equation.
However, the exact operational form of the production function is far from an 
undisputed procedure. A great part the academic debate has dealt with the most adequate 
empirical calibration. In this analysis, apart from the private inputs as well as the 
infrastructure variable in its different guises, a time trend and the capacity utilisation rate 
were also included. The latter was added into the equation in order to control the 
influence of the business cycle. Ford and Poret (1991) have argued for the importance of 
the inclusion of this term (see chapter 4 for this point).
Several alternative formulations of the Cobb-Douglas, with and without the 
inclusion of the public infrastructure variable, have been tested. The straightforward 
conclusion here is that the formulation with the infrastructure capital is the most 
successful variation, in comparison to alternative ones excluding public capital, or 
including it but estimated in terms of first differences. Another econometric test (RESET) 
was performed in order to secure that the Cobb-Douglas calibration is not inconsistent 
with the empirical data. The results of this test were again favoured of the formulation 
with the infrastructure variable.
The main result from the empirical analysis in this research is that there is indeed 
a positive and significant relationship between the public capital variable and the private 
sector’s industrial output. As mentioned in chapters 2 and 4, the estimated elasticities for 
the production inputs give the percentage change in output if the respective input has 
changed, for instance, by one percent. The estimated coefficient for public infrastructure 
was 0.20 for Greece as a whole (see table 4.10). This result closely approximates the
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results from similar research in other countries that have been undertaken for a wide 
variety of time periods: table 4.1 in chapter 4 shows that the results of Aschauer, Baltagi 
and Pinnoi, Eisner, and Munnell for the United States are near to this estimate3. Mera has 
estimated exactly the same figure for the role of Japanese infrastructure (see table 4.1 for 
these references). Similar are the estimations for the Spanish case. Bajo-Rubio et al.
(1993) have discovered a 0.19 coefficient for public capital, while the estimations arising 
from the research of Mas et al. (1993, 1994, and 1996 respectively) vary from 0.21, 
through 0.24, to 0.08.
The only point of reference for the Greek infrastructure capital that is directly 
comparable to the findings of this thesis is the Cobb-Douglas production function 
estimated by Segoura and Christodoulakis (1997). With the caveat already mentioned 
(that they used a time-series dataset and an all-encompassing definition for public capital) 
their estimation is extremely high (0.42 for infrastructure variable; see Segoura et al. 
1997, table 1). The only other piece of work for the Greek case, that of Dalamagas 
(1995), is not directly comparable as it has employed a translog formulation and variables 
such as energy and the public deficit.
Another point that the academic debate has focused on is the way in which panel 
datasets, in econometrics terms, should be properly analysed. In an effort to refute the 
Aschauer-Munnell /?ro-inffastructure thesis, Holtz-Eakin has argued that if panel analysis 
has to be employed, then it is imperative to use the right econometric techniques in order 
to obtain unbiased and consistent results. More specifically, he argued that it is essential 
to take into consideration the regional specific effects (provided that the panel is based on 
spatial units)4. It is reassuring to observe that in chapter 4 (where the analysis is based on 
the regional panel) the introduction of the dummy variables, which capture the regional 
specific effects, has produced results showing that infrastructure has a significant impact 
both statistically and in terms of actual magnitude.
The production function was also used for a temporal analysis. The ten-year 
period of the panel was disaggregated into two different panels each comprising a sub­
3 However, it has to be kept in mind that table 4.1 reports also some pieces of research for the US where the 
estimated coefficient is almost zero.
4 The key references on this point are Munnell (1990b), Holtz-Eakin (1993c), Eisner (1991); for a more 
extensive analysis see chapter 2.
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period of five years. The results showed that the public capital variable, either as total 
infrastructure or as the productive and social categories, have no significant impact. This 
is a demonstration of the notion that infrastructure effects can really only be detected over 
long time periods.
Another part of the analysis is that which considers the type of returns to scale5 of 
the Cobb-Douglas production function. The results obtained (see table 4.9) were rather 
ambiguous, as the constrained (to have constant returns to scale) versions, with or without 
the infrastructure variable, produced similar results to the unconstrained versions.
The next step in the production analysis was to analyse the public capital impact 
over the sub-national territory Greece. In this respect, three different spatial levels were 
used. The first regarded a division of the prefectures into two smaller panels creating 
effectively one panel for the ‘north’ and one for the ‘south’ of Greece. The results showed 
that the overall infrastructure investment has had a much larger impact (twofold) on 
southern rather than northern Greece.
A second level of analysis concerned three non-spatially contiguous groupings 
(panels) of the prefectures according to their overall level of manufacturing output (high, 
intermediate, and low). The results showed that infrastructure has had its largest impact 
on the lowest output group of prefectures, followed by the highest output cluster. It has to 
be mentioned, however, that the difference in magnitude was fivefold between these two 
classes (see table 4.12).
In the third level of spatial analysis are the prefectures themselves. These were 
used to construct regional panels that correspond, more or less, to the Greek regions of 
the NUTS II level. The results for the infrastructure variable were statistically 
insignificant for all but one region (the Ionian Islands). One potential explanation is that 
the smaller the spatial case the harder it is to detect the infrastructure effect (see chapters 
2 and 4). It seems, however, that these results have more to do with the reduced degrees 
of freedom in the NUTS II panels, than with the actual effect of public capital. An 
indication corroborating this argument is the fact that apart from the infrastructure
5 This is an important question, as the type of the returns to scale reveals the type of technology of the 
Cobb-Douglas equation (see chapter 4.6).
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variable, the private capital variable coefficients also appeared to be statistically 
insignificant.
The Cobb-Douglas function was also used for the investigation of potential 
regional network effects of infrastructure capital. The aforementioned regional NUTS II 
panels were again used6, but the public capital stocks were estimated taking into 
consideration the infrastructure capital of the adjacent prefectures. It seems that if there 
are such network effects, they are only captured by the national and the north-south 
panels.
All this analysis has been conducted not only for public capital as a whole, but 
also for the productive and social categories that make it up. The calibration of the Cobb- 
Douglas function at the national level showed that almost all of the impact estimated for 
infrastructure as a whole can be attributed to the effect of the productive component. The 
coefficient for this category was statistically significant, with a magnitude of 0.17, while 
the coefficient for the social category was only 0.06 and statistically insignificant (see 
table 4.6 AAA). The results for the north-south divide showed that for the north the 
findings for the two categories are almost the same as those for Greece as a whole (see 
table 4.13). These results are in accordance with the empirical findings from similar 
research in other countries (see table 2.1).
However, for the south of Greece, the results are less straightforward as they are 
statistically significant only at 10 percent level, even though both coefficients for 
productive and social categories are substantially positive. The empirical findings for the 
NUTS II level regions are even less clear. There are some regions that have statistically 
significant coefficients for the two public capital categories. From these coefficients, all 
elasticities regarding the productive category are positive, while those for the social type 
are mixed (for a more thorough analysis see section 4.7, in chapter 4).
6 The ‘Greece as a whole’, and North and South panels were not used as it is supposed that the large spatial 
aggregations of prefectures capture any network effects (see chapter 4).
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7.2.3 The impact of infrastructure on the non-manufacturing part of 
the economy
Due to data limitations it has not been possible to extend the production function 
approach analysis to the non-manufacturing part of the private economy. For similar 
reasons, it was also impossible to implement the cost function approach for these 
activities. The main deficiency of the data is that there are no available estimations for the 
private capital investment/stocks, or employment remuneration, or number of workers 
for, at least, some of the non-manufacturing sectors. In order to circumvent this problem, 
quasi-production functions similar to those employed by Cutanda and Paricio for Spain
(1994) were used (employed in the context of the economic model developed in chapter 
6).
Panel data analysis was the method selected used once again, this time based on a 
prefectural dataset. The dependent variable in the equations was regional Gross Domestic 
Product (GDP), which apart from its total value was disaggregated to ten sectoral sub- 
categories. The employment rate in the industrial sector has been used as a proxy for the 
prefectural employment, which along with the infrastructure variable (in total, productive, 
or social forms), and a time trend formed the explanatory variables7. The overall result 
that arises from these quasi-production functions is that public capital investment, 
irrespective of its guise, has no significant effect on either the total regional GDP, or on 
any of its sub-categories. It has to be noted that even in cases where some of the estimates 
for public capital appeared to be statistically significant, these coefficients were rejected 
on the basis of a Hausman test for the exogeneity of infrastructure variable (see chapter 6 
for a more thorough presentation). This means that, based on the results of this test, the 
possibility that it is changes in GDP that determines the infrastructure investment (and not 
the other way around) cannot be rejected.
7 As in the analysis for the manufacturing sector, a least squares dummy variable model was used.
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7.2.4 The impact of infrastructure on manufacturing costs
The production function approach is the most widely used method in modem 
infrastructure effects literature (see chapter 2). However, as explained in chapters 2 and 5, 
this dominance is less a result of the theoretical advantages of the production function 
analytical framework, and more a product of the ease of estimation and results 
interpretation that this framework provides. The main alternative in public capital 
research is cost function analysis, which, despite being more data demanding and 
producing results that are less straightforward to interpret, uses more flexible functional 
forms, and can shed more light to the production and cost structure of the economic unit 
under investigation (whether this be a firm, a sector, a region, or an economy as a whole).
The general principle of the cost function approach and the duality theory that 
underpins it is that there is a dual cost function to its primal production counterpart. 
Dalamagas (1995), and Segoura and Christodoulakis (1997) in their analyses for the 
infrastructure capital at national level have also used cost functions. In both these pieces 
of research the selected form for the cost function was the translog specificatioa The 
overall conclusion from the Dalamagas analysis is that public infrastructure is labour and 
private capital saving, and energy using (which is the only intermediate input that he adds 
into the cost function). Segoura and Christodoulakis, on the other hand, have argued that 
public capital is labour and intermediate inputs saving, and private capital using. As 
argued previously, the results of these earlier - national level - pieces of research are not 
directly comparable to those of this thesis8, though they ought to be directly comparable 
with each other, as the time period and their methodologies are similar (with the notable 
exception of the intermediate inputs treatment). However, it seems that there is only a 
small area of agreement regarding their main findings.
This thesis has used a generalised Cobb-Douglas cost function, similar to that 
employed by Nadiri and Mamuneas (1994). Four different datasets (panels) were used in 
order to capture all the nuances of the infrastructure impact on different spatial levels for 
the Greek industry. The first panel is based on the prefectural data that were used for the 
production function analysis, augmented with some necessary additional variables. The 
second panel refers to sectoral data (two-digit level) for Greece as a whole. The only
8 They were time-series analyses, with a broad definition of infrastructure.
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area/region for which these sectoral data are available, in addition to those at national 
level, is the metropolitan area of Athens. Thus, these data constituted the third panel of 
the cost analysis. Subtracting the Athens data from those at national level generates the 
last panel, which can be referred to as the industry for the Rest of Greece.
The system of equations calibrated for the cost function analysis has been tested 
against several alternative specifications for all four different datasets (without 
regional/sectoral dummy variables, constant returns of scale, and a variant in which 
public capital was restricted to have zero effect). These specifications were compared 
with the use of a log-likelihood ratio test. As argued earlier in this section, the cost 
function analysis results are not easy to interpret, at least directly. The estimated 
coefficients are used at a second stage to compute several ‘derivative’ measures of 
infrastructure impact on private costs. These are a) the cost elasticity with respect to 
public capital, b) the ‘factor bias effect’ (which has been estimated over the share of the 
private inputs), and c) the private input demand elasticity with respect to infrastructure 
(which is the sum of the cost elasticities and factor bias effect). An additional estimated 
measure was the ‘shadow value’ of public capital, which can be interpreted as a gauge of 
the willingness of the private sector to pay for an additional unit of infrastructure services.
The basic conclusion from the analysis based on the regional (prefectural) data is 
that the productive part of public capital does have an impact on the private costs, while 
its social counterpart does not. The estimated private input demand elasticities for the 
impact of productive infrastructure showed that it saves labour and intermediate inputs, 
and uses private capital. There is no clear geographical pattern for these elasticities, but, 
in general, prefectures which have higher levels of a particular private input (private 
capital, labour, intermediate inputs) tend to have a higher private input demand 
elasticities. It seems, however, that the higher shadow values for public capital belong to 
prefectures that are near to the two major urban centres of Greece (Athens, and 
Thessaloniki). Additionally, the Magnisia prefecture (which includes the industrial area of 
Volos, probably the most important in the country) also has a high shadow value.
The second level of cost analysis regards the sectoral panel for the manufacturing 
industry of Greece as a whole. This panel contains all twenty two-digit sectors. A notable 
difference from the regional (prefectural) results was that both productive and social
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infrastructure appeared to have an impact on private costs (with the latter category indeed 
and unusually having a larger effect). The measures of that impact showed that both 
productive and social categories of infrastructure save labour and private capital (they are 
substitutes for these inputs), and use intermediate inputs (they are complements). Thus, it 
seems that even when the results regarding the labour input have the same direction for 
the regional and sectoral panel (this is a strong point of stability for all results), the results 
for private capital and intermediate inputs have the reverse direction.
The international literature has provided several pieces of research in which the 
direction of relationship between infrastructure and private inputs is similar to either the 
regional or the sectoral results (but there are also differences as well; see chapter 2 table 
2.2). For instance, Conrad and Seitz (1994), Lynde and Richmond (1992), Seitz (1994), 
Seitz and Licht (1995) have found that infrastructure is a substitute for labour, and a 
complement to private capital. On the other hand, Morrison and Schwartz (1996) have 
found that infrastructure is a substitute for private capital in the short run. However, this 
relationship has the opposite direction in the long run. As far as the difference in the 
results from the Greek panels is concerned, it can be argued that the regional (prefectural) 
panel differs substantially from the sectoral panel for Greece as a whole (as well as from 
the other sectoral panels - Athens, and the Rest of Greece). The regional panel contains 
information for spatial differences of manufacturing, without any sectoral dimension, 
while for the sectoral analysis there is information for the industrial sectors, but not for 
their spatial differences. As argued in chapter 5, this problem could have been 
circumvented if the National Statistical Service of Greece had been able to make 
available sectoral data at prefectural level. The only geographical area for which such 
data are available is that of Athens.
The results for the Athens panel are notable in the sense that it is the only spatial 
level of analysis in which the productive part of public capital does not have a significant 
impact on private costs (as it is rejected by the log-likelihood ratio test). On the other 
hand, the social category does indeed have a positive effect. This may be an indication 
that some sectors are sensitive to cost reductions by better public administration or health 
services, for which social infrastructure is a proxy. Regarding the relationship between 
public capital and the private inputs, the results for Athens have shown that they have the 
same direction as in the sectoral analysis for Greece as a whole. However, the estimated
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measures revealed that the magnitude of the infrastructure impact was smaller in the 
Athens area.
The last sectoral panel refers to the Rest of Greece. The results for both productive 
and social parts of public capital are similar to those for Greece as a whole. Thus, labour 
and private capital are substitutes for infrastructure, while the latter has a complementary 
relationship to intermediate inputs. The absolute magnitudes of the estimated measures 
(of infrastructure impact on private costs) are higher than those for the national level, for 
both public capital categories.
7.2.5 The impact of infrastructure on manufacturing through indirect 
channels
Standard infrastructure research has focused on the analysis of the production, 
and, to a lesser degree, cost effects of public capital (see chapter 2). There is the 
possibility, nevertheless, that infrastructure investment could affect the private sector of 
the economy in other, more subtle, ways. There are very few pieces of empirical work in 
which such alternative channels have been investigated. The work of Holtz-Eakin and 
Lovely (1996) is one such promising example, and for this reason their theoretical model 
has been used here for the examination of the Greek case.
Holtz-Eakin and Lovely constructed a model for the economy that provides the 
theoretical underpinning for these alternative channels. In a nutshell, they argued that 
infrastructure capital investment does not seem to have a significant direct impact on the 
production process of either the non-manufacturing, or the manufacturing parts of the 
economy (according, at least to their results summarised in chapter 2). Nevertheless, there 
is strong evidence (at least for the United States) that infrastructure affects manufacturing 
industry in two indirect ways. The first is by changing the scale of production of 
individual firms (by only a small degree in the US case) and the second is by having an 
impact on the equilibrium number of the manufacturing firms.
The empirical findings for the manufacturing part of the Greek economy are 
different from the respective results for the US obtained by Holtz-Eakin when the 
production function approach is used. The results for Greece showed a positive impact of
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public capital, while Holtz-Eakin found no significant effect. For the non-manufacturing 
sectors there is no clear evidence that there is a significant impact of public capital (as 
argued extensively in chapter 6, and earlier in this chapter9), and thus, the US and Greek 
results are in line. Chapter 6 also attempted to explore the alternative channels (which the 
production function approach cannot reveal) of the impact of public capital on the 
manufacturing part of the economy.
The impact of infrastructure on the scale of production of manufacturing firms 
was investigated by examining the effect of the number of manufacturing establishments 
and public capital stock on the gross production value per manufacturing establishment. 
The results for the regional panel showed that infrastructure does have a significant 
positive impact, and that impact is almost solely due to the productive component of 
public capital. The estimated impact from the sectoral panel for Greece as whole is even 
higher, and here the social category also has a significant positive impact, even higher 
than its productive counterpart. The analysis from the two available sectoral panels with a 
regional dimension (Athens and the Rest of Greece), revealed that the effect on the 
Athens economy was not statistically significant. Thus, the results for Greece as a whole 
seem due only to the effects occurring in the Rest of Greece.
These results were double-checked using Holtz-Eakin and Lovely’s stratagem to 
regress the gross manufacturing output on the private capital and labour per firm, the 
number of establishments, and infrastructure capital. The results for all spatial levels 
(regional and sectoral panels) corroborate the results from the previous regressions. One 
of the most important conclusions is that as far as the metropolitan area of Athens is 
concerned, public infrastructure does not have a significant, if any, effect. This may be an 
indication that manufacturing activity in the capital is ‘qualitatively’ different in the sense 
that it does not depend on infrastructure provision for its production process. Possibly this 
is an indirect confirmation of the basic Holtz-Eakin’s argument that public capital has no 
significant impact on the private sector. Athens represents a significant part of the nation's 
industry, along with some of the most productive part of the labour force. It also stands 
for a significant part of the overall infrastructure capacity of the country.
9 It appeared that infrastructure had a significant impact on some non-manufacturing sectors, but these cases 
were rejected on the basis of a Hausman specification test.
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Thus, since Athens is the most economically advanced area of the country, it is 
possible that here infrastructure does not play such an important role as it does in other 
parts of the country. The only potential counter-argument may be that the Athens 
economy ‘uses’ not just the Athenian infrastructure but also the adjacent infrastructure 
stock, or possibly the infrastructure capacity of Greece as a whole.
The second channel by which public capital affects manufacturing according to 
the Holtz-Eakin and Lovely model is through its impact on the equilibrium number of the 
manufacturing firms. Two empirical formulations were used, one assessing directly the 
impact of infrastructure on the number of firms, and the other adding the private input 
factors of production. The results showed that only social infrastructure at the regional 
level (prefectural panel) plays a positive role. It has to be noted that these results are 
based on the theorisation of this particular model. Recent research has shown that there is 
a significant time lag of the public capital impact on the manufacturing openings (see 
Fotopoulos 1998), and perhaps the present study somewhat underestimates the real 
infrastructure effects on the equilibrium number of the manufacturing firms.
7.3 Infrastructure and economic developm ent in Greece -  
the policy im plications of the main findings
The basic conclusion from the literature review is that the theoretical and practical 
problems of infrastructure research are yet to be resolved. It seems that the ‘positive 
effects' camp has shown more empirical results in their favour, however, the opposite side 
is not without good arguments and supporting evidence (see chapter 2). It may be 
characteristic of the current state of the debate the fact that even Holtz-Eakin, one of the 
key figures of the ‘no effects' side, has recently advocated that public capital has an 
indirect positive impact on the economy (see Holtz-Eakin and Lovely, 1996).
In any case, it can be safely argued that the public capital and regional 
development relationship is a complex one, especially as the infrastructure effects can be 
different at different spatial levels. The different impact is due to the specific conditions 
and level of development of a particular regional economy. This argument is also a
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warning for caution over the extension of empirical results either from another country10, 
or from a more aggregate level. The use of empirical findings from a national study based 
on aggregate time series analysis for policy recommendations at the regional level, for 
example, is potentially misleading. As for international comparisons, of course, countries 
can have a totally different social and economic structures and levels of development and 
this makes cross-national comparison problematic.
The empirical results from the production function analysis confirm at first sight 
the argument, raised especially in the US debate, that the larger the spatial scale the larger 
the estimated infrastructure impact (probably due to spillover effects). However, this 
conclusion for the Greek case may be the result of the reduction in the degrees of freedom 
of the regional panels11. The results from the sectoral panels in cost function analysis 
have shown that if there is sufficient information in terms of the econometrics, there can 
be detected a significant infrastructure impact even at a small spatial scale. One example 
of this feature is the case of the metropolitan area of Athens and social public capital.
For these reasons (the complexity of the relationship of infrastructure and 
development, and the nuances that the spatial dimension adds to the problem) that the 
geography of public capital investment must be seriously considered in any infrastructure 
assessment. Even the estimation of the public capital impact at the national level should 
be based on a dataset that contains information at the lowest spatial level possible. In an 
ideal world, this geographical information should be coupled with the disaggregated data 
regarding the sectoral composition of the economy under examination (regardless of 
whether or not this concerns the manufacturing or non-manufacturing parts of the 
economy).
The main conclusion from the descriptive analysis in chapter 3 is that despite the 
fact that the real investment in public capital has increased or decreased according to a 
political cycle, it has remained a constant source of investment for the economy. It has to 
be noted that within the same period, the manufacturing sector experienced a severe
10 Often there are economists or politicians who advocate in favour of some specific policy based on its 
fruitful application in other countries, or even worse on how well a theoretical model of an economy works 
with such simulated policy. However, in reality good economic policy should be the art of contextual 
analysis.
11 This problem has been addressed recently in econometrics theory as ‘micronumerosity’. For a brief 
discussion and some key references, see Gujarati 1995, chapter 10.
266
CONCLUSIONS
crisis, of which the most salient characteristic was the fall in private investment (see 
chapter 4). The public investment, however, was not distributed equally to the Greek 
prefectures according to the several measures of regional inequalities used in chapter 3.
The effect of public infrastructure in private production, which has been estimated 
in chapter 4 with the use of Cobb-Douglas production functions showed that there is a 
significant positive impact. This can be attributed solely to its productive component. 
This result was confirmed by the cost function analysis at the regional level. At the 
sectoral level, however, the social category seems to have a significant role in reducing 
private costs of production. The theoretical model used in chapter 6 showed that there is 
no significant impact of public capital in the non-manufacturing sectors and further 
corroborate the positive impact on manufacturing industry (even though there seems to be 
no significant relation to the total number of manufacturing firms).
These results concerning infrastructure investment pose some serious questions 
about public policies for the development of the national economy and its regional 
components.
(a) Has public infrastructure provision been used as tool of economic growth and 
regional planning?
(b) Were the various government administrations aware of the different impact of 
the infrastructure categories?
(c) Was the infrastructure investment policy complementary to the industrial 
policy?
(d) What would be the ‘ideal’ mix of public infrastructure investment at national 
and regional level, and would be the achievement of these ‘targets’ result in 
conflicts (regarding the use of limited financial resources and potential 
contradictory effects)?
One significant obstacle in answering these questions is that all of them have a 
degree of normative12 statement in them -  most planning questions do. This makes 
answers difficult if the policy objectives are not clearly specified. However, as Hausman 
has argued, positive and normative issues are intermingled in economics (1992, p. 114).
12 For definition on the term see, for instance, Lipsey (1989).
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Thus, some policy recommendations and observations perhaps may not be considered 
here to be out of line.
The Greek administrations could argue that there has always been a coherent 
public investment policy. This is true, at least to a certain degree, for some of the 
infrastructure categories13. Thus, despite the influence of the political cycle there seems to 
have been a constant flow of public investment during the period under examination. 
This, however, can also be one of the major problems with public capital policy, and this 
applies not only to Greece. As there is a general perception that the implementation of 
public works is something ‘positive’ for the economy (it can be seen as a materialised 
proof for the ‘work’ of a government), then infrastructure policy may well be sometimes 
driven by ‘inertia’. The fact that some of the infrastructure categories have constantly 
spends over time is often just due to the fact that in the previous year the spend was also 
high. The same phenomenon can be observed for the spatial distribution of these 
categories.
A policy maker should be informed about both the short and long run potential 
impacts of each specific type of public capital investment as well as the complexity of 
these potential results. (The next section proposes that one of the first aims of future 
research should be the further dissagregation of infrastructure categories.) For instance, 
as it has been shown in the empirical analysis in this thesis that productive infrastructure 
capital has a significant impact at the regional level. However, its social counterpart does 
not, either in terms of the production process or the cost structure of the manufacturing 
sector. Based on these results the policy maker may well conclude, depending on 
objectives, that under an optimum policy resources should be directed from the social 
category to productive infrastructure.
Nevertheless, as the cost function analysis has shown, at all spatial levels 
regarding the industrial sectors, social infrastructure does seem to have an effect in 
reducing private costs. Thus, what is needed is a balance between regional (the need to 
promote the whole industry in a specific prefecture) and sectoral (the need to promote a 
specific sector in the whole country) objectives.
13 This has been demonstrated in chapter 3.
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Another question regarding the policy targets relates to some of the cost analysis 
findings. A point of stability of the cost results, regardless the type of panel used or the 
spatial level, is that all categories of public capital appear to reduce the demand for labour 
input. In cost terms this is an advantageous effect. It could be more positive if it is 
assumed that a more advanced type of industry would be more capital intensive. 
However, it could be argued that if the long run effect of public capital investment in an 
area leads to a less labour intensive industrial structure, this subsequently would result in 
a reduction of the local employment. It is obvious that the decision for the increase or not 
of the labour reducing infrastructure investment hinges on the long term targets of the 
regional or national policy maker.
The right mix of infrastructure categories and the overall spending on public 
capital depends on the balance between local, regional, and national targets for the 
economy. At the same time it has to be taken into serious consideration the fact that 
Greece is not a remote island, but has neighbouring countries, as well as partners in the 
European Union. Some of the infrastructure categories, for instance transport, health, 
tourism, education, to mention but a few, could (or should) be seen as a part of a larger 
sum or network. It must be kept in mind that a part of the Greek infrastructure stock in 
recent years has been constructed with the financial aid of the European Union.
Relative to the development of policy about financing infrastructure is the US 
debate/dispute as to whether investment should be for the creation of additional 
infrastructure stock or for construction of modem systems of fees/tolls of charging 
infrastructure users. The latter could subsequently fund the replacement of the worn 
public capital. This issue is related to the reduction of the planning role of the state, and to 
fiscal austerity programmes that many countries, including Greece, have followed. A 
comprehensive infrastructure policy in Greece should aim to combine both of these two 
objectives. Certainly there are areas in which the existing infrastructure stock is overused 
(for instance, the dominant role of private car for mass transportation in Athens has lead 
to increased need for improved roads etc., as well as negative external economies). Thus, 
it may well be a sensible aspect of infrastructure policy to introduce fees in order to 
reduce these negative externalities. In other less developed areas, however, it is clearly 
necessary to increase the already existing stock of public capital.
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7.4 Infrastructure and economic development in Greece -  
the lim itations and analytical lessons to be learned
It is hoped that this study may have contributed some new insight into the 
investigation of the public capital’s impact on economic growth at national, regional, and 
urban levels. However, there are many significant limitations and shortcomings, which 
have to be acknowledged. These limitations can be classified under four general headings. 
The first refers to the general methodological framework in which the empirical analysis 
was conducted. The second concerns the use of differentiated levels of analysis within the 
methodological framework itself regarding the type of data used. A third problem stems 
from the ‘nature’ and inherent problems of the data employed. The last limitation of the 
thesis is that due to the character of the project several potentially valuable research paths 
have not (yet) been explored
As it was argued in chapter 1, the empirical research of this thesis has been based 
on theoretical paradigms and quantitative techniques of mainstream neo-classical 
economics and economic geography. The resurgence of public capital research in the late 
eighties and in the nineties has been based on these accepted tools of empirical research 
and this has helped to put public economic activity, and especially infrastructure 
investment, back onto the political and theoretical agenda, most certainly in the US14. 
However, by using a completely different theoretical approach, it would be possible to 
dismiss much of this body of work, including research projects such as this thesis, on the 
grounds of empiricism and ‘chaotic conceptions’15. Due to space limitations, is not 
possible to present the methodological debate for economics and economic geography. 
The interested reader can find a good summary of relevant arguments in Hausman (1992), 
and Johnston (1986), for each discipline respectively.
Harvey’s view on public fixed capital16 incorporates the role of infrastructure into 
the ‘big picture’ of the process of capital accumulation. It also links public infrastructure 
with a theory of class struggle. Such a theorisation emanates from a totally different set of 
initial assumptions about how society and economy operate, how commodity value is
14 See, for instance, Clinton (1993) and Clinton and Gore (1992).
15 For an analysis of an alternative methodological framework, as well as the term ‘chaotic conceptions’ see 
Sayer (1992).
16 For a summary of Harvey’s arguments see chapter 1.
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created, or how fixed investment is incorporated in space. The recent resurgence in 
infrastructure research is based on altogether different premises, and possibly lacks such a 
clear perspective of the mechanism by which fixed public investment affects growth. It is, 
however, and despite its shortcomings, a useful tool in order to assess and appraise the 
specific impact of public capital in a country, region, or city.
This study, nevertheless, has some limitations even within the quantitative 
analytical framework. There are several levels of analysis, in regard to the nature of data 
used, by which the impact of infrastructure can be evaluated with statistical/econometric 
methods. One option is the use of secondary data, which can refer to the urban, regional, 
or national spatial levels (or even allow international comparisons). This approach was 
used here.
There is, of course, another option that involves the use of data acquired through 
questionnaires designed specifically for infrastructure assessment. An example of this 
kind of research is the analysis of Diamond and Spence (1989) designed to assess the 
impact of infrastructure on British industry. Such data can be tailored to the specific 
needs of analysis and, thus, provide insight into some of the effects of public capital that 
would not normally be revealed by secondary data. Unfortunately, this type of analysis 
has not been pursued here in the main due to constraints on resources. Another potential 
type of research, closely linked to the aforementioned questionnaire approach, is to 
examine the effects of public capital on a specific industry or industrial sector. The 
previous constraints prohibited again this type of research. These ‘micro’-approaches, 
though, have important potential for future research (see next section).
The third major category of limitations of this study stems from the secondary 
nature of the employed data. The regional dataset is restricted to the total of 
manufacturing industry, as there is no published sectoral breakdown at regional levels in 
Greece (by the NSSG). On the other hand, there are two available sectoral datasets, one 
for Greece as a whole, and one for the metropolitan area of Athens. On the basis of these 
two, a third regional sectoral set was derived that for the Rest of Greece. However, in 
other countries sectoral datasets at regional level do exist. This is true not only for the 
United States, where data are available at fine regional scales, but also for smaller 
countries like Spain (see Moreno 1998). The existence of similar datasets for Greece,
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even at NUTS II level, would have provided great opportunities to examine the regional 
effects of infrastructure on the manufacturing industry in more depth.
In addition, the lack of regional estimations for the private sector capital stocks, 
for investment, and employment for the non-manufacturing sector has made impossible 
the use of the production and cost function analytical frameworks in the fashion used for 
the secondary sector. There is, though, an analysis for non-manufacturing activity that 
attempts to use quasi-production functions (see chapter 6). However, the results for this 
part of the economy should be read with the caveat of the restrictive assumptions that 
have had to be made.
The data limitations have not only restricted the spatial-sectoral dimensions of this 
study, but also its time dimension. Unfortunately, the data for both public capital, 
manufacturing industry (especially at the prefectural level), and the non-manufacturing 
sector before the late eighties are of poor quality or just non-existent. If panel data 
analysis had not been used, then it would be impossible to use time-series analysis (due to 
the limited number of observations) to examine the regional effects of infrastructure in 
this way. However, a longer time dimension would have given the opportunity to 
examine these effects in greater depth.
Another data limitation regards the regional estimation of infrastructure 
investment. Some of the public capital categories are not allocated (accounted) at 
prefectural level (see chapter 3). This means that public capital stocks at the prefectural 
level in this study underestimate the real infrastructure capacity. This problem did not 
occur in the estimation of the stocks for the sectoral panels, as for Greece as whole and 
for the metropolitan area of Athens all public investment was taken under consideration.
There is a last category of limitations of the thesis that is due mainly to the time 
and length restrictions such a project entails. Most of the following shortcomings (along 
with the limitations already discussed) can be the starting point for future research and 
will be returned to. The present thesis has not been able to cover all of the potentially 
fertile ground. A catalogue of these theoretical and empirical possibilities would include 
experimentation with time-lags of infrastructure effects; a deeper analysis of the 
infrastructure categories; dynamic modelling of infrastructure investment; incorporation 
of public capital into elaborate models of economic growth at national and regional
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levels; fiscal and financial aspects of infrastructure investment; maintenance-repair- 
management of public capital and infrastructure fees; technology aspects of the actual 
infrastructure investment; privatisation and quasi-public ownership of infrastructure 
stocks. All these are potential areas of future research and are more extensively addressed 
in the following section.
7.5 Infrastructure and economic developm ent in Greece -  
the potential for future research
There are many aspects of infrastructure investment effects that have not been 
investigated deeply enough in this study. The most interesting of the extensions of this 
research are briefly discussed in this section and for reasons of convenience have been 
classified into several broad categories. This categorisation has been made here only to 
facilitate the presentation of the arguments and by no means constitutes a proper 
methodological classification. The following proposed areas for research, with the 
possible exception of the first theoretical category, can be explored not only in the Greek 
context, but could also be fruitful new areas of research for other countries as well.
The first major category for potential future research is in the theoretical domain. 
As it was mentioned earlier, the recent literature on infrastructure effects has utilised the 
mainstream paradigms of economics and economic geography. Despite the recent 
development of theoretical models of national or regional economies in which public 
capital has been incorporated as one of the key variables (see chapter 2 for a description 
of some of these models), the ‘mechanics’ of how infrastructure affects the economy are 
still unclear. This is even truer if the spatial dimension is added into such models. Even 
though chapter 6 has tried to shed some light on the empirical results for Greece, at a 
theoretical level much work is still to be done.
Alternative theorisation for the role of public fixed capital, particularly Harvey’s 
work (see chapter 1, and previous section in this chapter) has attempted to accentuate 
space as one of the key factors of social change. However, Harvey has not worked 
specifically on infrastructure investment and the points of his argument are scattered in 
his work. An interesting, yet underrated, alternative theoretical framework for economic 
geography is that provided by Sheppard and Barnes (1990). Even though they have also
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not worked specifically on infrastructure, they have stressed the importance of fixed 
public investment in transport infrastructure in reducing production costs in their 
modelling17.
In this category of potential theoretical advancement lies a potential link of 
infrastructure research with New-Keynesian economics18. This strand of macroeconomics 
has tried to explain the ‘stickiness’ of prices in the economy, in the short-run. Some of the 
main arguments in favour of the non-flexibility of commodities prices include the costs to 
price adjustments (the so-called ‘menu costs’ in macroeconomic jargon), which are linked 
to the problem of externalities to price adjustments (called ‘aggregate-demand 
externalities’, and which are represented by the benefits occurring for one firm from price 
reductions of other firms), and the ‘staggering’ way in which the overall level of wages 
and prices adjust. Given that many studies from various countries (including this 
research) have shown that infrastructure investment has a significant impact on the 
private sector costs, it would be interesting to examine the potential role of public capital 
on price reductions. As infrastructure capacity is difficult to change significantly in the 
short run, it is possible that bottlenecks in infrastructure provision could result in higher 
production costs. If these costs constitute a significant part of the overall costs of the firm, 
infrastructure underprovision can be an additional source of price rigidity, and negative 
‘aggregate-demand externalities’.
A second category for future investigation can be the several aspects of public 
capital research which either have been neglected or have not yet been properly explored, 
at least within the Greek context, and have as a common thread the creation and 
maintenance of the infrastructure stock. An interesting topic, which begs for further 
examination, is the finance of infrastructure investment and its fiscal effects. This topic 
can be directly linked to some of the previous arguments for a better theorisation, and 
especially to the macroeconomic debate (that New-Keynesian economics are part of).
17 For this point see Sheppard and Barnes (1990), especially chapter 13.
18 For an introductory presentation of the New-Keynesian ideas, as well as the main Neo-Classical 
arguments on macroeconomic analysis see Mankiw (1997). For a critique of both these dominant schools of 
thought see Palley (1996).
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As infrastructure investment is a large part of public expenditure, it is obvious that the 
way this investment is financed can have a significant impact on the aggregate demand of 
the economy and private saving, as well as on other significant macroeconomic variables. 
Dalamagas (1995) has provided a discussion, at least to some extent, of the fiscal 
dimension of public investment in Greece. However, there are many unanswered 
questions in this field. A relevant query for regional analysis is the fiscal dimension for 
infrastructure projects conducted by local governments. Even though in the Greek case 
the Public Investment Programme finances the great bulk of infrastructure investment at 
this level, it would be interesting to examine in the future the financing of at least a 
sample of local government infrastructure projects.
One relevant area for infrastructure finance is the maintenance and repair of the 
existing stock of infrastructure. As it has been argued in chapter 2, Holtz-Eakin (1992; 
1993a; 1993c) has proposed that it would be better if the money spent on construction 
projects for new infrastructure in the US were used for the development of systems which 
would charge infrastructure users. This, as it was discussed earlier in this chapter, may be 
a rather extreme policy measure especially for countries in a lower stage of economic 
development, like Greece. However, the field of infrastructure maintenance could well 
prove to be one of the most significant for future research, since fiscal problems (and 
austerity packages) still plague many countries, again like Greece.
It is these problems that have led many governments to the privatisation of a 
significant part of their infrastructure capacity, especially in the telecommunications, 
energy, and transport areas. Greece has not been an exception to this trend and that was 
one of the reasons for which the public capital of the publicly owned (and privatised in 
the immediate future) telecommunications and energy companies in Greece has been 
excluded from this study (for some of the other reasons see chapter 3). In any case, the 
privatisation of public capital stock and public utilities is a field of research of its own, 
and it would be enticing to study the reasons for and the ways in which these private 
companies have been privatised in Greece. The interested reader can find some additional 
bibliography on these topics in Appendix V.
Another category for future research is the exploration of new research methods 
for the already existing data. For instance, there are few examples in the bibliography to
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date on infrastructure research investigating the short run effects of public capital 
investment (see for example Moreno 1998, or Morrison and Schwartz 1992). It is possible 
that there will be some differences in the short and long run effects of public capital, and 
that these may be of great importance, especially for policymaking. Policymakers may 
also be interested in simulation results from alternative temporal or spatial allocation of 
public capital investment. Some interesting examples towards this direction of research 
can be found in Ohkawara and Yamano for the Japanese regions (1997), or the Economic 
and Social Cohesion Laboratory report from LSE about the impact of projects financed 
by the EU Cohesion Fund (1997).
In this last study, an extensive use of Vector Auto-regression (VAR) models can 
also be found. Despite the fact that VAR techniques have sometimes been criticised (see 
chapter 2 for some references on this point), this approach can prove to be a useful tool of 
analysis, especially for the dynamic modelling of infrastructure effects. The combination 
of VAR techniques with panel data analysis would be an additional improvement (see 
Holtz-Eakin, Newey, and Rosen 1988).
Another type of econometric analysis from which public capital regional research 
can benefit is the investigation of the presence of spatial autocorrelation. A recent 
example on the topic in the infrastructure research context comes from the US (Kelejian 
and Robinson 1997). The analysis, and especially the empirical work based on the 
prefectural-regional data, presented in the thesis can be extended, time permitting, to 
incorporate an investigation for spatial autocorrelation.
The investigation of the space parameter, however, can be even more explicit. A 
whole category of future research can be comprised by potential spatial comparisons of 
infrastructure studies at different geographical levels. The Greek infrastructure capacity 
can be examined as a part of the overall capacity of the geographical area in which 
Greece belongs to (i.e. the Balkans), and/or as a part of a wider study of the infrastructure 
impact in the European Union (or even Europe in general). The examination of the impact 
of investment in some types of public capital (transportation networks, for instance) in the 
Balkans could well prove to be of great importance for the future economic development 
of this area.
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In conjunction with the macro-spatial research, analysis at micro-geographical 
level can also be fruitful for future research in the Greek context. The economic, social, 
and environmental effects of specific infrastructure projects could be monitored on a 
regular basis, possibly best at the level of local government. An additional area of future 
research is the use of attitudinal questionnaires and the replication of work similar to that 
conducted by Diamond and Spence for British industry (1989). It is more than likely that 
the Greek Ministry of Public Works, or Industry, would benefit by such an analysis in the 
planning of their investment policy.
However, the most important future research for both national and regional 
analyses of infrastructure effects is a further breakdown of infrastructure investment to its 
categories. The disaggregation used in this study was dictated by the space and time 
constraints of a research project like this. Nevertheless, even the production and social 
categories used in this research are composites of more elementary sub-categories (see 
chapter 3). It is possible that some of the categories bundled together under the headings 
productive or social public capital might yield different effects. For instance, productive 
infrastructure contains the Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheiy, Industry, Energy and 
Handicrafts, Irrigation, Research and Technology, Special Works, Transportation, 
Water/Sewage Works, and Prefectural Works/Programmes. There is no guarantee that 
public investment in the Forestry and Fishery category would have the same, if any, 
impact on the manufacturing sector, as the investment in the Industry, Energy and 
Handicrafts, or Transportation categories.
The same breakdown to sub-categories is also necessary for the social 
infrastructure category with one additional point for future research. It may be possible 
that, as indicated in chapter 2, the services from these categories are not merely the result 
of investment in fixed capital (for instance, school buildings or hospitals), but of their 
combination with the human resources (for instance, the services of teachers or doctors). 
Thus, it may well be necessary to add the respective public spending in these categories to 
public investment on fixed capital. The best-case scenario would be to have the public 
spending for these social categories at a prefectural level. In this way, it would be 
possible to replicate the whole analysis conducted in this study for each category using 
panel data analysis based on the prefectural data.
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Notwithstanding the caveats and future research possibilities discussed in the last 
two parts of the conclusion to this thesis it is hoped that the findings and work that it 
contains has added some insight into better understanding this important dimension of the 
economy of Greece.
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Ap p e n d ix  I
Appendix I:
The Use o f Panel Data: Advantages and Limitations
In the eighties, as Hsiao argued in his seminal book Analysis o f Panel Data 
(1986), a new source of data enriched empirical research in economics and related 
subjects -  panel data analysis. Essentially, this involves the pooling of cross-section 
observations over several time periods. These observations can refer to firms, households, 
regions, or even countries. If, for instance, a researcher wanted to analyse the production 
process of a specific country, and the available data covered a period of ten years, say 
1981 to 1991, the problem of the restricted number of observations (just ten) would have 
to be confronted. The data for the estimated equation for a Cobb-Douglas production 
function with two inputs, private capital (K), and labour (L), and output ( 0 ,  would be as 
follows:
Qsi = A + Kgi + Lgi + e8i 
Q82 “  A + K.82 + L<82 + e82
Q 91 -  A + K 91 + L<8i + esi
However, if there were data available for the same time period for the regions of 
this country (say 3 regions: region 1, region 2, and region 3), then it would be possible to 
pool the data for the regions over the period 1981-1991. In this way the dataset would 
have three times more observations in comparison with purely national data. The panel 
data for the estimated equation then would be:
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Qregionl,81 A + Kregionl,81 + Lregionl,81 Cregionl,81 
Qregionl,82 — A + J^ regionl,82 Lregionl,82 + Cregionl,82
Qregionl,91 — A + Kregiool,91 +  Lregionl,91 ®regionl,91
Qregion2,81 ~ A + K regi0n2,81 L regjon2,81 Cregion2,81
Qregion2,82 A + Kregion2,82 Lregion2,82 ^region2,82
Qregion2,91 A + K region2,91 L region2,91 Cregion2,91
Qregion3,81 A + K region3,81 Lregion3,81 Cj-egionS.Sl
Qregion3,82 — A + Kregion3,82 L region3,82 ^region3,82
Qregion3,91 A  +  Kregion3,91 Lregion3,91 Cregion3,91
The panel data regressions can be written compactly as:
y i t = a  + x !tP + uit
where, subscript /' denotes the cross-section dimension (e.g. firm, region, country), t the 
time-series dimension, y it is the dependent variable, X  the itth observation on M  
explanatory variables, a  is a scalar, and f$ is of M x 1 dimension. Finally, ult is the 
disturbance term. As Baltagi observed, “most of the panel data applications utilize a one­
way error component model for the disturbances, with
uit = H i+ v it
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where m denotes the unobservable individual specific effect and vit denotes the remainder 
disturbance” (1995, p. 9).
Panel data analysis has some considerable advantages in comparison with pure 
time-series and cross-section studies. These can be summarised as follows (this list is 
based mainly on Baltagi 1995 and Hsiao 1986, but also on Klevmarken 1989 and Solon 
1989):
1. Controlling for individual heterogeneity. “Panel data suggest that individuals, firms, 
states or countries are heterogeneous. Time series and cross-section studies not 
controlling for this heterogeneity run the risk of obtaining biased results” (Baltagi, p.
3).
2. Panel data help in reducing estimation bias. This is true for omitted variable bias, bias 
induced by the dynamic structure o f the model, and/or simultaneity bias (Hsiao, pp. 
215-218).
3. Panel data increase the degrees o f freedom and the variability of the data, and, thus, 
lessening the problem o f multicollinearity. (see Baltagi p. 4).
4. Panel data reduce also the potential biases from the aggregation of data (in time-series 
analysis), (see Baltagi pp. 5-6).
5. Panel data can describe better than cross-sectional studies the dynamic nature of 
social relationships, and allow the construction o f more complicated behavioural 
models than purely time-series or cross-section data, (see Baltagi pp. 4-5).
One of the main disadvantages of panel data analysis is the fact that it is not always easy 
to construct such a dataset (with the use of a questionnaire), or that disaggregated data (at 
firm or regional, for instance, level) are not always available. Also too short a time-series 
dimension of the panel dataset can still pose some estimation problems. Even so, even 
though the estimation of panel data is more difficult in terms of practical computation, 
panel data analysis has provided a most powerful tool for quantitative research in the last 
two decades.
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Appendix II:
Correspondence of Public Investment Programme 1976-80 
to 1981-92 categories
In the following table, the 1976-1980 categories of Public Investment Programme (in the 
fourth column) correspond to the respective 1981-1992 categories (in the third column). Column 
2 presents the categories used in this research (column 1 offers their classification according to 
productive, social, or operational expenditure types of public investment).
Infr. Type Categories used in this research 1981-1992 1976-1980
Misc+Adm Administrative Expenditures Administrative Expenditures Administrative Expenditures
Productive Agriculture Agriculture Agriculture
Productive Borderline Programme* Borderline Programmes 
Special Programme for Evros
Social Education Education School Buildings 
Higher Education 
Rest Education
Productive Forest/Fishery Forest/Fishery Forest
Fishery
Social Health/Welfare Health/Welfare Health
Welfare
Social Housing Housing Housing
Productive Industry/Energy/Handicraft Industry/Energy/Handicraft Industry/Energy/Handi craft
Productive Irrigation Irrigation Irrig. Progr. Ministry of Agriculture 
Irrig. Progr. Ministry of Public Works
Misc+Adm Miscellaneous* Miscellaneous Miscellaneous 
Mines etc.
Productive Prefectural works *+ Prefectural works 
OTA(Local Government) Prog. 
Pref. Pr. financed by the MIP* 
Prefectural Programmes
Prefectural works 
Prefectural Programmes
Social Public Administration Public Administration Public Administration
Productive Research and Technology* Research and Technology Committee of Atomic Energy 
Research Institutions 
Technical Co-operation
Productive Special Works*+ Special Works
Special works Athens/Thessaloniki
Special Works
Special works Athens/Thessaloniki
Social T ourism/Museums/Monuments Tourism/Museums/Monuments Tourism
Museums
Productive Transportation* Railways Railways 
Aviation (Civil) 
Roads-Bridges 
Ports
Urban Transportation 
Athens Works
Productive Water/Sewage* Water/Sewage Water
Sewage
l^ T55Sr3R3egooSlwEIcirSclu3^ev53rt97S-I95II^ SegOT!^ ™™™m m ^TSS^^Segcri:^Iucn^ncIu3^vwar[9Bn55^aS^)ries
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Appendix III:
Zellner’s Seem ingly Unrelated Regression (SUB) Estimator
The seemingly unrelated regression method (SUR) can be described if it is 
assumed that the objective is to estimate the coefficients of a system of equations as 
follows (composed, for instance, of 3 equations, written compactly in matrix algebra):
yi = Xibi+ei 
y2= X2b2+e2
y3 ~ X3b3+e3
The disturbance (e) variances are supposed to be constant over time, but different for each 
equation. These variances would be, erf ,o 2,cr3, or, following Judge et al.’s (1988, p. 446) 
notation cj11,CT22,a 33 . Two disturbances in different equations (for instance, in equations
1 and 2), but at the same time period, will be correlated, if contemporaneous correlation 
exists. Thus, the covariance for equations 1 and 2 would be:
cov ar(elte2t) = E[elte2t ] = ct12 , for a given time period t.
Two disturbances in different equations, and for different time periods (for instance, 
equation 1 in time period t, and equation 2 in time period t+1) are uncorrelated:
cov ar(el>te2ft+1) = te21+1 ] = 0, for time periods t and t+1.
The covariance matrix of the joint disturbances would be:
Q -  E[ee] =
anI a12I a13I
^ 12  ^ ^ 22  ^ ^ 23^
a 13I a 23I 33
(*12 O 13
or = (Jl2 CT22 ®23
_°13 ^23 CT33_
0 L
This can be written even more compactly as, 2 ® IT, where Z  represents the first matrix, 
symbol 0  denotes the Kronecker product, I  an identity matrix, and the subscript T the 
time dimension (for an analysis of this notation see Judge et al. 1988).
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Consistent estimates of the variances and covariances of matrix X can be 
computed by the formula:
(A11-1)i i t=i
where Sj = y{ -  Xjb* (AII-2)
(see Judge et al. 1988, pp. 451-452, for a discussion on the divisor T).
A
If X is the matrix with the estimated variances and covariances, then Zellner’s 
SUR estimator would be:
A
P =  [X X X '1 ® I)X]'] X X X '1 <2> I)y (A n -3 )
Another method to estimate p is to use successive iterations (starting with 
equations AII-1 and AII-3). Thus, new estimates for the variances and covariances can be 
computed. These estimates will be:
(AIM)
A
A A A A A
where, P' = (PI, Pjv ••,$*) • Then, with a- a new estimator for P(that is P) can be
estimated and so on, until convergence. As Judge et al. (1988) argue “when the random 
errors follow a multivariate normal distribution this estimator will be the maximum 
likelihood estimator” (p. 452).
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Appendix IV:
Two digit Sectors and three digit sectors in Greek 
manufacturing
The following breakdown is based on the sectoral nomenclature in English as 
provided by the National Statistical Service of Greece.
2-digit Sectors 3-digit Sub-sectors
20 Food and Kindred Products 201 Meat Products
202 Dairy Products
203 Canned, Frozen, & Pres. Fruits, Vegetables, & Food Spec.
204 Fats and Oils
205 Grain Mill Products
206 Bakery Products
207 Sugar
208 Chocolate and Confectionery Products
209 Miscellaneous Food Preparations and Kindred Products
21 Beverages 211 Alcoholic Drinks and Alcohol
212 Wines
213 Beer
214 Non-alcoholic Drinks, Mineral Water
22 Tobacco Manufactures 221 Tobacco
222 Cigarettes and Cigars
23 Textile Mill Products 231 Manmade and Natural Wool Fibre and Fabrics
232 Manmade and Natural Cotton Fibre and Fabrics
233 Manmade & Natural Silk Fibre and Fabrics, & Nylon Fibre
234 Manmade Fibre and Fabrics, except Nylon
235 Jute, Linen and Canvas and Related Products
236 Knitting Mills
237 Colouring, Printing and Finishing Plants
238 Threads and Yams
239 Miscellaneous Textiles
24 Apparel and Other Textile Products 241 Shoe Making
242 Shoe Repair
243 Apparel
244 Clothing and Other Textile Goods
25 Lumber, Wood and Cork Products 251 Sawmills and Planing Mills
252 Construction Wood Works
253 Wood Containers and Small Wood Goods 
259 Cork and Cork Products
26 Furniture and Fixtures 261 Wood Household Furniture
262 Metal Household Furniture
27 Paper and Allied Products 271 Pulp and Paper Mills
272 Paper Products
28 Printing and Publishing 281 Printing & Edit, of Newspapers, Journals, Books & Pamphlets
282 Miscellaneous Printing Works
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2-digit Sectors 3-digit Sub-sectors
29 Leather, Leather Products and Furs 291 Leather Plants
292 Fur and Fur Products, Except Apparel
293 Manmade & Natural Leather Prod, Except Apparel & Shoes
30 Rubber and Miscellaneous Plastics Products 301 Rubber Plants
302 Miscellaneous Plastics Products
31 Chemicals and Allied Products 311 Acids, Salts and Fertilisers
312 Plastics Materials and Resins, Manmade Fibres
313 Other Primary Chemical Plants
314 Paints, Printing Inks and Allied Products
315 Pharmaceuticals
316 Cosmetics, Perfumes and Toilet Preparations
317 Soaps and Detergents
319 Miscellaneous Chemicals Products
32 Petroleum and Coal Products 321 Petroleum Refining
322 Coal Products and Lignite 
329 Petroleum By-products
33 Non-metallic Minerals and Allied Products 331 Minerals and Earths for Structures
332 Glass and Glass Products
333 Clay, Porcelain and Related Products
334 Cements
335 Lime, Gypsum and Related Products
336 Cement Products
337 Marble and Marble Products
338 Asbestos Products
339 Miscellaneous Non-Metallic Minerals Products
34 Primary Metal Industries 341 Iron
342 Other Metals
35 Fabricated Metal Products, except for Mach. Equip. 351 Iron Tubes
352 Chains, Wire Springs, Nails and Related Products
353 Metal Structures
354 Metal Tools
355 Household Metal Appliances
356 Cast Iron Products
357 Copper and Lead Products
358 Aluminium Products
359 Miscell. Metal Products, except Machineiy & Transport Equip.
36 Machinery Except Electrical 361 Internal Combustion Engines
362 Air Conditioning Machines
363 Agricultural Machinery
364 Machinery for Roads, Quarries and Structures
365 Machinery for the Food, Beverages & Tobacco Industries
366 Machinery for the Textile, Wood and Metal Industries
367 Pumps, Blowers and Industrial Spraying Machinery
368 Office Equipment and Balances
369 Machinery and Repair non specifically Named
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2-digit Sectors 3-digit Sub-sectors
37 Electric and Electronic Equipment 371 Electrical Machinery
372 Transformers and Dry Electrical Elements
373 Electrical Coil Windings and Electrical Wiring
374 Lamps and Lighting Fixtures
375 Other Electrical Materials
376 Telecommunications, Materials and Hearing Devices
377 Electrical Scientific Instruments
378 Other Electrical Apparatuses
379 Repair of Electrical Equipment
38 Transportation Equipment 381 Boats and Repair
382 Rail Materials
383 Cars
384 Car Repair
385 Motorcycles and Bikes
386 Repair of Motorcycles and Bikes
387 Repair of Aeroplanes
389 Other Transportation Equipment
39 Miscellaneous Manufacturing Establishments 391 Medical Instruments, Measuring & Control Instruments
392 Photographic and Optical Products
393 Repair of Photographic and Optical Products
394 Watches and Cosmetics
395 Repair of Watches
396 Musical Instruments
397 Toys and Athletics Products
398 Manmade Teeth
399 Miscellaneous Plants
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